

The Virtues of Embodiment

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Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas depicted human embodiment in terms of a concord or harmony of goods. A representative, amusing example may be found in *The City of God*. Augustine offers a wonderfully rich picture of human embodiment as a pacific harmony of elements.

If anyone were to hang upside-down, the position of the body and arrangement of the limbs is undoubtedly perverted, because what should be on top, according to the dictates of nature, is underneath, and what nature intends to be underneath is on top. This perverted attitude disturbs the peace of the flesh, and causes distress for that reason. For all that, the breath is at peace with its body and is busily engaged for its preservation; that is why there is something to endure the pain. And even if the breath is finally driven from the body by its distresses, still, as long as the framework of the limbs holds together, what remains retains a kind of peace among the bodily parts; hence there is still something to hang there. (Book XIX, Chapter 12)

In contemporary philosophy of mind there is little mention of the peace of the body or any effort to depict the mind-body relationship in terms of a concord of goods. I propose an essay in that direction, in part to see just how far such a picture of the mind-body relationship is feasible as well as to explore its virtues.

Today there is an unusual accord among noneliminative materialists and dualists on the nature of embodiment. Both camps depict the embodiment of human persons in terms of three elements. What is it that makes my body *my* body instead of someone else's or no one's at all? From a dualist perspective, the answer is not the simple reply: Because you *are* your body. And so dualists have sought to delimit a person's body in terms of three kinds of relations. My body is the one I sense directly; I feel, see, taste, hear, and smell the world in and with this body. My body is also the one I act on or in or with directly; I do not have this unmediated power in or over objects like this paper or the chair I am sitting on. And my body sustains my psychological life in a direct, constitutional fashion; it is the functioning of *this body* and its organs by virtue of which I have mental life. As dualists typically believe the mind-

body relation is contingent, they have crafted a way of demarcating not just which body is mine now but a way of characterizing when I might come to have a different body or cease to have any body at all.¹ On this later point, materialists typically see matters quite differently. After Saul Kripke's work on reference, many materialists now eschew contingent identity relations and construe persons as essentially identical with or constituted by their physical bodies or as a part of their bodies such as the brain. By their lights, any apparent contingency of the person-body relation needs to be dispelled rather than employed as the chief cornerstone in the philosophy of mind. Even so, noneliminative materialists appeal to the same elements as dualists in their depiction of being a human person: sensations, agency, and causal underpinnings. In a materialist framework, I am a physical object, but not just any object, I am this particular one that is now sensing, acting, and causally constructed in such and such a fashion. As Sydney Shoemaker has noted, 'There seems no reason why essentially the same account of embodiment should not be available both to materialists who take mental states to be realized in brains and to dualists who take mental states to be realized in immaterial souls, where brains and souls are thought of as capable of animating different bodies at different times' (Shoemaker 1998, p.30). Even neoAristotelian 'animalists' who do not think kindly of body-switching by means of brain transfer or soul switching, draw on the same factors as dualists and materialists like Shoemaker in their portrait of being a human person. If some of the animalists are right, then you may still exist as an animal after you have ceased to be a person due to the fact that you have lost all powers of sensation, thought, and agency.²

In this essay I develop two proposals. I contend that our characterization of embodiment should be expanded to include three

¹ Perhaps the most imaginative, ambitious display of dualist musings on the contingency of the mind-body relation, and an account of embodiment, is Jonathan Harrison's collection, *Essays on Metaphysics and the Theory of Knowledge*, Volume 1. Other dualist portrayals of embodiment may be found in work by C. J. Ducasse, John Foster, W. D. Hart, H. D. Lewis, H. H. Price, and Richard Swinburne.

² Some 'animalists' argue that our self-awareness requires our awareness of ourselves as physical objects. Even granting this, along with the central arguments of Quassim Cassam's *Self and World*, one does not dispense with the necessity of appealing to sensations, agency, and causal constitution, in a depiction of being an embodied human person. For an amusing thought experiment of how a materialist might face quandaries about embodiment, see Dennett's story of the American spy in *Brainstorms*. Compare Dennett with Price's *Thinking and Experience*, p. 213.

additional factors: epistemic, structural, and affective. And I further propose that these features, together with sensations, agency, and the causal constitution of the body that sustains mental life, are all virtues. The account that I sketch below will therefore depict the embodiment of a human person in terms of the exercise of six virtues: Sensory virtues, the Virtue of Agency, Constitutional Virtues, Epistemic Virtues, Structural Virtues, and Affective Virtue. The first step is to clarify the terms of this proposal. This will involve more than a few remarks.

