IRELAND, INDIA AND THE EMPIRE: 1780–1914

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ROY Foster remarks in *Paddy and Mr Punch* that a nodding acquaintance with Irish history, which one of his English commentators claimed to have, is 'the most dangerous type of acquaintance.' My own growing alarm at attempting to reinvent the wheel for the purpose of this conference has been allayed only slightly by reading a remark of John Stuart Mill: 'Those Englishmen who know something about India, are even now those who understand Ireland best.'[1]

I hope at least that the dangerous exercise on which I am about to embark is justified by a useful academic agenda. For in the last ten years, 'connective' and 'comparative' histories have become fashionable and some historians now talk of the need for global social history to replace traditional types of history. A number of developments, ranging from the influence of post-modernist literary criticism to the decline of high marxist historiography have contributed to this change of mood. But the main impulse behind it has been the intellectual crisis of national history in the West and of area studies in the extra-European world. Outside the United States and perhaps Australia, introverted national history has everywhere taken a hammering. British identity, for instance, has been portrayed as a recent and friable construct by self-serving elites in the context of world crisis. Revisionism has unsettled the old Irish national history of 'Faith and Fatherland'. Similar fractures spread across other European national historiographies.

Meanwhile, histories of the extra-European world have been rewritten to show how westernised elites appropriated the language of European nationalism to marginalise and suppress the inter-connected, plural identities of the Asian and African past.[2] Colonial nationalists are now less often depicted as the embodiments of historical rectitude. The nation itself has become a questionable historiographical artefact.

My lecture today endorses this change of mood to some degree. We can learn much from connective and comparative histories, even from the interconnections of histories so distant in space and cultural form as those of Ireland and India. At the same time, I want to suggest that some parts of the older agenda of empire, nation and class are still valid. Ireland and India bear comparison not only because they were 'othered' in similar patterns of imperial discourse or because they were zones of hybridity for shifting identities. Their trajectories can also be compared because the lineaments of new national leaderships did, in fact, begin to consolidate in the context of interrelated developments in the British imperial system. At the ideological level, again, the nationalist spokesmen of Ireland and India slowly became aware of each other as what were thought of as peoples. They were animated by each others' demands for economic justice. The growing calls for national self-determination were cumulative and mutually reinforcing even if they were not teleologically driven by those unfolding national essences which our predecessors are now so often berated for invoking.

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[1] John Stuart Mill, *England and Ireland* (London, 1868), p. 22, cited in S.B. Cook, *Imperial Affinities. Nineteenth century analogies and exchanges between India and Ireland* (Delhi, 1993), p. 53.

[2] Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. A derivative discourse?* (Princeton, 1986); *The Nation and its Fragments* (Delhi, 1994); Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy* (Delhi, 1993); idem, *The Illegitimacy of Nationalism* (Delhi, 1994).

Ironically, recent studies which have unsettled the distinction between East and West have made clearer some of the structural similarities between Ireland and India during the period when they were both submitted to the rigours of British industrialisation, free trade dogma and the intrusion of the modern state. Prasannan Parthasarathi, for instance, has argued that Indian weavers in the late eighteenth century had a higher standard of living than British and, by extension, Irish ones.[3] A similar argument was made by Mirza Abu Taleb Khan, one of the first Indian visitors to Ireland who observed in 1800 'The poverty of peasants or common people in [Ireland] is such that the peasants of India are rich when compared to them.'[4] Abu Taleb believed that Indian peasants benefited from much cheaper food and did not need to spend their resources on heating and clothing. Whether this can be substantiated or not, the distinction between European proto-industrialisation and Indian family artisanship is now more difficult to sustain. India and Ireland can both be seen as old agro-industrial provinces of Eurasia and ones which were quite rapidly, if only partially deindustrialised at the beginning of the nineteenth century.[5] Their decline was exacerbated by the collapse of British and European demand for their products and the rigorous imposition of free trade: from 1801 in the Irish case and from 1834, in the Indian case. The nationalist slogans of *swadeshi* in India or 'home production' in Ireland were not tokens of a reinvented mythical past, but a response to very recent economic malformations.

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[3] Prasannan Parthasarathi, 'Rethinking wages and competitiveness in the eighteenth century: Britain and South India,' *Past and Present*, 158, 1998, 79–109.

[4] Charles Stewart (ed.), *The Travels of Mirza Abu Taleb Khan in Asia, Africa and Europe in the years 1799–1803* (London, 1814; reprint Delhi, 1972), p. 47. As J.R.I. Cole has pointed out this work cannot be regarded as a 'pure' indigenous creation. It represented instead a form of 'occidentalism', a turning on its head of the contemporary 'orientalist' position, Cole, 'Invisible occidentalism', *International Journal of Iranian Studies* 3, 1992, 3–16. For another early Indian visitor to Ireland, see Michael H. Fisher, *The First Indian Author in English. Dean Mahomed (1759–1851) in India, Ireland and England* (Delhi, 1996).

[5] See, e.g., Cormac O'Grada, 'Poverty, population and agriculture, 1801–45' in W.E. Vaughan (ed.), *A New History of Ireland*, v, i, *Ireland under the Union, 1801–70* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 109–38; cf. O. Macdonagh, 'Economy and Society, 1830–45', ibid. pp. 229–34.

The land problem which provided the second vector of nationalist thought in both dependencies, also arose from comparable conditions and elicited similar responses. S.B. Cook has recently made this point in a book on the mutual influence of late nineteenth-century Indian and Irish land legislation. Published in New Delhi, his work deserves to be better known to British and Irish historians. I am happy to be able to acknowledge it as a precursor of what I have to say today in its emphasis on *Imperial Affinities*.[6] Cook concentrates on legislation and on the period after 1860. My aim in the lecture is, first, to consider earlier imperial affinities and convergences between Ireland and India for the years between 1780 and 1860. Secondly, I will try to show how, in both dependencies, varied and inchoate forms of patriotic resistance were transformed into radical nationalisms before the onset of the long metamorphosis of British imperialism which stretched from Gladstone's Occupation of Egypt in 1882 to the First World War.

