developed as rapidly as they did before the first World War. Her volume will certainly be a welcome addition to the literature on nineteenth and twentieth century German aesthetic culture.

Marion Deshmukh George Mason University

History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Ninenteenth Century. By Ivan T. Berendt. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2003. Pp. 330. \$39.95. ISBN 0-520-23299-2.

With his most recent book Ivan Berendt has finished his impressive trilogy of the history of modern Central and Eastern Europe. Volume one covered the post-World War II period, volume two the interwar period, and he is now discussing the long nineteenth century (his other books are: Central and Eastern Europe, 1944-1993: Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery [Cambridge, 1996] and Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II [Berkeley, 1998]. Berendt stays firmly in the Sonderweg tradition developed earlier by historians in Hungary like Istvan Bibo and Jenö Szücs who also followed a Marxist approach. According to them and to Berendt, East Central European history is a deviation. Berendt has stressed this vision in the very title of his new book. Using the term "derailed" for Central and Eastern Europe implies that in Western Europe, history is on track. This distinction between a normal and an exceptional development is built upon a heavy dose of determinism, such as used by Szücs in his famous book about the three regions of Europe (in German published as Die drei historischen Regionen Europas [Frankfurt, 1990], also translated into French and Polish). Berendt begins his new monograph about Central and Eastern Europe with an overview of distorted structures, which, already in the early modern period, set this part of the continent on a special path of history. All the peculiarities of the region are seen in negative terms. Ethnic mixture, its geopolitical location, slower population growth, and of course the Turkish invasions are among the culprits creating a "sleeping East" (p. 5) that "hibernated" until the beginning of the nineteenth century (pp. 5 and 36).

Just at the moment when the reader is in danger of falling asleep because of the abundance of structuralism and Berendt's tiring fashion to treat the same problems in each single country of the region from Albania to Lithuania, the narrative takes a new turn. As the author acknowledges Central and Eastern Europe finally was awakened through romanticism, which, besides early nationalism, is the topic of the second chapter. Berendt explains well the specific and

long-lasting significance of romanticism for the region. He shows convincingly how it combined with the Enlightenment and allowed the "combining messages of reason *and* emotion" to break through (p. 42, see also p. 77). In this part of the book Berendt moves elegantly between economic data, the history of ideas, music, arts, and politics and thus provides a much more colorful picture of the region than that given in his structuralist overture.

In the following chapters titled "Uprising and Reforms" and "Economic Modernization" Berendt also adds a new twist to his traditional Marxist approach. He contends that one of the major motivations making the region move forward was its own perception of backwardness. Thus, the history of the region is not reduced to factual differences between Western and East Central Europe, but is shown to have been driven in part by a contemporary perception of difference. This means that on top of his traditional structural comparison Berendt adds a relational dimension. In doing so, the author leaves behind the binary comparison between an idealized West and a presumably backward Central and Eastern Europe that one finds in many older books about the region and in his own first chapter. According to Berendt's relational approach and his optimistic conclusion, Central and Eastern Europe greatly reduced the gap in development with Western Europe through the import of and adaptation to Western models and the region's own efforts. One can only support this view and should add to it. Especially Bohemia, but also some parts of Germany had long caught up with Western Europe by the late nineteenth century. However, they still perceived themselves as latecomers, with fateful results in particular for German history. This auto-perception contributed to a longing for nationalist grandeur born out of an inferiority complex and the claim that one's own nationalism is defensive only. This defensiveness greatly reduced the possibilities for compromises between the competing nationalisms of the region. Berendt also portrays nationalism as one of the main dangers of the period and a basis for authoritarianism during the interwar period.

While one can easily agree with this diagnosis, doubts about the concept of the book remain. The first problem is one of generalization. Berendt attempts to cover all countries and peoples between the Germans in the West, the Eastern Slavs in the East and the Turks in the southeast. Several misspellings and grammatical errors indicate that Berendt is less well oriented in the history of the small Slavic nations. What are, for example, the historical commonalities between Czechs and Albanians? It would have been more convincing to concentrate on East-Central Europe, which in the past decades has also been well established as a structural region and object of study (see the works of Jenö Szücs, Klaus Zernack, Piotr Wandycz and other authors). Because of his overstretched geographical reach including all of southeastern Europe, Berendt also fails to show adequately the strong influence of the Austrian state on the region. Thus he draws an artificial border within the Habsburg Empire between

Austria and Hungary, but also between Poland and Ukraine or Russia. His book is clearly strongest in its chapters and paragraphs about Hungary. But even there it remains a deficit history, which is based on a one-sided hermeneutical basis. Since the author views the history of the entire region as derailed from the very beginning of his trilogy, no other result is possible than the confirmation of this presupposition. Backwardness becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. After reading the whole book the reader may be certain that Berendt derailed the history of Central and Eastern Europe, but is longing for a change from this well-established story line. Especially for teaching purposes The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present" by Piotr Wandycz appears to be the preferable book for the long nineteenth century. This does not reduce the value of Berendt's whole trilogy, in particular for the analysis of interwar authoritarianism and the socialist regimes. And one should use the opportunity of this review to congratulate the author on the occasion of his 75th birthday for his lifelong achievements as a historian and for finishing his series of three books

> Philipp Ther Europa-Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt an der Oder

Gender and the Modern Research University: The Admission of Women to German Higher Education, 1865–1914. By Patricia M. Mazón. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2003. Pp. ix + 297. \$65.00. ISBN 0-8047-4641-9.

Patricia Mazón's new book fills a major gap in the scholarship about the German Empire. The admission of women to fulltime student status at German universities is a wonderful subject and Mazón has written a real "page turner." She has delved both deeply and broadly into primary unpublished sources, contemporary articles and books, as well as digging up photos of many of the women she writes about.

She has made a number of contributions that will make the book required reading for historians of Imperial Germany as well as scholars interested in higher education and women. First, she raises the issue of whether women succeeded in gaining the right to matriculate in the first decade of the twentieth century by using an argument derived from the Enlightenment about individual rights or, perhaps, older Germanic ideas of corporate rights and responsibilities. In raising this issue she is seeking to look at the broader picture of the decline of liberalism in the 1890s and the resurgence of corporate