I employ the OED definition of a virtue as ‘excellence in respect of nature or of operation; worth or efficacy of any kind’. In this context ‘virtue’ has a wider scope than it does in ethics. Arguably, this broad use of the term is the oldest, for in preSocratic Greek, virtue or ‘*arete*’ is a flexible term which can stand for any particular excellence’ (Parry 1965, p. 261; see also vonWright 1963, p. 137). Recent work in virtue epistemology has invited this extended depiction of virtue and excellence. Ernest Sosa commends ‘a broader sense of “virtue,” still Greek, in which anything with a function—natural or artificial—does have virtues’ (Sosa 1991, p. 271). In light of this, Sosa depicts the function of the eye in seeing as a virtue. Along similar lines, John Greco proposes that sight, hearing, introspection, memory, deductive and inductive reasoning, all count as virtues (Greco 1992, p. 520). I shall follow their lead and the important contribution to virtue epistemology by Linda Zagzebski in building up what may be termed an aretic philosophy of mind (Zagzebski 1996).

For present purposes, I employ the well-known Lockean depiction of persons. A person is a self that ‘is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason, and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places’ (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II. xxvii.9). The import of the proposed virtue-based view of embodiment does not depend on the success of Locke’s view of persons as an analysis. If you think there can be persons who lack all these properties, then the account that follows may be amended to cover materially embodied, human persons at the stage of development identified by Locke. From a Lockean perspective—and one that I believe is broadly supported by common sense—being a person involves certain activities or functions, or at least having the capacity for these activities or functions.

The phrase ‘materially embodied human person’ is awkward, and will be deemed a curious redundancy by some materialists. But I use it because some philosophers think human persons may exist after ceasing to be materially embodied. And some philosophers

think that a human person might be reduced to (or that a human person is identical with) just a brain or a simple part of a brain. My aim is to depict human beings as embodied persons and to forego cases of disembodiment or Kafka-like metamorphoses.

Employing the term 'embodiment' may give the impression that the account that follows is inescapably dualist. I shall refer to a person's mental states in causal interaction with his bodily states, and even a person's relation to his body, but many materialists grant the permissibility of these and related conceptual distinctions while insisting that they do not signal any metaphysical distinction between the mental or the person and the physical world. Part of the point of nonreductive materialism is to allow for such conceptual distinctions without adopting dualism. My aim is to articulate an account of being a materially embodied human person that is neutral with respect to materialism and dualism. The account is at odds with a radical eliminative form of materialism, however, just as it conflicts with a radical form of eliminative idealism.

I need to stress that the object of my foray into an aretic account of embodiment is the composite picture of the embodiment of human persons. So, I am not trying to analyze when it is that a body is embodied by a person, e.g. a Person is embodied by Body B=df (1) B is the locus of P's sensory activities; (2) P has agentic authority over B, etceteras. Rather I am seeking to unpack what it means for there to be an embodied human person. This project then, groups together matters of personhood (with all its intentions and components, phenomenological and otherwise) and bodily life so that I am not addressing personhood first and then bodily life, but I am addressing the nature of the cluster of psychological and physical components that constitute being an embodied human person. Being an embodied human person involves there being a bodily life in which the following virtues are exercised. Recall that I am assuming a characterization of personhood, given above, so that my goal is not to produce a new analysis of persons, but to produce a new way of conceiving of the makings of being an embodied human person. So, my concern is not with personhood alone or embodiment alone but, if you will, embodied personhood.

