

# *Teaching ‘Correct’ Attitudes: an Anglican Emissary to Sweden and Finland in 1944*

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*In autumn 1944, the British Ministry of Information sent one of its officials, the Revd Herbert M. Waddams, to Sweden and Finland. His task was to collect information about opinions in church circles in both countries and to try to persuade them to a more favourable attitude towards the Allies, especially the Soviet Union. Sweden had remained neutral throughout the war and Finland had just made peace with the Allies. Waddams’s memoranda on the trip reveal how the assessment of the international situation by a representative of a British government ministry differed from that of churchmen in Sweden and Finland.*

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On the whole I was not very favourably impressed by the Finns. They seem to have a narrow outlook, and few of them seem to be capable of seeing any of the larger issues at stake in the political events in Europe. Finland is the centre of their world, and there is a strong nationalist spirit which affects all their views.<sup>1</sup>

It was in these terms that the Reverend Herbert M. Waddams, an official of the religions division of the British Ministry of Information, described the Finns after a visit to Sweden and Finland between 20 October 1944 and 2 January 1945. This article discusses Waddams’s visit and his impressions, mainly with reference to his reports. Naturally, the war, international politics and plans for the new Europe overshadowed everything

ÅAB, GOR = Åbo Akademi Bibliotek, G. O. Rosenqvists arkiv; KA = National Archives, Helsinki; EG = Eelis Gulin papers; AL = Alekski Lehtonen papers; LP = Lambeth Palace, London; LPL = Lambeth Palace Library, London; ULA, EEA = Uppsala Landsarkiv, Erling Eidems arkiv

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<sup>1</sup> ‘Visit to Finland of the Rev. H. M. Waddams’ [Jan.–Feb. 1945] (hereinafter cited as Memorandum ‘Finland’), LP, LR file 31/3.

at that time; for that reason the main focus is upon Waddams's remarks on politics and the political role of the Churches.

### *Background*

During the war Sweden and Finland were in very different situations. Sweden remained neutral, although economically linked to Germany, in particular by supplying iron ore. During the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland, the Church of Sweden was very active in arranging humanitarian aid for Finland. It also had contacts with both German and British churchmen. Some Swedish churchmen had even acted as mediators between Britain and the resistance movement in Germany through Bishop George Bell. The Church of Sweden was in an interesting position, both theologically and politically, between Anglicans and continental Protestants, and its importance for the reconstruction of church relations after the war was self-evident.<sup>2</sup>

Finland could not remain neutral. On 30 November 1939 Finland faced attack from the Red Army, which it resisted until a peace treaty was signed on 13 March 1940. Although many warm words were spoken about Finland in the west, it received little in the way of military aid. The peace conditions imposed upon Finland were harsh, and left the Finns hoping for revenge. During the following year Finland drew closer to Germany, and when Germany attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Hitler declared that Germans were fighting against Bolshevism 'in league' with the Finns. The political leaders of Finland quickly declared that their country remained neutral and that it was waiting for Russian action. Three days later the Soviet Air Force bombed various targets in Finland, and the country was again at war with the Soviet Union, only this time it was much better prepared. Finland wanted to see its war as a separate war and Germany as its 'co-belligerent' rather than as an ally, though there were German troops fighting on the Finnish borders. The war was seen as a continuation of the Winter War.<sup>3</sup>

The German attack caused the Soviet Union and Britain, despite ideological differences, to form an alliance against their common enemy. That was a disappointment to the Finns who continued to expect to receive, if not military aid, then at least some sympathy from the British in their

<sup>2</sup> Eberhard Bethge, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: theologian, Christian, contemporary*, London 1970, 661–76; Eino Murtorinne, *Suomen kirkon historia, IV: Sortovuosista nykypäiviin, 1900–1990*, Porvoo 1995, 273–6.

<sup>3</sup> Seppo Hentilä, 'From independence to the end of the Continuation War, 1917–1944', in Osmo Jussila, Seppo Hentilä and Jukka Nevakivi (eds), *From grand duchy to a modern state: a political history of Finland since 1809*, London 1999, 181–7, 197–8; Eino Jutikkala, 'Independent Finland', in *A history of Finland*, Porvoo–Helsinki–Juva 1996, 436–41, 443–7.

efforts against the Soviets. Deeper bitterness resulted from the British declaration of war on Finland on Finnish Independence Day, 6 December 1941. The Finnish army quickly recaptured the areas lost in the Winter War, and crossed the old border, invading Soviet-held eastern Karelia. The Finnish government hoped that the newly occupied areas could be of use in future peace negotiations, but the idea of 'a Greater Finland' of which eastern Karelia would be an integral part lived on in certain circles. From December 1941 until June 1944 the front was rather quiet.<sup>4</sup>

Winter 1942–3 was a turning point for the Germans on the eastern front with their surrender at Stalingrad in February 1943. The first attempts at peace negotiations were made by the Finns at that time, but it was another year and a half before Finland and the Soviet Union finally agreed upon a ceasefire on 4 September 1944. According to the terms of a treaty signed on 19 September 1944, Finland agreed to expel German troops from its territory. By the end of 1944 there was only a handful of Germans left in northern Lapland, near the Norwegian border. The terms of the treaty included large territorial concessions and heavy war reparations.<sup>5</sup>

The Allies set up a special military commission in Helsinki to supervise the carrying out of the terms of the armistice. This began its work in September 1944. Although officially an Allied commission, in practice it was run by the Soviets with Colonel-General Andrei Zhdanov at its head. In a memorandum to the War Cabinet in August 1944, the British secretary of state, Anthony Eden, had admitted that Finland lay within the Soviet Union's sphere of interest. The fact that Zhdanov was the highest-ranking political officer on the Leningrad front, known for his role in the annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union in 1940, made the Finns very nervous. All in all, the atmosphere in Finland at the end of 1944 was full of uncertainty and fear for the future. Rumours of an impending coup by Finnish communists with the assistance of the Soviet Union or about possible Soviet occupation spread, fuelling flames of insecurity already burning within a jittery public.<sup>6</sup>

Throughout the war, the Church of Finland had supported the Finnish war effort. Its position in Finnish society was strong; its members constituted 96 per cent of the population. It had maintained contacts with German Lutherans, although the Nazi government's attitude towards international church contacts was one of suspicion. Germany's setbacks in the war and information about the German church struggle meant that engagement

<sup>4</sup> Hentilä, 'Continuation War', 199–208; Jutikkala, 'Independent Finland', 447–8.

<sup>5</sup> Hentilä, 'Continuation War', 209–13; Jutikkala, 'Independent Finland', 448–53; Jukka Nevakivi, 'From the Continuation War to the present, 1944–1999', in Jussila, Hentilä and Nevakivi, *From grand duchy to a modern state*, 217–23.