Agrarian inequality in this earlier period provides us with a fruitful line of comparison. In Bengal during the first half of the eighteenth century tenant farmers retained considerable bargaining power in their dealings with the rural magnates and revenue contractors who lorded it over them. The last Mughal viceroys of Bengal had attempted to contain the power of landed magnates and usurious grain merchants and give greater stability to the cultivating peasant.[7] In Bengal it was Lord Cornwallis's Permanent Settlement of land revenue in 1793 which began to entrench the power of zamindars or landlords against both the state and the peasantry in the interests of stable revenue for an imperial state at war.[8]

Similarly, the great Irish landowners consolidated their power in the course of the mid-eighteenth century. They benefited from access to the thriving British markets, and less surely colonial ones. They had some success in squeezing out middlemen and tenants and in imposing closer financial management on their estates.[9] The Revolutionary and

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[6] S.B. Cook, *Imperial Affinities: nineteenth century analogies and exchanges between India and Ireland* (Delhi, 1993).

[7] 'Riyaz-az Salatin' trans. Charles Stewart, *A History of Bengal* (London, 1813), pp. 407, 370–3; J.R. McLane, *Land and Local Kingship in eighteenth-century Bengal* (Cambridge, 1993).

[8] Ibid.; Ranajit Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal. An essay on the idea of permanent settlement* (Paris, 1963).

[9] O'Grada in Vaughan (ed.) *New History*, pp. 109, 128.

Napoleonic war years were the heyday of the great estates In Ireland. Other classes suffered from high wartime taxation and high food prices, unable, if they were Catholics, to enter the ranks of the landed clique. To these pressures were added in both dependencies during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century a rapid growth of population.[10] From its early decades radical publicists and bureaucratic critics were comparing the 'congested' agricultural districts of Ireland with those of eastern India. By 1827 G.H. Harrington, a Bengal revenue administrator, denounced Cornwallis's permanent settlement because it had produced in India not the intended improving English-style landlords but absentee Irish-style rack-renters.[11]

By then, however, it was too late in the day. North India and Ireland were visited by disastrous famines in the 1830s and '40s. How far the rigid policies of free trade adopted by some British administrators contributed to these disasters remains a matter of debate.[12] But they clearly arose from failures of social entitlement in Amartya Sen's sense of this term, rather than from absolute scarcities of food.[13] Localised deindustrialisation, lack of money and declining consumption by former elites exacerbated agrarian problems in the longer term in Ireland and India. Both dependencies went on into the mid-Victorian era as exporters of young labourers to overseas plantations or building sites and as exporters of young men in uniform to far parts of the empire.[14] Both remained relatively impoverished consumers of British goods, despite attempts after 1850 to start up national industrial enterprises and cooperative credit associations.

To rule these dependencies, in the late eighteenth century the British government had already developed administrative measures which also bore a family resemblance to each other. Resistance to the consequent centralisation of power provides the third point of congruence between Irish and Indian patriotisms, alongside resistance to the straightjacket of free trade and periodic agrarian distress. Here again Lord Cornwallis was a pivotal figure. Judging that the corruption of European officials in India was imperilling the East India Company's finances and security, he sought its root cause in 'native depravity.'[15] Cornwallis therefore followed through a policy which excluded Indians and people of mixed race from major government and military offices. Not until the cost-cutting days of the Whig reformist government of Bentinck in the 1830s were Indians brought back in numbers, but here only as subordinate judges and collectors of revenue.

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[10] Ibid., p. 118; Sugata Bose, *Peasant Labour and Colonial Capital: Rural Bengal since 1770* (Cambridge, 1993).

[11] Cf. *The Zemindary Settlement of Bengal*, I (Calcutta, 1879) ix.; R.D. Collison Black, *Economic Thought and the Irish Question 1817–70* (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 55–58.

[12] Sanjay Sharma, 'Famine, state and society in north India c.1800–1840' unpublished PhD dissertation, SOAS, London University, 1996; C.A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars. North India in the age of British expansion, 1780–1870* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 380–4; Peter Gray, *The Irish Famine* (London, 1995).

[13] Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines. An essay on entitlement and deprivation* (Oxford, 1981).

[14] See, e.g. Hugh Tinker, *A New System of Slavery* (London, 1993); for emigration from Ireland generally see, David Fitzpatrick, 'Emigration 1800–1870' in Vaughan (ed.), *New History*, I, pp. 569–78.

Irish catholics of course, had long been excluded from office, commissions in the British army and even the purchase or mortgage of Protestant land in Ireland. But the effect of the Union was evidently to make government yet more Anglocentric. Cornwallis had a conventional, but very deliberate mind. He had supported the Americans before the war, but their throwing off allegiance to the Crown had endangered property and let loose murderous banditti.[16] Therefore, government should become more viceregal and the executive strengthened. The problem in India, he believed, was the dangerous conjunction of Company servants run wild and corrupt natives.[17] Commerce had to be severed from government and the Company's rights enforced. Finally, the problem in Ireland, he thought, was selfish interests, both Protestant and Catholic, which had defied wider imperial interests invested in the British Parliament.[18] Irish government would also have to be brought closer to the executive and made more British through an Act of Union.[19]

Ireland in the late eighteenth century retained some features in common with the classic Indian princely state. Ultimate power remained with the British, but the trappings of native government and native legitimacy remained in place. Now after 1799, this too was lost. So the Irish legislature was removed to London and its conflicts with the executive were terminated. The Ascendancy landed interest was bought off with jobs and patronage in London, Canada, the Cape Colony and India. In both dependencies this new ethnic and religious division of political labour became, then, the third great cause of nationalist resentment.

Even some of the intellectual practices which sustained British rule, but ultimately nurtured local patriotisms, appear to be rather similar in the two locations. In the eighteenth-century learned life was full of the celebration of ancient Irish and ancient Indian culture. The Irish Royal Academy and the Asiatic Society of Bengal were founded within a few years of each other.[20] Irish, Latin, Greek and Indian languages were found to be among the first and most senior of the Aryan languages. Col Charles Vallancey, Sir William Jones and Francis Wilford traced similarities of religions and social institutions in all three venues.[21] It must be said, though, that Jones, good Celt that he was, was displeased with the possibility that his sobriquet 'Persian Jones' might be replaced with 'Irish Jones.'

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[15] E.g., Cornwallis to Dundas, 14 Aug. 1787 about Benares 'The Raja is a fool, his servants rogues, every native of Hindustan (I really believe) corrupt', C. Ross (ed.), *The Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis* (London, 1859), I, 206.

[16] Cornwallis to Brig.-Genl. Pattison, 10 June 1780, ibid., I, 46; cf. F. and M. Wickwire, *Cornwallis and the War of Independence* (London, 1971).

[17] E.g., Cornwallis to Dundas, 15 Nov. 1786, Ross (ed.), *Correspondence*, I, 227.