The account of embodiment in terms of the exercise of virtues does not require that all the virtues be exercised at once or at a maximal degree (if there is one) in order for a human person to be materially embodied. On this point, the proposed employment of virtues in philosophy of mind may take a clue from virtue ethics; a person may be courageous without having to perform courageous acts on a continuous, uninterrupted basis. But unlike virtue ethics, it needs to

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be underscored that the proposed virtue theory of embodiment does not in any way imply that the failure to exercise the virtues outlined below should count as a vice. Ethical vices can lead to a break down of some the virtues (as when deliberate, severe intoxication can impair one's sensations, motor skills, and physical constitution), but abridgments or profound losses of the virtues described below should be described not as vices but as impairments or damage or harm to the material embodiment of a human person.³

One last preparatory note: Before outlining an aretic or virtue-based account of embodiment, one may well want to know why we should even try to set out in that direction at all. Current philosophy of embodiment is very much akin to positivism in law. Just as positivists in jurisprudence separate the concept of law from concepts of good and evil—it is one thing to ask what is a law and another to ask whether it is good—most philosophers of mind separate the concept of human embodiment from concepts of good and evil. As it happens, I think that the positivist view of law fails to do justice to the widely held honor that is accorded to law, and I believe, too, that the analogous positivist account of embodiment fails to do justice to the widely held, intuitively satisfying judgment that human embodiment is good (George, ed. 1992). Leaving to one side philosophical jurisprudence and turning to philosophy of mind, I submit that the loss of the powers of agency, sensation, causal constitution and the other powers to be identified below, is naturally described as injury or damage. This implies that there is some good to being an embodied human person. Porphyry reported that Plotinus never celebrated his birthday because he regretted the joining together of his soul with his material body. I take this to be a minority opinion. Suffice to say that what I seek to articulate is an account of embodiment that recalls work by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and others, who construed embodiment in terms of harmonious goods (notwithstanding Plato's ambivalence about embodiment in light of the alternative, disembodied life). I assume that proponents of value-free accounts of embodiment have an interest at least in taking stock of an alternative

³ Perhaps due to the conceptual link often presumed between 'virtue' and 'vice' Zagzebski is not willing to adopt Sosa's broader depiction of virtue that will be emphasized in this essay (Zagzebski 1996, pp. 8–10; 84–89). I believe that Zagzebski's stance here is too restrictive. We do not use the term 'virtue' to stand for good or fitting power as commonly as we used to (as in 'the virtue of morphine is that it makes people sleepy') but we still employ 'virtue' as a nonmoral good in many contexts (e.g. 'the theory [car, plane, lamp, wilderness area] has many virtues'). I employ Zagzebski's virtue epistemology later in the paper.

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schema, if only to underscore claims that modern philosophy of mind has made considerable progress over the ancients and medievals. More on the justification of an aretic account later.

The first three categories of what I am depicting as virtues involve the factors already cited that are typically identified in accounts of human nature by dualists and materialists. I shall be brief in my overview of these domains.

Sensory Virtues. Being a materially embodied human person involves the array of sensations highlighted in the philosophy of mind literature. A materially embodied human person feels with his skin, sees with his eyes, hears with his ears, smells with his nose, and tastes with his mouth. Moreover, such persons have proprioceptive awareness of their internal, bodily states. Obviously a person may be embodied and lack many of these valuable sensory powers or capacities. It would be nonsense to describe a person who is blind and deaf as in anyway disembodied. But cases arise in which it is natural to claim that someone's embodiment has been impaired due to damage to one's sensory powers. In *The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat*, Oliver Sacks describes Christina as a disembodied woman because, while she has all five senses, she lacks proprioception. Her inability to have this interior, sensory feeling of her body makes her feel detached from her body. I would not want to say that she is thereby disembodied but I think it is quite natural to claim that there is a respect in which her embodiment has been impaired; she has lost a vital, sensory contact with her body or, as a materialist might put matters, she has lost a central sensory awareness of herself as a body. Complete, irrevocable sensory deprivation would disable a central element of embodiment.

The Virtue of Agency. There are many theories of agency and thus many ways in which this virtue may be described. Because I do not want to harness the virtue-based description of embodiment to a specific theory of agency, I shall depict this virtue quite generally. Being a materially embodied human person involves a person's being able to affect his body directly. In intending or willing or trying to do some activity, a person thereby intends, wills or in some other way directly affects or involves his body. I have direct, intentional control over my body whereas I have only indirect, intentional control over the computer I am using. There are hundreds of theories of agency that may be employed to further elucidate the virtue at hand. Loss of a person's agentic power would not be a matter of a person failing to be able to have a role in the shape and history of his embodiment but would, I suggest, involve a person's very embodiment being impaired. Under unhappy conditions, a

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person's inability to act as an embodied agent may leave him feeling entombed in something foreign or alien. I suggest this may be seen not just as an effect on the phenomenology of embodiment but a failure to be embodied as a human person.