<sup>6</sup> Jutikkala, 'Independent Finland', 454–5; Nevakivi, 'Continuation War to the present', 225–7; Tuomo Polvinen, *Teheranista Jaltaan: Suomi kansainvälisessä politiikassa*, II: 1944, Porvoo–Helsinki–Juva 1980, 93–4.

between the Churches gradually began to diminish. Moreover, the interest of Swedish Christians in the fate of Finland was not as high as it had been at the beginning of the war. The most important international point of contact for the Church of Finland was the Nordic Ecumenical Institute of Sigtuna in Sweden. After the war, Finnish churchmen were eager to renew relations with western Churches and thus receive sympathy and assistance in an uncertain situation.<sup>7</sup>

### *Planning Waddams's journey*

The British Ministry of Information was established in September 1939. Its work included the planning of government information policy, censorship and the distribution of related material and gathering information for the government. The number of divisions varied. The religions division, focused on the main western denominations, was responsible for religious weeklies, material for newspapers, the distribution of photographs and organising tours for persons involved with the churches. It also served as a liaison between the government and various religious bodies.<sup>8</sup>

The idea of sending the Revd Herbert M. Waddams, who was responsible for Scandinavian affairs at the religions division, to Sweden as a representative of the Ministry of Information originated with the division's head, Hugh Martin. In a letter to P. F. D. Tennant, the British press *attaché* in Stockholm, in March 1943, he suggested a brief visit during which Waddams could discuss Anglo-Swedish church contacts.<sup>9</sup>

Herbert Waddams (born 1911), educated at King's College, Cambridge, and Cuddesdon Theological College, and linked theologically with Anglo-Catholic circles, was ideally suited to be an emissary. He had studied in Lund for four months in 1933 and had some knowledge of Swedish. He had also participated in Anglo-Scandinavian theological conferences at Fritzøhus in Norway in 1936 and at Durham in 1939. Of the leading figures of the Church of Sweden he was personally acquainted with Bishop Gustaf Aulén of Strängnäs, Bishop Yngve Brilioth of Växjö and Harry Johansson, director of the Nordic Ecumenical Institute in Sigtuna. Ordained in 1935, Waddams subsequently held posts in the church in Cambridge, London and Chichester, but since 1942 he had worked at the Ministry of Information.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Murtorinne, *Suomen kirkon historia*, iv. 233–41, 273–6; Jaakko Ripatti, *Suomen kirkon ulkomaansuhteet ja kansainvälinen politiikka 1944–1946*, Helsinki 1990, 80, 265–6.

<sup>8</sup> John D. Cantwell, *The Second World War: a guide to documents in the Public Record Office* (PRO Handbooks xv, 1993), 114–15.

<sup>9</sup> [Hugh Martin] to P. F. D. Tennant, 26 Mar. 1943 (copy), PRO, Inf 1/773.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*; H. M. Waddams to Eelis Gulin, 29 Nov. 1944, KA, EG 27; Ragnar Bring to G. O. Rosenqvist, 4 Dec. 1944, AAB, GOR iv; Canon H. M. Waddams's obituary, *The Times*,

He had thought of leaving the ministry to re-enter the service of the Church of England, but Archbishop William Temple urged him to remain at his post for the time being. There appear to have been plans to appoint Waddams secretary of the Council on Foreign Relations of the Church of England following the retirement from that post of Canon J. A. Douglas.<sup>11</sup>

Tennant found Martin's proposal interesting and assumed that Waddams's old contacts with the Swedes would be of use to British propaganda efforts in Sweden. He suggested that the press department might have neglected religious circles. Waddams's visit, however, might prove to be unnecessary if the plans for a lecture visit to Uppsala by Bishop George Bell of Chichester were realised in the autumn.<sup>12</sup> In the summer of 1942 Bell had visited Sweden, travelling to Stockholm, Uppsala, Gothenburg, Lund, Malmö, Växjö, Strängnäs and Sigtuna.<sup>13</sup> The British minister in Stockholm felt that this had been 'a great success', and that of the dean of St Paul's even more successful. He maintained that church-related visits were worth continuing if suitable candidates could be found.<sup>14</sup>

The Swedes too suggested that Waddams might visit. Harry Johansson made the proposal in May 1943. He felt that Waddams's basic knowledge of Swedish religious life and theology would serve him well in observing the situation in Sweden.<sup>15</sup> In his reply Waddams said that there was hope of a visit, although no final decision could be expected for some time. He himself was eager to go and hoped to meet Johansson.<sup>16</sup> There was, however, a change of plan. Late in 1943 Waddams discussed the situation with members of the northern department of the Foreign Office and representatives of the British embassy in Stockholm. It transpired that Bell's lecture tour, planned

<sup>11</sup> May 1972. Anglo-Scandinavian theological conferences had been held since 1929: Ragnar Bring, 'Anglo-Scandinavian theological conferences', in Leslie Stannard Hunter (ed.), *Scandinavian Churches: a picture of the development and life of the Churches of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden*, London 1965, 184–9.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Kenneth Grubb to William Temple, 16 Aug. 1944; Waddams to Temple, 23 Aug. 1944; Temple to A. C. Headlam, 29 Aug. 1944 (copy); Temple to Waddams, 29 Aug. 1944 (copy), LPL, W. Temple papers, vol. 44. Jaakko Ripatti gives Waddams's title in 1944 as the Church of England's secretary of international affairs. Waddams, however, did not become secretary of the Council on Foreign Relations of the Church of England until the autumn of 1945, when Canon J. A. Douglas retired. The matter had been tentatively discussed, as indicated by Harry Johansson in his letter to Archbishop Eidem in Nov. 1944: Harry Johansson to Erling Eidem, 3 Nov. 1944, ULA, EEA CI, 73; Ronald C. D. Jasper, *Arthur Cayley Headlam: life and letters of a bishop*, London 1960, 305; cf. Ripatti, *Suomen kirkon ulkomaansuhde*, 85.

<sup>12</sup> Tennant to Martin, 7 May 1943, Inf 1/773.

<sup>13</sup> See 'Notes on a visit to Sweden May 13th–June 11th 1942', LPL, Bell papers, vol. 87; Ronald C. D. Jasper, *George Bell, bishop of Chichester*, 2nd edn, London 1968, 266–70.

<sup>14</sup> Victor Mallett to George Bell, 19 Aug. 1942, Bell papers, vol. 87; Hugh Martin, notes on an interview with Mr Mallett, British minister in Stockholm, 8 May 1943, Inf 1/773.

<sup>15</sup> Johansson to Waddams, 10 May 1943, Inf 1/773.

<sup>16</sup> Waddams to Johansson, 21 May 1943 (copy), *ibid.*

for the autumn, could not go ahead. Moreover it had proved difficult to obtain invitations from the Swedish Church for visitors from Britain. As an alternative it was suggested that the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information, together with the Council on Foreign Relations of the Church of England, could invite Bishop Manfred Björkquist and a junior representative of the Church to come to Britain.<sup>17</sup> That plan too failed to materialise.

