
From Paneurope to the Single Currency: Recent Studies on the History of European Integration

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- Mark Gilbert, *Surpassing Realism. The Politics of European Integration since 1945* (Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 276 pp., \$26.95, ISBN 0742519147.
- John Gillingham, *European Integration 1950–2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 588 pp., £47.50, ISBN 0521012627.
- Gilles Grin, *The Battle of the Single European Market. Achievements and Economics 1985–2000* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 375 pp., \$144.50, ISBN 0710309384.
- Wolf D. Gruner, and Wichard Woyke, *Europa-Lexikon. Länder – Politik – Institutionen* (Munich: Beck, 2004), 505 pp., €19.90, ISBN 3406494250.
- STEVEN VAN HECKE and EMMANUEL GERARD, eds., *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, KADOC Studies on Religion, Culture and Society 1 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004), 343 pp., €29.00, ISBN 9058673774.
- Guido Müller, *Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Das Deutsch-Französische Studienkomitee und der Europäische Kulturbund* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2005), 525 pp., €54.80, ISBN 3486577360.
- Anita Ziegerhofer, *Botschafter Europas. Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi und die Paneuropa-Bewegung in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren* (Vienna, Cologne, Weimar: Boehlau, 2004), 587 pp., €69.00, ISBN 3205772122.
- Anita Ziegerhofer, *Europäische Integrationsgeschichte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des österreichischen Weges nach Brüssel* (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2004), 235 pp., €19.00, ISBN 3706519046.

Over the last ten to fifteen years there has been an unprecedented boom in interest in the history of Europe in general, and of European integration in particular. Why is this? The launch in 1985 of the internal market by Jacques Delors as President of the EC Commission, the deliberate political choice embodied in the Single European Act

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of 1987, and the signing of the Maastricht Agreement in 1992 have fed a rich variety of new impulses into the politics of integration, increased its dynamism and induced a quantum leap in the integration process. In 1993 the 'four freedoms' ushered in the realisation of the single market; in 1999 twelve European states introduced the single currency (the euro); 2004 saw the admission of ten new member states and a new EU constitutional treaty was agreed by all twenty-five heads of state or government.

Historians and political scientists interested in integration have had difficulty keeping up with all these developments, are indeed left panting in their wake. Never has the 'history of integration' been more up to date or in the swim – and this at a time when the rejection of the 'EU Constitution' in recent French (May 2005) and Dutch (June 2005) referenda is threatening to plunge the whole EU project into one of the most acute crises it has ever experienced. There are fears that plans to extend membership to Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey may overburden the capacities of the European Union and stretch the integration process to breaking point. While some, such as Helmut Schmidt and Thierry de Montbrial, still insist on the need for European 'self-assertion', others, such as the celebrated social historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler, see the further planned enlargements as a road to self-destruction and the end of the EU.¹ We have seen the history of integration pitch violently from one extreme to the other: first, the fervour of the 1980s and early 1990s, which saw the 'second European *relance*'; then a reversion to 'euro-sclerosis' in the wake of the Amsterdam treaty (1997, came into force in 1999) and Nice (2000, came into force 2003), neither of which did much to promote integration. Now, finally, the risk of non-ratification of the EU Constitution has once again underlined the value of paying close critical attention to the latest research into the history of Europe and its integration.

Any contemporary history of the European movement must begin with Count Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi and the 'Pan-European Union' which he brought to birth in Vienna in the early 1920s. Mentions and citations of this European pioneer are commonplace, but much less common are any thorough studies of his life, intentions or initiatives. In fact, his publications and proposals are a rich source of information for understanding the basic problems and issues around the economic and political formation of Europe in the 'age of ideologies' (K. D. Bracher). As early as 1923 Coudenhove was invoking 'Paneurope' – as a bulwark not just against the 'Bolshevik threat' in the east but also against the looming 'economic threat' from the United States. Now, for the first time, Anita Ziegerhofer-Pretenthaler, who lectures in legal and contemporary history at Graz, has devoted a richly documented and meticulously researched monograph to this many-faceted and multifarious personality which can rank as a trail-blazer for work on Coudenhove and the Paneurope movement between the two world wars. It draws abundantly on sources in the archives of the Pan-European Union, now in Moscow. (When the Nazis annexed Austria in 1938 they took over the Union's archive in Vienna; it was seized by the Red Army in

1 Michael Gehler, *Europa. Ideen – Institutionen – Vereinigung* (Munich: Olzog, 2005), 321, 343.

1945 and taken to Moscow.) Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler is one of the first historians² to exploit, systematically evaluate and include these sources in her convincingly presented and carefully organised study, using them to illuminate the life and times of her protagonist, whom she treats sympathetically, but from a proper critical distance. Coudenhove, thanks perhaps to his cosmopolitan background, proposed a concept of 'Paneurope' which struck many of his contemporaries as Utopian: a currency and customs union stretching from Portugal to Poland, with its own parliament comprising an upper and a lower house. Now, eighty years later, this vision is on the verge of becoming reality. However, Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler's parallel between Coudenhove's idea of a European army and the modern Western European Union (WEU) (p. 512) is dubious, to say the least; since the Amsterdam Treaty the WEU has been at best a paper tiger, if not a dead letter.

