Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics

Michael C. Williams

Abstract Debates over how ideas matter in international relations have come to occupy a key place in the field. Through a reexamination of the thinking of Hans Morgenthau, this article seeks to recover a tradition of classical realism that stressed the role of ideas in both the construction of action and in political and ethical judgment. Locating Morgenthau's understanding of politics against the background of the oppositional "concept of the political" developed by the controversial jurist Carl Schmitt shows how Morgenthau's realism attempts to recognize the centrality of power in politics without reducing politics to violence, and to preserve an open and critical sphere of public political debate. This understanding of Morgenthau's realism challenges many portrayals of his place in the evolution of international relations, and of the foundations of realist thought. However, it is also of direct relevance to current analyses of collective identity formation, linking to—and yet providing fundamental challenges for—both realist and constructivist theories.

How and why do ideas matter in international relations (IR)? For at least a decade this question has been at the center of IR theory. Constructivists, liberal institutionalists, poststructuralists, Gramscians, structural realists, and neo- or postclassical realists have all debated the importance of ideas, and while there is now some agreement among these competing positions that ideas matter, there is little consensus on precisely why or to what extent they do so.[1] This article seeks to contribute to these ongoing discussions by exploring a position that has been notably absent within them: that of classical realism. I argue that a reengagement with

For helpful and insightful comments on this article in its wide variety of previous incarnations, I would like to thank Michael Barnett, James Der Derian, Randall Germain, Alexandra Gheciu, Stefano Guzzini, Jef Huysmans, Oliver Jutersönke, Jennifer Mitzen, Vibeke Schou Pedersen, and especially Rita Abrahamsen and Richard Wyn Jones. Previous drafts were presented at the 2002 meetings of the British International Studies Association, and at the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. My thanks also to the participants at those sessions.

1. See Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Desch 1998; Wendt 1999; and Jacobsen 2003.

International Organization 58, Fall 2004, pp. 633–665

DOI: 10.1017/S0020818304040202

classical realism reveals a tradition of thinking that provides a subtle and sophisticated understanding of the role of ideas in IR. Recovering this strand of thought questions many conventional portrayals of the foundations of realism and its place in the evolution of IR, but its implications also go beyond disciplinary history, raising fundamental philosophic, analytic, and normative challenges to contemporary IR theory.

To recover this strand of classical realism, I reexamine one of its most significant proponents: Hans Morgenthau. At first glance, this may seem a particularly inauspicious place to start, for while Morgenthau's status in the development of realism remains unquestioned,[2] he is often accused of being one of the prime movers in realism's marginalization of the role of social constructions and "ideas" in the study of world politics.[3] There is no doubt that support for this view can be found within his voluminous writings, and his oft-quoted statement that "all politics is power politics" seems only to confirm such a view.[4] Yet to see Morgenthau's realism simply as a crude reduction of politics to pure power is mistaken. In fact, when read carefully and in context, his realist theory emerges as a sophisticated, self-conscious, and highly political interrogation of the relationship between power and politics. Morgenthau's thinking, like that of figures as diverse as Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt,[5] is driven by a concern that recognizing the centrality of power in politics risked yielding (and legitimizing) a situation in which the capacity to wield any form of power—particularly physical violence—is the ultimate arbiter of authority and legitimacy: that might would indeed make right, and that politics would be subsumed by violence in both a theoretical and a literal sense at both the domestic and the international levels. As a consequence, his realism is marked by an attempt to recognize the centrality and complexity of power in politics while avoiding the extreme conclusion that politics is nothing but violence. In this endeavour, political judgment—the impact of ideas—is crucial. In particular, I argue, a correct understanding of the concept—the very idea—of "politics" is an essential element of the ethical and evaluative stance at the heart of Morgenthau's realism.

One of the clearest illustrations of the continuing relevance of Morgenthau's thinking lies in its relationship to contemporary debates over collective identity formation. It has been argued with increasing frequency that constructivist analyses of collective identity formation provide a potential common ground of engagement between realism and constructivism, extending realist insights into both relations between states and the activities of nonstate groups.[6] I suggest that while Morgenthau's thinking does indeed provide a basis for a broader engagement

2. See Donnelly 1995, 2000; Buzan 1996; Grieco 1997; Jervis 1998; Kahler 1997; Bucklin 2001; and Haslam 2002.
3. Philpott 2001, 62–63.
4. Morgenthau 1967, 27.
5. For an excellent discussion of this context, see Hanssen 2000.
6. Jervis 1998, 988, 989.

between realism and constructivism, it also poses fundamental challenges for both. Morgenthau's concern with the idea of politics is no abstract enterprise. It is part of an ethical and political stance opposing violent and manipulative forms of realpolitik in which the construction of collective identity becomes identical with the construction and use of enemies. Such a conception of politics as enmity was at the core of the political strategies of the extreme Right in Weimar and was most powerfully, sophisticatedly, and dangerously represented in the "concept of the political" put forward by the individual against whom Morgenthau's understanding of politics is directly directed: the "crown jurist of the Nazi party," Carl Schmitt. In this setting, ideas mattered in the most direct and political sense, in avoiding—and opposing—Schmitt's claim that politics was defined by the opposition between friend and enemy, and that intergroup relations were inevitably defined by radical opposition. In Morgenthau's view, realism required a capacity to make critical normative and political judgments about collective identity formation, and to fail to make such judgments was both intellectually and politically irresponsible. In this way, his understanding of the politics of collective identity formation was not limited to understanding the "social construction of power politics"; it was also an attempt to understand the role of ideas in the moral construction of power politics.

The Curious Concept of Politics in Realism

If turning to Morgenthau seems at first glance an inauspicious place to uncover the role of ideas in classical realism, then in many eyes looking at his concept of politics may seem a doubly unpromising point of departure. Indeed, however diverse the positions in contemporary IR may be, there is almost universal agreement that one of the greatest weaknesses of Morgenthau's thinking (and that of immediately postwar realism in general), lies in its remarkably narrow understanding of politics. While liberal institutionalists,[7] social constructivists,[8] historical sociologists,[9] political economists,[10] and even "neoclassical" realists[11] may diverge widely on the nature of realism and its place in the future development of IR theory, they are largely united in the conviction that a concern with political economy, the impact of domestic structures, or the influence of culture and identity, all appear remarkably marginal (or at best inadequately developed and unsystematically theorized) within "classical" realism, and that a broader, more sociologically and institutionally rigorous theory of the structure, dynamics, and multiple determinants of politics at the domestic level is essential for the further development of IR theory, whether "realist" or not.

7. See Keohane and Nye 1977; and Moravscik 1997.
8. Lapid 1996.
9. See Hobden 2001, 48–49; and Reus-Smit 2001, 126.
10. See Burch 1997, 26; and Underhill 1999, 10.
11. See Rose 1998; Schweller 1998, 20; and Zakaria 1999, 32–35.

There is little doubt that Morgenthau proposes a very constricted vision of politics. In *Politics Among Nations*, for example, he argues that "a nation is not normally engaged in international politics when it concludes an extradition treaty with another nation, when it exchanges goods and services with other nations, when it cooperates with another nation in providing relief from natural catastrophes, and when it promotes the distribution of cultural achievements throughout the world."[12] Such an unambiguous statement seems only to confirm suspicions concerning the narrowness of the realist vision and its obvious—and increasing—inadequacy as a basis for thinking about world politics.[13]

Explanations of the narrowness of classical realism's understanding of politics abound in discussions of IR, and form a key element in accounts of the evolution of the field. Most commonly, it is traced to the historical conditions of realism's ascendance, particularly to the dominance of "high politics," diplomacy, and military conflict at the conclusion of World War II and the onset of the Cold War.[14] Under these conditions, it is argued, realism's narrow vision of political relations is comprehensible, if ultimately unsatisfactory. To still others, classical realism's concern with human nature—in particular its concern with an elemental lust for power—overwhelmed any sustained concern with social and historical trajectories and the importance of political structures.[15] From yet another perspective, the assumption of the state as a unitary rational actor precluded by analytic fiat the need to inquire more deeply into the complexities of state structure, domestic preferences, and action,[16] while still other accounts locate its origins in realism's uncritical adoption of the classical liberal divide between politics and economics.[17] Whatever the explanation, however, the narrowness of the classical realist vision of politics is seen as a symbol of its limited theoretical bases and utility, and the evolution of the field of IR is again presented as a process of moving beyond these limits toward a more sophisticated theory of international politics.

Yet the narrowness of Morgenthau's realist understanding of politics can also be seen as posing a particularly intriguing puzzle. As a series of recent studies have revealed, a closer look at Morgenthau's intellectual biography sits uncomfortably with his adoption of such an obviously naïve and simplistic view of politics. Trained in the complexities of legal and state theory spanning thinkers from Hans Kelsen to Otto Kircheimer, Morgenthau was personally engaged in the highly politicized legal struggles of Weimar Germany and was well aware of the

12. Morgenthau 1967, 26.
13. Rosenberg 1994, 24.
14. See Holsti 1998, 135; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 652; Kegley and Wittkopf 1999, 28–34; and Vasquez 1998, 45–59.
15. See Donnelly 2000, 43–80; and Spirtas 1996.
16. Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 658.
17. Rosenberg 1994, 24.

complex relationship between law, institutions, culture, and politics.[18] Deeply influenced by the sociology of Max Weber,[19] and familiar with the neo-Marxist work of the Frankfurt School,[20] he could scarcely have been unaware of the complexity of political life and its economic and cultural dimensions. Schooled in continental philosophy and profoundly affected by the legacy of Nietzchean and post-Nietzschean philosophy,[21] Morgenthau was also intimately familiar with the complex German debates surrounding the nature of politics, and he was particularly involved in the intense and sophisticated disputes surrounding the "concept of the political" developed by the controversial jurist Carl Schmitt.[22]

Seen in this light, it hardly seems likely that Morgenthau could have been oblivious to the fact that he proposed an extraordinarily constricted—in fact, largely counterintuitive—view of the political realm; and it seems equally difficult to avoid the view that the conventional explanations of this narrowness seem suspiciously easy. I suggest that rather than being the result of historical constraints, philosophical myopia, or methodological strictures, Morgenthau's narrowing of the political sphere is not an oversight. Rather than ignoring the obvious breadth of political life or the complexity of the concept of "the political,"[23] the limited conception of politics is part of a sophisticated intellectual strategy seeking to address the centrality of power in politics without reducing politics to an undifferentiated sphere of violence, to distinguish legitimate forms of political power, to insulate the political sphere from physical violence, and to discern the social structures that such a strategy requires to be successful. Far from being alien to the concerns of historical sociology, oblivious to the importance of domestic social and political structures, or obtuse regarding ethical issues, the narrow concept of politics in Morgenthau's realism is in fact the outcome of a philosophically complex historical and ethical sociology of modern politics.