[18] E.g., Cornwallis to Portland, 2 Jan. 1799, 21 Jan. 1800, ibid., III, 28–29, 67.

[19] R.B. McDowell, *Ireland in the Age of Imperialism and Revolution 1760–1801* (Oxford, 1979), pp. 678–9, 699–201.

Nonetheless, from here it was a relatively small step to argue that these ancient civilisations had become degenerate as a result of priesthood and savage government. The only difference was that in Ireland the Catholic priesthood had replaced the Brahmins, their equals in superstition, in the first years of the Christian era. In both cases, the invigorating rule of Aryan brothers from across the sea was required to put matters right. Ironically, these atavistic fantasies helped root patriotic identities more than they naturalised British power. Bengal orientalism was the matrix of Young India.[22] Anglo-Irish literati provided the historical and literary grammar of Young Ireland.[23]

Many of these arguments, which put India and Ireland into the same historiographical frame, were common currency in the old literature of empire and nation state or economic dependency. What has happened more recently, though, is that the critique of orientalist knowledge has made a considerations of these comparisons and connections easier by undermining the stark distinction between East and West. It has also re-established the history of Eurasia as in overlapping terrain of communities, powers and lines of commerce. There was a global economy and a global society of knowledge in the eighteenth century which stands as precursor to the much vaunted globalism of the late twentieth century. By contrast, national histories and area studies were a product of the nineteenth and early twentieth century when the rise of the national state and European empire submerged these connections.

These ambiguities of identities and long-range connections appear particularly striking if we examine again the history of Ireland and India during the first long period of crisis in the British empire which stretched from Cornwallis's defeat at Yorktown in 1782 to the victory over Napoleon in 1815. The interlinking of the issues of Ireland, America and India was already only too evident in the dying days of Lord North's administration. The Irish Parliament and the volunteers were demanding Irish national liberties in language similar to that of American patriots.[24] In the 1780s and '90s, Eurasians and British Indians likewise attacked the corruption of the Company in the language of the liberty of freeborn Englishmen, used by Wyvill, Wilkes and other domestic supporters of the Irish and Americans.[25] Indian states, meanwhile, were trying to concert what one Muslim diplomat called an alliance of 'all turban wearers against all hat wearers', or Europeans.[26] Histories of 'Modern Times' were being written by Indo-Muslim historians who denounced the drain of silver from India, the British monopoly of government posts and the destruction of the artisan weaving industry of Bengal.[27] One Indian chronicler and critic of Warren Hastings, governor of Bengal, seems to have been aware of the American War;[28] others appear to have been influenced by the general sense of global crisis. Later, of course, Edmund Burke drew on American and Irish exemplars in his denunciation of the East India Company's government. Even in the 1780s, then, the languages of old patriotism in the British dependencies distantly echoed each other, though few were yet aware of this.

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[20] See O.P. Kejariwal, *Asiatic Society of Bengal* (Delhi, 1988); R.F. Foster, *Paddy and Mr Punch* (London, 1993), pp. 2–5.

[21] Charles Vallancey, *A Vindication of the Ancient History of Ireland* (Dublin, 1786); Francis Wilford, 'On the ancient geography of India', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, xx, 1851; cf. C.A. Bayly, 'Orientalists and Informants in Benares, 1780–1860' ms. in author's possession.

[22] David Kopf, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance* (Princeton, 1969).

[23] Jeanne Sheehy, *The Rediscovery of Ireland's Past. The Celtic Revival 1830–1930* (London, 1980).

The interdependent nature of the crisis of empire was yet more pronounced during the first phase of the French Revolutionary wars. But this still did not mean that old Irish patriots of the 1798 perceived much of a similarity between their case and that of the Indians. The most illuminating example is that of Theobald Wolfe Tone and the rising of 1798. As his autobiography reveals, the 'Hannibal of the English' had India and Empire on his mind quite often. Tone's maternal grandfather had been a Captain in the West India trade.[29] His brother William worked for the East India Company and then for the Maratha rulers of Western India. William Tone's account of the 'Institutions of the Maratha People'[30] is an early example of orientalist anthropology.

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[24] McDowell, *Ireland*, 293–326.

[25] P.J. Marshall, 'The whites of British India: a failed colonial society?' *The International History Review*, 12, 1990, 26–44.

[26] Tafazzul Hussain Khan, cited, 'notes on interviews with Sindhia', David Anderson Papers, Add. Mss. 45419, f. 39, British Library.

[27] Kumkum Chatterjee, 'History as self-representation: the recasting of political tradition in late eighteenth-century eastern India', *Modern Asian Studies*, 32, 4, 1998, 913–48.

[28] 'Muntakhul-t Tawarikh', H.M. Elliot Papers, Add. Mss. 30786, ff. 106–48, British Library.

[29] *The Autobiography of Theobald Wolfe Tone (1763–98)* edited with and introduction by R. Barry O'Brien (London, 1893), I, 2.

[30] Ibid., I, 3; cf. W.H. Tone, *Some institutions of the Maratha people* (London, 1799).

Its intellectual roots lay in the Scottish enlightenment which was a dominant influence in Protestant Dublin in the 1760s and 1770s.

Wolfe Tone's hostility to Ireland's link to England did not, however, extend to England's empire, which was already providing a great resource for Irish commerce and Irish military entrepreneurs. To be sure, Tone denounced the manner in which England's declaration of war against Spain during the American revolutionary conflict was extended by executive action to Ireland. But this did not prevent him urging on William Pitt a plan for seizing Spain's American colony's and establishing a colony of settlement in the Pacific. This he declared would be a 'good system for England.'[31] Perhaps mindful of the long dominance of the Irish Sulivan connection in the Court of Directors and its extensive patronage in India, Tone and his brother presented themselves a little later as volunteers in the East India Company's service. The boats had already sailed and India was closed to them. Wolfe Tone wrote:

> Thus we were stopped and I believe we were the single instance since the world begun of two men, absolutely bent on ruining themselves, who could not find the means ... we could not help laughing at the circumstance that India, the great gulf of all undone beings, should be shut against us alone.[32]

India and the empire continued to haunt Tone and the Irish rebellion.[33] It took vital months in 1796 for Tone and his co-conspirator, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, to persuade Truguet, the French Minister of Marine, to divert ships to the Irish rebellion which Truguet wished to use against the British in India.[34] When Napoleon invaded Egypt, as a prelude to an India expedition, Tone was momentarily diverted from contemplating a union of Catholic, Anglican and Dissenter in Ireland, to the wider, millenial vision of returning the Jews to Palestine.[35] It was, ultimately, Lord Cornwallis, still festering with Indian disease, who confirmed the sentence of hanging on Wolfe Tone.[36]

This quadrilateral of Britain, India, Ireland, and then Egypt, re-established itself once again after the defeat of the Rebellion in County Wexford in 1798. When Cornwallis, now Lord-Lieutenant, called halt to the White Terror, 2,000 of the Wexford patriotic volunteers, outraged that France had abandoned them, enlisted in arms against the French.[37] They became the 'flower' of the British Army under Sir Ralph Abercrombie which in 1801 defeated Napoleon's army in Egypt and fought alongside Indians from the Company's armies. A few survivors of the 1798 Rebellion, such as Wolfe Tone's own son, fought for the French and later the Americans. Many more found themselves carving out a career in the British Empire, with varying degrees of resignation.