Constitutional Virtues. Under this heading, we may group those powers of the body that sustain psychological life, the powers that enable one to be a Lockean person as an embodied, human being. It is in virtue of your bodily life, the functioning of your brain, that you can think, reason, reflect, and have emotions, sensations, desires, exercise memory, imagination. Your mental life depends on your breathing with your lungs, your heart's pumping blood, and so on. It is this overall biological composition that delimits our genera and species identity as *Homo Sapiens*. This dimension of embodiment is of course widely discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind, with materialists accusing dualists of their inability to account for this fundamental dependency and dualists accusing materialists of collapsing an evident disparity in kind between the mental and the physical. I have nothing novel to contribute to this area except to propose that this constitutional function be thought of as the exercise of powers that are rightly deemed nonmoral goods or what I am calling virtues.

Epistemic Virtues. I propose that being a materially embodied human person involves being truly aware of one's body. Moreover, I submit that this awareness needs to be justified, warranted or, at a minimum, to be epistemically in the clear (to use Chisholm's expression for beliefs that are permissible). Obviously awareness of one's body need not be exact nor constant nor range over every aspect of one's body. But just as ignorance or skepticism can prevent me from certain actions (if I know nothing about chess I cannot intentionally check-mate someone), ignorance and skepticism can prevent one from laying claim to embodiment. If G. E. Moore was convinced by skeptics that he might not have his two hands, then he could not justifiably claim to know when or if he was waving to someone. Many skeptical arguments in the history of philosophy can be read as arguments that what we customarily assume to be our proper human embodiment may not be anything of the sort. The Cartesian demon hypothesis threatens our embodiment by making us question if we only appear to have bodies whereas in reality we have none. And the scenarios in which we are brains in vats confront us with the possibility that our embodiment is so disfigured that our claims to know our bodies and the world around us are all undermined. The skeptic's arguments, if successful, loosen one's claim to justifiably believe that one is truly embodied and thus compromise

one's ability to function in the world with Lockean powers of reason, reflection, and the like.⁴

The rationale for including epistemic virtues may be brought to the fore through some thought experiments. Consider a case in which your ankle is injured and you believe you have this injury on the basis of what appears to be the pain in your ankle. The pain you feel is indeed a result of the injury but, unknown to you, it is also the outcome of a wild, deviant causal process of the kind that radical skeptics propose. Cartesian demons and mad scientists have interrupted your nervous system just above your ankle at a point they designate as X. The physiological information about the pain is then electronically beamed to a remote computer which then beams back the information so that your nervous system at X then shoots the information through your body to your brain and you feel the injury. Imagine that the beams and dog-legged communication of physiological information and resultant stimulation of your nervous system is so good that you have a pain that is qualitatively indistinguishable from the pain you would have if your body had not been reconfigured. I suggest that under these circumstances your claim to know about your ankle would be defeated. A more extreme case can be envisaged in which all the physiological information is severed and re-routed just below the brain stem. Under these circumstances, one's embodiment would be impaired not simply in lieu of the causal deviance and thus the breakdown of sensory virtues, but in light of your failure to be able to know of your body. Imagine a slightly different case: You have all the sensory feelings you have now and you take these to represent your bodily

⁴ Even Gettier's famous counter-examples to the standard analysis of knowledge may be read as difficulties that involve embodiment, albeit in an extended sense, e.g. having beliefs about Brown's location in Barcelona and properly identifying the person who has some coins in his pocket. Although Swinburne's book *Providence and the Problem of Evil* is some distance from the material discussed in this paper, his interpretation of embodiment explicitly builds in an epistemic component. 'An agent has a body if there is a chunk of matter through which alone he or she can make a difference to the world, and through which alone he or she can learn about the world' (Swinburne 1998, p. 98). While I believe that dualists like Swinburne can adopt a far more integrated understanding of the person-body relationship that is suggested in this passage, I think Swinburne's introduction of an epistemic component in embodiment is right on the mark. As an aside, I note that a Pascalian wager argument against skepticism I articulated in "Imaginary Evil; A Skeptic's Wager" raises moral reasons why one should trust the appearance of our material embodiment under conditions of uncertainty.