Power, Interest, and Politics

In unravelling the nature of politics in Morgenthau's realism, it is useful to begin by noting the strong emphasis he places on the importance of the concept of politics, and on the autonomy of politics as a sphere of action and understanding. In what is perhaps the most oft-quoted phrase in the history of IR, Morgenthau's "second principle of political realism" holds that its core lies in the definition of

18. See Amstrup 1978; Frei 2001, 48–49, 114–44; Koskenniemi 2001, 413–509; and Scheuerman 1999, 225–51. On the broader legal context, see Dyzenhaus 1997 and Scheuerman 1994.
19. See Morgenthau 1977, 7; Hobson and Seabrooke 2001; and Smith 1986.
20. See Morgenthau 1977, 14; and Frei 2001, 38–39.
21. See Frei 2001, 107–53; and Petersen 1999.
22. See Morgenthau 1933; Frei 2001, 118–19, 160–63; Honig 1996; Huysmans 1998; Koskenniemi 2001; McCormick 1997, 303–5; Pichler 1998; and Scheuerman 1999.
23. See Ebata, Neufeld, and Beverley 2000; and Edkins 1999, xi.

politics as "interest defined in terms of power." "This concept," he argues, is crucial if one is to make sense of international politics, for it

> provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion. Without such a concept a theory of politics, domestic or international, would be altogether impossible, for without it we could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts, nor could we bring at least a measure of systematic order to the political sphere.[24]

Yet despite the almost iconic status that "interest defined as power" has assumed in presentations of realist theory, a close examination of Morgenthau's discussion quickly reveals that power and interest are actually remarkably flexible and indeterminate concepts. The forms taken by interest and power, and the relationship between them, are fluid and only foundational in the broadest possible sense. In his "third principle of political realism," for example, Morgenthau discusses this fluidity in terms worth quoting at length. Realism, he argues,

> does not endow its key concept of interest defined as power with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. . . .Yet the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. *The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue*.[25]

The objects of "interest," it turns out, are almost limitless. Literally anything could in principle be an interest. A similar indeterminacy applies to power. As he puts it:

> The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the power of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement.[26]

24. Morgenthau 1967, 5.
25. Ibid., 8–9; emphasis added.
26. Ibid., 9.

At this point, a degree of confusion might seem appropriate, for these extremely broad visions of power and interest seem logically to lead not to a narrow conception of politics, but to an extremely broad one.[27] If all interests are indeterminate, and all forms of power are multiple and contextual, then surely this implies that all realms of life in and through which interests are formulated and power is exercised are political, and that what is required is an extremely broad—almost pervasive—vision of politics rather than its opposite. In fact, it might even be argued that Morgenthau's understanding of power and interest has its closest analogues in social theories more commonly associated with the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, with their very broad understanding of power and the political field, rather than with the narrow understanding of politics that realism stands accused of adopting.[28] But despite the obviousness of this conclusion, it is not the path that Morgenthau chooses to follow, and his reasons for not doing so are central in understanding the concept of politics in the realist theory he develops. But before turning to these issues, it is useful to examine briefly the most prevalent ways in which they have been treated in IR theory.

The Specificity of Politics

Broadly speaking, Morgenthau's definition of politics as "interest defined as power" has been given two interpretations in IR theory, neither of which comes fully to terms with the complex position he stakes out. The first of these interpretations tends to reduce realism to a form of materialism. Here, both interest and power are defined primarily in material—and particularly military—terms, and international politics becomes characterized as a struggle for material power. As Mearsheimer succinctly put it in an oft-quoted statement of this theme: "Realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the *material structure* of the international system."[29]

The adequacy of this materialism as the foundation for the study of IR has been a source of continual debate within the field and is often presented as marking a fundamental divide between realists and their critics—particularly social constructivists who stress the importance of ideational phenomena.[30] However, as evidenced in the definitions of power and interest cited above, a reduction of "interest

27. For a criticism of this breadth, see Claude 1962, 25–37. For a discussion of how Morgenthau's view of power has been adopted in different ways by different contemporary realists, see Legro and Moravscik 1999, 22–34; and for its significance in the debate over realism and the end of the Cold War, see Wohlforth 1995, 9–10.

28. A theme suggestively explored by Ashley 1984. Good, critical surveys of "power" in international relations are put forward in Guzzini 1998, 218–22; and Barnett and Duvall forthcoming. More broadly, see Hindess 1996.

29. Mearsheimer 1995, 91. For an innovative recasting of materialism, see Deudney 2000. A very useful survey is found in Guzzini 1998, 133–35.

30. Wendt 1995, 1999.

defined as power" to predominantly material forms of each clearly does not do full justice to Morgenthau's realist understanding of politics. Confirmation of this point is provided by Morgenthau himself, who felt the need to stress the role of diverse forms of power precisely because of the tendency to reduce power to its material aspects. As he put it in a discussion of his revisions to the fourth edition of *Politics Among Nations*: "Against the misunderstanding of the central element of power, which, after having been underrated to the point of total neglect, now tends to be equated with material strength, especially of a military nature, I have stressed more than before its immaterial aspects, especially in the form of charismatic power, and have elaborated the discussion of political ideologies."[31] Material power and the pursuit of material interest are indeed central, but neither power nor interest can be reduced to material forms. To do so does little justice to the multiple, fluid, and relational view of power and interest Morgenthau puts forward. Nor, importantly, does it account for the claim that politics is a specific sphere that is distinguishable from the pursuit of material interest characteristic of, for example, the economic sphere.

The question of the specificity of politics is also important when considering the second common interpretation of realism. In this view, the definition of politics as "interest defined as power" is seen in essentially instrumentalist terms: if power is a necessary means for the pursuit of interests, then power becomes an end in itself. As a necessary instrument to the achievement of any given interest, power itself becomes a universal interest and, therefore, as Ruggie summarizes this view, "whatever the ends that leaders may seek to achieve, their doing so is mediated and constrained by all states deploying their power to pursue their own ends, so that power itself becomes the proximate end of any state's foreign policy."[32]

On the surface, an instrumentalist interpretation of realism seems more satisfactory; and it certainly captures the open-ended and multiple character of interests and power more fully than does a reductionist materialism. However, in reducing realism to a form of instrumentalism, this view also fails to account for the specificity of politics, and to address the question of why politics constitutes the autonomous sphere that Morgenthau insists it does. If the definition of politics is "interest defined as power," and power is just an instrument for the achievement of other interests, then what differentiates the political sphere from any other realm of social life in which power is essential to the successful pursuit of a given interest? In the economic sphere, for example, the pursuit of economic power is essential for the acquisition of wealth. But if this is the case, what is unique about the political sphere as opposed to that of the economic, and why does Morgenthau explicitly differentiate the political from the economic sphere? In short, if the pursuit of any interest requires power, and power becomes an end in itself in any sphere of social life, then "interest defined as power" applies equally to all social spheres and ceases

31. Morgenthau 1967, ix.
32. Ruggie 1998, 4–5.

to be uniquely useful as a concept for distinguishing political phenomena from other forms of social interaction. Politics, accordingly, would again become an extremely broad sphere, not a conspicuously narrow one. While an instrumentalist definition may tell one something about the realist stress on power as a means to the realization of interests, it fails to specify what is distinctively political about the sphere of politics in realist theory.

On closer examination, the most prevalent understandings of politics in Morgenthau's realism fail to come to terms with either its conceptual specificity, or to explain his remarkably limited definition of the sphere of politics. Similarly, neither explanation provides a satisfactory account of the relationship between power and interest that is at the heart of Morgenthau's realist conception of politics. These considerations seem to leave open two possible options. From one perspective, they might be seen as still further evidence of the inadequacy of realism, and yet another reason to consign it firmly to the theoretical (pre)history of IR. A second position, however, is to take these apparent inconsistencies as inspiration for a deeper investigation of the realist vision of politics. Taking this path requires a broader engagement with philosophical roots, intellectual lineage, and political context underlying Morgenthau's realism. At the heart of this context is Morgenthau's debt to the social theory of Weber, his fundamental engagement (again shared with Weber) with Nietzchean philosophy, and his engagement with the political consequences of this legacy as they were expressed within the tumultuous setting of Weimar Germany. When placed in these contexts, Morgenthau's realist concept of politics and the remarkably narrow definition of political phenomena that he develops emerge as sophisticated and self-conscious attempts to deal with the relationship between politics, power, and violence.