The author gives us a detailed description of the programme, organisation and propaganda that underpinned the Pan-European Union, before examining the way in which these ideas grappled with and confronted contemporary politics, economics and propaganda, with detailed attention to the Pan-Europe congresses and Pan-European economic conferences. For Coudenhove, politics ranked before economics. Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler relates his ideas to theories of federal integration, though here Coudenhove sometimes wavered. She also pays attention to the 'cultural and intellectual' dimension of the Pan-European movement, focusing on its discourse with contemporary interwar intellectual currents and ideologies, bringing out the relative importance and the limitations of the Union's ideas. Coudenhove's idea never took root among the population at large; it remained an elite project, as the EU project is today. Pan-Europe also failed to transcend the divisions of party; it always retained a smack of monarchic conservatism, the offspring of the neo-aristocratic 'Count Pan-Europe'. For a time he even sympathised with contemporary critiques of democracy and with racial ideology.

Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler draws us a sensitive portrait of this interesting personality and sweeps away many clichés and prejudices. What turned him into the 'ambassador for Europe'? His multi-cultural, transnational background encouraged him to dismiss the idea of the European nation-state; he thought in continents. To him, the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was neither catastrophic nor tragic but an opportunity to build a new world, and so he became a *Vernunftrepublikaner*, seeing the republic as the least worst political option; nonetheless Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler considers that he suffered from a kind of nostalgia for a pre-1918 Europe. Hence she sees the 'Pan-Europe' project as part of a continuing history of aspirations towards a united Europe, rather than a new departure. Coudenhove was strongly influenced by the Austrian Nobel peace laureate and Freemason Alfred Fried, author of *Panamerika*, whose worth Coudenhove somewhat over-estimated, modelling his

2 See also Katiana Orluc, 'A Last Stronghold against Fascism and National Socialism? The Pan-European Debate over the Creation of a European Party in 1932', *Journal of European Integration History*, 8, 2 (2002), 23–43.

pan-European economic conferences in Vienna on the pan-American conferences held in Montevideo (1933) and Santiago de Chile (1934).

Why did this messenger before the face of Pan-Europe prove a political failure? Pan-Europe was not a new creation but a rediscovery, as Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler correctly observes. Coudenhove's personal vanity, his self-will, inability to compromise and imperious attitude, together with his ignorance of other pro-European associations and their representatives, were not conducive to the success of his cause. He maintained a critical distance from the League of Nations, seeing it as a feeble competitor to his own organisation. Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler describes the Pan-Europe congress as 'a meeting of second-rate political personalities, a preaching to the converted, a League of Nations session in miniature'. The only such congress at which European states were officially represented took place in Vienna in 1926, and the representatives were mostly from smaller countries, particularly the Baltic and Nordic states.

Coudenhove's world-view was riven with dichotomies and contradictions which prevented him from reaching an overall synthesis and encouraged exclusiveness. While Pan-Europe aspired to integration, it also aspired to keep enemies at a distance, particularly Bolshevism and Soviet Russia, for which, in Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler's opinion, Coudenhove nursed an almost pathological hatred which blinded him to the looming menace of Nazism. He also considered that the history and geopolitical position of Britain put it beyond the European pale. His flirtations with fascism and enthusiastic support for Mussolini (Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler calls it 'maniacal imitation') made the Pan-Europeans deeply suspect to the European Left.

While Coudenhove was a skilful exploiter of (at the time) new media and propaganda resources, the Union never had more than between 6,000 and 8,000 members. Disagreements and quarrels among the various national sections were common, and Coudenhove never succeeded in resolving them. Thus a paradoxical situation arose: while the Union stagnated, the movement flourished. What finally killed it was not the shortcomings of its begetter but the unwillingness of nation-states to pursue an actively pro-European policy, and the fundamental lack of a European consciousness among the citizens of Europe, or so Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler believes. Coudenhove wanted to go beyond contemporary notions of Mitteleuropa, but this did not deter politicians such as Aristide Briand, Julius Curtius and Ignaz Seipel from hijacking, and misusing, Pan-Europe to suit their own ends. However much Coudenhove is to be viewed as an advocate of strong-arm politics and European leadership, his interest in and sympathy for smaller states is striking. He rightly saw them as the future bearers and advocates of European unity as it was subsequently embodied in the successful holding of the presidency of the European Council by such states – Luxembourg and Ireland, for example.

For those seeking a companion to and completion of Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler's work, the monograph *Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Das Deutsch-Französische Studienkomitee und der Europäische Kulturbund* by the Cambridge-based German historian Guido Müller is a good choice. It draws on a wealth of printed material, private collections and national archives to illustrate

the history of European societies after 1918, focusing on the Deutsch–Französische Studienkomitee (1925–38) and the European Cultural Union (1922–34), but also paying attention to other Europe-oriented interest groups, unions and associations. The author, previously a collaborator in a new history of international relations, including transnational non-governmental networks and socio-historical structures,³ has built on his earlier work to show clearly from two examples how this new approach is to be exploited. The conclusions already drawn from our discussion of Coudenhove-Kalergi are confirmed by Müller in his comments on ideologues, initiators and prophets of the European ideal such as Pierre Viénot and Karl Anton Rohan, the begetters and upholders of the two organisations mentioned above.