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[31] *Autobiography of Tone*, I, 18.

[32] Ibid., I, 20.

[33] For the background see, Marianne Elliott, *Partners in Revolution. The United Irishmen and France* (London, 1982).

[34] *Autobiography of Tone*, II, 122.

[35] Ibid., II, 303.

[36] Ibid., preface, xx.

Such interconnections and ambiguities were equally apparent on the imperial side. For a start, much of the personnel was the same. Gerard Lake's dubious fame for burning the villages of refractory peasantries followed him from Wexford to Jat north India.[38] Cornwallis's famed benevolence to Tipu Sultan[39] proved a valuable tool of English propaganda in Ireland – though it was not extended to Wolfe Tone. Again, the early career of the Dublin Wellesley family in India was set around with rumours of the Irish crisis. While it may be true that Wellington disavowed his Irish origins, Richard and the other brothers, were much more firmly rooted here. There is no conclusive proof, but the sense of urgency with which Richard, Lord Mornington, set about tempting Tipu Sultan and the Marathas into their decisive wars against the Company after 1798, owes something to his fears about the situation in Ireland. As he contemplated the coup de grace against Tipu, Richard's brother, Wellesley Pole, and other correspondents wrote to him in the most gloomy terms about the course of the rebellion and the 'spirit of insurrection and treason'[40] which manifested itself throughout Ireland. The 'French threat' posed by Citizen Tone and Citizen Tipu to Anglo-Ireland and Anglo-India may have been more real to the Governor-General and less of a mere excuse for aggression than is sometimes imagined.

Beyond these indirect connections in a more intransigent official mind, the British Empire during the Anglo-French wars appears to have been confronting species of traditional patriotisms in both Ireland and India, though much more firmly developed in the former. Tone and his contemporaries thought of Irishness as a permeable and segmented sentiment, forged through commitment to ancient liberties and institutions now under threat again. United Irishmen could be

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[37] Ibid., II, 343.

[38] McDowell, *Ireland*, 592, 631–2, 673; Gerard Lake, *DNB*; Penderel Moon, *The British Conquest and Dominion of India* (London, 1989), pp. 345–8.

[39] P.J. Marshall, ' "Cornwallis Triumphant": war in India and the British Public in the late eighteenth century', in Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes and Robert O'Neill (eds.), *War, Strategy and International Politics. Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 57–74.

[40] Wellesley Poole to Wellesley, 1798, The Editor of the Wyndham Papers, *The Wellesley Papers. The Life and Correspondence of Richard Colley Wellesley, Marquess Wellesley, 1760–1842* (London, 1914), I, 71.

Anglicans, Dissenters or Catholics, though the Catholics had a more natural commitment. Tone's own project was to consolidate this sense of Irishness among the Presbyterians of the north, judging Anglicans to be ambivalent and Catholics already won over. This was only a minor development towards a fuller autonomy of the ideals of the Protestant radicals of the 1780s which envisaged an Irish dominion within a wider Britannic world, then comprising north America.

India during the revolutionary crisis exhibited many overlapping forms of cultural unity, but no political unity beyond a vague sense of the legitimacy of the Mughal Empire. However, we can glimpse in the resistance of Tipu Sultan and the Marathas during the Wellesley period the reflections of inchoate forms of traditional patriotism, though regional ones. Recent work has shown how Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan, Britain's fiercest Indian enemies, were more rooted in the sacred landscape of Mysore than earlier historians have credited.[41] The Maratha polities of western India had also long exhibited a sense of shifting unity, created by the emergence of a regional language, Hindu devotionalism and a warrior state.[42] The Marathas' dedication to the concept of *panchayat*, an institution of parochial governance, may have raised distant memories of the assemblies and Parliaments of the old Britannic and Celtic worlds when W.H. Tone described them. Both raised powerful patriotic feelings; both excluded the mass of the population.

In the event, the imperial settlement at the end of the war years had less room for such local particularisms. The Irish parliament disappeared and the apparatus of British rule with its resident magistrates, garrison towns and trigonometrical surveys was imposed.[43] In India the anglicising project of Cornwallis and his successors removed Indians from high office in the British territories and imposed the same apparatus of garrisons and map-makers. Ironically, Wellesley's own period as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland saw the beginnings of a reassessment of these ties. But Wellesley's marriage to a Catholic woman, support for Catholic Emancipation and distaste for Orangemen signalled a false dawn.[44] Agrarian unrest and the clandestine organisations of the patriotic Ribbonmen only worked to entrench the British state more firmly. In the aftermath of the slump of 1815–18, law and order became paramount.

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[41] Kate Brittlebank, *Tipu Sultan's Search for Legitimacy. Islam and Kingship in a Hindu Domain* (Delhi, 1997).

[42] See C.A. Bayly, *The Origins of Nationalism in South Asia. Patriotism and ethical government in the making of modern India* (Delhi, 1998), pp. 19–62, ff.

[43] Matthew H. Edney, *Mapping an Empire. The geographical construction of British India 1765–1843* (Chicago, 1997).

[44] See (C.A. Bayly), 'Richard Colley Wellesley' in *New DNB* (Oxford, forthcoming); B. Jenkins, *Era of Emancipation. British Government of Ireland 1812–30* (1988).

