Ideology as Rationalization and as Self-Righteousness: Psychology and Law as Paths to Critical Business Ethics

Wayne Eastman

Rutgers University

ABSTRACT: Research on political ideology in law and psychology can be fruitfully applied to the question of whether business ethics is ideological, and, if so, what response is warranted. I suggest that legal and psychological research streams can be drawn upon to create a new genre of critical business ethics that differs from normative and empirical business ethics. In psychology, Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) suggests how the mainstream ideology within an academic field can be criticized as a reflection of a self-righteous, us-them mind-set. In law, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) suggests how a field's mainstream ideology can be criticized as a rationalization of the status quo. I suggest that the MFT and CLS criticisms of ideology can be joined to develop a critical approach to business ethics that seriously examines science on normatively charged topics, such as liberal-conservative differences and implicit attitudes, and that frames it in terms of alternative narratives.

KEY WORDS: ideology, critical business ethics, Moral Foundations Theory, Critical Legal Studies

BUSINESS ETHICS, MANAGEMENT, AND LAW all focus on providing reasoned, coherent answers to the questions of how and for whom managers should manage. Those questions have long been matters of vigorous contention among the political camps of the left, the center, and the right. Scholarship in business ethics and the other applied disciplines that aim to take rational positions on these questions can thus reasonably be characterized as ideological in a positive, non-pejorative sense of being classifiable with some degree of reliability and validity as to where it lies on the political spectrum.[1] Whether such scholarship and corresponding disciplinary practices are ideological in the pejorative sense of being a misleading effort to claim the mantle of general truth for a particular interest or cause is a subject that has attracted much attention in law and management over the past several decades. In management, this attention has been reflected in the formation of a Critical Management Studies division in the Academy of Management.[2] In business ethics, however, the possible connection between ideology and the discipline has attracted comparatively little attention.[3]

This essay will review literature in law and social psychology, with the aim of persuading the reader that the legal and psychological analyses of ideology can be applied to business ethics scholarship. Two academic movements within those fields

are particularly useful as a background for considering the potential role of (and the possibility of superseding) ideology in business ethics, and will be the central focus of the essay. Critical Legal Studies (CLS) as developed by Duncan Kennedy and others in the 1970s and 1980s criticized mainstream legal scholarship for presenting itself as non-ideological while actually being immersed in the politics of Warren Court–era legal liberalism.[4] Similarly, Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), as developed by Jonathan Haidt and others in the 2000s and 2010s criticized the left of center mainstream of social psychology for developing theoretical perspectives and empirical hypotheses purportedly divorced from ideology, but in fact driven by adherence to a community sacred value of anti-racism (Haidt, 2011). As we will see, the political valences of the CLS and MFT criticisms of their fields' mainstreams are different. CLS and its successor movements have questioned the legal mainstream from the left, on behalf of the possibility that criticism could open the eyes of legal academics and possibly judges and other practitioners to radical alternatives to existing legal doctrines and social norms. MFT is currently questioning the mainstream of social psychology from the center—as well as, in the hopes of Haidt (2012), from a perspective detached from ideological struggle—on behalf of the possibility that criticism may open the eyes of social psychologists to the possibility that the left-of-center academic mainstream underrates the values of loyalty, authority, and purity relative to the values of fairness and care.[5]

The CLS and MFT treatments of ideology within their fields can be related to the approaches taken by critical Marxism (Gouldner, 1980) and its critics (Mannheim, 1997). Part I of this article sets the stage with a discussion of the long-standing critical humanist debate between supporters and critics of Marx's definition of ideology as the falsely universalized ideas of society's rulers. Part II examines CLS and its successor movements—collectively, critical legal scholarship (cls)—that have criticized mainstream legal scholarship as ideological. Part II also offers a secondary focus on law and economics scholarship (l&e), which has provided a social scientific alternative to the legal mainstream, and on conservative legal scholarship, which has found a home within l&e. Part III examines a developing body of literature in social psychology that studies the psychological and evolutionary roots of political ideology. The focus will be primarily on MFT, which has criticized mainstream social psychological scholarship as exemplifying a group-oriented, us-versus-them "righteous mind" in its understanding of ideology (particularly politically conservative ideology) (Haidt, 2012). For MFT, "righteousness" is understood not in the religious sense of virtuous uprightness, but rather as self-righteous, polarized, and ideological thinking and feeling.

Part IV considers how the MFT criticism of mainstream social psychological ideology as partisan self-righteousness and the CLS criticism of mainstream legal ideology as rationalization of the status quo can be applied to business ethics. The section focuses on the possibility of drawing on key features of both MFT and CLS to create an inclusive critical movement within business ethics that challenges the central division in the field between behavioral scholarship and normative scholarship, and, further, is open to scholars from different positions on the political spectrum. I will suggest that the CLS and MFT frameworks can be helpful in fostering the

rise of a critical humanism in business ethics that fuses empiricism (or analytical modeling) with an aesthetic sensibility attuned to the multiple, normatively laden narratives that accompany science. As examples of how critical business ethics scholarship could engage in the reversal, or "flipping," of standard normative and social scientific theories, the section offers alternative accounts of the political dimensions of corporate social responsibility (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007) and of the politically charged topic of implicit attitudes (Reynolds, Leavitt, & DeCelles, 2010). In addition to helping to mediate the fundamental disciplinary dichotomy between empiricism and normative philosophy (Weaver & Treviño, 1994), I will suggest that critical business ethics might help in countering the all-too-human tendency to conflate debatable ideology with scientific or moral truth.

I. INTERPRETATIONS OF IDEOLOGY IN MARX AND HIS CRITICS

A. Marx and His Successors: Ideology as Rationalization of Dominant Interests

> [E]ach new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society. . . . [I]t has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.
> —K. Marx, *The German Ideology*

> What the philosophers once knew as life has become the sphere of private existence and now of mere consumption, dragged along as an appendage of the processes of material production, without autonomy or substance of its own. . . . Our perspective of life has passed into an ideology which conceals the fact that there is life no longer.
> —T. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*

Much of the literature on ideology to be reviewed in this article—in particular, one strand within critical legal scholarship and the mainstream in social psychology criticized by MFT—may reasonably be understood as carrying forward the approach to ideology advanced by Marx (1998) and continued into the twentieth century by the Frankfurt School, led by Horkheimer and Adorno (2002). Another substantial part of the literature reviewed here—in particular, the MFT criticism of the social psychological mainstream and an anti-self-righteousness strand within critical legal scholarship—may be understood as carrying forward the case of critics of Marx and of Frankfurt School Critical Theory who viewed Marx and his successors' mode of criticizing ideology as itself troublingly ideological.

For Marx, ideology consisted of ideas that reflect the material circumstances and interests of the dominant class in society, falsely expressed as universal truths. His definition—reflected in the quote above from *The German Ideology*—was accompanied by an effort to explain why the ideas associated with government by and for the working class do not constitute another falsely universalized ideology. Marx claimed that a working class majority aligned with the common interests of society, unlike the ruling class (Marx, 1998). The working class was thus for Marx what shareholders are for mainstream agency theorists (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), or

what stakeholders are for stakeholder theorists (Freeman, 1984): a class that in some sense transcends class because its interests coincide with the interests of the whole.

The Frankfurt School (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002; Adorno, 2005) retained Marx's definition of ideology as the false universalization of the interests of the dominant class, while jettisoning, or at least severely limiting, Marx's hopeful belief in working class rule as a way to transcend ideology and capitalism (Jay, 1974; Gouldner, 1980; Geuss, 1981). For Frankfurt School critics, a working class in thrall to Henry Ford's productivist ideology and prone to authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) suffered from false consciousness that debilitated it as an agent of revolutionary change. In the 1960s, some within the Frankfurt School tradition became more optimistic, finding hope for liberation among young people and blacks (Marcuse, 1969). As we shall discuss in Part III, this turn toward identifying groups beyond the working class as affected by, but capable of rising above, false consciousness has become influential within psychology (Jost & Banaji, 1994).