In his introduction the author discusses questions of methodology before embarking on a well-informed survey of previous research. He engages with the key words embodying Franco–German relations in the European context of 1919–32, identifying them as ‘understanding’ and ‘movement’, before turning to the forms and institutions that embodied these cultural and political interchanges. Among them were the League of Nations and trade associations and transnational social organisations. Taking as an example the newspaper *Germania* and its editor, Richard Kuenzer, which served as a platform for Franco–German social relations, Müller looks at Catholic and conservative milieus and the function of print as a catalyst for rapprochement and understanding. The economic and cultural aspect of these cross-border relationships are pursued through the figures of August Müller and Ernst Robert Curtius. Whereas opinion formers in *Germania* inveighed against democratic nationalism and argued for a European customs union, a ‘spiritual Locarno and ‘the West’, Viénot saw himself as an ‘active intellectual’ who, thanks to his German and Moroccan upbringing, rejected the democratisation of the process of European unity and gravitated towards the elitist notions of such individuals as the Luxembourg steel baron Émile Mayrisch. A committee, initially bearing Viénot’s name, was created in 1925/26 to seek access to leading economic figures and foreign ministries with offices in Paris and Berlin, which led it into difficulties with influencing public opinion. The committee was active in the three-way interchange between Luxembourg, the German Reich and France and did something to facilitate exchanges between financial and administrative elites in Paris and Berlin. Debate followed in the press. The problem of the economic impact of industrial alliances, along with Mayrisch’s death in 1928, led the ‘Study Committee’ into a funding crisis which for a time threatened its survival, but was eventually overcome.

Müller deals not only with the repeated crises of confidence in the Committee, but also the zenith of its productive life in 1928–9, when it paid attention to social

3 See Guido Müller, ‘Internationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte und internationale Gesellschaftsbeziehungen aus Sicht der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft’, in Eckart Conze, Ulrich Lappenküper and Guido Müller, eds., *Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen. Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin* (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna: Böhlau 2004), 231–58; see also Matthias Schulz, ‘Netzwerke und Normen in der internationalen Geschichte. Überlegungen zur Einführung’, in *Historische Mitteilungen*, ed. Jürgen Elvert and Michael Salewski for the Ranke-Gesellschaft, vol. 17 (2004) (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005), 1–14.

solidarity, the prioritising of economic activity, plans for military co-operation and affinities with National Socialism (here there is some discussion of Franz von Papen and Arnold Bergsträsser). The author traces the changes in the institutional structure of the Committee, its social recruitment programme and its relationships with – or self-distancing from – other comparable attempts to foster mutual understanding. Müller is fully in control of the complexity of his vast subject and also takes due account of the intellectual roots of the movement's conservative representations – and of its love affair with fascism.

This 'conservative revolution' is also connected with the Cultural Union or Kulturbund, founded in Vienna in 1921/22 to foster a sort of 'neo-aristocratic Europeanism'. Conferences were held in Paris (1924) and Milan (1925), and a German section was set up in 1926, but it was Vienna that was to be the European gateway of the 'conservative revolution'. The Kulturbund reached its zenith in the late 1920s and 1930s, when its feelers extended into central and south-eastern Europe; but its association with fascism, coupled with the Nazi seizure of power, brought about its demise. Müller's analysis of the Kulturbund is as thorough as that of the Studienkomitee, enhancing the coherence of this comparative study.

The aristocrats, purveyors of culture and financial barons in the Kulturbund nourished conservative elitism as an answer to bolshevism and Nazism, communicating through the pages of the *Europäische Revue*. However, the pluralism of these conservative ideas showed an ever-increasing tendency to drift towards anti-democratic 'young conservatism', until the movement turned into a Nazi fellow-traveller.

Müller's work reveals that these associations have long been unjustly neglected by historians. No future history of Europe between the wars will be complete without them, for they developed into the initiators, moulders and representatives of transnational cultural movements at a time when nation-states, apart from a few isolated initiatives, had completely lost interest in such matters. Their ambassadors did far less to foster interchanges among financial, political and cultural elites than did the Studienkomitee and the Kulturbund. Those much-quoted apostles of entente, Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann, had virtually no impact on Franco-German social relations; and no deep or meaningful 'top-down' entente would have been possible without such a basis at the middle and lower levels of society. If such an understanding developed at all it was thanks to the efforts of private individuals and associations, while larger groups such as churches, trade unions, peace movements, political parties, youth organisations and multinationals never rivalled the number, intensity and continuity of those relationships. Müller is well aware that in the larger context, the weakness and eventual failure of all the initiatives he describes must be attributed to the instability of multilateral structures in interwar Europe, and to the collapse of international relations in the 1930s. Back in 1924/25, the 'myth of Locarno' (p. 458) lifted Franco-German cultural exchanges to an encouraging height, but this was not to last. For a brief time the political, economic and cultural aspects clearly existed in harmony, but thereafter they got out of phase as sociocultural relationships developed a dynamic of their own. Müller brings out the extent to which the structure of the international system permitted the exploitation

of opportunities for co-operation despite the eventual failure of conflict avoidance strategies and attempts at compromise; but he also stresses the importance to the unification movement of individual initiatives and private representations. He shows that between the wars such movements were far too high-flown and elitist, envisaging an oligarchy (the Europe of 'the few', p. 468) fed by a Franco-German avant-garde. That these observations are far from outdated is clear from modern complaints about the EU's remoteness from its own citizens and the failure to bring about a 'citizens' Europe'.

Regardless of the success or failure of the movements involved, however, Müller's study is a model of successful network analysis that sets the standard for other cross-border studies of unification movements. His work is also a valuable contribution to the European history of ideas.

Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler has also attempted a 'history of European integration' with special reference to the 'Austrian road to Brussels'. In a mere twenty-eight pages (plus extracts from sources) she spans a period from the high Middle Ages, looking at plans for and concepts of Europe expressed by Pierre Dubois and Dante Alighieri, all the way to Aristide Briand. Here she covers largely the same ground as Wilfried Loth in his short book *Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europäischen Integration 1939–1957*.⁴ How far it was wise to include, in a book devoted to the history of European integration from the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to the EU, such a cursory introduction to European thinkers and planners from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries, without explaining their background and interrelationships, is debatable. It is very noticeable that many histories of Europe which seek to encompass the colossal breadth and scope of earlier European history give only a nod towards the history of integration as such, while other works provide a very brief introduction on the previous history before embarking on a much more detailed description of developments from the European Economic Community (EEC) to the EU. Both approaches lack balance and proportion and are therefore unsatisfactory, as regards both the wider European view and the history of integration as such. Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler's book falls into the second category. It is not a weighty work of scholarship – it has no footnotes – although it includes discussions of European laws and treaties, excursions, extracts from sources and brief descriptions of EU institutions. It describes itself as an 'indispensable reference work', but is better described, with some reservations, as a sort of reader or workbook.

Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler pays particular attention to 'Austria's road to Brussels', but the account is peppered with errors and inaccuracies. The Elysée Treaty between France and the Federal Republic of Germany of 1963 bore the title 'Treaty', not 'Treaty of Friendship' (p. 105); the negotiations leading up to Austria's independence treaty (Staatsvertrag) began in 1947, not 1945 (p. 178); the Grand Coalition was made in 1987, not on 18 June 1986; the Council of Europe came into being in 1949, not 1948 (p. 232); the ERP was the European Recovery Programme, not the European Recovery Plan (p. 227); the 'Rome Protocols' were actually the 'Rome Treaties'

4 3rd edn (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck Ruprecht 1996 [1990]).

(p. 234), etc., etc. The 'Glossary of Terms' could usefully have covered more than two pages. The list of 'Important Europeans' includes such variegated politicians as Charles de Gaulle, Paul-Henri Spaak and Margaret Thatcher, but does not explain exactly why they were important to Europe and/or to the politics of integration. All in all, Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler's history of European integration is a good deal less pleasing, and less convincing, than her magisterial study of Coudenhove.

In contrast, the *Europa-Lexikon* of Wolf D. Gruner and Wichard Woyke is both pleasing and convincing, and manages to combine both broader European history and the history of integration with due balance and proportion. The book has three parts. The first contains brief articles on concepts, ideas and plans of and for Europe and on European politics, society, economy and law. Part II contains articles covering the geography and history of individual countries, and Part III brief accounts of European institutions and political concerns. An appendix, by Gruner, comprises a 'Chronology of Europe', covering both general and integration history. A general annotated bibliography (plus internet addresses) concludes this focused and highly useful lexicon, which achieves a successful mixture of historical and political approaches to its subject matter. Wolf Gruner is an expert on Germany and a historian of Europe, and holds the Jean Monnet chair at the University of Rostock; his contributions do more to clarify the relative and absolute importance of Europe's historical dimension than do those by Woyke, a political scientist at the University of Münster. Tightly constructed and competently written entries on broader topics give us a view of the long evolution of geographical, cultural, political, historical, religious, economic and social aspects of European history. A select bibliography is appended to each entry. The configurations of nation-states which shaped, and are still shaping, today's EU are given full attention. Articles on individual countries ranging from Denmark to Cyprus are each divided into 'key dates', 'socio-economic background', 'history', 'political system' and 'policies in and for Europe', which facilitates comparison.

While the introductory overviews are plainly the work of the historian, the entries on individual countries and states have been divided between Gruner and Woyke. It would be wrong to assume that analyses of institutions and political interests were considered the prerogative of the political scientist, because the historian's hand is very perceptible here as well. A crisp and comprehensive overview is given of every significant institution, both of the EU proper and of the wider Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), from the Committee of the Regions (AdR in German) to the Economic and Currency Union (WWU). The book covers both successful initiatives, like the Rome Treaties and the Single European Act, and failed or superseded attempts at integration such as the European Defence Community (1952–4) and the WEU (1955–99). The authors also pay attention to the Europe of the Cold War, relations with the United States, the European periphery and the sovietisation of east central Europe, so that NATO, the Nordic Council, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Baltic Council, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact

rub shoulders with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Council and the EU Commission. This is not the traditional viewpoint of German historians and political scientists, with its focus on 'little' or 'core' Europe, but an all-embracing concept which includes even the peripheries, showing how well this lexicon has kept pace with the drive towards European expansion. It provides a solid basis of facts for both students and researchers, plus a wealth of detailed information for specialists.

European Integration 1950–2003. Superstate or New Market Economy?, by John Gillingham, Professor of History at the University of Missouri, is a compact and extremely detailed account of the history of European union from the Schuman Plan to the twenty-first century. While historians in Europe may risk infringing academic ethics by adopting an excessively positive and approving attitude towards the integration process, Gillingham is in no danger of this: he is not just a critic of the EU but a self-confessed euro-heretic, with the corresponding danger that pro-integrationist historians may be disinclined to take his occasionally provocative arguments seriously, or grapple with them. Gillingham's substantial book does not actually seek to engage in the wider debate; rather it avoids challenging the views of many other historians and does not concern itself even with the industrious and formidably footnoted pre-1990 work on 1950s and 1960s integration by the EU Historians' Liaison Committee, although most of that is available in English. Individual monographs and collaborative studies by the likes of Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, Gérard Bossuat, Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, Antoine Fleury, Pierre Gerbet, René Girault, Robert Frank, Wolfram Kaiser, Wilfried Loth, Piers Ludlow, Sergio Pistone, Raymond Poidevin, Klaus Schwabe, Gilbert Trausch, Antonio Varsori and Andreas Wilkens are ignored. This is a common failing with American, and some British, contemporary historians who write on European topics but cannot read – or simply ignore – work in other European languages. As a consequence, the encomiums by the noted British and American fellow-historians who praise Gillingham to the skies on the back cover should be taken with a pinch of salt. To what extent a book that itself refuses to engage in debate and ignores other research on the subject can really contribute to 'scholarly debate for years to come' (Andrew S. Moravcsik) will doubtless become clearer with time.