Although his Swedish trip was cancelled, Waddams was given an even more important international assignment, specifically as a representative of the Church. He was appointed to a three-man delegation sent to Moscow by the Church of England in 1943 at the invitation of the Russian Orthodox Church. The party was headed by Archbishop Cyril Garbett of York and its third member was the Revd Francis House, who worked for the BBC. During the visit, which lasted from 19 to 28 September, the English delegation met leaders of the Russian Church and the commissar for foreign affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov. The Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office were actively involved in arranging the trip. At press conferences held afterwards the delegation presented a cautiously optimistic picture of religion in the Soviet Union. In his own report Waddams concentrated on giving detailed information on events and conversations without revealing his personal opinion of the situation.<sup>18</sup>

Waddams's visit to Sweden was not forgotten. In November 1943 the press *attaché*, Tennant, discussed the matter with a representative of the northern department of the Foreign Office. R. R. Williams, who had succeeded Hugh Martin as director of the religions division of the Ministry of Information, referred to those discussions in a letter of January 1944 to C. Purves, an official of the Northern Department. In his opinion the visit could take place during the coming April. Williams stressed that as an expert with the required language skills Waddams could investigate the influence of British religious propaganda in Sweden and possibly reinforce it. Favourable prospects for the visit were indicated not only by the positive attitudes of ministry officials but also by the fact that it had also been proposed by Harry Johansson, 'an important figure in the ecumenical movement'. Williams felt that the progress of the war had increased the strategic value of the Swedish Church in the Protestant world and that it had become the only link between

<sup>17</sup> [Waddams], notes on a conversation between religions division and Mr Ulander, northern section, and Mr Leadbitter from Stockholm, 26 Aug. 1943, *ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Waddams, report 'An account of the visit to Moscow by a delegation of the Church of England, September 1943', LP, Council of Foreign Relations, OC Russia; Charles Smyth, *Cyril Forster Garbett, archbishop of York*, London 1959, 299–309; P. M. H. Bell, *John Bull and the bear: British public opinion, foreign policy and the Soviet Union, 1941–1945*, London 1990, 74; Dianne Kirby, *Church, State and propaganda: the archbishop of York and international relations: a political study of Cyril Forster Garbett, 1942–1955*, Hull 1999, 35–59.

the Anglo-Saxon world and continental Protestantism. Sweden was also 'an information centre' for news from the continent. Williams suggested that the idea of the visit be taken up with Tennant. The trip should not take too long; it was important that Waddams return to Britain for the summer months<sup>19</sup> as representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church were expected to come to Britain then, and as Waddams was involved in organising this visit his presence was important.

Owing to the war, and for security reasons, visits between Britain and the neutral nations were limited in early 1944. Williams, however, regarded Waddams's trip as being so important that it had to be arranged regardless of practical problems. Seeking support for his scheme, he contacted H. Koeppler of the political intelligence department of the Foreign Office with the suggestion that they should jointly further the plan. Because of the experiences gained on his visit to Moscow, Waddams was in Williams's eyes a suitable person 'to assist the Swedes in taking a reasonable view on these matters [concerning the Soviet Union]'. Williams underlined the point that Waddams's visit would be important not only because of what could be gained in Sweden but also because he could obtain important information on church circles in Germany.<sup>20</sup> By 'reasonable view' Williams most probably meant a positive attitude towards the Soviet Union. Relations with the Soviet Union thus became an additional argument for the trip.

Koeppler warmed to the plan, but felt that the initiative for support from the political intelligence department should come from a higher level. Williams reported to Purves on his talks with Koeppler, urging him to make a decision. If the plan were supported by the northern department, the next step would be to canvass the views of the passport and permit office and to arrange the financing and communications of the visit. Waddams was expected to take care of the actual programme of the visit himself.<sup>21</sup>

Thus far Waddams's trip had been prepared in the ministries, and the Church of England had not been involved. Williams did not tell William Temple of the plans until late March 1944. He defined the purpose of Waddams's visit as not only to provide the clergy of Sweden with information on the condition of the Churches in Britain during the war but also to obtain information on the situation of the Churches of northern Europe and Germany. Alongside his work for the ministries, Waddams could also take care of contacts between the Church of England and the Swedes, should Archbishop Temple so desire. Williams hoped that this visit could be undertaken as soon as possible and he assured Temple that Waddams would return from Sweden in time to receive the Russian Orthodox delegation.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>19</sup> R. R. Williams to C. Purves, 28 Jan. 1944 (copy), Inf 1/774.

<sup>20</sup> Williams to H. Koeppler, 23 Feb. 1944 (copy), *ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Williams to Purves, 6 Mar. 1944 (copy), *ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Williams to Temple, 25 Mar. 1944, W. Temple papers, vol. 44.

Waddams also contacted the archbishop.<sup>23</sup> Temple took a positive view, and he wished, if possible, to send greetings *via* Waddams to the archbishop of Sweden.<sup>24</sup>

Owing to the military situation and consequent travel restrictions, however, Waddams had to cancel his departure at the last moment. The outward journey could have been arranged easily enough, but probably he would not have been able to come back until September. Because of changes in the military situation, the visit of the Russian delegation was also postponed indefinitely.<sup>25</sup> The matter was next raised during the following summer, when Williams again referred to it in a letter to Purves. He emphasised that the trip had only been postponed, not cancelled, in the spring, and now suggested that Waddams could leave in August and remain in Sweden for a month or six weeks. Kenneth Grubb, who was responsible for foreign relations at the Ministry of Information, was prepared to support this plan once the Foreign Office had been consulted. Williams wanted to have the opinion of the northern department in order to arrange the visit as soon as possible.<sup>26</sup>

Writing to Grubb, Williams argued for the importance and urgency of Waddams's trip. It should be arranged without delay in order to gain the greatest possible benefit. It would also be of great importance now that other Anglican visitors were not going. Waddams would thus be regarded more as a representative of the Church of England than of the Ministry of Information, which would increase his opportunities for influencing ecclesiastical circles in Sweden. A further reason for expediting the visit was the fact that, should the Russian churchmen come to England, Waddams could not travel again before the next spring.<sup>27</sup> Williams wanted the Swedes to regard Waddams as a representative of the Church of England, although he was primarily being sent by the Ministry of Information.

Williams noted that they needed to demonstrate that the visit was necessary for either operational or tactical reasons. The former was not relevant, so a strong argument in the favour of the latter had to be made. Williams presented a four-point itemised rationale. First, Sweden was the only remaining link with European Protestantism and Britain had to be able to influence the Protestant Churches. Waddams's visit could help to achieve this goal. Second, Sweden had become an important ecumenical centre. Third, Sweden, as the largest country in Scandinavia, had to be persuaded to

<sup>23</sup> Waddams to Temple, 28 Mar. 1944, *ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Temple to Waddams, 30 Mar. 1944 (copy), and Temple to Williams, 30 Mar. 1944 (copy), *ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Tennant to Waddams, 29 Apr. 1944, and Williams to Purves, 19 July 1944, Inf 1/774; telegram, A. Clark Kerr to the Foreign Office, 26 June 1944, FO 371/43340.

<sup>26</sup> Williams to Purves, 19 July 1944 (copy), Inf 1/774.