B. Critics of Marx: Ideology as Dogmatic Self-Righteousness

> In the utopian mentality, the collective unconscious, guided by wishful representation and the will to action, hides certain aspects of reality. It turns its back on everything which would shake its belief or paralyze its desire to change things.
> —K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*

> "Up to now, all revolutions have been made by moralizing dilettantes. They were always in good faith and perished because of their dilettantism. We for the first time are consequent. . . ."

> "Yes," said Rubashov. "So consequent, that in the interests of a just distribution of land we deliberately let die of starvation about five million farmers and their families —in one year."
> —A. Koestler, Darkness at Noon

Having noted the definition of ideology as rationalization by Marx and the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School and suggested its continued relevance, we must also define the contrasting approach to understanding ideology, as adopted by critics of Marxism. As Mannheim and Koestler suggest, the criticism of established ideas as ideology can enable an unpleasant denial of the social critic's own interests and a demonization of those with different views. This suggests an alternative critical definition of ideology, which is employed by the MFT school and reviewed here: Ideology is dogmatic political self-righteousness that idealizes one's own cause and demonizes the opposition. Ideology in this conception involves seeing reality in black-and-white terms and failing to appreciate the other side.

Historically, those who employed Marx's definition of ideology as the rationalization of the status quo have been split between those like Marx himself who were optimistic about the prospects of escaping ideology, and those like members of the Frankfurt School movement, who were not. A similar division occurs with those employing the alternative definition of ideology as dogmatic in-group self-

righteousness. Anti-Communists like Koestler and mid-twentieth century "end of ideology" social scientists like Bell (2000), Lipset (1960), and Shils (1954) shared Marx's optimism about escaping ideology, but from a very different political perspective: They argued that by embracing a centrist, democratic worldview, one could rise above the dangerous polarizations that ideology engenders. Not all who have worried about divisive ideological polarization have seen democratic moderation as an antidote to the pathologies of ideology, however. Mannheim (1997) saw ideology in the fierce anti-radical beliefs of moderates as well as in those of utopians, and accordingly shared some of the Frankfurt School's pessimism about alternatives to ideology. Likewise, as we shall see, Haidt (2012) in his exposition of MFT holds out a hope for transcending ideology only partially, and in the form of Zen-like detachment rather than in the form of centrist politics (or any other form of politics). That sense of ideology as pervasive yet also troubling is a key point of similarity between MFT and the CLS movement, to which we turn next.

II. ASSERTING THE POLITICAL NATURE OF LAW: THE CRITICAL LEGAL CHALLENGE TO THE LEGAL MAINSTREAM

Over the last several decades, the American legal academy has been challenged by CLS and its successor movements. Critical legal scholarship has criticized mainstream attempts to justify or reform the law through using the standard tool kit of legal argument: precedent, legislative intent, plain meaning, interpretation guided by public policy and fundamental constitutional values, and so on. Such standard legal advocacy, critical legal scholars have suggested, is unconvincing; it claims to be authoritative and rational, but in fact reflects the conventional wisdom of the judicial and academic status quo. The criticism of the centrist and liberal legal mainstream by cls has been from the left, and has aimed to open up terrain for radical left small-scale or large-scale alternatives to the academic and real-world legal status quo. However, we shall see that over time, the rise in the legal academy of the cls position—that standard legal scholarship is political—has gone along with the rise of conservative legal scholarship and of l&e aimed at providing a scientifically grounded alternative to mainstream scholarship.

A. Critical Legal Studies (CLS) and Critical Legal Scholarship (cls)

> My purpose is the rational vindication of two common intuitions about [individualism and altruism] as they apply to private law disputes. . . . The first is that altruist views on substantive private law issues lead to willingness to resort to standards in administration, while individualism seems to harmonize with rigid rules rigidly applied. The second is that substantive and formal conflict in private law cannot be reduced to disagreement about how to apply some neutral calculus that will "maximize the total satisfaction of valid human wants." The opposed rhetorical modes lawyers use reflect a deeper level of contradiction. At this deeper level, we are divided, among ourselves and also within ourselves, between irreconcilable visions of humanity and society, and between radically different aspirations for our common future.—D. Kennedy (1976)

> First of all, I renounce the fundamental contradiction. I recant it, and I also recant the whole idea of individualism and altruism, and the idea of legal consciousness. . . . I mean these things are absolutely classic examples of "philosophical" abstractions which you can manipulate into little structures. . . . "Nothingness is the worm at the heart of being." I'm willing to embroider that on the flag.
> —D. Kennedy (Kennedy & Gabel, 1984)

In the 1970s, the CLS movement pioneered an approach to criticizing the legal mainstream that jettisoned the Marxist belief in a coherent if malign legal logic that arises from the material conditions of capitalist production (Balbus, 1977). Instead, CLS adopted the view that the legal status quo was a patchwork of principles and rules with both reformist, liberal elements and also traditionalist, conservative elements (Unger, 1975, 1976; Kennedy, 1976).[6] Unger's and Kennedy's CLS work drew on the 1920s and 1930s legal realist movement and its claims about the open-ended, political nature of law (Hale, 1923; Frank, 2000; Llewellyn, 1930) and wedded them to Continental philosophy. CLS characterized the self and the legal system as split between contradictory value poles (Kennedy, 1979), with a consequent Sartrean freedom to choose at the individual and systemic levels (Kennedy, 1976). Over the past several decades, CLS has served as a starting point for an ongoing series of large and small critical legal movements in the United States (U.S.) and internationally, including Critical Race Theory (CRT) (Delgado, 1984; Bell, 1987; Williams, 1991); critical legal feminism (Olsen, 1983; Fineman, 1988; Menkel-Meadow, 1988); critical race feminism (Harris, 1990; Crenshaw, 1991; Matsuda, 1991; Wing, 2003); British critical legal studies (Fitzpatrick & Hunt, 1987; Goodrich, 1992); Latina/o critical legal theory (LatCrit) (Valdes, 1997; Delgado & Stefancic, 1998; Iglesias & Valdes, 1998; Johnson & Martinez, 1999); Asian-American critical legal theory (Chang, 1993; Matsuda, 2001); gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender (GLBT)/ queer legal theory (Levit, 2000; Fineman, Jackson & Romero, 2009); third world approaches to international law (Anghie, 2008; Gathii, 2011); and the ClassCrits Project (Mutua, 2008; Kessler, 2008). Together, these varied movements constitute a broad stream of cls.[7]

Unger's early CLS/cls work anatomized liberalism and modern law as systems of thought characterized by sharp antinomies between reason and desire, fact and value, and the individual and society (Unger (1975). In similar fashion, as illustrated in the quote above, Kennedy (1976) anatomized American contract law as a contested, open-ended domain that incorporated contradictory commitments to both individualism and altruism. The CLS/cls method of identifying competing value poles within the legal mainstream, such as individual and society (Unger, 1975), individualism and altruism (Kennedy, 1976), liberalism and conservatism (Kennedy, 1997), or reason and passion (Unger, 1975, 1984) has in the last decades been employed by critical movements in a variety of legal fields.[8] Cls work has argued that current fields of law, such as civil rights law or contracts, might be radically transformed, given their open-endedness and the presence of a real if subordinated element within the field (such as altruism) that could be used to support radical change that would benefit subordinated individuals and groups (Kennedy, 1986).