It is striking, and puzzling, that Gillingham devotes only a little over a fifth of his book to the formation, foundation and consolidation phases of Western European integration from 1950 to 1965, particularly as he has an exceptionally good knowledge of the ECSC. It is also disappointing to find that his assessment of and judgement on this phase of the integration draws principally on the views of the exiled Austrian economist Friedrich August von Hayek, who, as an apostle of free trade and competition, was in favour of a liberal approach to socioeconomics. Hayek's ideas had virtually no impact on the formation or development of the European integration process from the Montan Union to the EEC/EC (1950–65).

Gillingham pays much greater attention to the setting up of the 'new market economy' in the 1970s and 1980s, the origins of which he attributes to Margaret Thatcher, the 'founding mother of Europe', who, he argues, resolved the conflict

between the 'European superstate' and the neo-liberal market economy to the advantage of the latter. Gillingham identifies as principal advocates of this European 'superstate' (which, despite its frequent appearance as a bogey in the British tabloid press, never existed and was never even seriously suggested) two presidents of the EEC/EU Commission, namely Walter Hallstein (1958–67) and Jacques Delors (1985–94), both of whom were indeed active integrationists and are favourably viewed by continental historians. In Gillingham's view they were misled and more or less failures, even in terms of integration history. He describes their supranational ambitions and visions for the European communities as undemocratic, unworkable and damaging to economic reform, and inimical to the legitimacy of the integration process. Gillingham would prefer to see the European Union develop into a sort of neo-EFTA – a minimally institutionalised intergovernmental organisation. However 'heretical' his views may seem to be, it can seriously be suggested that this is the very path that the EU is now following, especially since the great 2004 enlargement to twenty-five states: there is still a solid core, but it is surrounded by a de luxe free trade zone with only limited ambitions as a world power. The ex-president of France and president of the EU Treaty Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, put it with unimpeachable clarity when contemplating the consequences to the community of the latest round of enlargements: 'That this enlargement will water down the community is not a risk but a certainty'.⁵ This fully supports Gillingham's assumptions and arguments. But the impact of this 'big bang' on the politics of integration cannot yet be determined with any certainty. At the time of writing, the EU reform process necessitated by the changes has made only modest, not to say derisory, progress.

All in all, it seems clear that the EEC, EC and old-style EU have now been consigned to history and that the twenty-first century will, or should, witness a completely new and different EU project.⁶ This being the case, fears of a European superstate appear unrealistic and exaggerated, and the question in Gillingham's title lacks both historical and political relevance. On the contrary, the tendency towards economic neo-liberalism in many EU member states seems to be unstoppable and unavoidable. Here we can heartily agree with Gillingham, but this makes his judgement that over the last decade before the publication of his book (i.e. from 1993 to 2003) the European Union achieved 'little or nothing' seem all the more blinkered. A historian has to be not only blinkered but blinded when he neglects and underestimates the partial achievement of the internal market and the introduction of the single currency, quite apart from the 'eastwards extension' of the EU, which was being prepared and negotiated in precisely that decade and showed the way towards the unification of a continent. And however much one may admire Margaret Thatcher's neo-liberal policies in Britain, which can stand as a blueprint for successful

5 Quoted after Werner Link, 'Primäre und sekundäre Ziele. Die Entwicklung der Europäischen Union nach der großen Erweiterung', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 Oct. 2005 (from his review of Esther Brimmer and Stefan Fröhlich, eds., *The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement*, Washington DC, 2005).

6 See Ludger Kühnhardt, *Erweiterung and Vertiefung. Die Europäische Union am Neubeginn*, Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung 62 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005).

'leadership', it is quite wrong to ignore or minimise the democratisation and legal codification of the EU, and thereby to overlook the increasing significance of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice as a motor for integration.

John Gillingham has set up a wide stage on which to present his ideal picture of the EU as a free-trade zone and bastion of the neo-liberal market economy, but he omits or under-emphasises a whole range of other dimensions of EU history. The whole picture only becomes clear, and its details comprehensible, if as many pieces of the mosaic as possible are in place. Gillingham's unusually comprehensive approach to EU history is, per se, a welcome contrast to the miniaturism of many contemporary historians who cover only a few years of European integration; but his blinkered approach and strongly negative attitude to the subject, together with his ideological preference for the new market economy, distorts the picture, sometimes to the point of caricature. He does more to confirm various clichés and prejudices about the EU than to account for its complexity and multiplicity. With all due respect to the value of monographs, this book is a missed opportunity to confer greater thoughtfulness and objectivity on the hitherto strongly pro-European historiography of integration. As it is, that historiography is likely to carry on in its wonted way.

The 1990s were the decade of the EU internal market, which, as aforesaid, was achieved, though not completely. It was already envisaged in the Rome Treaties, as shown by Gilles Grin in the detailed retrospective that comprises the first chapter of his empirically based, theoretically conceived and valuable *The Battle of the Single European Market. Achievements and Economics 1985–2000*. The book takes an interdisciplinary approach, drawing on history, political science, economics, law and sociology, as well as on interviews with witnesses and printed sources. If the evolution from customs union to internal market was a process that took decades and was beset with difficulties, the reason is to be sought chiefly in the protectionism of member states and their refusal to remove non-tariff-based obstacles to trade. Grin points out that the Rome Treaties contained many elements conducive to the later creation of an internal market. First, they formulated the goal. Second, they specified and provided the tools. Third, the open-endedness of the proposal provided flexible space for negotiation so that the nation-states could be won over to the idea in the medium or long term. A similar process can be discerned between the Commission's white paper (1985) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992), allowing a transitional period for the achievement of the internal market and economic and currency union, that is, leaving room for a process of trial and adaptation.