<sup>27</sup> Williams to Grubb, 26 July 1944, *ibid.*



give moral support to the allies; in this the Swedish Church had an important part to play. Waddams could also be of use in tempering the Swedes' exaggerated Russophobia. Fourth, Williams mentioned the need to investigate and thoroughly check the effectiveness of religious and ecclesiastical propaganda aimed at Sweden.<sup>28</sup> Williams's arguments appear to have been sufficient. In late September Waddams informed the British press *attaché* in Stockholm that he could possibly arrive within two weeks. He also reminded Archbishop Temple that he was prepared to pass on his message to Sweden. Finally the trip was to be realised.<sup>29</sup>

Waddams went to Sweden primarily as an official of the Ministry of Information to investigate the state of religious and church propaganda, to gather information on the ecclesiastical situation in northern Europe and to guide the Swedes in their attitudes towards the Soviet Union. His mission was regarded as of considerable importance by the ministry; nevertheless it clearly wished that he be regarded by his hosts more as a representative of the Church, carrying as he did greetings to leading figures in the Church in Sweden from the archbishop of Canterbury, than of the civil service.

### *Meetings in Sweden*

Waddams arrived in Stockholm, via Gothenburg, on 20 October 1944. Apart from a brief visit to Uppsala, he spent the last days of October mostly in Stockholm, working in the press department of the British legation. His schedule was very full, especially during November, when in visits lasting from a few days to a week, he visited the centres of church life in Sweden. He met leading figures in the Church of Sweden (the bishops of Uppsala, Växjö, Lund, Strängnäs and Stockholm), persons responsible for ecumenical relations and academics. He estimated that he had had talks with between fifty and sixty Swedes and representatives of several other nationalities, Frenchmen, Norwegians and Danes. After the mission, Waddams compiled an extensive and detailed memorandum from his notes, outlining his discussions and work in Sweden and presenting his assessment of the atmosphere in the country and in particular the views of clerics on the current international situation.<sup>30</sup>

On 31 October Waddams met Archbishop Eidem, to whom he passed on the greetings of William Temple,<sup>31</sup> of the British Council of Churches and of

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Waddams to the British press *attaché* in Stockholm, 29 Sept. 1944 (copy), *ibid*; Waddams to Temple, 29 Sept. 1944, W. Temple papers, vol. 44.

<sup>30</sup> Waddams to Williams, 17 Nov. 1944, Inf 1/774; Memorandum 'Visit to Sweden of the Reverend H. M. Waddams' [Jan. 1945] (hereinafter cited as Memorandum 'Sweden'), title page and section 4.1, *ibid*.

<sup>31</sup> Temple to Eidem, 3 Oct. 1944, EEA CI/77.

many individuals, including Bishop Bell of Chichester.<sup>32</sup> (News of Temple's unexpected death on 26 October reached Waddams in Stockholm that same day.<sup>33</sup>)

Talks with Eidem were concerned almost exclusively with ecclesiastical affairs. Waddams felt that the archbishop was mostly interested in congregational and academic matters; national and international matters seem to have been a burden to him. Waddams also felt that the archbishop looked exhausted and that he was not by nature a leader. The archbishop's caution in public statements had aroused criticism, particularly outside the Church, and for this Waddams felt there was due cause. He considered that Eidem's extreme caution was a result of his basic character together with traditional Swedish attitudes. Eidem's hospitality towards the *émigré* Estonian bishop Johan Kõpp, who had been released from a refugee camp in early November 1944, showed what sort of a person he was. Eidem took him into his own home, which, Waddams acknowledged, was a Christian act, but would hardly promote *rapprochement* between the Swedish and Russian Churches or improve the standing of the Swedish Church in Soviet eyes.<sup>34</sup> Waddams appeared to give priority to good relations with the Soviet Union and the Russian Church over showing understanding for the small Churches and peoples of the Baltic nations.

Waddams spent two days visiting Bishop Yngve Brilioth of Växjö, with whom he discussed Anglo-Swedish relations, the ecumenical movement and the international situation. Waddams felt that Brilioth understood the overall situation in Europe better than other leaders of the Church in Sweden, although he, too, was over-cautious. Waddams attributed this to a reluctance to gain enemies through expressing strong views: Brilioth was generally regarded as a possible successor to Eidem. In his memorandum, Waddams complained that Brilioth had been cautious when speaking with him about political matters, apparently constantly keeping in mind that the Englishman was an official of the British Ministry of Information, despite the fact that they had known each other well for over ten years. Although Brilioth was moderate in his views on the Soviet Union, he clearly appeared to be concerned over the future of both the Soviet Union and Germany. He was also very sympathetic towards Finland and the Baltic countries. Brilioth felt that Finland was in a difficult position and feared that Soviet demands for repatriating the Ingrian Finns<sup>35</sup> would make matters worse. Waddams, in

<sup>32</sup> Waddams to Eidem, 23 Oct. 1944, *ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Waddams to Eidem 27 Oct. 1944, *ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Memorandum 'Sweden', section 4.1; J. Aunver, *Eesti rahvakiriku ristitee*, Stockholm 1953, 94.

<sup>35</sup> The Ingrian Finns had settled in an area called Ingria on the eastern coast of the Gulf of Finland mostly in the seventeenth century. During the Continuation War more than 60,000 of them had voluntarily migrated to Finland. The Soviet Union demanded their repatriation. A majority of them were returned to the Soviet Union. They were immediately deported to the

turn, said that there were no grounds for concern. He also strongly dissented from Brilioth's view that Soviet-American relations would run into problems before long, and he accused the Swedes of undue pessimism. Waddams believed that the Soviet Union would promote stability in the current international situation.<sup>36</sup>

Waddams described Bishop Edvard Rodhe of Lund as an astute churchman, who was interested in political affairs and whose views were considered seriously by the other bishops. On the international scene Rodhe was primarily interested in contacts among Lutherans. At his meeting with Waddams the bishop wished to explain the role of the journal *Kyrkor under Korset* (*Churches under the Cross*). This, published by the Swedish national committee of the Lutheran World Convention, had been accused of expressing pro-Nazi views and of publishing anti-Soviet material. Rodhe was a member of the national committee. He explained to Waddams that the editor, Lars Wollmer, had shown a lack of judgement, failing to realise how the views expounded in the journal would be received by outsiders. Rodhe blamed himself for not having admonished the editor with sufficient severity. In Waddams's estimate, Rodhe's explanation, though truthful as far as it went, did not tell the whole story. He reminded the bishop that there was no reason to place weapons into the hands of circles already hostile to the Church, by which he principally meant Swedish cultural radicals and social democrats.<sup>37</sup>

Discussions with Bishop Manfred Björkquist of Stockholm concerned, among other matters, the relationship of the Orthodox Churches and of the Russian Orthodox Church in particular, with the ecumenical movement. Waddams estimated that it would still be some years before the Russian Orthodox Church would join the ecumenical movement. He suggested to Björkquist that the Swedish Church could take the initiative in establishing friendly relations with the Russian Orthodox Church. The bishop felt that this proposal was worth considering. Waddams judged that Björkquist was not anti-British, but nor was he very interested in British Christianity. In his memorandum Waddams notes that the press department of the British legation had branded Bishop Björkquist as pro-German.<sup>38</sup>

Of the Swedish bishops, Bishop Gustaf Aulén of Strängnäs made the most positive impression on Waddams. Married to a Norwegian, the bishop was devoted to the Norwegians, and thereby to the Allied cause. Waddams expressed his satisfaction that the bishop had taken the 'right view' ever since the beginning of the war. The two also discussed the situation in Finland and

areas of Tver, Jaroslay, Ivanovo and Pskov instead of to their home region around Leningrad. On the Ingrian Finns during the war see Pekka Nevalainen, 'Inkerinmaan ja inkeriläisten vaiheet 1900-luvulla', in Pekka Nevalainen and Hannes Sihvo (eds), *Inkeri: historia, kansa, kulttuuri*, Helsinki 1991, 267–88.