Critical legal method criticizes mainstream legal ideology, but at the same time may be described as ambivalently pro-ideology. It assumes the pervasiveness of ideology, the absence of ideology-free approaches to legal and ethical problems (Kennedy, 1983), and the value of radical alternatives. Often, as in the CLS critiques of legal rights (Tushnet, 1984b) and international humanitarianism (Kennedy, 2004), the legal mainstream that cls work criticizes (e.g., Dworkin, 1977) has been politically liberal rather than conservative.

A particularly interesting strand of cls work (Kennedy, 1995; Kennedy, 2004, Halley, 2006) fuses opposition to politically correct moralism with phenomenological accounts (Sartre, 1942) of the authors' own situations, and also employs cost-benefit analysis. Halley's case for "taking a break" from feminism, David Kennedy's case for treating one's human rights activism as that of a powerholder rather than that of an academic outsider speaking truth to power, and Duncan Kennedy's case for valuing the erotic pleasure for straight men from sexy dressing by women, carry on the original CLS commitment to being a modernist, avant-garde movement (Kennedy, 1997) that criticizes both the legal mainstream and moralistic critics of the mainstream for being stuffy, pretentious, and overly wedded to a sense of themselves as being in the right.

The criticism in some cls work of philosophical, political, and legal pomposity and over-seriousness, exemplified in Kennedy's "I renounce the fundamental contradiction" statement above (1984) and in the works just noted, has helped the movement by appealing to some who would have been left cold by politically correct, un-ironic leftist, feminist, or anti-racist denunciations of the legal mainstream. At the same time, though, the combination of radical political commitment with questioning of ideological moralism, appealing as it is in individual cls books and articles, has created tricky challenges for cls scholars.

The three major submovements within cls—CLS, feminist legal criticism, and CRT—have all declined, although not disappeared, in the 2000s, with CLS experiencing the earliest and steepest decline. As we shall see in the next section on law and economics and legal conservatism, a plausible explanation for that decline (along with the vagaries of academic fashion) is that the once-radical cls emphasis on the political nature of law has been assimilated by the legal mainstream as well as by l&e and legal conservatism. But it is also worth reflecting on the difficulty inherent in the cls strategy of combining renunciation of claims to being morally in the right with a radical renunciation of the status quo that is typically associated with a claim of being morally right.

Although feminist legal criticism and CRT have not been as preoccupied as CLS with questioning the rhetoric and emotions of moral seriousness, they have also featured their own internal and external struggles over the idea of being less pretentious and formal than traditional legal advocacy. CRT has weathered a substantial controversy associated with the use by a number of its leading figures (Bell, 1987; Williams, 1991; Delgado, 1995) of fictional, quasi-fictional, or memoiristic narratives that critics found unconvincing and troubling (Kennedy, 1989; Tushnet, 1992; Farber & Sherry, 1997). Within critical legal feminism, there have been significant divides between feminists who employ versions of the critical legal method de-

scribed above (Olsen, 1983; Fineman, 1988; Fineman, Jackson & Romero, 2009; Menkel-Meadow, 1988): power feminists who follow a "woman as proletariat" method, drawing on Marx (MacKinnon, 1982); and cultural feminists who draw on Gilligan (West, 1997). There have also been significant divides on the regulation of pornography, with a morally intense advocacy of regulation (MacKinnon, 1988) countered by a more pro-sex, anti-regulatory stance (Frug, 1992).

The suggestion here is that the decline of critical legal feminism and CRT in recent years, and of CLS over a longer period, has not been a function of the splitting off of new critical legal movements; the criticism, both mild-mannered (Sparer, 1984; Kornhauser, 1984; Altman, 1990) and more ill-tempered (Carrington, 1984; Johnson, 1984; Schwartz, 1984), that cls has faced; or of the lack of consensus within the movement on specific radical changes in the law (Fischl, 1992). Rather, as noted before, the claim here is that cls has lost steam basically because its fundamental point about the political nature of law no longer has an edge as the result of having been assimilated by other legal movements and by the legal mainstream. To that story we turn next.

B. Law and Economics Scholarship (l&e) and Legal Conservatism

The claim that mainstream legal doctrine is a messy amalgamation of liberal and conservative positions could lead one not to the left but to the right, and specifically to a pro-market version of economics that reframes standard legal analysis. That trajectory describes the career of Richard Posner, federal judge and polymathic founding figure of the American l&e movement (Posner, 2007). In several of his many publications, Posner has advanced a pragmatic jurisprudential framework that allows ideological, economic, and policy considerations to play some role in judicial decision-making (Posner, 1993, 2005, 2010). This framework explains left-of-center and right-of-center ideology in terms of a model of elites competing for popular support (Schumpeter, 1942; Posner, 2010).

Despite some criticisms of each other offered by Posner and critical legal scholars (Kelman, 1987, Posner, 1993),[9] there are considerable similarities between Posner's jurisprudence and that of the legal critics. These extend to origins as well as to substance. Posner, as the leading figure of Chicago l&e, and Kennedy and Unger, as the founding figures of CLS, shared a discontent from the right and the left, respectively, with the liberal late 1960s judicial and academic mainstream. The shrinking of the liberal legal mainstream over the last several decades as the l&e and conservative legal movements have risen reflects a win for Judge Posner's side. Further, the radical bent that cls imparted to jurisprudence has increasingly faced effective competition from Posner, Sunstein (1996, 2002b), and others with non-radical versions of the claim that law has a significant political component. But the history of the past few decades contains ironies that apply to Posner as well to the critics. The right-of-center bent that Posner originally imparted to l&e has faced growing competition from centrist and liberal perspectives as the movement has grown and matured (Ayres, 2003, Ayres & Brown, 2005). Noteworthy in that regard is the work of Cass Sunstein, who has identified a tendency of a group, such

as a jury or a panel of judges that is inclined in one direction, to polarize further in that direction after deliberation (Sunstein, 2002a). Sunstein has advocated ways to depolarize opinion, such as bringing people with different views together (Sunstein, 2007, 2009).

The rise in the U.S. over the past thirty years or so of a conservative legal movement inside and outside law and economics (Teles, 2008) that provides a counterweight to the liberal legal mainstream might have occurred because of general American political trends, regardless of the cls-led jurisprudential turn toward identifying law with liberal-conservative competition. Legal conservatives have adopted an approach that fits well with that turn, however. Their most important institution in this development, the Federalist Society, is structured around debates between liberals and conservatives (Teles, 2008).

More generally, there is a reasonable case that the cls emphasis on the connection of law and politics has been favorable to scholarship advancing social scientific and conservative alternatives to the liberal legal mainstream as well as leftist alternatives. The view that mainstream legal academic scholarship and judicial practice are structured by liberal-conservative ideological contestation was heterodox in the 1970s when Kennedy and Unger advanced it. It no longer is. That view has become mainstream through the work of Posner, Sunstein, and others. It is now widely, although not universally, accepted in the contemporary American legal academy, much as an earlier-reigning vision of law as reflecting the logic of institutional processes (Hart & Sacks, 1985) was accepted in its time. The growing acceptance of politics in law has opened up space in the American legal scholarship for l&e, for conservative and libertarian scholarship, and for Sunstein's urgings for moderation and depolarization, as well as for ongoing cls criticisms of the mainstream from the left. Conservative legal scholarship, although perhaps destined to rise in any case from its low ebb in the 1960s and 1970s, has done so in an environment in which the cls criticism of law as political has helped make it plausible to view conservatism as a yin that needs to be lifted up to balance the yang of legal academia's dominant liberalism.