Grin sees the chief motors of the internal market as being the legal substance of the Rome Treaties and the opportunities presented by directives, but also the very geographical limitations of the EEC: the idea of 'core Europe' was a distinct advantage in this regard. The convincingly formulated analysis in his second chapter focuses on the ideological history of European economic integration before 1985, with special reference to the effects of Jacob Viner's theories concerning customs unions. These theories raised the question of the likely huge costs of *not* having an internal market, and based on this important realisation, concrete political measures were proposed to foster integration. When Jacques Delors assumed the EC presidency on 7 January

1985, this ushered in what Grin calls the 'battle for the four freedoms' (free movement of persons, goods, money and services), as described in his third chapter.

Grin also looks in detail at the implementation of the internal market and the greater integration that accompanied it. Chapter 4 combines macro- and micro-economic development analysis. In chapter 5, Grin examines the origins and content of the notorious Cecchini Report of 1988 (named after Paolo Cecchini, the leader of a special commission and deputy Director-General of the EC Commission with responsibility for the internal market and industrial affairs), which bore the title 'The Cost of Non-Europe'; it had a profound influence on various economic interest groups, but its political impact was limited. Grin refers to the various schools of thought that inspired François Mitterrand, including those led by François Perroux, Pierre Uri and Jacques Delors. He evokes the power of economic thought that acted as the driving and legitimising force of the internal market, however entangled it might become with constitutional, legal and political motivations. Jacob Viner and James Meade are hailed as the fathers of modern economic thinking in connection with economic integration. There were other items on the agenda at the time: discussions over a 'social model' for Europe; competition and innovation; allocation versus accumulation; distribution effects; the external dimension of the internal market. All of these are considered in the fifth chapter. Chapter 6 is a critical examination of the internal market as regards monetary integration, economic growth, convergence and divergence in the internal market and its relations with the outside world.

Grin's impressive study makes it clear how long-drawn-out the Community's decision-making process actually was. It is not uncommon for six to eight years to elapse between a Commission proposal and its implementation by the member states; Grin explains that the EU is far more than a 'state' in the traditional sense, and therefore deals with complexity, as it relates to harmonisation, quite differently from any such state. The sector which stood to benefit most from the internal market was heavy industry, and it was this that forced the pace, although leading European Social and Christian Democrats collaborated in its realisation. The intense debate in the late 1980s over the introduction of a fiscally active, socially oriented EC, leading to political union, remained unresolved. Neither Delors nor Thatcher (the leading figures in this debate) could be fully satisfied with the outcome, which offered only partial solutions. 'Europe' as a social model remained undefined and un-unified, only twelve states introduced the euro, economic union proved as elusive as political union. Grin, however, argues that while the motive for integration was, to all appearances, solely or principally economic, it was also politically motivated from beginning to end (pp. 351–2). Support for the internal market project among heads of state and government was the decisive factor. And without that project, the introduction of the euro would have been unthinkable.

Those looking for a history with the focus very much on European integration may turn to *Surpassing Realism. The Politics of European Integration since 1945* by Mark Gilbert, Professor of International Relations at the University of Trento. This is an essentially narrative history, well written, well balanced, vivid and refreshingly positive, suitable for both students and specialists in European integration, a rewarding

and entertaining read. Gilbert traces the history of the EU, which he views as a 'unique form of confederalism' (p. 4), from the end of the Second World War up to the Constitutional Treaty Convention. His approach to the central questions is open and flexible, unshackled to any particular theory of integration: how did Europe manage to overcome its traditional quarrels and rivalries when dealing with supranational institutions? What economic powers and geopolitical factors drove the whole process? Which statesmen contributed most to the success of the integration process? (Mrs Thatcher is conspicuously absent from this list.) What problems will the EU face when it seeks further political integration? The book was written before the 'eastward enlargement' was complete, when the EU was still a confederation of fifteen states, but even then, as an economic power with 375 million citizens, it had already acquired the character of a collective actor. The EU has now lasted for fifty years and has twenty-five member states totalling 450 million inhabitants – and it is embroiled in a political and institutional crisis. Closer examination shows, however, that this crisis does not really relate to the EU, but rather to the post-national states, their democracies, societies, economies and party systems.

For Gilbert, the success of European integration is due, indirectly and in part, to the efforts of European political leaders who perceived and responded to the enormous challenges of, and changes in, the global economy from the 1970s onwards; it is due also to the comparatively effective interplay between supranational EU institutions (the Commission, the Parliament and the European Court) and intergovernmental practice (the Council of Ministers and the European Councils). Gilbert returns frequently to questions of economics, currency fluctuation and monetary matters in general. He sees European monetary union (the EMU) as 'the child of the fluctuating dollar' (p. 9), in that it flattened out the switchback of European exchange rates and created a common monetary system.