<sup>36</sup> Waddams to Williams, 17 Nov. 1944, Inf 1/774; Memorandum 'Sweden', section 4.5, 8.

<sup>37</sup> Memorandum 'Sweden', section 1.5, 4.8–9. <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* section 4.10.

Poland and the question of the Baltic refugees. Aulén said that forty *émigré* clergymen from the Baltic countries were currently in Sweden. He felt that they should not have fled and that they should return to their own countries as soon as conditions were stabilised. Aulén also said that he had heard from the Swedish Foreign Office about Finnish enquiries and feelers for peace with the Soviets and of Ribbentrop's visit to Finland in June 1944. The bishop criticised the actions of the Finns, particularly those of Väinö Tanner, the prominent Finnish politician, as unreliable.<sup>39</sup> Waddams appears to have had a clear idea of how the leaders of the Swedish Church should have thought and acted. Of the bishops whom he met, Gustaf Aulén was the only one to have 'correct' views on the international situation.

During his stay in Sweden Herbert Waddams also met representatives of the universities of Uppsala and Lund. He spent a week with his old acquaintance Ragnar Bring, Professor of Practical Theology at the University of Lund. Most of their conversations touched upon the Soviet Union, the future of Europe and the political situation in Sweden. Bring felt that cordial Anglo-Soviet relations were also in the interests of Sweden and that any improvement in relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Swedish Church was desirable. Waddams suggested that Swedish professors of theology send a greeting to the new Theological Academy in Moscow as a gesture of sympathy and interest. Bring seemed to show interest in the idea. In Waddams's opinion the publication of a Swedish translation of N. S. Timasheff's book on the Russian Orthodox Church<sup>40</sup> had fanned Swedish mistrust of the religious policies of the Soviet Union. Discussing *Pravda o religii v Rossii*<sup>41</sup> (*The truth about religion in Russia*), which had appeared in Swedish translation, with a preface by Bishop Gustaf Aulén, Waddams emphasised to Bring that although the book neglected to mention the problems of the Orthodox Church in the early years of Soviet rule, there was every reason to believe that its picture of the present situation was correct.<sup>42</sup> When Bring mentioned the actions of the Soviet

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. section 4.9.

<sup>40</sup> N. S. Timasheff's book *Religionen i Sovjet, 1917–1942* was published in Sweden in 1943. It appeared in English in the same year.

<sup>41</sup> *Pravda o religii v Rossii* was published in the Soviet Union by the patriarchate of Moscow in 1942. Its Swedish translation, *Sanningen om religionen i Ryssland*, appeared in 1943, and an English translation *The truth about religion in Russia* in 1944. The book contained speeches, statements and articles by representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church. It discussed freedom of religion in the Soviet Union, the patriotic work of the Church during the war, and the damage caused by the Germans in the occupied areas. In October 1942 Waddams had noted that the statement in the book that 'the Church is not and was not persecuted in the Soviet Union' was 'clearly untrue': Waddams to Martin, 22 Oct. 1942, Inf 1/790.

<sup>42</sup> Indeed, the situation of the Russian Orthodox Church had improved since the beginning of the war: it had received permission, for example, to restore its patriarchate and to organise theological education. Nevertheless, atheism remained the official ideology of the Soviet government. Waddams referred many times in his report to developments 'of the past ten

Union in Poland and the Baltic countries, Waddams defended the Soviet Union by explaining that the situation was complex in both areas; the Poles, too, had made mistakes and some of the Balts had collaborated with the Germans. One could not expect the Soviet authorities to take a very positive view of such activities.<sup>43</sup> The talks with Bring clearly highlighted Waddams's desire to explain Soviet actions in the best possible light and to defend the rights of the Soviet Union. His aim here was to follow the official British line on policy towards the Allies. Waddams also appeared to believe that Soviet policy on religion really was changing and had already done so.

Professor Bring and Sven Kjällström, Professor of Practical Theology, were concerned about the possible spread of communism in Europe, particularly in Germany. Waddams said that he underlined the need to distinguish left-wing politics and socialism from communism. It was not in the interests of the Church to be labelled as reactionary as a result of resisting left-wing governments in Europe.<sup>44</sup> Waddams made a similar comment to *Komminister* (perpetual curate) Arnold Werner, saying that he did not see why communism would be dangerous, 'especially as it would not be in favour of persecuting the Church'.<sup>45</sup>

Waddams described Bring as having close relations with Finland. In the early 1930s Bring had been a professor at the Swedish-speaking Åbo Akademi in Turku.<sup>46</sup> His sympathies accordingly lay with Finland during the war and a few years earlier he had written at least one anti-Soviet article on Finland. In this, published in *Kyrkor under Korset* in 1941, Bring staunchly supported the moral justification of Finland's war effort and criticised the archbishop of Canterbury's pro-Soviet statements. Bring now observed that he would no longer write in the same vein. As Bring was interested in the Church of England, Waddams felt that he could be a suitable contact, for example in student exchange matters.<sup>47</sup>

In addition to these individuals, Waddams met Professor Gunnar Westin and Professor A. J. Fridrichsen in Uppsala and Professor Anders Nygren and Asta Kihlbom, Docent in English, at the University of Lund.<sup>48</sup>

In Sigtuna Waddams saw Harry Johansson whom he had first met while studying in Lund. Waddams had such intensive talks with Johansson and Dr Nils Ehrenström, the Swedish representative in the office of the World

years' in Russia, omitting the fact that those years encompassed the Great Purge and the severe pressure directed against religious institutions.

<sup>43</sup> Memorandum 'Sweden', section 4.6. <sup>44</sup> Ibid. section 4.8. <sup>45</sup> Ibid. section 8.6.

<sup>46</sup> Hans-Olof Kvist, 'Systematisk teologi', in Solveig Widén (ed.), *Åbo Akademi, 1918–1993: forskning och institutioner*, II: *Humanistiska fakulteten, Teologiska fakulteten*, Åbo 1993, 332.

<sup>47</sup> Memorandum 'Sweden', section 4.8; Eino Murtorinne, *Veljeyttä viimeiseen saakka: Suomen ja Saksan kirkkojen suhteet toisen maailmansodan aikana, 1940–44*, Helsinki 1975, 100.

<sup>48</sup> Memorandum 'Sweden', sections 4.4–5, 8.

Council of Churches in Geneva, that he complained of seeing almost nothing of Sigtuna itself. Their discussions concerned the relations of the Swedish Church with society, the future of the ecumenical movement and the international situation. On the matter of the Russian Orthodox Church Waddams felt that in the current situation it was more important to establish personal contacts with churchmen than to rush that Church into participation in major ecumenical meetings. He took a positive view of Johansson and Ehrenström as useful contacts between the Church of England and the Swedish Church and the ecumenical movement.<sup>49</sup>

The secretary of the Swedish Ecumenical Council, Pastor Nils Karlström, however, did not make a positive impression on Waddams, with whom he had an hour-long discussion on the subject of the Soviet Union. Waddams disliked Karlström's views and complained that neither counter-arguments nor facts made any impression upon them. He observed that Karlström's anti-Russian attitudes were the most sharply defined that he had come across in the Swedish Church and that he placed too much trust in information from the Finns and the Balts and was too suspicious of the Soviet Union's intentions.<sup>50</sup> The English visitor does not appear to have had the slightest understanding of Swedish anxiety on the subject of Finland.