The Weberian Legacy

While it has for some time been common to see Morgenthau as standing within a tradition of realpolitik initiated by Weber,[33] it is only recently that the depth and breadth of the Weberian legacy in realism has become a focus of detailed attention.[34] In the context of Morgenthau's understanding of politics, this legacy has two related aspects: a methodological stance and a philosophical vision of the specificity of politics as a sphere of social life. Each—and the less well-recognized relationship between them—is central in understanding the limited and specific vision of politics in his realism.

The most straightforward element of this limitation lies in the influence that Weber's philosophy of social science had on Morgenthau. Weber's method of ideal-

33. Smith 1986.

34. As Morgenthau wrote autobiographically, "Weber's political thought possessed all the intellectual and moral qualities I had looked for in vain in the contemporary literature inside and outside the universities." Morgenthau 1977, 7. For broader treatments, see Barkawi 1998; and Pichler 1998.

types had sought to provide a means of classifying different social spheres according to their specific logics. By distinguishing these spheres (as ideal types) the analyst can abstract specific logics of action from the totality of social life and then examine how they struggle, interpenetrate, and fuse in the production of concrete practices, as for example, in Weber's classic analysis of the role of radical Protestant morals and aesthetics in the rise of the economic logic of capitalism.[35] The influence of this view on Morgenthau is obvious; as he puts it, "Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer of the conformity of action with legal rules. . . . the political realist asks 'How does this policy affect the power of the nation?' (Or of the federal government, of Congress, of the party, of agriculture, as the case may be)."[36]

Part of the narrowness of the concept of politics is, therefore, an analytic device: an attempt to specify politics as an ideal-type as referring particularly to structures of governance. Yet it is clear that this designation alone is not enough to account for conceptual specificity of politics or its delineation as an autonomous sphere. If the focus of the political realist is on how a particular policy increases, for example, the "power of agriculture," there is no exclusive connection between this and governmental structures. Nor is it clear why this political sphere should be separated from, for example, cultural spheres that support particular interests: for instance, a belief in the importance of rural agriculture in maintaining national identity. Once again, the defining concept of the political realist—interest defined in terms of power—appears strangely amorphous and ill-defined. It seemingly applies to almost any actor, any interest, any form of power, in any given sphere. It either depends on a content that is smuggled in after the definition (interest as the "national" interest, or power as "governmental" power), or to be completely lacking in content.

Coming to terms fully with the specificity of politics requires a further appreciation of how the roots of this concept lie not in Weber's methodology, but in his political philosophy and the Nietzschean aspects of that philosophy.[37] Weber begins from the postulate of value-pluralism: there are no transcendental standards that can provide a ground for conduct, and in modernity individuals are left only with the choice between warring "gods and demons."[38] In this disenchanted context, all value choices and the actions that follow from them are inescapably political in the sense that they involve claims about values that are irresolvable by appeal

35. Weber 1958.

36. Morgenthau 1967, 11; 1959, 17.

37. The Nietzchean roots of Morgenthau's thinking have been comprehensively documented in Frei 2001. The links between Nietzche and Weber are nicely outlined by Owen 1994; see also Turner and Factor 1984.

38. Or as Morgenthau phrased the theme in terms of international politics: "Nations meet under an empty sky from which the Gods have departed" Morgenthau 1967, 249.

to a transcendent authority, and thus inevitably carry with them the possibility of contestation and conflict with competing visions. But as Warren has insightfully argued, this does not mean that Weber collapses into a facile relativism; as he puts it:

> Viewed negatively, politics is essentially "struggle" . . . the "striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state." . . . Viewed positively, however, politics involves relating individual value rationalities to group choices, implying that recognition of persons together with processes of discussion, argumentation, and consensus lie behind exercises of power. Political actions are a distinctively human kind of social action: they combine instrumental and value rationality, and thus develop and express what Weber conceives as the human potential for teleological action and self-determination.[39]

Politics is thus identified by its specific duality: an indeterminacy that makes it at one and the same time a realm of power and inevitable struggle and a realm of openness and self-determination. For Weber, the maximization of the positive potential entailed by this value relativity required a differentiation and separation of value spheres at both the conceptual and the social levels. To quote Warren: "Weber does not seek one set of value criteria to ground all others because he sees cultural progress in the differentiation of value spheres, none of which are primary and each of which has its own distinctive kind of rationality and criteria or propriety. This is true for economics, aesthetics, erotic life, language, intellectual life, social life, and so on. Each sphere is necessary for a fully human life, and it would be inappropriate to universalize the standards of one sphere to all others. One does not judge art by logical consistency, love by utility, or righteousness by efficiency."[40] This is, as Warren nicely summarizes it, is "politicized neo-Kantian liberalism":[41] it adopts Kant's differentiation of spheres of knowledge (the empirical, the aesthetic, the moral), but rather than grounding them transcendentally, it legitimates these categorical distinctions politically and ethically in terms of the possibilities of human freedom, and consequentially in terms of social differentiation that will allow the maximization of that freedom.

Seen in light of this Weberian heritage, the specificity of politics in realism becomes clearer. Power and struggle are intrinsic to human life. Politics is the sphere of contest over the determination of values and wills—an undetermined realm in which the struggle for power and domination is pure (without content) and thus potentially limitless. The specificity of the political sphere thus lies in power as an interest in itself. Politics, as an autonomous sphere, has no intrinsic object of interest; it is literally lacking in any concrete "interest" except the pursuit of power. This indeterminacy stands in contrast to other social spheres that

39. Warren 1988, 35.
40. Ibid., 38; Warren here follows Habermas 1984.
41. Warren 1988, 31.

possess concrete interests, forms of power, and limits that politics does not; for example, the economic sphere has a specific logic of interest (material gain) and a dominant form of power (control over material resources) that define its operation and give it a particular set of limits. Paradoxically, it is the unlimited nature of politics that is the basis of its conceptual specificity, and the basis of the distinction between the political sphere and other social spheres.[42]

Yet the essential emptiness of politics also represents its promise and positive potential. The quest for power without a fixed interest leaves those interests open to transformation and revision and is, thus, the condition of change and progress. As a realm without a fixed interest, politics becomes the sphere of activity uniquely concerned with the consideration, generation, and transformation of common interests and understandings: the sphere where the fundamental meanings and values of social life are contested and determined. The lack of fixed understandings of the good and the true is the condition of modern politics, and the basis of its distinctiveness as a realm of freedom, creativity, and change.

Morgenthau shares this understanding of politics. Politics, in principle, has no limits—it lacks defined objects of interest or resources of power. Its limits lie only in the confrontation between divergent wills, interests, and the forms of power they can wield. To return to Morgenthau's illustration of "nonpolitical" issues cited at the outset of this article, both legal (extradition) and trade relations are not political because they are conducted within largely shared and settled structures of agreement on the appropriate norms, rules, and procedures. The political struggle for power—the struggle over foundational principles, values, and so on—does not prevail in these relations (unless one actor is explicitly using them to these ends). By contrast, because it has no specific object to govern its interests or its potential forms of power, politics is an almost limitless field of struggle and domination. As Morgenthau repeatedly makes clear, the conceptual specificity of politics applies across all political realms; at this level, there is no fundamental distinction between domestic and international politics. The primary difference between the two lies in the social resources—institutional and ideational—available for the limitation of the negative logic of politics, and the exploitation of its positive capacities. As he puts it, "The essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart," a symmetry "modified only by the different conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and the international spheres."[43]

This recognition allows one to make sense of Morgenthau's claim that as an ideal-type purely "political" man would be a "beast": as a sphere without content or limits, politics is potentially a remarkably destructive dimension of human action.[44] Yet at the same time, politics is the protean center of social life, and

42. This point is also stressed by Frei 2001, 126–28 especially; see also Hobson and Seabrooke 2001, 269.
43. Morgenthau 1967, 32.
44. Ibid., 13.

Morgenthau views the indeterminacy of politics as a potentially positive phenomenon, representing the possibility of change, and as a core principle of democracy. As he characterized this ethic in direct contrast to that of Nazism: "The doctrine of democracy starts with the assumption that all citizens are potentially capable of arriving at the right political decision and that, consequently, nobody has a monopoly of political wisdom to which, at least potentially, the others would not have access. . . . Philosophic relativism, political pluralism, the protection of minorities of all kinds and with respect to all kinds of activities are therefore the earmarks of democratic theory and practice."[45]

The limitless nature of politics is thus the source of both its perils and its possibilities.[46] Politics is an extraordinarily dangerous sphere. By understanding its essence—its narrow conceptual specificity—it is possible to see the logic of political conflict, and the possibilities for its amelioration. Political conflict cannot be reduced to conflicts of material interest and calculation.[47] It is far more fundamental; indeed elemental. Rather than wishing away this conflict, it is necessary to recognize its nature and attempt to exploit its positive potential. It is here that the importance of limits in realism becomes clearer. The process of conceptual limitation is linked to political practices of limitation. Far from precluding a broad analysis of political life, the narrow definition of politics becomes the foundation of a sophisticated sociological and institutional analysis, in which a limited conception of politics is deployed in an attempt to constrain the destructive capacities of the logic of politics, while retaining its possibilities for creativity. This requires discerning the structures and practices that support this goal, identifying those that are lacking, and developing a strategy to maximize the promise of politics and limit its perils.

In Morgenthau's thinking, this realist strategy of limitation develops along three dimensions. First, he defines politics and political power as separate from other forms of power, particularly physical violence. This provides the basis for a limitation on the legitimate use of violence within the sphere of domestic politics. Second, he seeks to foster the development of other social spheres whose forms of interest and power can balance those of politics, minimizing the attraction of its violent potential and counteracting its capacities. Third, he attempts to insulate these spheres from each other. The spheres of morality, law, and economics must be insulated against the intrusion of the logic of limitless domination characteristic of politics, while the openness of the political sphere must be defended against

45. Morgenthau 1946, 144; see also Murray 1996, 101.

46. Similarly, history is neither pure continuity, nor pure change. Rather, the enduringly empty nature of politics—its radical indeterminacy that is part of its constant struggle for power—represents both its unchanging nature and its capacity for change. The affinities between Morgenthau's views and Nietzche's conception of history as "eternal return" are striking here. For an insightful analogous discussion, see Der Derian 1998.