Although it does not deal with the latest crisis trends in the EU/Europe, Gilbert's book is an indispensable overview, offering a comprehensive explanation of earlier developments. He traces the unprecedented political initiative in Europe back before the Schuman Plan and the *méthode Monnet* to the Marshall Plan and the Europe movement that led to the Hague Congress and the Council of Europe. He does not reject the 'realist' theory that integration was a clear and objective cost–benefit calculation (Joseph H. H. Weiler), but also attaches importance to the history of ideas and the long-term value debate in Europe, in which he sees something more than windy rhetoric. He sees the solution to the 'German question' as a fulcrum of the successful integration and unification movement, seeking a balance between US initiatives (the ERP, the OEEC) and British proposals for closer intergovernmental co-operation, because that resolution enabled a gradual and painful, but also lasting, transformation of erstwhile belligerents into partner states.

Gilbert places the formative phase of European union as far back as 1945–50 and traces its fruitful after-effects through the European Payment's Union and the European Currency Agreement. As for the period between 1950 and 1958 Gilbert, borrowing from contemporary functional integration theory, describes it as a time of 'spill-over' but also of recoil. The key concepts here are the Montan Union and the

Army of Europe, seen as prototypes and signposts towards creating an institutional and administrative underpinning for future communities (the EEC, EURATOM, the EU).

Gilbert's third phase begins with the coming into force of the Rome Treaties (1958) and ends with de Gaulle's resignation in 1969. He sees the then community of Europe as a union of states overshadowed by Charles de Gaulle's policies, as the general exploited his power of veto to stall both the British accession negotiations and the transition from unanimity to majority decision-making in the Council of Ministers. After the collapse of the European Defence Community in August 1954, France succeeded in plunging the integration process into its second profound crisis (1965–6). While the 'empty chair' policy was never to be repeated in the whole history of integration, the Luxembourg compromise of 1966 was not really a compromise at all: it set back the progress of the European Community towards true supranationality by some fifteen years.

The 1970s brought fresh crises after some very positive moves towards integration in the earlier years after the Hague Summit of 1969. Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing brought in the European Monetary System, the nucleus of the later EMU. Gilbert lays great emphasis on this achievement by the EC, seeing it as something of a miracle that it should have kept together through the crisis-ridden 1970s and not relapsed into the economic nationalism and protectionism of the interwar period.

One of the secrets of the successful integration was a truly revolutionary procedure, according to Gilbert: politicians in the member states of the ECSC, EEC, EC and EU consciously and deliberately turned the theory and practice of national policy on their heads, discovered their common interests, defined areas for political action, and, thanks to political compromise and institutional collaboration, attained higher levels of economic prosperity and geopolitical stability than ever before. The title of Gilbert's book cleverly draws attention to this success story: the integration process surpassed expectations. The historic greatness of the postwar politicians lay in their ability to remain loyal to the interests of their own nation-states while being equally loyal to the principle of European co-operation. It may be felt necessary to nuance such a strongly positive judgement in the case of certain individual statesmen: a critical look at Konrad Adenauer's policy of west European integration may raise some doubts, for example, in view of its connections with the decades of German division and the sheer material and financial costs to the Federal Republic of eventual reunification (not to mention the human and spiritual tragedies), which have been gauged at some 2,000,000,000,000 euro from 1990 to the present. How far this portentous policy could have been avoided, and how the process of west European integration would have been affected if it had been, is another story altogether. I will add only that national and European policies did not always go well together, and that priorities were often one-sided.

Gilbert rightly considers the starting point of the internal market, namely the Single European Act, signed in 1986 and implemented in 1987, as a fresh departure and a springboard for more dynamic advances in integration, which were

consummated by the 'Maastricht compromise' and the 'Delors package' in the wake of German reunification. The introduction of the euro in 1999 can be seen as the last exhalation of this phase, in the preparation, formation and characterisation of which Jacques Delors, Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand played a decisive part. Thereafter, 'making sense of Maastricht' became a much more difficult process. Gilbert identifies four factors that in the 1990s revived and complicated the question of where the community was meant to be going: the fact that not all member states introduced the euro; the enlargement, leading to new democratic challenges in central and eastern Europe; the 'democratic deficit' within the EU itself; and, last but not least, the changes brought about by a 'unipolar' world in which the United States was the only surviving superpower. Even if the 1990s saw more progress towards a common EU foreign and security policy than in all the preceding fifty years put together (p. 226), that policy, if no longer embryonic, is certainly still in its infancy. The author is well aware of the structural deficit and details its consequences (p. 251). The Balkan wars (1991–6, 1999) and the Iraq war (2003) pitilessly revealed the ineffectiveness and failure of any notionally united EU foreign policy, while the transatlantic alliance came under greater strain than ever before in its history.

Gilbert identifies three decisive moments in the history of west European integration: first, British hesitancy and reluctance to join the Montan Union in 1950/51, whereby Britain manoeuvred itself completely out of the process and left it to be overwhelmingly dominated by Germany and France; second, the rejection of the Fouchet Plan by the other Common Market countries in 1961/62, which prevented de Gaulle from positioning Europe as a superpower and confirmed his refusal to espouse the gradual strengthening and cementing of supranational integration; third, the establishment of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986/87, the indispensable starting point for a new identity as an internal market and *Rechtsgemeinschaft*, which came to a head at Maastricht.

Gilbert's clearly written and wide-ranging work extends not only to political history but also to the history of institutions, economies and monetary developments. He does not, however, extend his treatment to the role of political parties in Europe and their contributions to the integration process. For this we must look to *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, a collection of essays edited by Emmanuel Gerard and Steven van Hecke, of the Catholic University at Leuven. It is no longer possible to write the history of Europe, or of European integration, without looking closely at the different actors in and contributors to political events and their social and cultural backgrounds. In other words, consideration of the historical role of political parties, and their policies on Europe and on integration, is now indispensable, particularly since the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, although their influence can be traced back further than that.⁷

7 See Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, *Transnationale Parteienkooperation der europäischen Christdemokraten: Dokumente 1945–1965/Coopération transnationale des partis démocrates-chrétiens en Europe: Documents 1945–1965* (Munich and New York: Saur, 2004).