Archbishop Heber, the Cork man who became second Archbishop of Calcutta, made the analogy quite clear when he compared the Sannyasi or armed ascetic raiders of the Bengal borders to the Irish Ribbonmen.[45]

As we have seen, both Ireland and India entered during the early nineteenth century into periods of great hardship and stress as the imperial state and the new industrial economy held them in thrall. Both dependencies saw their pre-modern industry decimated if not destroyed. Distance kept free trade from India until the 1830s or '40s. But by then old patriots in Bengal and western India were already talking of *swadeshi*, the need to protect home industry. In India, the death of indigenous industrial production had been a centre of political debate from the 1830s. In Ireland, however, protectionism was the love that could not be named. Home Rule was the first desire. Openly breaking with laissez faire economics might offend too many in Britain and Ireland to be publicly endorsed by many in the Liberator's generation.[46] Ireland needed Britain's markets.

Nevertheless, the ruptures in the imperial polity in 1815–18, in 1829–34 and during the Indian Mutiny of 1857–9 were distantly, but insistently reflected in both dependencies. Though it is unfashionable to say so these days, in the first half of the nineteenth century both India and Ireland witnessed the development of a new language of national politics and the beginnings of a sense of commonalty between embattled elite and struggling populace. The battle for Parliamentary reform in Britain raised the temperature of politics in Ireland and India. The stagnant monopoly of the East India Company and the Irish penal laws were regarded with equal distaste by the new Catholic Irish and the new Bengali and Bombay middle classes. Daniel O'Connell does not appear to have had India on his mind very often. But the Indian intelligentsia were very interested in Ireland. The great reformer, Raja Rammohun Roy, gave strong moral support to Catholic emancipation.[47] As early as 1822 Indian residents of Calcutta set up a fund to help 'the distressed Irish'.[48] Later the writers of the 'Young Bengal' movement of the 1840s and '50s began to cite writings on Ireland and Germany as proof of the evils of a rigid system of free trade.

By 1857 the beginning of a change of tone in Ireland was also apparent. Assumed racial difference began to be supplanted by a sense of common grievance under the yoke of imperialism. Irish Catholic patriots began to discover a bond with India. In the 1850s, Britain's problems in the subcontinent and the Crimea, along with the vaunted resurgence of French power, gave hope to the radicals in Ireland and America who were soon to become known as 'Fenians.' A little ditty appeared in Ireland to confront the flood of cheap patriotic songs which were released to the British public in 1857.[49] 'The Bowld Sepoys' ran:

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[45] Reginald Heber, *Narrative of a journey through the Upper Provinces of India* (London, 1844), I, p. x; I am grateful to Dr Nigel Leask for this point.

[46] A point emphasised by Prof. R.F. Foster, personal communication; R.D. Collison Black, *Economic Thought and the Irish Question 1817–70* (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 140–6.

[47] D.K. Chattopadhyay, *Dynamics of Social Change in Bengal (1817–1851)* (Calcutta, 1990), p. 91.

[48] *Bengal Hurkaru*, 5, 17 December 1822; I owe this reference to Ms Piali Dasgupta.

> They bent and bore for a hundred long years
> of plunder, of torture of blood and of tears
> But they've kept the account and duly paid back
> The weighty sum in whop, whop, whack, whack.

Most suggestive of all, this song predicts of the sepoys that:

> 'They'll place the old king on his glorious old throne.'

So the first protagonists of a Catholic revolutionary nationalism had distantly glimpsed the flames of what some historians have now come to see as the immolation of the loosely linked patriotisms of the Indian homelands. Of course, the same identification had already been made unequivocably in the imperial camp. R.A. Sterndale's, *The Afghan Knife* refers to an Indian Islamic purist, a so-called-Wahhabi, as 'a fanatic, a rebel, a sort of Mahomedan Fenian, one whom the police should take under special surveillance.'[50] By this time British spokesmen had linked in a chain of sedition the supposed Wahhabi involvement in the 1857 rebellion to the Patna conspiracy of the mid-1860s and the assassination of the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, that great Irish landowner, in 1872.[51]

Nevertheless, in 1857 most Irishmen still seem to have identified with British rule in India because of the threat the Rebellion posed to overseas European communities. This was because the Irish were not only the victims of the imperial state, but also some its greatest beneficiaries, a position which hardly changed through to the 1930s. These benefits flowed both to Protestants and to Catholics, both to North and to South, although unevenly. I will briefly describe Ireland's imperialist history as a background to the full emergence of Irish and Indian nationalism, and their mutual acknowledgement, in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

In the 1830s India broadly remained for the Irish as it had done in the youth of Wolfe Tone, the 'great gulf of undone beings', rather than a submerged nation. Irish emigration to India during the first half of the nineteenth century evidently differed in fundamental aspects from Irish emigration to other parts of the Empire and to America.[52] Firstly, it was generally neither seasonal migration, nor permanent, but of ten to twenty years duration, in the main encompassing the careers of soldiers, administrators and priests. As in the eighteenth century, a substantial number of Irish recruits into the Company's armies were from poor peasant families in the West and South of Ireland.[53] The city of Cork may have had a more direct personal contact with India than any other place in the British Isles, including Dundee, during the nineteenth century.

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[49] 'The Bowld Sepoys' Plate 20c in Vaughan (ed.), *New History*, I; cf. ibid., p. 417.

[50] R.A. Sterndale, *The Afghan Knife* (London, 1879), pp. 16–17. I am grateful to Dr Gautam Chakravarty for this reference.

[51] For Wahhabis see Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 80–84; Peter Robb, 'The impact of British rule on religious community; reflections on the trial of Maulvi Ahmadullah of Patna in 1865', in P. Robb (ed.), *Society and Ideology. Essays in South Asian history* (London, 1994), pp. 142–76.

There were, of course, families of longer term residence in India such as the Conlans of Allahabad, many of them associated with the uncovenanted service, posts and railways. The Conlans appear to have followed one of the familiar paths of upward mobility in eighteenth century Ireland moving from commerce into the professions and from Catholicism to Protestantism. A Conlan became leader of the Allahabad Bar in the 1880s.[54] Only in later generations did Australian and American Conlans rediscover their Catholicism. Indo-Irish families were prominent among Eurasians who were also to throw up Indian labour activists and early nationalists.