III. CRITICIZING THE STATUS QUO IN PSYCHOLOGY: MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY

MFT (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007) has criticized the mainstream within social psychology for adherence to an us-them view of an "us" of enlightened liberals advancing the cause of anti-racism and other efforts to uphold social justice and compassion, and a "them" of benighted conservatives (Haidt, 2011). As an alternative to that view, MFT has advanced an empirical approach to political ideology that aims to decouple empiricism from liberal (or conservative) partisanship, and that supports a "yin-yang" conception of conservatism and liberalism as part of an enduring and valuable balance of opposites (Haidt, 2008). The prime aims of this section are to explain and evaluate MFT. First, though, it is useful to consider the mainstream within psychology that has given rise to the concern expressed in MFT (and its predecessor, social intuitionism (Haidt, 2001)) that the field has suffered from a conflation of empiricism and liberalism.

A. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) and System Justification Theory (SJT)

> From recent research on the unconscious modus operandi of stereotyping , we discuss the possibility that stereotypic justifications may operate implicitly. The unconscious nature of system-justification may allow existing ideologies to be exercised without the awareness of perceivers or targets.—J. Jost & M. Banaji (1994)

> Because of the rapid accumulation of research using the Race IAT in the last decade, two important findings are now established. First, we now know that automatic White preference is pervasive in American society—almost 75% of those who take the IAT on the Internet or in laboratory studies reveal automatic White preference. . . . Second, the automatic White preference expressed on the IAT is now established as signaling discriminatory behavior.—M. Banaji & A. Greenwald (2013)

Even as the classical Marxist challenge to capitalism and the critical Marxist challenge to productivism and consumer culture have both faded, psychologists have kept alive and, in some respects, strengthened the understanding of ideology as a rationalization of an unequal status quo. On the empirical side, a key innovation has been the IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Reynolds et al., 2010). On the theoretical side, a key approach that incorporates the IAT has been System Justification Theory (SJT) (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004). The IAT in its most renowned version is associated with the much-replicated finding, noted above by Banaji and Greenwald (2013), that even as most Americans profess egalitarian racial beliefs, most also—especially if they are white—match images and concepts faster when asked to sort positive valence words like "good" with images of white faces into one category and negative valence words like "bad" with images of black faces into another category than they do when asked to do the reverse, i.e., by associating the word "bad" with white faces and "good" with black faces.[10] Critics of the IAT, notably Tetlock and Mitchell (2009a, b, c), have suggested that the test is infected with ideological bias and lacks managerial relevance. In making the claim that the IAT does indeed have managerial relevance, Jost et al. (2009a, b) cite an array of studies and challenge Tetlock and Mitchell to do their own empirical studies rather than criticize others' studies or the purported ideological tilt of the IAT and its advocates.

I will return in Part IV to the topic of the managerial relevance of the IAT and will propose that business ethicists inspired by MFT should take a critical perspective on the standard account of the test exemplified in the quote from Banaji and Greenwald (2013), and should consider alternative forms of the test that emphasize implicit attitudes that are valuable in the workplace. To get to that point, though, we first need to understand the outlines of SJT as an approach to explaining political ideology that incorporates not only the IAT but also conscious attitudes, and also the critical response to the SJT perspective offered by MFT.

SJT (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004; Jost, 2011; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012) carries forward a technically improved version of the Adorno et al. (1950) project of examining the possibly troubling psychological determinants of the political right (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). The theory aims

to explain not only the roots of political conservatism (Jost et al., 2003) but also the psychological bases of support for social and economic inequality in terms of a basic motivation to uphold and justify a typically inegalitarian status quo (Jost, 2011; Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012). SJT analyses and meta-analyses have suggested that conservatism and support for inequality are correlated with arguably troubling psychological traits, including high threat sensitivity, closed-mindedness, intolerance of ambiguity, death anxiety, and in-group bias (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai, & Ostafin, 2007; Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010; Thorisdottir & Jost, 2011).[11]

By introducing a system-justification motive alongside the self- and group-justification motives (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), SJT suggests an explanation for conservatism and its appeal to less-advantaged individuals and groups in a way that resonates with popular discussions of why working-class people often support conservative parties (T. Frank, 2004). Under the SJT approach, there is an asymmetry between the liberal and conservative sides (Jost & Amodio, 2012), given the existence of a system-justification motive associated with fear of death and disorder that impels people toward conservatism. SJT thus has an interesting normative implication: If the asymmetry posited by the theory can be reliably demonstrated, the system-justification motive could be a thumb on the scales that leads people, including people in non-dominant groups, to favor conservative positions even if liberal, change-oriented ones would be better overall, or at least for non-dominant groups.

On the face of it, SJT is simply a positive empirical theory. There is no ringing set of normative SJT policy recommendations and no SJT stage theory à la Kohlberg (1981), in which people ascend from death-haunted conservatism to open-minded liberalism.[12] At the same time, though, the intriguing policy implications of a system justification motive both give the theory normative weight and open it up to criticism as a disguised form of left-of-center advocacy.

B. Challenging the Disciplinary Mainstream: Moral Foundations Theory

> Durkheimian social psychologists recently proposed a theory—called "Victim Justification Theory"—to explain the unconscious motives that impel Dissenters to defend traitors and challenge the legitimacy of the social system. In this paper we will suggest that . . . many people who "justify" the political/economic system even when it seems to work to their detriment are trying to act in accordance with moral concepts such as loyalty, tradition, hierarchy, order, respect for one's superiors, and sacredness. The politically homogeneous discipline of psychology, however, does not at present consider such traditional concepts to be a part of the moral domain.
> —J. Haidt & J. Graham (2009)

> So once you see this—once you see that liberals and conservatives both have something to contribute, that they form a balance on change versus stability—then I think the way is open to step outside the moral matrix. This is the great insight that all the Asian religions have attained. Think about yin and yang. Yin and yang aren't enemies. Yin and yang don't hate each other. Yin and yang are both necessary, like night and day, for the functioning of the world.—J. Haidt (2008)

The SJT combination of being implicitly critical of a broad social status quo and yet being part of a local status quo in social psychology invites criticism of SJT as itself being a form of system justification. That invitation has been accepted by MFT (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Haidt, 2012), which turns SJT on its head by adopting a critical stance toward the mainstream in social psychology and a more accepting stance than SJT toward support for the social status quo.

To understand MFT, it is useful first to understand its origins. MFT arose out of an empirically based challenge to Kohlberg's moral development theory, which places moral reasoning about justice and care at its core (Kohlberg, 1969; Gilligan, 1982; Turiel, 1983; Jorgensen, 2006). When Haidt, Koller, and Dias compared eleven groups of different socioeconomic status in Brazil and Philadelphia to University of Pennsylvania students on questions about purity, disgust, and moral judgments, they found that the Ivy League students were highly unusual. They often invoked universal principles to overcome their initial reactions of disgust ("It's not actually morally wrong to eat the family dog that's been killed in an accident for dinner, because no one is harmed") in a way that members of the other groups did only rarely (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). But rather than understanding the difference between the students and the other groups in terms of Kohlberg's rationalistic theory of moral stages (1958, 1971, 1981)—where the students would be at a higher, post-conventional "Stage 5" or "Stage 6," and other groups lagging—Haidt, Koller, and Dias, and other critics of Kohlberg, such as Shweder (1991) and Fiske (1991), asked whether highly educated Westerners were actually more morally advanced relative to more traditional groups. Kohlberg's critics suggested that instead of being characterized as more morally developed, the students should be characterized as "WEIRD" (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).

Haidt (2001) drew on Haidt et al. (1993) and related research (Haidt, Bjorklund & Murphy, 2000; Haidt & Hersh, 2001) showing "moral dumbfounding," in which a great majority of respondents are not able to justify their emotion-laden, instantly made moral judgments on matters like the wrongness of eating the family pet. This discussion was the starting point for a broad review of empirical literature on intuition, affect, and reason that advanced a social intuitionist model of morality as an alternative to the rationalist approach advanced by Kohlberg (1969) and Turiel (1983). Under the social intuitionist model, moral intuition typically precedes moral judgment and moral judgment typically precedes moral reasoning, with all of these forms strongly affected by interpersonal, often group-related, considerations.