47. Contrast to the positions surveyed in Rosecrance 2001, that lead him to ask, "Has Realism Become Cost-Benefit Analysis?"

its subsumption within these other spheres. In actuality, these structures and strategies of limitation will always be partial, and political practice will always involve the interpenetration of different spheres and the struggle between them. But this interpenetration must always take place against the background of their basic separation, a separation that is essential for the operation of an ethical and balanced political order.

The Insulation of Politics from Violence

The obvious dilemma accompanying Morgenthau's famous claim that "all politics is power politics" is that it risks reducing politics to nothing but a struggle for power, and rendering the application of any and all forms of power and coercion equally legitimate in the struggle. Indeed critics have long claimed that this is the logical conclusion of realist theory: that ultimately might equals right. However, Morgenthau's limitation of the concept of politics represents, in fact, an attempt to respond precisely to this dilemma. In the context of Weimar, these were not abstract questions. The reduction of politics to violence and the assertion of its essential—even defining—role in politics was found across the political spectrum.[48] On the Left, for example, theorists such as Sorel had developed a powerful vision of the role of violence in politics that threatened to render the two indistinguishable. But of even greater concern to Morgenthau was the position developed on the Right, particularly the concept of the political developed by Schmitt.

As Scheuerman has superbly demonstrated, an engagement with Schmitt's thinking constitutes a continuing "hidden dialogue" within Morgenthau's thought.[49] Schmitt, too, had argued that the essence of the "concept of the political" lay in its emptiness, in its fundamentally creative absence of limits and lack of natural determination by other interests characteristic of other spheres. Paradoxically, however, he concluded that the essential openness of politics as a concept meant that in concrete terms the essence of politics lay in the capacity to determine definitively the rules, norms, and values of a society. Sovereignty, Schmitt consequently defined as the capacity for "decision": the ability to make ultimate decisions in cases of fundamental contestation, where no prior rule could provide the solution. All rule-bound orders (such as legal systems) thus ultimately depend on a capacity for decision that itself stands outside of the given structure of rules. In his criticisms of legal positivism, for example, Schmitt argues that the application of any rule requires the existence of a prior rule that determines which particular rules are to apply to which particular instance. This rule structure is inherently

48. McCormick 1997, 31–82.

49. Scheuerman 1999. Morgenthau had confronted Schmitt's arguments explicitly in an early and detailed critique, see Morgenthau 1933. See also the excellent analysis in Koskenniemi 2001, 413–509.

indeterminate: no rule can cover definitively all of the different instances to which different rules might apply. At some level, there must simply be a decision. To say that this decision must itself be governed by rules is only to defer the problem, for even if it were itself determined by a prior set of rules, these rules themselves would require adjudication and decision. If the process were not to go on infinitely, ultimately a position of final decision, itself undetermined by rules, must exist. Sovereignty, Schmitt declared, is therefore a "pure decision, emerging out of nothingness": the provision of a concrete content within the indeterminacy that is the essence of the political.[50] Therein, he argued, "resides the essence of the state's sovereignty, which must be juristically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide."[51]

The political, correspondingly, was defined by the social conditions under which such sovereign acts of decision became viable. The essence of this condition lay in the basic division between those who belonged to a political order and those who did not; a distinction that was ultimately one between friend and enemy.[52] In Schmitt's view, friendship and enmity provide the foundational structure of allegiance, of solidarity, that underpin the capacity for effective decision. The commonality of friendship—and the limits prescribed by enmity—define the parameters within which values can be decided upon and the decisions of a "sovereign" actor or institution accepted by the society at large. Such a commonality, he argued, is ultimately inextricable from enmity—from a group that is "not us"—and from the possibility of life and death struggle with that enemy. A sovereign order—quite literally sovereignty in itself—is defined by the existence of such a center of decision and the acceptance of its decisions by the relevant group within an overarching structure of friendship and enmity.

For Schmitt, the politics of the enemy are not normative.[53] They represent the essence of politics—of the concept of the political—in itself. In principle, individuals can come together to form a group around any particular interest, but they will only become properly political if they enter into a friend-enemy relationship where the group's ultimate willingness to engage in mortal struggle is at stake. In Schmitt's view, all functioning sovereignties are founded on this principle and capacity; those that do not possess it are unlikely to survive.[54] To this end, he

50. Schmitt [1922] 1985, 32.

51. Ibid., 13. I have tried to trace dimensions of this legacy within contemporary securitization theory in Williams 2003.

52. Schmitt [1932] 1996.

53. A key ambiguity must be noted here, for while Schmitt often presents the concept of the political as simply "objective," it has often been argued that his vision is actually underpinned by a vitalistic commitment to violence and enmity as essential for the preservation of a "full" human life in opposition to the neutralization and depoliticisization of liberal modernity. On Schmitt as an exponent of a conservative vitalism, see Wolin 1992; for an excellent discussion in international relations, see Huysmans 1998.

54. This is one element of his critique of Weimar liberal-democracy, explored most fully in Schmitt [1926] 1985.

recognized (and in many eyes advocated) the conscious use of myth and violence as a particularly effective means of creating the division between friend and enemy, and thus of political mobilization and the production of a viable and vibrant political order.[55]

Morgenthau's thinking clearly bears the marks of his engagement with Schmitt. As discussed earlier, his understanding of politics as an undetermined realm of pure will reflects a similar position (and Nietzchean-Weberian heritage) on the specificity of politics, and he shares the view that the essence of sovereignty lies in the capacity for decision.[56] However the most important element of this relationship lies in the way that Schmitt's concept of the political provides a key position against which Morgenthau's understanding of a limited politics emerges.[57] The limited vision of politics can, in fact, be seen as a direct attempt to counter the Schmittian logic of enmity at both the conceptual and the social levels, and to avoid the radical realpolitik that is one potential outcome of the specific concept of politics he adopts.

As noted earlier, Morgenthau views democracy as based on the claim that there is no fixed idea of the right or the good, and that this openness is, paradoxically, itself the principle of democracy. Democracy, he asserts outright, is based on a "relativistic philosophy" and a "relativistic ethos" that is paradoxically protected by "certain absolute objective principles which legitimize majority rule but are not subject to change by it."[58] While decision may be the essence of sovereignty, the indeterminacy that is the essence of politics is the principle of democratic sovereignty. This indeterminacy itself must be a value to be defended if it is to survive, and this may require the application of violence. But the only legitimate exercise of violence is in support of the principled openness that is the essence of politics.[59] This is the paradoxical role of the state, and the limit of its legitimate exercise of violence.[60] The capacity for coercion may be important (indeed essential) in upholding political structures, but it is not their essence. Violence is only legitimate to the extent that it insulates the political sphere from forms of power derived from physical violence: the state's capacity for violence balances all attempts to bring violence into the political sphere, but this violence is limited to the defense of that order, it is not the principle of its operation.

These concerns are clearly expressed in Morgenthau's distinction between political power and military power. "When we speak of power" he argues, "we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other men. By political power we refer to the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority, and

55. See McCormick 1997; and Wolin 1992.
56. Morgenthau 1967, 307–25.
57. See Morgenthau 1933; Frei 2001, 132; and Scheuerman 1999.
58. Morgenthau 1970, 40–41.
59. On some readings this is Schmitt's position as well, but these issues are beyond the scope of this article.
60. Morgenthau 1967, 490.

between the latter and the people at large."[61] This is not merely an institutional distinction, it is a practical and ethical one: politics is a relationship of obligation and identification, and properly political domination takes this form and is constrained by these limits. By contrast "When violence becomes an actuality, it signifies the abdication of political power in favour of military or pseudo-military power."[62] The narrow conceptual definition of politics is here part of an attempt to distinguish the exercise of legitimate political power and domination, and particularly to insulate this sphere from the intrusion of physical violence and domination.[63]

Seen in this light, the narrow definition of politics and its clear delineation from other social spheres is not only analytically or methodologically driven; it is a part of a comprehensive political philosophy. Equating political power with physical violence would violate the autonomy of the political, reducing it solely to one of coercion and thus destroying the autonomy of politics. By defining politics narrowly, Morgenthau seeks to distinguish the forms of power appropriate to politics, to limit their legitimate exercise within the political sphere, to insulate the political sphere to the greatest degree possible from other forms of power, interest, and domination, and to ensure that the openness and capacity for change that is the promise of politics is not foreclosed by the domination of the interests and power structures of other spheres. The conceptual specificity—and thus narrowness—of politics is part of an attempt to justify a political practice in which the indeterminacy of the political sphere is understood in both its positive and negative dimensions.

However, the effectiveness of this strategy requires more than just conceptual clarity concerning the specificity of the political. As Morgenthau was well aware, ideas alone are rarely powerful enough to prevail in social life;[64] for the limited understanding of political power itself to have power, it must possess viable social foundations and be supported by competing interests. In pursuit of these foundations for a politics of limits, Morgenthau invokes one of realism's most basic concepts: the balance of power.

The Balance of Power as a Strategy of Limitation

The idea of a balance of power and interest is justifiably recognized as a key theme in realism. In light of the argument above, however, it takes on a significance much broader than the narrow focus on the interstate balance of power that has so dominated discussions in IR. For Morgenthau, the idea of a balance of power and

61. Ibid., 26.
62. Ibid., 27; see also Frei 2001, 127–28.
63. The affinities to Arendt's position in particular are clearly illustrated here.
64. Morgenthau 1967, 326.

interest is as complex and vital at the domestic level as it is at the international. Indeed the two are closely linked. A balance of power at the domestic level supports a politics of limits that, in turn, supports a limited foreign policy and provides a more solid basis for a balance of power at the international level.