While staying in Stockholm, Waddams also met Mme Alexandra Kollontay, the Soviet ambassador, with whom he discussed his visit to Moscow, the attitude of the Swedish Church towards the Soviet Union and Finland and its Church. Kollontay felt that the Soviet-British alliance was the most important issue for the future of Europe. Speaking of the Russian Orthodox Church, she noted that it had been of great benefit to its country during the war and that Churches in general could serve their countries. The Finnish Church should also direct its influence 'in a positive direction'. Kollontay was positively inclined towards Waddams's plan to visit Finland.<sup>51</sup>

Waddams told Mme Kollontay that he had visited Latvia and Estonia in 1938 as secretary of an Anglican delegation and that he hoped that contacts could be revived once conditions were stabilised. He stressed that this would silence 'certain church circles' that continuously wrote on this subject. Kollontay seemed to regard contacts as a possibility – or at any rate she did not reject the idea.<sup>52</sup> Waddams appeared to believe that the work of the Church would not suffer in the Baltic nations even if those states were annexed by the Soviet Union.

### *General impression of the Swedish Church*

In his memorandum Waddams presented a thorough evaluation of the Swedish Church, especially of its foreign relations, its attitudes concerning

<sup>49</sup> Waddams to Williams, 17 Nov. 1944, Inf 1/774; Memorandum 'Sweden', section 4.1–3.

<sup>50</sup> Memorandum 'Sweden', section 4.3–4. <sup>51</sup> Ibid. section 4.13. <sup>52</sup> Ibid.

the international situation and of the role of the Church in Swedish society. He observed that the Swedish church leaders were particularly concerned about the future prospects of the Soviet Union and Germany. Their views appeared to be determined by traditional preconceptions and expedience rather than principle. They were, moreover, slow to change their views.<sup>53</sup>

The memorandum returns repeatedly to the subject of Swedish prejudice and fear of Russia and the Soviet Union. In a letter to Williams Waddams notes that most of his time was spent on attempts to persuade the Swedes to 'take a reasonable view of our great Ally'.<sup>54</sup> Waddams felt that anti-Soviet propaganda had greatly influenced the Swedes in the years after the Russian Revolution. While maintaining that they simply did not have enough information about recent developments in the Soviet Union, he saw the Swedes' close links with Finland and its Church as the main reason for their negative attitudes. 'Cherishing' the Finns had blinded the Swedes; Waddams sarcastically remarked that they felt that Finland's only fault was that she had lost the war. Finno-Swedish contacts had operated even during the war, and the Swedes were thus influenced by Finnish views. Waddams's annoyance is revealed by the following comment:

It does not seem to have occurred to these people to find out whether the Finns have always acted like little gentlemen, nor to compare the Russian behaviour with the treatment of Church property in the North of Sweden by Swedish soldiers. Now they think chiefly of poor suffering martyred Finland, a point of view which seems to be encouraged by most Finns visiting Swedish Church people in Sweden. They do not wish to think of poor suffering Leningrad and in most cases this seems to be due to their own wishes. They only see what they desire to see.<sup>55</sup>

Waddams observed that the situation in the Baltic states and the reports of refugees from these countries had greatly influenced attitudes in the Swedish Church. He could not deny the poor treatment of Baltic clergymen during the first Soviet occupation, but he stressed that the situation was different now and that the Soviet Union had changed its behaviour. Waddams also pointed out that many Balts had collaborated with the Germans and the negative attitudes of the Soviet authorities towards them were thus understandable.<sup>56</sup>

Waddams described the attitude of the Swedish Church towards its Finnish counterpart as fatherly. The Finns, in turn, are described as flattering the Swedes, whom they regard as their saviours and sole friends. Relations with Danish and Norwegian Churches were not as close. One of the reasons for this was that the Norwegian and Danish refugees in Sweden criticised the Swedes for giving advice to others in need while they lived in plenty themselves. However, the Swedish Church played a leading role among the Churches of Scandinavia. Waddams pointed out that its position in the

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. section 1.2.

<sup>54</sup> Waddams to Williams, 8 Nov. 1944, Inf 1/774.

<sup>55</sup> Memorandum 'Sweden', section 1.1–2.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. section 1.2.

ecumenical movement was eroded by the lack of leaders such as the late Archbishop Nathan Söderblom. Nor did the Churches of Denmark and Norway seem to want Sweden to maintain its leading role. Waddams suggested that the Churches of Great Britain should seek to establish independent relations with the Churches of Denmark and Norway.<sup>57</sup>

One of Waddams's goals was to obtain information on the situation of the Churches of Germany. A section of the memorandum is devoted to this.<sup>58</sup> In addition Waddams assessed contacts between the Swedish Church and Germany. He saw Lutheranism as the significant link, and felt that an exaggerated fear of communism also swayed Swedish opinion in this matter. While the leaders of the Swedish Church opposed Nazism they were also concerned about the plans of the Allies for the future of Germany. Waddams criticised the view generally held in Sweden that Germany was in a sense the first country to be occupied by the Nazis and should be viewed accordingly. He mentioned the contacts of Swedish clergymen with church-based resistance groups in Germany, but he also noted that the Swedes had joined with participants from Germany in official church functions. He felt that they had not kept sufficient distance from the official German Church, which supported the Nazi government.<sup>59</sup>

Waddams came to the conclusion that the Swedish Church wanted closer contacts with Britain, particularly as a shield against possible Soviet expansionism. He notes having opposed such an idea and the desire to pit Britain and the Soviet Union against one other. Waddams underlined the fact that Britain was resolutely striving to achieve true mutual understanding with the Soviet Union. In any case it was Waddams's experience that the Swedish clergy were very willing to increase co-operation between the Churches of Britain and Sweden.<sup>60</sup>

Waddams urged the Swedes to be active in establishing contacts with the Soviet Union and to support the aims of the Allies. He was annoyed with their passivity; with the war nearing its end no one should stand by and remain neutral.<sup>61</sup>

In discussing the role of the Swedish Church in post-war reconstruction, Waddams felt that it would seek to act as an intermediary, if required. Although the concept of a 'soft peace' and the need for reconciliation with Germany prevailed within the Swedish Church, its leaders appeared to have chosen to remain silent on the matter, a wise decision in Waddams's opinion. There were, however, those within the Church who spoke loudly in favour of more lenient peace terms and a speedy improvement in relations.<sup>62</sup> Activity along these lines did not please Waddams.