MFT, using the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) as a starting point, directly addresses liberal and conservative moral judgments. MFT treats both liberalism and conservatism as examples of motivated, group-oriented, affect-driven, litigious, righteous moral reasoning (Haidt, 2007).[13] With its three proposed moral foundations that resonate in both post-conventional and conventional terms (fairness/cheating, care/harm, and liberty/oppression) and three that resonate mainly in conventional or traditional terms (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation) (Haidt, 2012), MFT can be understood as a perspective on ethics as a whole, like the social intuitionist model and the typologies of Shweder

(1991) and Fiske (1991), from all of which MFT draws. Given that, a major part of MFT's interest for business ethicists (Weaver & Brown, 2012) and others concerned with ethics (e.g., Pinker, 2011) lies in its connection to morality in general, quite apart from its connection to the moral judgments related to ideology that are the domain of this review.

Although Haidt (2001) respected Hume's call to avoid confusing "is" and "ought" (2003), noting that social intuitionism was an account of how moral judgments were made, not an account of how they *should* be made, there is a significant normative implication associated with MFT and the original and restated social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Especially given the framing of MFT in terms of evolutionary psychology and "Durkheimian utilitarianism," to which we will turn later, the theory can be reasonably taken as a defense, not just a description, of all six proposed moral foundations as being socially functional, including the sanctity/degradation foundation espoused by working class and non-U.S. respondents in Haidt et al (1993).

From the inception of the theory, a core empirical proposition of MFT has been that there is a basic difference between the moral foundations prioritized by liberals and conservatives. Liberalism per MFT prioritizes three individualizing foundations (fairness/cheating, care/harm, and liberty/oppression) over three "binding" or communitarian foundations (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation), while conservatism tends to endorse all the foundations equally (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2012).

There is a growing body of MFT empiricism (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007; Graham et al., 2009, 2011; Haidt, Graham & Joseph, 2009; Iyer, Graham, Koleva, Ditto, & Haidt, 2010; Lewis & Bates, 2011; Koleva, Graham, Ditto, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). The major MFT empirical results fall into three major categories: a) confirming the core MFT hypothesis of conservative breadth (or balance) and liberal narrowness (or focus) (Graham et al., 2009); b) confirming a secondary hypothesis that libertarians will have a yet narrower or more focused moral scope than do liberals, tilted toward the liberty/oppression foundation and away from the other five foundations, especially the traditional ones (Iyer et al., 2012); and c) confirming an additional secondary hypothesis that conservatives are more accurate in understanding liberals and their moral focus than are liberals in understanding conservatives and their moral breadth (Graham et al., 2012), an interesting result that one might expect to be true given the basic MFT finding that conservatives value all of the foundations that are valued highly by liberals while liberals place a relatively low value on the binding foundations valued highly by conservatives.[14]

The central empirical results concerning the core MFT proposition relating to conservative breadth and liberal narrowness are laid out in Graham et al., 2009. Conservatives showed a relatively similar ranking of the moral relevance of the sanctity, authority, loyalty, fairness, and harm-related factors, while liberals ranked the fairness and harm-related factors much higher than the other factors. There was greater liberal agreement with moral judgments that invoked the fairness and care-related foundations, while conservative judgments were fairly evenly distributed

across the foundations. Further, liberals stated they would need greater monetary incentives for cheating and harm violations than for disloyalty, disrespect, and impurity violations (e.g., slapping your father in his face with his permission as part of a comedy skit, for the authority foundation), with conservatives again showing fairly balanced responses.

The criteria for selecting foundations, the number of foundations that pass the test for inclusion, and how the foundations are described, are key issues for MFT (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007; Haidt, 2007; Haidt, 2012). Compared to Shweder's (1991) simple triune of autonomy-community-divinity division or to Fiske's (1991) division into sharing, authority, equality, and market domains (which can be seen as a comprehensive approach to the ethics of who gets what), the expanding list of moral foundations in MFT (four in the nascent version [Haidt & Joseph, 2004], five in Graham et al., 2009, and now six with the liberty/oppression foundation [Haidt, 2012]) lends itself to questions of "why not more or fewer?"

Much as it presents difficulties (Suhler & Churchland, 2011), the open-ended quality of MFT compared to the related Shweder and Fiske approaches is arguably a virtue for purposes of theory development (Graham et al., 2013) and allows researchers to make discoveries that improve the theory rather than allow it to remain static (Haidt & Joseph, 2011). Further, one can reasonably defend MFT as being attuned to virtue ethics (MacIntyre, 1981; Sadler-Smith, 2012) and to the search for what moves people to strong moral emotions of elevation, righteousness, communion, anger, and so on. One hopes the theory over time will allow for combining as well as splitting foundations. But the idea that MFT might incorporate, say, honesty/lying or conscientiousness/laziness as foundations, perhaps combining that incorporation with a classification, seems less subversive of the theory than a sign of MFT's potential to make a contribution.[15]

From its inception, MFT has been expressed in terms of evolutionary psychology (Wilson, 1975; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Aligning MFT with an account of evolved moral nature has provided the theory with a powerful overall counter-narrative to the Kohlbergian narrative of development upward toward post-conventional morality. It also has created the possibility, thus far not realized in MFT scholarship, of a turn to analytical modeling that parallels the broader turn in that direction evident in modern evolutionary theory (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Wilson, 1975). At the same time, it has brought baggage to the theory that must be unpacked, and such unpacking relating to innateness, culture, and other Darwinian themes has been a significant concern in MFT (Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2011).

The MFT version of evolutionary psychology has been carefully couched and hedged (e.g., in the statement in Haidt & Joseph, 2007: "*The first draft of the moral mind has diverse moral content that was specified in advance of experience, but this innately given content gets revised and greatly extended during the course of development as children actively construct their moral knowledge within a cultural context that uses narrative to shape and guide the development of specific virtues*" [italics in original]). It has also been couched in the form of powerful, value-laden, and speculative narratives about prehistory. For example, in proposing a liberty/oppression moral foundation, Haidt (2012) suggests that the part of human morality

that is concerned with equal division did not arise from the fairness/anti-cheating moral foundation, which impelled band members toward a just deserts, karmic concern with reciprocity (Trivers, 1971). Rather, equality concerns in the MFT account derived from liberty/anti-oppression in the form of a reactant drive to resist bullying alpha males (Boehm, 1999).

There are intriguing questions for MFT as to when and how liberal-conservative opposition began, and further interesting questions about the value or disvalue of that opposition in the past and present. Were the communities of human prehistory characterized by a consensus on moral questions such as the reality of sacred beings and the importance of worshipping them? Or were they communities in which individuals and perhaps groups differed on such moral questions, although presumably without the openness and fervor with which camps of secular liberals and devout conservatives compete in modern democratic politics? Was moral diversity, if it flourished in human prehistory, a socially functional aid to the success of early humans? And how about moral diversity in the more recent past and in the present?

Drawing on Emile Durkheim's sociological focus on community (1893, 1897), Haidt (2012) advocates "Durkheimian utilitarianism." The Durkheimian utilitarian perspective assumes that humans are fundamentally groupish, social creatures, and emphasizes the functionality of community and of the binding moral foundations of authority, loyalty, and purity as well as the individualizing foundations of fairness, care, and liberty. That consequentialist, socially oriented perspective can be interpreted in either a consensualist fashion—shared values are enduringly useful and are threatened by a lack of consensus on which moral foundations are important—or, in a more relaxed, yin-yang fashion—within the overarching framework of our groupish, Durkheimian spirit, there has, from the beginning of the species to the present, been a socially functional back-and-forth between conservative adherence to tradition and liberal openness to change, and between conservative values, such as respect for authority, and liberal values, such as resistance to alpha-male bullying.[16]

The suggestion here is that it makes sense to acknowledge uncertainty about what the facts of the matter really were and are in regard to the origins and the value of differing moral sentiments in the human past and present. The facts about value cohesion and value diversity and their consequences matter, but we simply do not know and are unlikely to know any time soon much of what we would like to know about the consequences in the present, much less in the past. If acknowledged across political lines, that uncertainty may allow evolutionary psychology in its Durkheimian utilitarian, MFT incarnation to take on an identity not as a claim of discovered truth, but as a critical humanist movement that includes both consensualist and yin-yang narratives of the human moral past and present under the same big tent.