Here the conceptual distinctions find a social expression and a political meaning. Distinct social spheres (economic, legal, moral, aesthetic) operating within their specific logics and forms of power can act as limits on the logic of politics and on the reach of the political sphere. While actors in these spheres may be tempted to further their interests and power by dominating the political field, these actors will also resist attempts by the political sphere to encroach on their autonomy, and vice-versa. What results is a social balance of power and interests in which the existence of nonpolitical spheres provides limits on an interest in politics and generates forms of interest and realms of power with an interest in maintaining politics as a limited sphere. In short, the idea of politics as a distinct sphere is linked to a strategy of balancing social spheres and interests against one another to limit the reach of politics while also limiting the influence of other spheres on the political.[65]

Yet this strategy of balancing contains a crucial paradox, and a vitally important corollary. In conditions of modernity, the processes of social differentiation must be balanced against their anomic and alienating consequences. In broad historical terms, the capacity for the individual exercise of power through a faith in the ultimate power (and judgment) of God that was a key plank in the moral economy of Christendom, providing even the most oppressed with a feeling of power. The breakdown of this moral economy of interest, along with the corresponding decline of cross-cutting and competing aristocratic hierarchies, destroyed the internal balance of power (and source of limitation) characteristic of feudal and early modern states.[66] The loss of belief in the power of the divine, and of an interest in religion, has left individuals in the anomic condition of modernity, and societal rationalization has increased this feeling of powerlessness. The progressive disempowerment created by bureaucratic political parties, conformist pressures of modern citizenship, and the alienating impact of large-scale industrial societies and capitalist production has led to a paradoxical rise in the mobilizing power of the state and an increase in the collective interest in, and power of, political logic. As Morgenthau puts it: "The growing insecurity of the individual in Western societies, especially in the lower strata, and the atomization of Western society in gen-

65. See also the excellent treatment of Weber in Hobson and Seabrooke 2001, 262–64. Indeed Morgenthau even allows that should these other forces become dominant, they can cause a nation to cease to act "politically," and a nation's engagement in international "politics" may wane whereby "under the impact of cultural transformations, which may make a nation prefer other pursuits, for instance commerce, to those of power." Morgenthau 1967, 26.

66. These (Nietzschean and Tocquevillean, respectively) themes are important in Morgenthau's explanation of the classical balance of power and its breakdown, most fully discussed in Morgenthau 1946. The Nietzchean elements are explored in Frei 2001, 112–20; the Tocquevillian in Ruiz 1995.

eral have magnified enormously the frustration of individual power drives. This, in turn, has given rise to an increased desire for compensatory identification with the collective national aspiration for power."[67]

For Morgenthau, this process was at the core of the rise of fascism. As a philosophy that rejected a politics of limits, which identified the essence of the political with violence, conflict, and the casting of Others as enemies, and which sought to inject this logic as broadly as possible in a process of social mobilization, fascism represents the ultimate social expression of an unbounded politics. In a passage worth quoting at length, he argues:

> Thus National Socialism was able to identify in a truly totalitarian fashion the aspirations of the individual German with the power objectives of the German nation. Nowhere in modern history has that identification been more complete. Nowhere has that sphere in which the individual pursues his aspirations for power their own sake been smaller. Nor has the force of the emotional impetus with which that identification transformed itself into aggressiveness on the international scene been equalled in modern civilization.[68]

While the existence of separate spheres and diverse forms of power and interest blunts the possibility of unified social expression of the will to power within the political sphere, it can also be the source of an (unlimited) political logic, giving rise to an international system of endemic and almost irreconcilable conflict. The logic of politics becomes merged with patterns of violence and enmity and extended destructively to all aspects of life, becoming the dominant logic of society as a whole and making its foreign policy wholly one of domination and conflict.

Morgenthau's concern with social balances, with playing off competing interests and limiting the political sphere, has clear affinities with liberal theories of the state, and he makes no attempt to conceal his admiration for liberal and republican systems of checks and balances at both the domestic and the international level.[69] But what marks Morgenthau's realism off from classical liberalism—and represents an under-recognized aspect of his critique of liberalism—is his insistence that a system of checks and balances, and of autonomous spheres, must continue to recognize the centrality of politics, and that balancing as a social strategy will only be effective if it is understood as a principled strategy, not a mechanistic

67. Morgenthau 1967, 100. For an insightful recovery of Morgenthau's views on human nature, see Koskenniemi 2001, 445–55.

68. Morgenthau 1967, 104.

69. Ibid., 164–67. In this way, Morgenthau's thinking has important links to republican traditions of thought explored in Deudney 1995 and Onuf 1998. Morgenthau's realism is also thus subject to sophisticated critiques of liberalism, which would allow for a fuller engagement between realism and other schools of IR and political theory.

process.[70] A failure to recognize these issues was at the heart of classical liberalism's inability to understand the nature of political relations, and its inability to cope with the rise of a "new nationalism" that reflected a shift in the structures of power and interest under conditions of modernity.[71] In reducing the principle of social differentiation to a mechanistic process of material self-interest, and allowing the political sphere to be dominated continuously by the holders of economic power, liberalism not only lost the sense of conflict and power central to politics: it also lost the sense of indeterminacy and reform that is the positive potential of political conflict. Indeed, it even lost the ability to see that change was necessary and possible, and as a result it gave rise to movements (both domestically and internationally) that rebelled against this order.[72] When this occurred, liberalism was incapable of mobilizing purely self-interested actors in defense of the liberal system itself.[73] Having reduced politics to the pursuit of material self-interest, classical liberalism failed to understand that liberal-democratic institutions required a commitment to the defense of the autonomy and value of the political sphere that could not be produced by pure self-interest. It was thus doubly and disastrously naïve, giving rise to a paradoxical and destructive synthesis of disenchantment and theology embodied in fascism, and consequently to the equation of politics with physical violence and total domination at both the domestic and international levels.

Morgenthau's conception of politics is not, therefore, just an analytic device: it is a moral and political project. Long-standing claims that his realism eschews morality, reduces freedom to determinacy, ignores domestic politics, and denies the possibility of progress are badly mistaken. This is not to say that his thinking is without difficulties. Taken in purely analytic terms, for example, his theory of distinct social spheres is certainly susceptible to many of the criticisms commonly levelled at Weberian-inspired methodologies. In particular, his presentation of separate social spheres as defined by specific logics—of economics solely with material gain, or eroticism as wholly with romantic love—risk obscuring rather than clarifying concrete practices. The economic and the romantic, for instance, were

70. A point of considerable relevance to contemporary theories of the "democratic peace" that focus on the importance of institutional checks and balances.

71. The nation of the "new nationalism," he argues, has dissolved the tension between morality and power by subsuming both under its own universalizing desires: the "nation, deeming itself intellectually and morally self-sufficient, threatens civilization and the human race with extinction." Morgenthau 1968, 60.

72. A position Morgenthau shared with E. H. Carr.

73. This is also true of the technologization of politics that would lead to a loss of belief and commitment in politics in itself. In this, Morgenthau agrees with Schmitt that the economic realm as one of material calculation and technical manipulation is not the same as the unlimited creative realm of the political. But unlike Schmitt, he does not ascribe to a vitalism in which all other spheres are devalued in contrast to this indeterminacy. Morgenthau's views on the technologization of politics are most clearly found in his first (1946) and last (1972) works in English. On Schmitt's views, see especially McCormick 1997.

rarely far apart in the dynamics of dynastic marriage,[74] and the play of power across different social spheres continues to be central to the operation of actual practices and forms of domination. To present social reality in such clear-cut terms is to risk both analytic distortion and political naiveté.[75] It is also to court the charge that in their replication of, for example, the distinction between politics and economics underpinning classical liberal economics, these categories are by no means politically innocent.

Yet it is also important to note that Morgenthau does not assume that these categories and social spheres are natural or given. On the contrary, he is aware that they have evolved as separate spheres through a series of historical struggles and conflicts. The autonomy of religion, for example, developed as a consequence of the political-religious conflicts of the Thirty Years' War, while the division between politics and economics reflects the class struggle in which the rising bourgeoisie came to supplant the aristocracy.[76] He also well recognizes that the political sphere (like all others) is in reality never pure, and that all spheres interpenetrate in ways that reflect the structures of power and interest operating in different ways at different times and places.

More importantly, however, Morgenthau's commitment to these categorical distinctions is more than just analytic: it is driven by a desire to maintain politics as an ethical principle or regulative ideal, and thereby to judge the extent to which it is capable of performing its role as an autonomous public sphere.[77] The autonomy of this public sphere is always problematic and can risk appearing almost utopian. Indeed Morgenthau's commitment to the autonomy of the political sphere often leads him to be deeply pessimistic in his appraisal of political developments. He is, for example, seriously concerned with the increasing penetration and domination of the political sphere by the economic in postwar America, and severely critical of the ways in which "scientific" and technical knowledge—not least in the increasing links of social sciences such as IR to policy formulation—threaten to dominate properly political debate.[78] These analyses may be overly pessimistic, or perhaps not. But by specifying the distinctiveness of politics, Morgenthau seeks to analyze how the autonomy of the political is threatened by domination by other spheres, and to point to the dangers—by no means irrelevant today—that this domination may entail.[79]

74. My thanks to Vibeke Schou Pedersen for this example.

75. By contrast, claims about processes of "de-differentiation" are, of course, central to many postmodern analyses.

76. Morgenthau 1946. Again, this theme is also pursued in Schmitt [1932] 1996; it is detailed historically in the Schmitt-influenced analysis of Koselleck 1988.