It is a fact that 'core Europe' (the Montan Union and the EEC) was a creation not just of individuals such as Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi or Robert Schuman, but also of Christian Democratic and popular republican parties such as the West German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the French Popular Republican Movement (MRP). It is also a fact that a number of European political parties have a transnational influence. Integration policies were agreed between Mitterrand's SFIO, the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) and Helmut Kohl's European People's Party in the run-up to the Maastricht summit of 1991 and pending the so-called union treaty. There can be no doubt that after the EU was democratised and endowed with a parliament, political parties, and cross-border co-operation among those parties, became highly important to the integration process. This makes it all the more worthwhile to study the role of the Christian Democratic parties vis-à-vis Europe-oriented corporatism and social partnership (see the contributions by Paolo Alberti and Robert Leonardi).

This volume fills a substantial gap by offering a series of individual country studies. Frank Bösch follows the crisis-ridden development of the Christian Democrat Party in Germany, its split into the CDU and CSU and the consolidation of this dualist structure, while in Austria the 'old' Christian Social Party was reborn as the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), as Franz Fallend explains. Robert Leonardi and Paolo Alberti trace the Italian DC from a position of dominance to its collapse in the aftermath of the Cold War; Wouter Beke describes the parallel evolution of the Belgian Christian People's Party (CVP) and Parti Social Chrétien (PSC) on either side of the linguistic divide; Paul Lucardie follows the Christian Democrats of the Netherlands from paradise lost to paradise regained. Whereas the Christian Democrats of Luxembourg are generally to be found at the heart of state affairs, the collapse of the French MRP and its disappearance from the political stage in the 1960s has made it impossible, to date, to revive Christian Democracy in that country, as explained by Alexis Massert. John T. S.Madeley studies life on the margins with the Christian Democrats of Scandinavia, while Peter Matuschek analyses the failure of the party in Spain and the corresponding success of the Partido Popular.

The two editors supply an authoritative conclusion to the book. Van Hecke sees the decade since the end of the Cold War in Europe as a time when Christian Democracy saw and seized its chances; the final contribution, which he wrote in collaboration with Gerard, sharpens the focus on comparative analysis of the parties through the 1990s. This is an exceedingly complex and internally contradictory development: whereas it was generally believed that Christian Democracy was doomed by the end of the Cold War in Europe (1989/90) – owing to progressive secularisation, the decline of the agrarian and rural milieu, the growing irrelevance of the Catholic Church and many other factors – by the beginning of the twenty-first century the recruitment of new electors and shifts in political parameters had unexpectedly enabled the movement to make something of a comeback. These successes were ushered in by the victory of the European People's Party in the 1999 elections to the European Parliament, which gave it a majority for the first time since the first

direct elections in 1979. At the time of writing the EPP is the largest group in the European Parliament.⁸

In their final comparative analysis, Gerard and van Hecke show that there was no single, linear trend followed by all Christian Democrat parties through the 1990s which would explain either their failures or their successes. National parameters and the peculiarities of each party system are a far better guide to the transformations of their programmes and profiles. For example, German reunification did not give a boost to the right but rather strengthened the CDU and CSU, which assumed a more socially accessible and liberal air. This was understandable in view of the declining relevance and perversion of the 'real socialist' model, which left an ideological vacuum waiting to be filled. As liberal and conservative elements combined forces, the European People's Party took an ever more distinctly neo-liberal path, though the same tendency was strongly opposed by Christian Democrats in Scandinavia; their devotion to the welfare state brought them far closer to the social democrats. The onward march of neo-liberalism forced socialism on to the defensive, to the point where people like Ralf Dahrendorf began to talk of an end to social democracy. The vaunted synthesis of socialism and neo-liberalism to create a 'third way' (Anthony Giddens) was not merely a theoretical contribution to an academic debate, or an answer to Francis Fukuyama and his 'end of history' or rather of ideology (the phrase assumes an ideology of its own): it accentuated the tendency of socialist and social democrat parties to position themselves 'in the middle'. This was felt as a threat by the Christian Democrats, who were forced to clarify their position vis-à-vis right-wing liberalism and conservatism. The importance of this discourse in terms of real politics was considerable. Developments in the late 1990s, coupled with the 'end of the end of the Cold War' (p. 318) strengthened the tendency towards bipolar party systems, reviving older political fault lines (left versus right) and ideological antagonisms (capitalism versus social democracy) and ushering in a neo-conservative renaissance. This meant that Christian values were defined along social rather than confessional lines. The assumption of government by the ÖVP in coalition with the populist right-wing Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), and the victory of the Spanish Partido Popular in 2000, pointed to the existence of political 'leaders' within this trend. The impact of the Islamist challenge in the wake of 9/11 and the debate over Turkey's application to join the EU have made a significant contribution to defining the new Christian Democrat profile – and this brings us right up to the burning questions of the present moment.

There is still a great deal to do in the field of contemporary European history. A range of new questions has arisen, and the latest developments have indirectly opened up still wider areas of research.

8 See also Steven van Hecke, 'Christen-democraten en conservatieven in de Europese Volkspartij. Ideologische verschillen, nationale tegenstellingen en transnationale conflicten', doctoral dissertation in social sciences, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Catholic University of Leuven, 2005.