The popular side of MFT is well-illustrated in Haidt's conference presentations (2008, 2011) about stepping out of the "moral matrix," appreciating the yin-yang balance of liberalism and conservatism, and avoiding liberal "locker-room" talk that disdains conservatives. MFT in its popular form can be described as a form of consciousness-raising for liberals: one can truly instantiate the liberal universalism one believes in and reach Kohlberg's elusive Stage 6 by rising above liberal us-them partisanship and transcending SJT-style justification of the status quo ideology of

one's liberal community. Given its blend of elements, MFT is best understood not as a positive or normative theory of either ethics or ideology alone, but as a hybrid theory that attempts to integrate the analysis of morality and ideology while also focusing critically on the politics of social scientific empiricism. As such, MFT can be evaluated positively, neutrally, or negatively as a theory that politicizes ethics and social psychology; it can also be evaluated, with the same range of valences, as a theory that ethicizes politics and psychology.

MFT in its early and recent formulations alike has been characterized by normatively laden calls for mutual respect between liberals and conservatives. Another recurrent theme has been concern over a tilt within psychology in favor of liberalism and the moral foundations associated with liberalism. Haidt & Graham (2007) carried out a content analysis of the valence of references to care, justice, loyalty, authority, and purity in two leading journals, finding that the individualizing foundations were treated more favorably than the binding or traditional ones. In an informal presentation of the theory, Haidt (2011) called for social psychologists to institute affirmative action for conservatives (so as to achieve "yin-yang" balance). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its critical stance in regard to its home discipline, MFT has not displaced SJT and SJT's kindred approaches as the mainstream in social psychology. In recent years, however, MFT has been joined by balance-oriented (Choma, Busseri, & Sadava, 2009; Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Braithwaite, 2009, Tetlock and Mitchell (2009b), and conservative (Brooks, 2007, 2008, 2010) approaches to understanding the psychological correlates of political ideology. Whether or not the future of social psychology is post-partisan, as envisioned in Haidt 2011, the field now features a lively challenge to the focus of SJT and kindred theories on the arguably dubious psychological foundations of conservatism.

Even-handed though MFT is in regard to treating liberals, conservatives, and other political and moral advocates alike as biased, self-righteous natural lawyers, the Durkheimian utilitarianism component of MFT has a normative implication that tilts in a conservative direction for liberals: To the extent one cares about the efficacy of one's moral, political, or managerial agenda, one needs to realize that the binding, or "Durkheimian," values of authority, loyalty, and purity are socially functional, whatever one's reservations may be about their role in a particular setting. To focus on management, one should consider that an agenda focused only on the fairness, liberty, and welfare values embraced by liberalism fails to account for important parts of what motivates the majority of people who are not WEIRD liberals (and perhaps those who are WEIRD liberals as well), and may well encounter significant practical difficulties as a result. The MFT critique has a similar message in regard to philosophical systems connected to liberalism: Adherents of the narrow set of values embraced by Kantian deontology, Benthamite utilitarianism, and libertarianism, all of which MFT criticizes (Haidt, 2012), need to be aware that their conceptions fail to take seriously very significant parts of human moral nature, and are hence flawed as practical guides to life in organizations, in which authority and loyalty play major roles (Weaver & Brown, 2012) and in which purity concerns may also be important.

IV. IMPLICATIONS: POSSIBILITIES FOR CRITICAL BUSINESS ETHICS

> These two stanzas from the Zen master Seng-ts'an contain, I think, the deepest insights that have ever been attained into moral psychology: "If you want the truth to stand clear before you, never be for or against. The struggle between for and against is the mind's worst disease." Now unfortunately, it's a disease that has been caught by many of the world's leaders. But before you feel superior to George Bush, before you throw a stone, ask yourself, do you accept this? Do you accept stepping out of the battle of good and evil? Can you be not for or against anything?—J. Haidt (2008)

Can there be a viable form of critical scholarship in business ethics that steps out of the battle of good and evil? Or, in the end, would an effort to critically examine the ideological presuppositions of mainstream business ethics be associated with its own morally charged, argumentative positions, such as MFT-inspired negative reactions to the dominance of liberal moral foundations in the standard approaches in the field, or cls-inspired negative reactions to the dominance in the field of a status quo–upholding fusion of liberal and conservative elements? In this section, I begin with the premise that mainstream business ethics, with its division into a significant normative side and a significant empirical side, differs substantially from both mainstream legal scholarship, with its normative focus, and also mainstream social psychology, with its empirical focus. In the distinctive split quality of the business ethics mainstream, I contend, there lies the potential for a critical movement that is not itself simply a new form of moral or political argumentation.

For scholars with different substantive moral and political agendas and methodological approaches to join forces in business ethics to create a body of critical scholarship, there needs to be a feeling of discontent (or something else) that unifies them. The suggestion here is that discontent with being limited to an unduly narrow choice between "for-or-against" normative ethics and purportedly value-neutral empirical ethics may provide the impetus for supporting a broad critical approach to business ethics that fuses science and humanism in its method. As discussed in the previous section on MFT and Durkheimian utilitarianism, such a critical approach to business ethics could stipulate that our human moral nature is normatively significant, yet maintain an open-minded stance in regard to the accidental qualities of that moral nature and the consequences of ideological and other types of moral diversity. More broadly, such a critical approach could take the position that science is highly important to business ethics and also uphold a humanistic position that science, as applied to ethics, involves multiple narratives that have differing normative implications and whose factual status is theoretically knowable but not actually known.

Out of a commitment to the ethical significance and open-endedness of science, a critical position could be forged. Critics could engage in the business ethics equivalent of the reversal or "flipping" of standard normative stories central to cls (Kelman, 1987) and carried out in the Haidt and Graham (2009) narrative of an alternative world in which the community of social psychologists is dominated by conservative communitarians rather than liberal individualists. One could fuse the MFT concern for taking seriously and respecting the traditionalist, conservative

elements of human moral nature with the strand of cls work, epitomized in Janet Halley's *Split Decisions* (2006), that reverses standard left and feminist as well as centrist and conservative stories while also employing experiential, phenomeno-logical accounts and l&e style cost-benefit analysis. In doing so, one could create what, in the spirit of Haidt and Graham 2009, could be dubbed as "Durkheimian flipping." That critical process could also be termed "Confucian flipping," in the spirit of Kim and Strudler (2012), who develop an alternative narrative of human sacredness based not on Kantian autonomy but on Confucian participation in cultural ritual; or "Daoist flipping," in the spirit of the Daoist emphasis on yin-yang balance and the juxtaposition of dual or multiple goods rather than the juxtaposition of good and bad, or good and evil (Haidt, 2008; Graham et al., 2013).

As an initial example of where flipping might lead us, let's consider corporate social responsibility (CSR), and, specifically, the political conception of corporate social responsibility (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2008). The political conception of the firm begins with the positive point that firms are or could be important politi-cal actors in a globalized world with weakened nation-states, and then employs a Habermasian framework to consider normative issues of how firms could become embedded in deliberative democratic politics. Or, as Scherer and Palazzo (2008: 427) put it, "The politicization of the corporation translates into stronger connec-tions of the corporation with those ongoing public discourses on 'cosmopolitan' or 'higher-order' interests [citations omitted] and a more intensive engagement in transnational processes of policy making and the creation of global governance institutions such as the Forest Stewardship Council or the Marine Stewardship Council or the numerous human rights initiatives that are emerging."