77. See Morgenthau 1960; and Goodnight 1996. For a very good analysis of the classical realists' (including Morgenthau) concern with American political culture, see Rosenthal 1991.

78. Morgenthau 1970, 13–39.

79. This may also help explain the oft-debated shift from Morgenthau's early work (with its extremely broad conception of politics) to his "American" writings, which advocate an extremely narrow view. On the surface, this seems to mark either a contradiction or a fundamental transformation in his posi-

Realism, Constructivism, and Collective Identity Formation

Placing Morgenthau's thinking in this broader context reveals a philosophic and political lineage often ignored in treatments of realism today, and challenges many—perhaps most—contemporary views about the foundations of realism and Morgenthau's place in the development of IR. Yet a recovery of this strand of realism is of more than just historical interest. It also has important implications for contemporary realism, and for IR theory more broadly. In this section, I explore some of these implications by looking briefly at a question that has come to occupy a prominent place in recent debates, that of collective identity formation. From the perspective of Morgenthau's realism, to open up the issue of collective identity formation is inescapably to open questions of ethics and requires an assessment of the relationship between political analysis, judgment, and action. These convictions sit uncomfortably, to say the least, with contemporary notions of analytic objectivity and social scientific responsibility that continue to stress the strict separation of fact and value, and that tend to dominate the positions of rationalists and many realists, as well as being at the center of debates over and within social constructivism. Indeed one of the most significant challenges arising from a reengagement with Morgenthau's realism lies in its claim that this vision of analytic neutrality is not a mark of scientific responsibility but is potentially a contribution to political irresponsibility.

In recent years, it has become increasingly common to claim that realism has clear affinities with (usually constructivist) theories of collective identity formation. Jervis, for example, holds that "Realism points to the reciprocal relationship between identities and conflict, arguing that conflict both grows out of and stimulates the perception of group differences," and that "Social psychologists have long known that perceptions—and misperceptions—of what people have in common often grow out of conflicts as internal unity is gained by seeing others as the Other."[80] Similarly, Sterling-Folker has drawn on recent work in sociobiology, where classical realist concerns with sin are replaced with Darwinian concepts of selection,[81] to argue that a realist "rereading" of constructivism's understanding of collective identity formation can contribute to a deeper understanding of realism's core claims about the inherently oppositional, and often conflictual nature of intergroup relations—whether those relations are between state or nonstate (for exam-

tion. In my view, however, it marks a shift in political judgment. The undifferentiated vision of politics as "intensification" (1933) is transformed into a practical judgment seeking to limit the sphere of politics in full consciousness of its intrinsically unlimited (and therefore potentially destructive) nature, and yet to defend a political sphere of (democratic) indeterminacy and limits. For a different, more instrumentalist, reading of Morgenthau's shift, see Wong 2000. My thanks to Oliver Jutersönke for an interesting discussion on this issue.

80. Jervis 1998, 988–89.

81. Thayer 2000.

ple, ethnic) groupings.[82] Perhaps most influentially, Mercer's treatment of "anarchy and identity" draws from social psychology, and social identity theory (SIT) in particular, to argue that because the individual only finds self-identity in the group, "people seek a positive self-identity that they gain by identifying with a group and by favorable comparison of the in-group with out-groups. These comparisons explain the pronounced tendencies for relative gains."[83] By placing the formation of individual identity via group identity as prior to the relations between groups, this view adopts the constructivist principle that identity is constructed while denying that anarchy is what states make of it. In fact, he argues, "the more carefully one examines the question of state identity in anarchy, the stronger the assumption of egoism becomes."[84]

Yet Mercer's analysis also provides perhaps the clearest illustration of the contemporary importance of Morgenthau's concern with the relationship between conceptual clarity and political judgment. As Mercer acknowledges, the claim that individual-group identity formation processes are prior itself requires explanation. Indeed a careful look at his analysis reveals that the process of identity formation is underpinned by a more basic set of claims about the nature and role of concepts and categorizations in individual identity formation. "Categorization" or the "cognitive requirement for simplication," he argues, is a "necessity" in social life and action. Categorization in turn involves comparison, and it is this necessary relationship between concepts and categories that ultimately explains the inescapably anarchic nature of intergroup relations. In light of its significance for the argument I have pursued above, this outcome is worth quoting at some length. As Mercer puts it: "Categorization explains comparison. When we categorize, we accentuate similarities within our group and differences between groups. Creating categories demands comparisons. These intergroup comparisons are not evaluatively neutral. Because our social group defines part of our identity, we seek to view our group as different and better than other groups on some relevant dimensions. In short, categorization is a cognitive requirement that demands comparisons; the motivational need for a positive social identity leads to comparisons that favor the in-group."[85] This vision provides a direct link between the nature and role of concepts and the nature of relationships between social groups. Categorizations are necessarily comparisons, and comparisons are dichotomous: in/out, us/them. Relations between groups necessarily resemble the nature of the concepts that underlie their construction and inevitable opposition.

It is precisely these kinds of arguments, however, that motivate Morgenthau's detailed engagement with conceptual analysis and its contribution to political judgment and action, and it is in light of their consequences that his otherwise seem-

82. Sterling-Folker 2002, 84. For innovative recent treatments of realism and identity construction, see Mitzen 2003; and Murray 2003.
83. Mercer 1995, 241.
84. Ibid., 230.
85. Ibid., 242.

ingly abstruse concerns with the concept of politics are clearly revealed. As I have shown, Morgenthau would deny neither the importance of conceptual constructions in action, nor the power of dichotomous or oppositional renditions of them. However, he argues that such understandings are radically and dangerously incomplete, potentially transforming claims about the nature of concepts into a claim about the nature of politics. It is exactly this move that Morgenthau finds in Schmitt, and it was precisely in an attempt to oppose an oppositional logic of identity formation—of politics as defined by the inescapable opposition of friend and enemy—that he develops his concept of politics. For Morgenthau, conceptual clarity is essential because it makes possible the political judgment that this stark form of division is not necessary and underwrites a responsible political opposition to it.

The importance of this issue can be brought out by looking at the question of judging actual political practices and strategies of identity formation. If, for example, the process of collective identity formation is necessarily oppositional, how is one to evaluate political strategies that seek consciously to manipulate and mobilize in-group/out-group animosities in the pursuit of political power? This poses directly the question of what it means to be a realist: if realism is the theory of power politics *par excellence*, does this mean that the height of political realism lies in the mobilization of social capacities and political power by casting Others—whether they be states or other collectivities—as enemies?

Recent attempts to link realism and collective identity formation have tended to shy away from these considerations in favor of an analytic neutrality. Thus, in Mercer's formulation: "The application of SIT to international politics suggests that we are stuck in a self-help system. It does not show, however, that war, conflict, and misery are natural and inevitable products of international politics. National leaders can pursue policies that increase their neighbours' and their own security. . . . They can do what they want; their competition can be either cooperative or coercive."[86] Similarly, in Sterling-Folker's view: "This does not mean that negative comparisons or intergroup competition must necessarily involve violence, since variance in access to natural resources and intergroup exposure also affect how much violence is a necessary component of group competition. Nor does it exclude the possibility that particular types of social practices might act as mitigating circumstances for intergroup violence. Yet neither possibility obviates the selection-by-competition logic operating across groups."[87]

This neutrality and indeterminacy is not without attractions, and these positions insist that division need not yield violent opposition. However, this neutrality is less satisfactory politically, for it begs the question of how (indeed if) such conceptions of realism are able to make judgments about—and take political stances toward—xenophobic political strategies. Morgenthau, by contrast, did not shy from

86. Ibid., 252.
87. Sterling-Folker 2002, 85.

a consideration of these issues. As I have shown, it is scarcely surprising that he did not do so, for his thinking was formed in an historical and political context where extreme formulations of in-group/out-group relations were linked to extremely violent political strategies at both the domestic and international levels, and where the ability to make judgments about those strategies was an essential element of political responsibility.

Morgenthau was well aware of the power of oppositional formations (and conceptual logics) of collective identity, of the need to recognize clearly the different social resources available for exploiting the positive potential of politics in these situations, and of the grim conclusions that might necessarily have to follow in the absence of those resources.[88] But ideas matter—and matter crucially—if the negative dimensions of politics are not to be mistaken for politics as a whole, and if its positive potential is to be realized. Here, the analytic and ethical come together, the one being neither reduced to, nor excluding, the other. Political realism cannot in this sense be defined by a view of objectivity defined as neutrality. It certainly requires a clear understanding of the nature of politics, and of the historical structures and limitations of a given situation; but responding to the dynamics of collective identity formation also requires a choice, and it is essential that this choice is underpinned by an ethos—an ethos that Morgenthau seeks to ground in the nature of politics itself.

As Morgenthau's engagement with Schmitt clearly demonstrates, he did not feel that the analyst could be wholly neutral in regard to the dynamics of collective identity formation and a politics of enmity. While it was essential to recognize objectively the dynamics and power relations involved in collective identity formation, and the intrinsic relationship between politics and power, it was equally essential to develop an ethical and evaluative stance toward these dynamics. If realism was not to descend into a crude realpolitik, and if a recognition of the centrality of power in politics was not to result in the reduction of politics to nothing more than power and violence, critical judgment was essential. To focus solely on an "objective" representation of existing practices in the name of social scientific method and a desire to avoid the intrusion of normative considerations in analysis is not a vision of political objectivity, nor of responsibility, that Morgenthau's realism could support.