As in the case of Canada and Australasia, but not the United States, there were substantial numbers of Ascendancy and landlord families, including a few Catholic gentry among the migrant administrators and soldiers in India. Particularly prominent here were Protestant gentry families of the Belfast region and of Enniskillen, who were equally well represented among their peers in Canada and Australia. High Anglicans among the Duke of Wellington's generation with their connections among the Directors of the Company held the day until the 1840s. Thereafter, men from less powerful families became prominent. With the careers of John and Henry Lawrence and Robert Montgomery the dominance of the rigorous Scots-Irish Protestants of the Punjab school began to be felt.[55] But great landlords still found their way to India in the late nineteenth century. The Earls of Minto followed a family tradition of Indian service. The Earl of Dufferin, with ancestors who fought both at Waterloo and Trafalgar, also reached the Viceroyalty. By the time of the competition wallahs in the later 1850s, a significant number of Catholics were reaching the ranks of the civil service to balance the Protestants who had passed through Trinity College, Dublin. Among these were Charles O'Donnell, an official in Bihar and Sir Antony MacDonnell, future lieutenant Governor of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh and Under-Secretary for Ireland.[56]

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[52] Fitzpatrick in Vaughan (ed.), *New History of Ireland*.

[53] Sir P. Cadell, 'Irish soldiers in India', *Irish Sword*, I, 1949.

[54] Personal communication Dr. K.H. Prior, 1998.

[55] E.g., R. Bosworth Smith, *Life of Lord Lawrence* (London, 1885), I, 1–29; Robert Montgomery Papers, Mss. D1019, I, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library.

It is difficult to say that these administrators and soldiers' Irish origins were critical in their attitudes, but they were certainly of some importance. Both Protestants and Catholics were strongly mindful of their nationality. Dufferin, stepping down as Governor of Canada in 1881 asserted that:

> There is no doubt that the world is best administered by Irishmen. Things never went better with us either at home or abroad than when Lord Palmerston ruled Great Britain, Lord Mayo governed India and Lord Munck directed the destiny of Canada.[57]

He went on to say that the Highland Scots were almost as eminent, but it was best to allow a few Englishmen to govern the Empire so they could see how much better the Irish and Scots were at it. More seriously, Irish administrators, doctors and priests brought a particular vision to bear on the Indian empire. Several members of the Bengal Medical Service came from the West of Ireland and were acutely aware of the processes of linguistic and cultural assimilation which accompanied British rule. This sometimes, but not necessarily predisposed them to Indian languages. One medical officer stated baldly that the Indians should learn English just as his Gaelic ancestors had done.

Secondly, the Irish in overseas service often recorded revealing views on religious antagonisms. Here again the reaction varied. Dufferin believed in religious separatism under a benign imperial rule. His dispensation between Druze, Maronite Christian and Muslim in Mount Lebanon in the 1860s followed his primordial understanding of the Protestant-Catholic divide in Ireland.[58] It also prefigured his concern that the status of the Indian Muslims should not be disadvantaged by the rise of a predominantly Hindu politics.[59] On the other hand, Sir Antony MacDonnell, a Catholic officer of the Bengal Civil Service understood North India in a different Irish light. He believed that North Indian Muslims were a rapacious group of landlords who had long monopolised government office. The Hindus, by contrast, resembled the Catholic peasantry in Ireland and needed both land reform and a recognition of their cultural difference.[60] As Lieutenant-Governor in 1900, MacDonnell allowed the Hindi language in the Devanagari script to stand equal in British courts with Urdu written in the Persian script, a momentous event in the separation between the two religious communities in north India.[61]

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[56] Cook, *Imperial Affinities*, *passim*.

[57] C.E.D. Black, *The Marquess of Dufferin and Ava* (London, 1903), p. 159.

[58] Ibid., pp. 58–9.

[59] Briton Martin, *New India 1885* (Princeton, 1969), pp. 328–35.

Related to this, Irish administrators and government servants were very much aware of the peasant problem, arguably much more so than their English counterparts. As Clive Dewey and S.B. Cook have shown the Bihar group of Indian Civil Servants, including MacDonnell and O'Donnell were particularly forceful in their demands for tenancy legislation.[62] This was at a time when official policy favoured men of broad acres in the wake of the Rebellion, which had disappointed hopes in the peasantry. It was partly through their advocacy that aspects of Irish land legislation were applied in modified form to India, while there is some evidence of the passage of ideas in the opposite direction too.

Equally, an Irish background, especially though not always an Ascendancy one could push officials in the opposite direction. Dufferin argued strongly against Grey's policy of compulsory purchase and redistribution of Irish land in the aftermath of the Fenian troubles of the 1860s.[63] He said he had no brief for the privileges of the Church of Ireland, but he insisted on the fundamental right of property in land. In his report on the Government of Egypt he made much play with the indebtedness of the peasantry, but went no further than urging the creation of Agricultural Banks, insisting on the right of the landowner.[64]

In India as Viceroy, Dufferin helped emasculate the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1886. Social remedies for the improvement of the Indian peasant were justifiable. But any intervention in the liberty of property would, he believed undermine the foundations of government.[65] Dufferin further worried that the propaganda of Young India might inflame outrages amongst the Indian peasantry. This was the main reason why he turned his face firmly against the newly-formed Indian National Congress in 1885, having once believed that it might play a useful role for government.[66]

This volte face was significant. Scholars of Indian nationalism have perhaps underestimated the extent to which the early years of the Indian National Congress after its foundation in 1885 were affected by the contemporary problems of the British empire. This saw the electoral defeat of Disraeli, Gladstone's Occupation of Egypt, the failure of the Irish Home Rule Bill and the suppression of the Irish Land League. Here I move to my final theme the moral and political connections between emergent Irish, Indian and Egyptian nationalisms.

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[60] Minute by A.P. MacDonnell, October 1901, MacDonnell Papers, Mss. Eng. Hist. 350–370, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

[61] Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims. The politics of the United Provinces' Muslims 1860–1923* (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 42–43.

[62] S.B. Cook, *Imperial Affinities*, pp. 88–94, 103–5.

[63] Black, *Dufferin*, p. 71.

[64] Black, *Dufferin*, pp. 71, 197; Dufferin, 'Correspondence Regarding the Reorganisation of Egypt, *Parliamentary Papers, 1883*, LXXXIV, c.3468.

[65] Cook, *Imperial Affinities*, pp. 82–107.

[66] Martin, *New India*, pp. 329–35.