Waddams also evaluated the internal state of the Swedish Church and its role in society. He had gained the impression that the Church had become

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. section 1.4–5.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. sections 1.2–3, 6.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. section 8.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. section 1.3.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. section 1.3–4.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. section 1.5.



alienated from the common people. It was in good order internally, but it gave nothing to those outside it; it had not succeeded in appealing to educated liberals or circles within the working class. On the other hand, Waddams felt that High Church activity within the Church pointed to opportunities to rectify the situation. He revealed his own High Church sympathies when he regretted ‘a sad lack of sacramental theology and practice’ in the Church of Sweden and assumed that High Church activity was ‘an attempt to fill a real gap in Swedish church life’.<sup>63</sup>

*An ‘instructive’ visit to Finland*<sup>64</sup>

Whilst in Sweden Waddams also studied the efforts made by the British legation in Stockholm to provide information about, and to direct propaganda to, the Finns. He had it in mind to travel to Finland himself to survey attitudes in church circles there. Waddams wrote of his plan to Williams on 8 November 1944. He assumed that there would be no political obstacles to the trip and hoped to meet at least Bishop Aleksi Lehtonen of Tampere, Professor Eelis Gulin and possibly Bishop Ilmari Salomies of Vyborg. Of the Swedes, Nils Ehrenström at least encouraged him. Ehrenström felt that Waddams’s visit could be useful, because church circles in Finland were probably reluctant to take a positive attitude towards Russia. Waddams had already been in indirect contact with Bishop Lehtonen through G. I. Sevelius, vicar of the Finnish congregation of Stockholm, and through Ehrenström, who went to Finland. Waddams told Williams that, as a British church representative – ‘however unrepresentative in fact’ – it was good for him to view Finland from within together with the non-aligned Swedish members of the ecumenical movement.<sup>65</sup> The Ministry of Information had no objection to the visit. Francis M. Shepherd, the political representative in Finland of His Majesty’s Government, also approved the plan for the trip.<sup>66</sup>

Waddams personally informed both Lehtonen and Gulin that he was coming and that he hoped to meet them during the visit. He had met Gulin at an Anglo-Scandinavian conference of theologians held at Fritzöehus in 1936. Waddams gave the tentative re-establishment of relations between the Churches of Finland and England as the purpose of his visit – although full relations could not be restored until after the war when travel restrictions, impeding visits, were lifted.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. sections 2, 3.

<sup>64</sup> In his doctoral dissertation Jaakko Ripatti mentions Waddams’s visit to Finland. He does not, however, have any detailed information on the itinerary or the discussions: *Suomen kirkon ulkomaansuhteet*, 83–9.

<sup>65</sup> Waddams to Williams, 8 Nov. 1944, Inf 1/774.

<sup>66</sup> Williams to Waddams, 21 Nov. 1944 (copy), and Waddams to Williams, 29 Nov. 1944, *ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> Waddams to Aleksi Lehtonen, 29 Nov. 1944, KA, AL 34; Waddams to Gulin, 29 Nov. 1944, EG 27, 85. In his letter Waddams said that he sought to promote contacts between the

Brilioth, Nygren and Bring prepared Waddams for his visit to Finland and, of the Swedes, Bring at least guided the Finns on how to receive him. Writing to G. O. Rosenqvist, a professor at the Åbo Akademi in Turku, Bring told him to be friendly and listen to what the Englishman had to say. Rosenqvist should speak openly and without bitterness or exaggeration about the situation in Finland. Bring assured him that Waddams had the best intentions in mind for Finland and its Church, although he also had a positive view of the Soviet Union.<sup>68</sup>

Waddams flew to Finland on 15 December 1944, returning to Stockholm on the 28th. He spent most of his time in Helsinki except for a three-day visit to Tampere.<sup>69</sup> On arrival he took part in a meeting of Helsinki clergymen upon the invitation of Professor Eelis Gulin. The meeting, held at the Hotel Klaus Kurki, where the participants were offered ‘bad sandwiches, frightful cakes and surrogate coffee’, was attended by Gulin and twelve clergymen: secretary general Arvo Salminen of the Finnish Ministry of Education; Verner J. Aurola, secretary of the Finnish Ecumenical Committee; Verneri Louhivuori, editorial secretary of the church newspaper *Kotimaa*; Kari Pietilä, assistant secretary of the Helsinki YMCA; Dr Aimo T. Nikolainen of the University of Helsinki; Fr Johannes Suhola, an Orthodox priest; Edvin Wirén, director of the Helsinki Deaconesses’ Institute; Urho Muroma of the Evangelical Lutheran Home Mission Foundation; Vicar Lauri Apajalahti; Ville Laurila, secretary general of the Christian Youth Movement in Finland; and pastor Heimer Virkkunen.<sup>70</sup>

Waddams began by describing his own position at the British Ministry of Information and pointed out that the purpose of his trip was to inform the Finns of the views of church circles in Britain and to re-establish links between the Churches of England and Finland. Questions from the floor followed. The Finns concentrated their remarks on the Soviet Union, explaining how their hostility towards their neighbouring country was justified.<sup>71</sup>

In his reply Waddams tried to make the Finns realise that the war was about much more than just their struggle. Great Britain was genuinely seeking to understand the Soviet Union, and in its own interests Finland should now seek to become a bridge between east and west. The Church of Finland should now use all its moral authority to improve international relations. Waddams said that his own Church was seeking closer relations with the Russian Orthodox Church and he urged the Finnish Church to do

Churches alongside his duties as an official of the ministry. No financial assistance appears to have been at issue in this connection: Ripatti, *Suomen kirkon ulkomaansuhteet*, 85.

<sup>68</sup> Bring to Rosenqvist, 4 Dec. 1944, GOR iv; Ripatti, *Suomen kirkon ulkomaansuhteet*, 86. In speaking of the ‘Waddams’s papers’ Bring is probably referring to the latter’s reports and impressions of his visit to Moscow in 1943 and not to any actual documents on relations with the Soviet Union: *ibid.* 86.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* 2–3.

<sup>69</sup> Memorandum ‘Finland’, 1.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* 3.

the same. They could start, for example, by sending a friendly message to Christians in Russia. Waddams felt that his suggestion seemed almost 'revolutionary' to the Finns.<sup>72</sup>

Wirén asked Waddams about the attitudes of the English to Bolshevism. He replied that it depended on the period under discussion, for Bolshevism had changed since the 1917 Revolution. He assured his listeners that the Soviet Union respected the independence of Finland and urged the Finns to act accordingly. The Finns said that they hoped this was the case. Waddams also talked about the changed situation of the Russian Orthodox Church. In his memorandum he noted that the Finns still formed their image of the Soviet Union from propaganda dating from the revolutionary period.<sup>73</sup>

In speaking of the Finno-Soviet Winter War, Waddams said that many Britons had been concerned about the fate of Finland, but had later come to the conclusion that the Soviet attack had nevertheless been militarily defensible. He pointed out that the Soviet Union had suffered a great deal, perhaps more than any other nation in Europe in the course of the war, and assured the Finns that in his view the Soviet Union desired true conciliation with its neighbours. He also urged his listeners to understand the critical attitudes of the Norwegians and the Danes on the matter of Finland's alliance with Germany. This alliance had led to an increasingly harsh German occupation of Denmark and Norway. As proof, Waddams gave examples of German actions against the citizens of occupied countries and against the Jews in Poland.<sup>74</sup>

At his very first meeting with Finns Waddams sought to explain the British position on the international situation and to teach the Finns the 'correct' attitude towards the Soviet Union.