states in an accurate fashion. When you seem to feel pain in your leg, you take this as a reliable indication of an injury. However, due to bizarre, sustained indoctrination and hypnosis, you believe that you have been cursed by a fairy and that, as a result, all your sensory awareness of your body is routed from your brain stem to a remote computer and back again by Cartesian demons and mad scientists. You believe that this routing system is regrettable but perfectly reliable. In fact there is no such routing, and the fairies, demons and mad scientists have not tampered with you at all. Under such upsetting conditions, I propose that your claim to be aware of your body has been undermined by your delusional beliefs about how your awareness of your body is achieved. In both cases, loss of warrant signals an impairment of one's embodiment.

I have described the epistemic breakdown of embodiment with the more dramatic tools of radical skepticism. But I do not want to suggest that the bare possibility of these savage interruptions thereby undermines one's justified claim to know one's body and thus be embodied. Many philosophers have proposed strategies for defusing the threat of Cartesian demon hypotheses (e.g. Peter Klein, Ernest Sosa, Keith DeRose). Maybe these philosophers are right. My point here is only that if there actually were the science fiction interruptions of our bodily awareness or the delusional beliefs described above, then in those cases our claims to know our bodies has been defeated.

The virtue account of embodiment is tailor-made for virtue epistemology, but it does not require it. If you are not a virtue epistemologist but a reliabilist, you may claim that the relevant epistemic virtue or good at issue is that a person has a reliable belief-forming process giving him access to his bodily states. If you are an internalist in epistemology, you may claim that the virtues involve a person's having subjectively accessible evidence and rules of evidence about their body (whether along coherentist or foundational lines or in some combination). A virtue epistemologist would take a position somewhere between externalism and internalism, and construe the person's access to their body in terms of reliable, proper or fitting relations between beliefs and states of the person's body.⁵ Zagzebski

⁵ My own preference is to situate the virtue epistemology that is defended by Linda Zagzebski in *The Virtues of the Mind* into the overall conception of the virtues of the mind-body relationship outlined in this essay. Zagzebski re-deploys a thought experiment I advanced (Taliaferro 1985) to motivate the case for virtue epistemology. I entirely agree with her analysis (pp. 27–29). While I embrace virtue epistemology, I also note that Alvin Plantinga's concept of warrant may readily be incorporated into the

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defines 'knowledge as cognitive contact with reality arising from "acts of intellectual virtue"' (Zagzebski 1996, p. xv). A virtue epistemology may readily depict the epistemic component of embodiment as a person achieving cognitive contact with his body. When things go astray, as with the cases sketched above, then, using Zagzebski's locution, a person may be described as losing contact with his body.

This inclusion of epistemic virtues in embodiment will have a bearing on one's theory of mental content. If you adopt an externalist theory of meaning in the company of Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, you will construe a person's articulation and grasp of his bodily life in terms of the person's accurately employing terms in his specific environment. So, if you do not have a proper grasp of 'arthritis' or 'water', then your claims to suffer from arthritis and to have a body made up largely of water may be undermined. This is not to say that you are somehow disembodied when you are mistaken about the meaning of terms you employ to describe your body! But I do suggest that some externalist accounts of mental content and meaning will give one reason to construe the epistemic virtue of embodiment with specific attention to the social and environmental conditions in which a person finds himself. What you mean by claiming that your body is largely made up of water will differ between here and Twin Earth, should Putnam be correct, and an aretic account of the mind-body relation may rank the resultant virtues accordingly.