The parallel was certainly very clearly in the mind of Dufferin and Sir Auckland Colvin, Lieutenant Governor of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, a province which had been plagued with sporadic tenant revolts since the early 1860s. Colvin had himself played a recent role in Egypt where he had urged the suppression of the Arabist movement for constitutional government.[67] That movement, as Juan Cole has recently showed, was also associated with a strong undercurrent of artisan and peasant unrest against the influx of cheap European manufacturers.[68]

In 1888 Colvin wrote to Dufferin of the dangers of what he called '*sans cullotte* [sic] Young India'. Later he argued that the Congress leaders were attempting to 'establish a League in India, not unlike that recently suppressed in Ireland'.[69] It was for this reason that the authorities were concerned with three issues which was preoccupying government in Ireland. First, they deplored the 'boycott' – the word was specifically used – of Indians who did not associated themselves with Congress. Secondly, officials denounced rural pamphleteering and the activities among the peasants of what were called 'stump-orators.' O'Connell haunted Dufferin's dreams like great Caesar's ghost.[70] Thirdly, the government of India was alarmed by the credence that young Indian radicals were being given in London. This was a time when leaders of the Irish Land League, such as Michael Davitt, supported by English radicals, such as Charles Bradlaugh were organising big agitations in the capital.[71] The fact that radical politics was emerging in the Empire at precisely the same time as working men's organisations in London were beginning to march in Trafalgar Square was not lost on the authorities.

During the years before the First World War, the links between Indian and Irish nationalists gradually strengthened. The new generation of nationalist politicians was keenly aware that they were actors in a series of problems which affected the whole Empire and not their own territories alone. The rise of the newspaper editor, the laying of the telegraph cable and the congregation of young, educated Irish people, Indians and later Egyptians, in London provided the context. Politics provided the trigger. Disraeli's new imperialism, marked by Lord Lytton's suppression of the Indian vernacular press and harsh action against Fenians in Ireland, had given way to Gladstone's moral rearmament. But then Gladstone had failed to secure Home Rule and Parnell's party had been pushed to the margins. As Wilfrid Scawen Blunt remarked, the Gladstone cabinet which ordered repression in Ireland was also the one which crushed the Egyptian National Movement.[72] 'The two causes, the Irish and the Egyptian' he wrote, 'the Catholic and the Mohammedan, seemed to me to stand on a common footing of enlightened humanity.'[73] Later, of course, he was to become an activist in the Irish land-war and suffer imprisonment for his part. Having visited India and feasted on the hospitality of his friend, Lord Ripon, Blunt denounced the Government for pushing the people towards 'cannibalism'. For him, Egyptian bondholders, Irish rentiers and Indian administrators merged into one terrifying incubus. He might have called them 'gentlemanly capitalists.' True to form, the Viceroy, Lord Ripon's early promises of major constitutional reforms in India were watered down and delayed by virulent opposition among Anglo-Indians to Indian judges having cognisance over English offenders. Liberalism had failed even before it was replaced in 1887 by Toryism and a yet harsher reign in Ireland, Egypt and India.

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[67] Alexander Scholch, 'The "men on the spot" and the English occupation of Egypt in 1882', *Historical Journal*, 19, 3, 1976, 773–85.

[68] J.R.I. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East. Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's Urabi movement* (Princeton, 1993).

[69] Colvin to Dufferin, 25 April 1888, and enclosure, Dufferin Papers, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London.

[70] Martin, *New India*, p. 118.

[71] Anne Taylor, *Annie Besant. A biography* (Oxford, 1982); cf. Conor Cruise O'Brien, *Parnell and His Party, 1880–90* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 22–23.

In this context, tentative links were made in London between Indian and Irish nationalists. In 1885 the leaders of what was to become the Congress tried to lay Indian grievances before the British electorate. The Irish caucus in Parliament agreed to support Dadhabhai Naoroji, the chief ideologue of Indian economic nationalism.[74] Davitt, leader of the Land League and an old Fenian, along with H.H. Hyndman among the early socialists, brought the problems of India and Ireland together in their speeches. Two other figures illustrate these persistent connections. Annie Besant was brought up in England and belonged on the wilder fringes of Victorian political and social life. But she always regarded herself as Irish and saw Indian issues through Irish eyes. Radicalised politically by the execution of Fenian gunmen in 1867, her religious beliefs found refuge in a theistical mysticism, which paradoxically had been awakened by studies of the Church Fathers during an early phase of neo-Catholic pietism.[75] In London in the 1870s and '80s she had been active in Irish politics and associated with Davitt, through her mentor and probable lover, Charles Bradlaugh. Besant had finally found refuge in the Theosophical movement which combined disdain for Christianity with a kind of pan-racial mysticism. Theosophy and Anglo-Celtic radical politics were important elements in the ideology of the early Indian National Congress.

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[72] W.S. Blunt, *The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt* (London, 1907), p. 110.

[73] Blunt, *The Land War in Ireland being a personal narrative of events* (London, 1912), p. 1.

[74] Anne Taylor, *Annie Besant. A Biography* (London, 1992), pp. 25–8.

Over the next twenty years Mrs Besant was to play a major part in both Indian Theosophy and Indian Nationalism. She founded dozens of local organisations for both bodies throughout India, but particularly in the south of the country. In 1916 her campaign culminated in the Foundation of the Indian Home Rule Leagues which were deliberately based on the mass organisations of Irish politics which had developed after the fall of Parnell, and particularly on Sinn Fein. Inwardly, moreover, the neo-Hindu, racial nationalism which animated many of the early Congress leaders found an echo in her own mystical Irish nationalism. At key points in the history of the Congress movement, Besant drew on Irish themes and made parallels in her speeches between the two dependencies.

The parallel in early Irish national thought is intriguing. An emerging cross-community sense of ancient Ireland and the Celtic origins of human virtue quite easily melded with the occult racialism of Theosophy. Madame Blavatsky herself hailed the rise of the ancient 'land of sages' and heroes from English thrall. She predicted the rise of what she called an avatar who would throw of the English yoke in both India and Ireland.[76] While Blavatsky drew a direct parallel with India, the work of W.B. Yeats and the Dublin mystics provides an indirect connection.[77]

Theosophy melded with apocalyptic racism provided a valuable counter-hegemonic ideology to British racial imperialism. Even at the level of less exciting, and excitable speculation, however, the intellectual life of the two dependencies increasingly cross-fertilised each other. ICS officials educated at Trinity College, spread the concern for folklore and legend to north India, while W.B. Yeats wove folklore into the national mythology of Ireland.[78]

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[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid., 253ff.

[77] Foster, *Paddy and Mr Punch*, p. 221; A.P. Sinnett had been editor of the Anglo-Indian newspaper, *The Pioneer* of Allahabad, a friend of A.O. Hume and devotee of Mme Blavatsky. His book *Esoteric Buddhism* had been presented to W.B. Yeats by a Protestant aunt in Sligo.

[78] See, e.g., William Crooke, *Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, rev. R.E. Enthoven, (Oxford, 1926); W.B. Yeats, *The Celtic Twilight: myth, fantasy and folklore* (1893, repr. Bridport, 1990).