From the perspective of Durkheimian/Confucian/Daoist flipping, one could construct a number of alternative narratives of the actual and potential political role of transnational corporations. In one such narrative, one could begin with the way in which democratic nation-states feature significant conservative parties and particularistic, localistic, traditional streams of opinion alongside universalistic liberal ones. One could then theorize on the possibility that effective and desirable corporate political involvement in a globalized world will work exactly in that fashion, with traditional communitarian moral foundations and modern individual-izing ones playing a significant role. For example, a transnational firm motivated by traditional binding moral foundations along with individualizing foundations might demonstrate loyalty to a low-income country with low-quality extractive institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) by sourcing locally (Porter & Kramer, 2011) and by devoting resources to back local forces who support better institutions, while at the same time expecting and receiving deference to its moral and economic authority from the country's government and people.

In Durkheimian/Confucian/Daoist flipping, one examines all the MFT moral foundations to tell stories of how a corporation's social responsibilities are embedded in the conservative-tilting foundations of authority, loyalty, and purity as well as the individualizing foundations. The point of the preceding example on how corporate activism can draw on the loyalty and authority foundations is not to suggest that the individualizing foundations are less important than the Durkheimian, socio-centric

foundations. The individualizing moral values of fairness, liberty, and care can and should lead a corporation to act in certain ways on behalf of social justice, human rights, and weak parties unprotected by a nation-state, just as political CSR and standard CSR suggest. Rather, the point of flipping is to instantiate and make practical the spirit of Haidt's call in the concluding chapter of *The Righteous Mind* (2012) for an irenic, both/and rather than either/or approach to the polarities of traditional and modern, binding and individualizing, conservative and liberal.

As a second example, I would suggest that Durkheimian/Confucian/Daoist flipping can usefully be applied to open up discussion in business ethics of the important and morally charged subject of the IAT and the relevance of implicit attitudes in the workplace. As previously noted, the standard social psychological story of the IAT, told by Jost and Banaji (1994) and Banaji and Greenwald (2013), is that negative stereotypes of groups, such as racial minorities, that are repudiated by individuals at the conscious level emerge at the level of quick, automatic moral classification. That story is a powerful and troubling one. It amply merits reflection at the practical and scholarly levels on the questions of whether it is a good idea or not for business ethicists to introduce and discuss the Race IAT in their classes, as many social psychologists do in theirs; whether it is a good idea or not for managers to introduce and discuss the test in their organizations; and whether it is a good idea or not for business ethics scholarship to follow practitioner-oriented management scholarship (Banaji, Bazerman & Chugh, 2003) by addressing the IAT and its relevance to workplace ethics.

The suggestion here is that Durkheimian/Confucian/Daoist flipping that draws on MFT and cls can allow the sensitive topic of implicit attitudes in the workplace to be treated by business ethicists in a way that avoids the unproductive self-righteous moralism that Tetlock and Mitchell see in the standard social psychological story of the IAT (2009b). There is indeed reason to be worried about a one-sided account that uses the science of implicit attitudes only to tell a story that juxtaposes liberal enlightenment against the forces of reaction. Concern about such one-sided moralism and fear of creating a partisan field akin to social psychology may explain the reluctance within business ethics, noted by Brief (2012), to address stereotyping and prejudice. But the concern, valid as it is, can be addressed by an approach that tells not only the standard implicit attitudes story but also alternative IAT stories in which quick, automatic moral classification is normatively desirable rather than undesirable.

Taking a critical flipping approach to the managerial implications of the IAT involves doing creative work that brings to life the simultaneously significant and also open-ended nature of the relevant science. One intriguing non-standard use of the IAT could involve creating an alternative story that emphasizes the potentially constructive nature of implicit attitudes Instead of being asked to quickly match up positive and negative valence words with faces from different racial groups, respondents could be asked to match GOOD and BAD with scenes of behavior in which a consensus exists that what is shown is bad (e.g., workplace theft or other workplace crime) or good (e.g., employees working hard), and researchers could

then measure respondents' levels of underlying moral clarity (or relative lack of moral clarity) based on their response times.[17]

Unlike the negative stereotyping revealed by the Race IAT, moral clarity in the form of rapid, automatic classification of morally desirable behavior as good and of morally undesirable behavior as bad is, at least on the face of it, normatively desirable. Managers and employees with high levels of moral clarity might be described as well-habituated to virtue at an automatic, intuitive level (Sadler-Smith, 2012), while those with low levels of clarity could be seen as less well-habituated. The normative issues with a Moral Clarity IAT would be knotty, just as they are with the Race IAT. The point here is not to assert a position on the normative issues associated with either version of the test. Rather, the point is to note that the standard negative stereotyping IAT story and the alternative moral clarity IAT story, if taken together rather than separately, provide the basis for a normatively inclusive critical perspective.

As the contentious exchange between Tetlock and Mitchell (2009b) and Jost et al. (2009a) well illustrates, the IAT stereotyping narrative is likely to provoke an ideologically charged "science war" (Kahan, 2007; Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans, & Rachlinski, 2012) if introduced by itself into business ethics and used as a basis for a normative argument that managers should emulate psychology professors by having their employees take the Race IAT and engage in consciousness-raising aimed at having white employees accept the reality of prejudice and the value of affirmative action and other approaches to counter it . The same "science war" outcome would be a likely outcome of an effort to introduce the alternative Moral Clarity IAT into business ethics by itself as a basis for a normative claim that managers should have employees take a Moral Clarity IAT and provide counseling to them on ways to increase their moral clarity.

In contrast to either a one-sided Race IAT approach or a one-sided Moral Clarity IAT approach, a critical business ethics stream of research that open-mindedly describes both stories, conducts (or describes) research related to both of them, considers their normative implications, and makes appropriately modest policy recommendations related to them would have a much better chance of avoiding a science war. Even a critic who winds up tilting toward one side or the other in suggesting alternatives to the current managerial mainstream—for example, by favoring administering either the Race IAT or the Moral Clarity IAT at a firm, but not both—can get some considerable distance away from dogmatism and axe-grinding by acknowledging and discussing multiple IAT stories.

If a "telling alternative stories" critical approach to business ethics that adopts the MFT and cls concern for not conflating ideology and science is to be of value, it must be applicable to a range of significant theoretical and practical concerns in business ethics. Beyond the examples discussed here, flipping could be applied to a wide range of empirical and normative approaches in business ethics to ask how these approaches would look if Durkheimian/Confucian/Daoist lenses were added to the standard ones supplied by morally narrower Kantian, Benthamite, and other theories that emphasize only certain moral foundations and fail to capture the totality of human moral feeling and experience. So, for example, what do prevailing notions

of corporate and managerial moral duties embodied in shareholder primacy (Friedman, 1970), stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), and Integrative Social Contracts Theory (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999) that are usually seen through fairness and utility lenses look like through Durkheimian/Confucian/Daoist lenses? And what about flipping not only the IAT but also behavioral research in other normatively charged topics, such as ethical ideology (McFerran, Aquino, & Duffy, 2010), the equity-efficiency tradeoff in group interactions (Garcia, Bazerman, Kopelman, Tor, & Miller, 2010), and offers in ultimatum games (De Cremer, van Dijk, & Pillutla, 2010)? Should critical business ethics gain traction as part of the field, it has a rich array of prospective topics to examine.