Morgenthau's realist analysis of the concept of politics is part of an attempt to generate the "particular types of social practices" that might act to mitigate violent conflict and encourage nonviolent engagement. The idea of politics as a positive value—yoked to a principled commitment to a social balance of power designed to foster that openness and offset its negative potential—is a strategy to defend the positive potential of politics as a practical ethos, and to defend the

88. See, for example, Morgenthau's remarks on the relationship between rules, "social forces," and the definitional and decision-making role and capacity of the state in a realistic vision of international law. Morgenthau 1962, 303.

public sphere as an arena for critical, pluralistic engagement. Power can certainly be generated by enmity and division; indeed this may be one of the most effective tactics of all, and one of the key strategies of power is to foreclose the political sphere and to limit debate through the mobilization of oppositional identities. But, for Morgenthau, one of the core commitments of a realist theory of international politics lies in a resistance to this process,[89] and the concept of politics correctly understood provides an ethical (fundamentally democratic) position from which, and in the name of which, strategies of enmity can be resisted in both domestic and foreign policy.

These issues also speak directly to controversies within contructivist theory, particularly those between "conventional" and "critical" constructivists.[90] Indeed it is possible to argue that Morgenthau's thought reflects a profound concern with questions of the social construction of politics that is of the greatest relevance for both contemporary constructivist theory and its opponents. For Morgenthau, all constructions of the social world are not equal, nor can they be studied wholly in a detached way. A "moderate" constructivism that focuses only on the question of better methods of social scientific explanation is not, in this view, more responsible as a result of this moderation: it is potentially politically irresponsible in its unwillingness to address and evaluate the consequences of different social constructions.

The idea that the world is comprised of nothing but competing constructions, and that the sole task of "objective" analysis is to describe these as best it can, would mean that the question of whether those constructions and conventions are positive or destructive would be by definition unanswerable. There would, for example, be little reason why Schmitt's mythological politics of enmity in all its destructive dimensions would in principle trouble a "positivist" constructivism if a mirroring of the operation of such a politics is all that social constructivism entails. Without a critical, ethical, and evaluative dimension, a focus on the social construction of practices risks becoming politically irresponsible, and stands in stark contrast to the deeply politicized understanding behind Morgenthau's apparently simple definition and delineation of politics.

Seen in this light, the concerns found in Morgenthau's conception of politics resonate (admittedly somewhat paradoxically given his status as a prophet of "power politics") with a series of important moves to address the political and analytic consequences of a constructivist position. Wendt's stress on the importance of reflective judgment and the transformative potential opened up by the relational nature of identity, for example, could be seen as evoking many of the same concerns with the positive possibilities of the political sphere, and his recent questioning

89. See, for example, Ibid., 36–78, and Morgenthau 1970, 13–39.

90. See Adler 1997; Der Derian 2000, 77–83; Hopf 1998; and Price and Reus-Smit 1998; for links to realist criticisms, see Mearsheimer 1995, 92; and Jervis 1998, 974.

about "what is IR for?"[91] harkens importantly back to the practical and normative concerns that Morgenthau placed as central "commitments of a theory of international politics." In a similar fashion, the recent focus of theorists of argumentative rationality and discourse ethics on the importance of the public sphere make this connection even more explicitly.[92] By stressing a realm of practice defined by a principled openness, and distinct from physical violence, these theorists explore some of the same terrain as Morgenthau's delineation of the positive dimension of politics. Perhaps even more strikingly, the explicit interest of some post-structuralist thinkers with the nature and ethics of "the political" engages with related questions in a similarly direct fashion.[93]

Conclusions

There are certainly many different ways to assess what Gilpin called the "richness of the tradition of political realism,"[94] and I do not here claim to have discovered the essence of realism. Morgenthau's thinking is sometimes contradictory and is certainly open to challenge at many levels, and I in no way wish to suggest that his thinking maps seamlessly or easily onto current debates. What I have tried to do, however, is to demonstrate that his thinking engages with complex political and analytical traditions often ignored in understandings of realism today. While this examination of classical realism may open as many questions as it answers, I hope to have shown that a fuller examination of one of IR's most significant realist thinkers provides a point of engagement for a much fuller theoretical dialogue than the field's division into opposing "isms," or between "American" and European traditions, usually allows.[95] Positions often presented as diametrically opposed to realism do not stand at an unbridgeable distance from the realist "origins" of IR—at least in the strand developed by Morgenthau. On the contrary, they take up dimensions of that legacy in important ways.

To answer the question "is anyone a Realist anymore?"[96] (or whether anyone should be), it is clearly essential to have a clear understanding of what being a

91. Wendt 2001; it also links back to the important analysis in Ashley 1981. On the realist commitment to political criticism, see especially Rosenthal 1991, 141–76.

92. See Linklater 1998; and Risse 2000.

93. See Edkins 1999; and Walker 1995. On the ethics of identity, see particularly Campbell 1998; and Neumann 1998. For an interesting overview, see Shapcott 2001. The links between elements of poststructuralism and classical realism have also been noted by Guzzini 1998, 228; and Rengger 2000. For a detailed survey of the connections between important strands in American intellectual history and contemporary thought, see Diggins 1994.

94. Gilpin 1986.

95. See, for example, Wæver 1998, and the positions of Copeland 2003, Desch 2003, Glaser 2003, and Little 2003 in a symposium on "American" realism.

96. Legro and Moravscik 1999. This article brought a raft of replies from self-declared realists (Feaver 2000), but the diversity of these responses was as intriguing as their individual arguments, prompting their collection under the revealing (and perhaps ironic) subtitle: "Was Anyone Ever a Realist?"

realist actually was, and a fuller answer to this question requires that IR engage with traditions in political and social theory too long excluded from the field in the name of realism.[97] It is insufficient to limit these debates to a contest between various forms of rationalism within what Wæver termed the "neo-neo debate,"[98] or to ignore the insights of classical realism on the grounds that it is irretrievably simplistic. Recent debates about realism have often focused on the nature and adequacy of power and interest as analytic categories, and Morgenthau's realism certainly supports the case that a broad understanding of these concepts is necessary for cogent political analysis. But in this vision of realism, interest and power are not just analytic tools or morally neutral categories providing a straightforward basis for rationalist social science: they demand differentiated social, political, and ethical analysis and judgment.[99] Seen in this light, the desire of neoclassical realists, for example, to reach back to the "classical" tradition for a richness lost in the neorealist quest for parsimony represents a laudable move toward more complex and nuanced forms of analysis. But a fuller engagement with classical realism involves more than just the explanatory integration of domestic politics into an essentially neorealist theoretical edifice, and taking Morgenthau's contribution to classical realism seriously would challenge neoclassical realism to push its reconstruction of the realist project in directions well beyond the neorealist confines within which it has tended to remain. Equally, while Morgenthau's realism has often been cast in opposition to a constructivist approach, enquiring more fully into his understanding of politics reveals a deep and challenging contribution to contemporary discussions over the development of constructivist thinking. In this sense, both contemporary critics and supporters of a "realist" theory of international politics can be well served by a closer interrogation of the tradition that continues to provide a defining point around which current theoretical alternatives continue to define themselves.

Finally, this analysis also supports recent calls for a deeper engagement between IR and fields of political and normative theory from which it has too often, and often in the name of realism, been severed. Taking seriously Morgenthau's concept of politics and the philosophical and political lineage from which it emerges places realism within the orbit of some of the most vibrant contemporary debates in contemporary political science and social theory, ranging from the shifting nature of "the political" in political theory, to the contribution of historical sociology to IR, to the relationship between the social construction of political action (and its analysis) and the question of political responsibility. One of the most paradoxical outcomes of a deeper engagement with the narrowness of Morgenthau's realist concept of politics may thus lie in its contribution to a broader analytic agenda in IR, and a richer theoretical dialogue between the field and the rest of political science.

97. Der Derian 1997.
98. Wæver 1996.
99. Morgenthau's strongest critique of rationalist social science is, of course, in Morgenthau 1946.

References

Adler, Emmanuel. 1997. Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (3):319–63.

Amstrup, Niels. 1978. The 'Early' Morgenthau: A Comment on the Intellectual Origins of Realism. *Cooperation and Conflict* 13 (3):163–75.

Ashley, Richard. 1981. Political Realism and Human Interests. *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (2):204–36.

———. 1984. The Poverty of Neorealism. *International Organization* 38 (2):225–86.

Barkawi, Tarak. 1998. Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau, and Modern Strategic Studies. *Review of International Studies* 24 (2):159–84.

Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. Forthcoming. Power and International Politics. *International Organization* 59.

Bucklin, Steven J. 2001. *Realism and American Foreign Policy: Wilsonians and the Kennan-Morgenthau Thesis*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

Burch, Kurt. 1997. Constituting IPE and Modernity. In *Constituting International Political Economy*, edited by Kurt Burch and Robert A. Denemark, 21–40. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner.

Buzan, Barry. 1996. The Timeless Wisdom of Realism? In *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, edited by Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, 47–65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Campbell, David. 1998. *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Claude, Inis L. 1962. *Power and International Relations*. New York: Random House.

Copeland, Dale. 2000. Social Theory of International Relations. *International Security* 25 (2):187–212.

———. 2003. A Realist Critique of the English School. *Review of International Studies* 29 (3):427–41.

Der Derian, James. 1997. A Reinterpretation of Realism: Geneology, Semiology, and Dromology. In *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, edited by Francis A. Beer and Robert Harriman, 277–304. East Lansing: University of Michigan Press.

———. 1998. Post-Theory: The Eternal Return of Ethics in International Relations. In *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, edited by Michael Doyle and John Ikenberry, 54–76. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.

———. 2000. The Art of War and the Construction of Peace: Toward a Virtual Theory of International Relations. In *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*, edited by Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, 72–105. London: Routledge.

Desch, Michael C. 1998. Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies. *International Security* 23 (1):141–70.