In both India and Ireland, early nationalist ideology emerged, therefore, out of a plural discourse. The elements which made it up constituted memories and traditions of the earlier patriotisms of the days of Tone or the Maratha realm. Also present were mystical ideas of race and nation, revived folklorism and reactive mainline religion: the Faith of Our Fathers or *sanatan dharma* (ancient religion). But there was also present the modernised version of rationalist, political and economic critique of British government which stretched back to the days of Tom Paine and Edmund Burke.

A second European interlocutor for these two national movements representing this radical stream was William Wedderburn, another Scots ICS radical. Wedderburn had become an expert on peasant poverty while in the Bombay Civil Service, advocating the establishment of peasant banks on Irish lines. He played a major part in organising the London Branch of the Indian National Congress after 1889. Elected to Parliament he took up the plight of Scottish and Irish crofters and fishermen. Having toured the Irish 'congested districts' in the early 1890s, he drew on his experiences in the Indian Famine League which was established to confront the great famine of 1898–1901, a formative moment in the history of Indian economic nationalism.[79] Wedderburn's ideas were close to these of the two major economic nationalist writers, Dadhabhai Naoroji and Romesh Chandra Dutt.

Yet there were deeper parallels and connections in the ideologies of indigenous nationalists, too. Along with Russian anarchism and Garibaldi, the Fenians and later Irish revolutionaries played a major part in the thought of the so-called extremist Congressmen of the years 1905–1909. The radical seer Aurobindo Ghose constantly affirmed the life enhancing quality of self-sacrifice and righteous assassination along the lines of the Irish.[80] A nation had to be created through the spilling of blood, a theme which picked up both on contemporary romantic nationalism in the west and on Indian ideas of sacrifice and regeneration. Equally, the Indian Boycott of British goods which was associated with the call for *swadeshi*, home industry, seems finally to have found an echo in Ireland. Here, nationalists instituted a boycott of British goods in 1909.[81] The effort was a failure. Significantly, however, they did not only employ the theme of economic nationalism in their propaganda. They also denounced the corruption and luxury which was spread by the consumption of the products of the ruling power. Catholic puritanism here matched the austere self-sacrifice of the pious Hindu urged by Bipan Chandra Pal, the Bengali nationalist and later, of course, by Mahatma Gandhi himself.

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[79] S.K. Ratcliffe, *Sir William Wedderburn and the Indian Reform Movement* (London, 1923), pp. 68–9.

[80] H. and U. Mukherjee, *Sri Aurobindo's Political Thought* (Calcutta, 1958), pp. 71–81, 84; cf. Leonard Gordon, *Bengal. The nationalist movement 1876–1940* (New York, 1974), p. 109.

[81] Cf. F.S. Lyons, *Culture and Anarchy in Ireland, 1890–1939* (Oxford, 1979), pp. 40–3, 80–81 on cultural protectionists movements.

The last stage in what Richard Shannon called the 'crisis of imperialism'[82] stretches from the election of the Liberal Government in 1906 to the emergence of Gandhi's mass movement and the Irish Free State in the early 1920s. The Liberal cabinet of 1906–14 proved the last phase for constitutional nationalism in both dependencies. More important, it saw the vigorous articulation of separatisms within them both, and indeed in Egypt, which we have seen had long provided the forth side of an imperial political quadrilateral. The politics of mass electorates and mass publicity through newspapers provided the context. But the Liberal government's desire to devolve power through Home Rule in Ireland and local self-government in India and Egypt provided the stimulus to separatist politics. Entrenched in the highest echelons of British politics, Sir Edward Carson and the Unionists staged a coup against the Liberals at the very centre of politics. Scarcely less successful were India's Muslims who achieved separate representation in the Morley–Minto Reforms of 1909. Muslim lawyers and gentlemen who by no means represented all of their correligionists were able to orchestrate a successful lobby in London with the help of retired Indian officials and educationists. Egyptian Copts tried the same tactics, but could not deploy enough weight in London.[83]

As separatism took off, with bitter implications for the future of national politics in both Ireland and India, majoritarian nationalism itself launched into a new mass phase under the impetus of world war. These movements removed the British presence from southern Ireland and secured the promise of dominion status for India. In their course, the old élite politicians of race and nation were replaced by younger leaders of populist stance if not mainly of rural origins. In 1917 Annie Besant, along with the older generation of Theosophists and cultural nationalists was swept aside, by the Home Rule League of Bal Gangadhar Tilak and later by Mahatma Gandhi. At the same moment, Besant's élite coevals lost control of the Irish movement to socialists and revolutionary nationalists. For a time, religious divisions were held in check in both cases. But the Irish nationalism which emerged after 1924 was more resolutely Catholic and exclusionary. In India the Congress, in rhetoric as much as in membership, was similarly a more Hindu body in 1926 than it had been in 1914.

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[82] Richard Shannon, *The Crisis of Imperialism 1865–1915* (London, 1976).

[83] See e.g., for Copts *Coptic Congress held at Assiout on March, 6, 7, 8 1911* (Assiout, 1911) FO 371/1111 Public Record Office, London; for Muslims, F. Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims* (Cambridge, 1974); for Ulster, Patricia Jalland, *The Liberals and Ireland. The Ulster Question in British politics to 1914* (London, 1980).

Sketching such distant yet persistent connections and comparisons as those between Ireland and India within the context of British dominion may have some utility as the certainties of the historiography of class and nation break down. This was a world where Abu Taleb, the north Indian munshi could become a Cork lounge lizard and George Thomas, the poor sailor from the far west could become a prophet of the Britannic Great Game in central Asia. Global connections of this sort speak to the history of transit and becoming which post-modernists tell us has eclipsed the history of static identities. Beyond this, however, there are striking parallels and comparisons at many points between Irish and Indian history over the century and I have been considering. Nor was this the simple story of the transfer of ideas from east to west which is the staple of theories of nationalism and also, ironically, of studies of subaltern mentalities. Of course, Indian patriotisms were less developed than the Protestant-led nationalism of eighteenth century Ireland. The demand for local representative government was also more strongly articulated in Ireland by comparison with even Bengal in the 1830s. On the other hand, the idea of national political economy was more advanced in India and, at least in part, it derived from indigenous doctrines. If historians are to get the balance right they may well need to ask once again why some identities become rooted in living traditions and in economic and social processes; why they remain obdurate and self-perpetuating rather than ever-protean and shifting.