By telling together two or more stories related to empirical research, such as the IAT or normative theory, such as CSR, and by treating all of the multiple stories seriously, the critic forgoes the force that comes from relying on one story alone as a basis for an ethical argument or an assertion of scientific truth. By telling alternative stories and stepping aside if only for a moment from the battle of good against evil and truth against error, however, the scientific humanist critic informed by MFT and cls together may also gain something valuable. One may become less the creature of ideology in the pejorative sense of being dominated either by self-righteousness or by rationalization of a liberal, conservative, or centrist status quo. And one may aspire to, and perhaps achieve, critical work animated not only by moral passion and the passion for scientific truth, but also by the appreciation of beauty and by the desire to create it.

V. CONCLUSION

The literature in law and social psychology that criticizes ideological mainstreams in these fields has considerable potential applicability to business ethics. MFT and critical legal scholarship together could help create a sub-field of critical business ethics that would emphasize the value of alternative narratives and that would provide a valuable corrective, complement, and alternative to mainstream normative and empirical business ethics.

NOTES

1.   On the transition in the United States (U.S.) and elsewhere from class-based forms of left and right politics centered on economics (Lipset, 1960) to contemporary forms with a major cultural component, see Inglehart (1977, 1990) and Clark and Lipset (2001). In keeping with the Inglehart-Clark-Lipset approach, a modern left-of-center (or liberal, in U.S. terms) political platform can be defined as one that combines support for egalitarianism and social welfare programs in the economic sphere with support for experimentation and individual freedom in the cultural sphere. A modern right-of-center or conservative platform can be defined as one that combines support for markets and individual freedom in the economic sphere with support for tradition and social control in the cultural sphere.

2.   Alvesson and Willmott (1992, 2003).

3.   Little attention, but not none. Recently, Mäkinen and Kourula (2012) analyzed the political ideologies associated with three phases of corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature, including new political CSR

(Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). See also Lodge, 1982 (individualist and communitarian ideologies); Goodpaster, 1985 (same); and Watson, Shepard, Stephens, & Christman, 1999 (same). Also, there are relevant streams of work in the discipline that draw upon Continental theorists who critically analyze existing understandings and institutions, although without the central focus on ideology of the work described in this review. See, for example, Crane, Knights, & Starkey, 2008 (Foucault); Painter-Moreland & Werhane, 2008 (Continental philosophy); and Worden, 2009 (Nietzsche).

4.   There is a contrast in this respect between CLS and critical management studies, which has tended to identify the business school mainstream as conservative. With its focus on criticizing a legal mainstream that it accurately identified in U.S. political terms as left-of-center and liberal, CLS, in the judgment of the present writer, offers a more realistic basis for criticizing a mainstream within business ethics that is to the left of the U.S. political median than does critical management studies. For a differing perspective that treats the business ethics mainstream as pervaded by libertarian, free-market ideology, see Mäkinen & Kourula (2012).

5.   Haidt has recently modified the theory to include a sixth foundation, liberty/oppression, drawn upon by both liberals and conservatives; that proposed new foundation is covered in his recent book, *The Righteous Mind: How Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion* (2012) and discussed in Iyer et al. 2012.

6.   Critical Legal Studies as a movement drew early support from left-leaning legal academics associated with the Law and Society Association; Schlegel (1984) and Trubek (1984) discuss the relationship of CLS to empirical social science and Law and Society.

7.   Critical Legal Studies is sometimes referred to as "cls" rather than "CLS" (e.g., Kennedy, 1997); in this article, "cls" refers to the broader movement of critical legal scholarship inspired by, but not limited to, the original CLS movement.

8.   Significant early contributions included Freeman, 1977 (civil rights law); Frug, 1980 (municipal law); Tushnet, 1983, 1984a (constitutional law); Olsen, 1983 (family law); Gordon, 1984 (legal history); Kelman, 1984 (law and economics); and Feinman, 1984 (contract law).

9.   In keeping with the reflective cls focus on disciplinary style, there has been more cls attention to l&e than the other way around; a subgenre of cls to which the author has contributed involves relating alternative versions of standard l&e stories that have different normative implications from the standard stories. Kennedy & Michelman (1980); Eastman (1996a, 1996b, 2000).

10.   For information on the IAT and sample IATs that can be taken online, see Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/.

11.   Although the focus of SJT on conservatism's psychological roots has often resulted in findings of correlations between conservatism and "negative" traits, as in the studies noted in the text, it should be noted that SJT studies have also found connections between conservatism and traits that most would consider neutral or positive, such as orderliness, conscientiousness, happiness, and a sense that life has meaning (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Napier & Jost, 2008; Rankin, Jost, & Wakslak, 2009).

12.   The treatment of ideology as system justification that underlies SJT has some similarity to the approach taken in cls. Both movements highlight the role of liberalism and conservatism: Just as cls from the 1970s to the present has replaced the classical Marxist idea of a capitalist logic of production manifested in law with the idea of law as a zone of on-going contestation between liberalism and conservatism, SJT has replaced the Marxist idea of a basic opposition between classes and between capitalism and an alternative socialist or Communist system with the idea of a basic opposition between system-justifying conservatism and change-supporting liberalism. Unlike SJT, however, cls holds itself apart from the mainstream in its field, places liberalism as well as conservatism within the mainstream, and has not been concerned with remaining on the "fact" side of Weber's fact-value dichotomy.

13.   The MFT image of political believers accords well with a recent body of empirical work showing both liberals and conservatives alike reacting in a quite comparable partisan and biased way to the same facts (e.g., a video of a demonstration) depending on certain manipulations (e.g., whether the subject is told that the demonstrators are anti-abortion activists or anti-war activists) (e.g., Kahan, 2007, 2011; Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans, & Rachlinski, 2012). The empirical results showing large and roughly symmetrical biases cast doubt on a "one side is worse than the other" claim of a significant asymmetry between the sides in favor of reality-based liberals over biased conservatives, or of fact-based, engineering-oriented conservatives over fact-twisting, lawyerly liberals, much as it should be acknowledged that testing biased ideological reasoning and determining its relative magnitude among liberals and conservatives is tricky.

14. As an extension of Graham et al., 2012, it would be interesting to ask liberal and conservative respondents how much they believe the "typical liberal" and the "typical conservative" would get the other side wrong. The idea would be to test a phenomenon that MFT would lead one to expect and that might be styled "conservative defensiveness." That is, conservatives (rationally, per the MFT framework and Graham, et al.) believe that liberals misunderstand them. Then, per the defensive mechanisms of ideological thinking applicable to them as well as to other groups, they would exaggerate that rationally based perception. Allowing for the usual issues, it would be interesting to know whether "conservative defensiveness" results in conservatives exaggerating liberal misperceptions of them more than liberals exaggerate conservative misperceptions.

15. The suggestion here is that MFT researchers should not be unduly concerned about whether a given virtue/vice is truly foundational—much as that issue may be highly important for other purposes in constructing the theory—in considering and testing their basic claim about conservative breadth and liberal narrowness. If that claim is a strong one, it ought to work well with a broad, simply worded set of virtues/vices with a significant historical provenance, such as those itemized by Aristotle and Aquinas, not just with those currently incorporated as foundational.

16. Although the explicitly Darwinian framework of MFT brings the questions just noted to the fore in thinking about that theory, they also can be applied to SJT. Was the system justification motive operating more or less in its current form in pre-WEIRD societies? Was it then countered by some people—"reality-based hunter-gatherers," or "paleo-liberals"?—who were more flexible and open to new experiences, perhaps had a sense of themselves as a group, and provided a useful counter to their system-justifying peers? Or were we all on the same system-justifying page until the Enlightenment and the rise of liberal group-consciousness circa 1800?

17. It would also be of interest to use the IAT to test associations between different major stakeholder groups such as executives, workers, and shareholders and positive and negative valence words.

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