Structural Virtues. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and others have drawn attention to the unified, structured character of human life. I suggest that without the power to be able to act in a unified, structured way over time, to reflect coherently about one's present circumstances, or to recall the past in an integrated fashion, one's embodiment is impaired. Peter Strawson's well known analogy between believing contradictions and a person walking in opposite directions may provide a good case (Strawson 1952, p. 2). What if there were a man, let's call him Proofrock, who set out both to walk and not to walk at the same time? Perhaps this cannot be done at once, with full conscious awareness. If so, imagine that Proofrock shifts back and forth with the intention to walk and not to walk at the briefest intervals. Presumably any sustained agency under these conditions would be impossible. Similar instability in Proofrock's

virtue-based view of embodiment articulated here. Many of the issues he tackles in *Warrant: The Current Debate* and *Warrant and Proper Function* may be read as distinguishing functional and dysfunctional forms of embodiment.

memory, desire, reason, and reflection would block the way for him to embody, let alone express, his mental life. Imagine Proofrock suffers from a Burdian's Ass tension: he is paralysed and thus suspended between constantly changing, equally compelling but incompatible memories, desires, emotions, actions, reasons, reflections, *et al*, with no overriding principle or mechanism by which to free him from suspension. He even lacks the structural ability to resolve to remain unresolved. I believe that materially embodied, human personal life involves the virtue of being able to exercise mental powers in a sustained fashion and to reflect, think, feel, and act in ways that are consistent and interrelated. Obviously some aspects of our lives may be isolated and seem quite inscrutable, but I submit that human persons can only endure so much interior *Sturm und Drang*.⁶

Affective Virtue. A person may believe that his body is indeed his (or believe that he is his body) and yet have such affective dissonance, distaste, and disapproval, that he may be said to affectively distance himself from his bodily states. One can see cases of this in contexts when a person adopts the values of a culture according to which the person's race, gender, physical configuration, age, and family, are widely perceived as grotesque and abominable. If a person internalizes these judgments, there can be an immense rupture in the person's very embodiment. A person may feel such profound alienation from his body that he regards it as a fitting object of only the most abject abuse and outrage. In such a case a person's experience of his body may be the experience of a hideous monster that he refuses to identify with and he therefore treats with deep-seated, irreconcilable disdain. The kind of affective dissonance I am trying to describe involves a radical break in one's embodiment. One may be at odds affectively with one's body in a case where embodiment is not itself impaired. Thus, I may hate my body and not be at all confused that it is in fact my body that I am hating. But there may

⁶ See John Campbell's speculative picture of disordered agency in *Past, Space, and Self*, chapter four. Some of the literature on freedom and the principle of alternative possibilities is relevant. Consider Frankfurt's case of a person who is rigged up so that he cannot make certain choices. I submit that such a person's embodiment may be described as impaired due to this barrier. We may also distinguish cases of when someone's embodiment is due to luck. Consider a case where someone's embodiment is so precarious that their sensory experience, agency, trust-worthy understanding of their surroundings, and so on, all work but only due to very good fortune and circumstances beyond the person's control. Certain views of embodiment historically differ in their depiction of the fragility of being an embodied human person.

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be a related affective rejection of one's body in which one does not even affectively identify with it as one's own; one may for example so deface one's affective life so that one does not think that one's body is the one that you appear to have but one that is different. I may be desperately underweight and loath my body so much that I affectively construe to myself that my body is different.

The current literature on self-respect is relevant here. Consider Joseph Raz' comments on self-respect:

Self-respect concerns one's ability to accept without alienation one's core being, one's core pursuits and relationships and those aspects of one's character and circumstances that one identifies with most deeply (Raz 1994, p. 26)

I suggest that being a materially embodied human person involves at least a minimal level of self-respect in which one has affectively incorporated one's body as one's own; in Raz's terms, one has accepted one's body without affective alienation. When a person has no affective identification with his body, then there is a sense in which his embodiment is impaired.

The six virtues identified above may be ranked in different orders of significance and causal relation. The exercise of the powers may also be depicted at different degrees, e.g. a person may excel in the exercise of the first five of these virtues and yet be hampered by the sixth. Because my aim is simply to propose employing a virtue framework in treating human, personal embodiment, I want to develop it with no more controversial commitments than necessary. For example, I will not depict the account in a way that makes it partial to those philosophers who think that one cannot have sensory life without having the power of agency. While leaving many of these concerns open-ended, I believe that we can readily distinguish between cases in which the virtues of embodiment are exercised and cases in which embodiment has been severely compromised. Consider Dennis and Christopher. As a result of falling down a staircase, Dennis loses all his senses and becomes incapable of action. He can only survive by his body being suspended in a vat of chemicals in which he lacks sensory awareness of his body. Dennis is drawn to Phyrnonian skepticism and not at all sure he even has a body, though he also has Gnostic tendencies and is fairly sure that having a body would be profoundly repugnant. Making matters worse, Dennis is largely unbalanced; he has repeated, conflictual shifts in attention, memory, desires, and intentions. Christopher, on the other hand, has all sensory, agentive, constitutional, epistemic, structural, and affective powers outlined above. I propose that