———. 2003. It Is Kind to Be Cruel: The Humanity of American Realism. *Review of International Studies* 29 (3):415–26.

Deudney, Daniel. 1995. The Philadelphia System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union circa 1787–1861. *International Organization* 49 (2):191–228.

———. 2000. Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security, and Changing Material Contexts. *Security Studies* 10 (1):1–42.

Diggins, John M. 1994. *The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Donnelly, Jack. 1995. Realism and the Academic Study of International Relations. In *Political Science in History: Research Programs and Political Traditions*, edited by James Farr, John S. Dryzek, and Stephen T. Leonard, 175–97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2000. *Realism in International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dyzenhaus, David. 1997. *Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann Heller in Weimar*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ebata, Michi, and Beverly Neufeld, eds. 2000. *Confronting the Political in International Relations*. London: Palgrave.

Edkins, Jenny. 1999. *Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner.
Feaver, Peter. 2000. Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm (Or, Was Anybody Ever a Realist?) *International Security* 25 (1):165–69.
Frei, Christoph. 2001. *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*. Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana State University Press.
Gilpin, Robert. 1986. The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism. In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by Robert Keohane, 301–21. New York: Columbia University Press.
Glaser, Charles L. 2003. Structural Realism in a More Complex World. *Review of International Studies* 29 (3):403–14.
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Keohane, eds. 1993. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Goodnight, G. Thomas. 1996. Hans J. Morgenthau *In Defense of the National Interest:* On Rhetoric, Realism, and the Public Sphere. In *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, edited by Francis A. Beer and Robert Harriman, 143–65. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
Grieco, Joseph M. 1997. Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics. In *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, edited by Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 163–201. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
Guzzini, Stefano. 1998. *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*. London: Routledge.
Hanssen, Beatrice. 2000. *Critique of Violence: Between Poststructuralism and Critical Theory*. London: Routledge.
Haslam, Johnathan. 2002. *No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations Since Machiavelli*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Hindess, Barry. 1996. *Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hobden, Steven. 2001. Historical Sociology: Back to the Future in International Relations? In *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, edited by Steven Hobden and John M. Hobson, 42–59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hobson, John M., and Leonard Seabrooke. 2001. Reimagining Weber: Constructing International Society and the Social Balance of Power. *European Journal of International Relations* 7 (2):239–74.
Holsti, Ole. 1998. Models of International Relations: Realist and Neoliberal Perspectives on Conflict and Cooperation. In *The Global Agenda*, 5th ed., edited by Charles W. Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, 131–44. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Honig, Jan Willem. 1996. Totalitarianism and Realism: Hans Morgenthau's German Years. In *Roots of Realism*, edited by Benjamin Frankel, 283–313. London: Frank Cass.
Hopf, Ted. 1998. The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. *International Security* 23 (1):171–200.
Huysmans, Jef. 1998. The Question of the Limit: Desecuritization and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 27 (3):569–89.
———. 1999. Know Your Schmitt: A Godfather of Truth and the Spectre of Nazism. *Review of International Studies* 25 (2):323–28.
Jacobsen, John Kurt. 2003. Duelling Constructivisms: A Post-Mortem on the Ideas Debate in IR/IPE. *Review of International Studies* 29 (1):39–60.
Jervis, Robert. 1998. Realism in the Study of World Politics. *International Organization* 52 (4):971–91.
Kahler, Miles. 1997. Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory After 1945. In *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, edited by Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 20–53. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner. 1998. International Organization and the Study of World Politics. *International Organization* 52 (4):645–85.
Kegley, Charles, and Eugene Wittkopf. 1999. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. 7th ed. New York: St. Martins.

Keohane, Robert, and Joseph Nye. 1977. *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Little Brown.
Koselleck, Reinhart. 1988. *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*. Oxford: Berg.
Koskenniemi, Martti. 2002. *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laffey, Mark, and Jutta Weldes. 1997. Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (2):193–237.
Lapid, Yosef. 1996. Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory. In *The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory*, edited by Yosef Lapid and Fredrich Kratochwil, 3–20. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner.
Lebow, Richard Ned. 2001. Thucydides the Constructivist. *American Political Science Review* 95 (3):547–60.
Legro, Jeffrey W., and Andrew Moravscik. 1999. Is Anybody Still a Realist? *International Security* 24 (2):5–55.
Linklater, Andrew. 1998. *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*. Cambridge: Polity.
Little, Richard. 2003. The English School vs. American Realism: A Meeting of Minds or Divided by a Common Language? *Review of International Studies* 29 (3):443–60.
McCormick, John M. 1997. *Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mearsheimer, John. 1995. A Realist Reply. *International Security* 20 (2):82–93.
Mercer, Johnathan. 1995. Anarchy and Identity. *International Organization* 49 (2):229–52.
Mitzen, Jennifer. 2003. Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma. Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago.
Moravscik, Andrew. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization* 51 (4):513–53.
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1933. *La Notion du 'Politique' et la Théorie des Différends Internationaux*. Paris: Librarie du Recueil Sirey.
———. 1946. *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1959. The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Politics. In *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*, edited by William T. R. Fox, 15–28. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
———. 1960. *The Purpose of American Politics*. New York: Knopf.
———. 1962. *Politics in the Twentieth Century, Volume One: The Decline of Democratic Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1967. *Politics Among Nations*. 4th ed. New York: Knopf.
———. 1970. *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960–70*. New York: Praeger.
———. 1977. Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography: 1904–1932. In *Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans Morgenthau*, edited by Kenneth Thompson and Robert Myers, 1–17. Washington, D.C.: New Republic Books.
Murray, A. J. H. 1996. The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau. *Review of Politics* 58 (1): 81–107.
Murray, Michelle K. 2003. Recognition and the Logic of Security. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, February, Portland, Oregon.
Neumann, Iver B. 1999. *The Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Onuf, Nicholas G. 1998. *The Republican Legacy in International Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Owen, David. 1994. *Maturity and Modernity: Nietzche, Weber, Foucault, and the Ambivalence of Reason*. London: Routledge.
Petersen, Ulrik Enemark. 1999. Breathing Nietzsche's Air: New Reflections on Morgenthau's Concepts of Power and Human Nature. *Alternatives* 24 (1):83–118.

Philpott, Daniel. 2001. *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Pichler, H. K. 1998. The Godfathers of 'Truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of Power Politics. *Review of International Studies* 24 (2):185–200.
Price, Richard, and Christian Reus-Smit. 1998. Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory and Constructivism. *European Journal of International Relations* 4 (3):259–94.
Rengger, Nicholas. 2000. *International Relations, Political Theory, and the Problem of Order*. London: Routledge.
Reus-Smit, Christian. 2001. The Idea of History and History with Ideas. In *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, edited by Steven Hobden and John M. Hobson, 120–40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Risse, Thomas. 2000. "Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics. *International Organization* 54 (1):1–39.
Rose, Gideon. 1998. Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. *World Politics* 51 (1):144–72.
Rosecrance, Richard. 2001. Has Realism Become Cost-Benefit Analysis? *International Security* 26 (2):132–54.
Rosenberg, Justin. 1994. *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*. London: Verso.
Rosenthal, Joel. 1991. *Righteous Realists: Political Realism, Responsible Power, and American Culture in the Nuclear Age*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
Ruggie, John G. 1998. *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalism*. New York: Routledge.
Ruiz, J. M. 1995. Political Realism as an American Tradition: A Comparison of Hans Morgenthau and the Federalists. *Revue Tocqueville* 16 (1):201–15.
Scheuerman, William. 1994. *Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
———. 1999. *Carl Schmitt: The End of Law*. Lanham, Md.: Rowan and Littlefield.
Schmitt, Carl. [1922] 1985. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Translated by George Schwab. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
———. [1926] 1988. *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*. Translated by Ellen Kennedy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
———. [1932] 1996. *The Concept of the Political*. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schweller, Randall. 1998. *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Shapcott, Richard. 2001. *Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Michael J. 1986. *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
Spirtas, Michael. 1996. A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory. In *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, edited by Benjamin Frankel, 385–423. London: Frank Cass.
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. 2002. Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading. *International Studies Review* 4 (1):73–97.
Thayer, Bradley. 2000. Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics. *International Security* 25 (2):124–51.
Turner, Stephen P., and Regis A. Factor. 1984. *Max Weber and the Dispute over Reason and Value*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Underhill, Geoffrey. 1999. Conceptualizing the Changing Global Order. In *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, edited by Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill, 3–24. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vasquez, John. 1998. *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wæver, Ole. 1996. The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate. In *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, edited by Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, 149–85. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1998. The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations. *International Organization* 52 (3):687–728.

Walker, R. B. J. 1995. International Relations and the Possibility of the Political. In *International Political Theory Today*, edited by Ken Booth and Steve Smith, 306–27. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Warren, Mark. 1988. Max Weber's Liberalism for a Nietzschean World. *American Political Science Review* 82 (2):31–50.

Weber, Max. 1958. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Translated by Talcott Parsons. New York: Scribners.

Wendt, Alexander. 1995. Constructing International Politics. *International Security* 20 (1):71–81.

———. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2001. What Is IR For?: Notes Toward a Post-Critical View. In *Critical Theory and World Politics*, edited by Richard Wyn Jones, 205–24. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner.

Williams, Michael C. 2003. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (4):511–31.

Wohlforth, William. 1995. Realism and the End of the Cold War. In *The Perils of Anarchy*, edited by Sean Lynn-Jones, 3–41. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Wolin, Richard. 1992. Carl Schmitt: The Conservative Reactionary Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror. *Political Theory* 20 (3):424–47.

Wong, Benjamin. 2000. Hans Morgenthau's Anti-Machiavellian Machiavellianism. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29 (2):389–409.

Zakaria, Fareed. 1999. *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.