Christopher has a cluster of interrelated virtues that Dennis lacks and, as a result, Christopher has the good of integrated embodiment that Dennis lacks.

Imagine someone describes Dennis' state but denies that this comprises damage, injury or harm. I suspect that such a person may be said to simply fail to grasp the nature of embodiment itself. The fault is not just a matter of failing to understand a theory of values or to undertake some additional reflective activity that would make us value or disvalue embodiment. Rather, I believe our very concept of being an embodied human person confronts us with an ostensible, apparent value that our theories need to accommodate. The aretic account does not have the evident cogency of the analysis of gold in terms of its atomic number, but the readily appreciable way in which Dennis and Christopher are described in value-laden terms does provide some evidence that the account captures an intuitively satisfying, workable notion of embodiment. I suggest that the reason why ordinary language is not filled with more explicit reference to the good of being an embodied human person is that it would be a matter of stating the obvious. Max Black once commented on Moore's work. 'After the intoxication of metaphysics, it is good to look upon the world again as a child might—to be told "After all, this *is* a hand. I have a body, so have you, and there are many other people like both of us who can say the same".' (Black 1963, p. 6.) We don't go on like this and say that it is good to have sensations, agency, sound, bodily constitution, epistemically warranted (or at least Chisholmian 'in the clear') access to our bodies, a structured, coherent mental life, and affective self-acceptance, because few people would deny it.

I have not advanced a detailed theory of values that explains why being an embodied human person is good. The plausible reading of the Christopher and Dennis case underscores the goodness of embodiment; presumably one of the tasks of a theory of values should be to explain or in some way account for this appreciable good. I submit that a theory of values that denied the good that is secured in Christopher and lost by Dennis would face the burden of proof. While the aretic account may not fair very well in Schopenhauer's theory of values, it would find a nice philosophical home in a range of other theories. It would, for example, receive ample support in an Aristotelian or Thomistic context. Some philosophers are prepared to recognize basic goods (Brentano, Moore, Chisholm), and in this vein embodiment may be cast as a good, organic whole. Contemporary Kantians may be able to place their concept of the person in the embodied, aretic framework.

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Witness Christine Korsgaard's remarks: 'Your whole sense that another is for you a *person*, someone with whom you can interact in characteristically human ways, seems to depend on her having a certain complement of the moral virtues—at least enough honesty and integrity so that you are neither a tool in her hands nor she in yours' (Korsgaard 1996, p. 11). One may enlarge this outlook to include a recognition of the goodness that embodied human persons possess in the bare power of agency, and thus interaction, and the possession of constitutional, bodily integrity that enables persons to be agents, *et al.* Consequentialists and divine command theorists could justify the aretic account through appropriate instrumental or theological claims. Even a Humean projectionist and who denies all teleology in nature could adopt a version of the aretic account. The aretic account may still be warranted as a conceptual analysis of the values we project on the world and ourselves in the world. According to some philosophers, quasi-realist values are still values, and the same may well be true for quasi-teleology.

In summary, I propose that being an embodied person consists in the exercise of six types of virtue: Sensory Virtues, the Virtue of Agency, Constitutional Virtues, Epistemic Virtues, Structural Virtues, and Affective Virtue. These are not moral virtues *per se* such as courage, but they may none the less be construed as non-moral goods and thus 'virtues' as I am using the term in this essay.⁷

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⁷ I thank members of the Department of Philosophy at New York University for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, especially Peter Unger and Roy Sorenson, and members of the Faculty of Divinity, Cambridge University, especially Douglas Headley. I also thank J. Greco, Del-Lewis, L. Zagzebski, D. Jackquette, H. Ducharme, S. Goetz, E. McMullin, S. Davis, K. Clark.

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