Waddams dined with Eelis Gulin the same evening. Gulin told Waddams that Urho Muroma had asked him whether Waddams had been sent solely to tell them to be friends with the Russians. Gulin had defended Waddams, saying that this was certainly not the case; the English always speak their mind. Perhaps slightly offended, Waddams notes in his memorandum that he said to Gulin that the subjects of conversation followed from the questions of his audience and therefore 'they had only themselves to blame if they heard too much of it [relations with the Russians]'.<sup>75</sup>

Waddams asked Gulin about his wartime visits to Germany. In response Gulin said that he had met many German clergymen who had complained of conditions under the Nazis, had lectured at the Luther Academy in Sondershausen in 1941 together with Professor Bring<sup>76</sup> and described

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.<sup>73</sup> Ibid. 3–4.<sup>74</sup> Ibid. 4.<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> On Gulin's visits to Germany see, for example, Eelis Gulin, *Elämän lahjat: edellinen osa 1893–1945*, 2nd edn, Porvoo 1967, 360–2, and Murtorinne, *Veljeyttä viimeiseen saakka*, 87, 89. On Swedish and Finnish contacts with the Luther Academy of Sondershausen see Eino Murtorinne, 'Norden och Lutherakademierna i Sondershausen, 1932–1943', in Lars Österlin

Bishop Theodor Heckel, head of the foreign department of the German Church, as a very nice man. He had disagreed with Heckel's repeated assertion that the Finnish-Anglican Church agreement was just 'an instrument of British imperialism', and as result suspected that he had therefore been branded 'a dangerous Anglophile' in the eyes of the Germans. He did not believe that the British government had influenced the Church of England in the negotiations with the Finnish Church in the 1930s.<sup>77</sup> Waddams felt that the Finnish clergy knew hardly anything about the resistance activities of the Churches in German-occupied countries and he suggested that books on this subject be translated into Finnish. Although Gulin did not appear to agree on the ignorance of the clergy, he took a positive view of publishing such books.<sup>78</sup>

In his memorandum, Waddams noted that Gulin had always had some contacts with members of the clergy in England, but, like other members of the Finnish clergy, had subscribed to the ideology of 'Greater Finland'. According to Waddams Gulin had been convinced of the inevitability of Britain's defeat in 1941, at the beginning of Finland's Continuation War (1941–4) with Russia, and had not necessarily been positively disposed toward Britain thereafter. He felt that Gulin lacked judgement and that his opinions were based on emotion. However, he was now very eager to forge closer ties with England.<sup>79</sup>

On Monday 18 December Waddams lunched with Gulin and Bishop Max von Bonsdorff of Porvoo at the Seurahuone Hotel in Helsinki. After formal greetings had been exchanged, the discussion again turned to the Soviet Union and a possible greeting from the Finnish Church to the Russian Orthodox Church. Waddams told the Finns that such a message should also express the wish that 'friendliness between the churches would strengthen the future good relations between Russia and Finland'. Von Bonsdorff had his doubts. Waddams seriously warned Gulin and von Bonsdorff against thinking that Great Britain could support the Finns against the Soviet Union. The fate of Britain was tied to that of the Soviet Union. Waddams cited a number of examples to convince Gulin and von Bonsdorff that the Soviet Union was not completely in the hands of atheists. No one would believe the Finns if they tried to justify their anti-Russian sentiments by reference to religious persecution. The Finns should seek an understanding with the Soviet Union and the Churches could help in achieving this goal.<sup>80</sup>

According to Waddams's report, the luncheon was a lesson in 'politically correct' thinking for Gulin and von Bonsdorff, who were both members of the leadership of the Finnish Ecumenical Committee. Waddams estimated

(ed.), *Nordisk lutherdom över gränserna: de Nordiska kyrkorna i 1900: talets konfessionella samarbete*, Lund 1972, and Gunnar Appelqvist, *Luthersk samverkan i nazismens skugga: Sverige och Lutherakademien i Sondershausen, 1932–1945*, Stockholm 1993.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. 4–6.

<sup>77</sup> Memorandum 'Finland', 5.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. 6.

von Bonsdorff to be 'a rather slow person' with very few contacts outside Finland or Sweden, incapable of reaching a conclusion quickly and not particularly broad-minded in his views.<sup>81</sup>

Next Waddams met Aleksii Lehtonen, remaining at Tampere from Tuesday 19 December to Thursday 21 December. Lehtonen had already established contacts with England on study trips in 1911 and 1912, and had later been there on many occasions on study, conference and lecture visits. Lehtonen had also been the chairman of the Finnish consultant body in the Anglo-Finnish joint communion negotiations in the 1930s. The war had been a particularly trying time for him; his son had died at the front in 1944. Speaking with Waddams, he noted that it would take a long time for the wounds of the war to heal. Waddams interpreted this as an inclination to leave everything in the hands of God and to refrain from doing anything oneself, an attitude of which he was critical. He also warned Lehtonen that it would be dangerous if in England a pro-Finnish attitude was identified with an anti-Russian stance. He again underlined the importance of the Anglo-Soviet alliance and the role of the Churches in improving the international atmosphere.<sup>82</sup>

In discussions on the Russian Orthodox Church, Waddams noted that Lehtonen appeared to have taken a sensible view and was prepared to 'accept the facts without wavering'. Nevertheless, he kept returning to the same two points: the statement of the archbishop of York following a visit to Russia in which he observed that the Soviet Union was still officially an anti-religious state, and a speech delivered in the House of Lords in 1939 by Cosmo Gordon Lang, then archbishop of Canterbury, in which he stated that in a life-and-death struggle one had to accept whatever aid was offered. Lehtonen felt that this applied just as much to Finland as to England. Waddams suspected that the Continuation War had not been a life-and-death struggle: it was not a separate conflict, but part of a larger war in which Finland fought alongside Germany. Lehtonen described Independence Day 1941 as Finland's darkest day, when Britain declared war upon her. On the other hand, he admitted that Archbishop Erkki Kaila's protest against the Church of England in 1941 was a mistake, but he had not wished to make this a matter of public controversy. Kaila had strongly protested against the archbishop of Canterbury's urging Christians to pray for the Red Army.<sup>83</sup>

Lehtonen and Waddams also touched upon the fate of the Ingrian Finns, the contacts of the Finnish Church with Germany and the Luther-Agricola Society. That society had been founded during Bishop Heckel's visit to Finland in November 1940, its aim being to promote research on the

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. 9. Waddams passed on to Lehtonen the condolences of the archbishop of York on the occasion of the death of Archbishop Erkki Kaila: Waddams to Lehtonen, 19 Dec. 1944, AL 34.

<sup>83</sup> Memorandum 'Finland', 10–11.

Reformation period in Germany and Finland and to encourage contacts in that field.<sup>84</sup> Lehtonen regarded it as a positive development. He had a high opinion of ‘ecumenical bishop’ Heckel who, he pointed out, had protested against the persecution of the Jews. According to Lehtonen, some of those who took a negative view of Heckel opposed him simply for theological reasons. Waddams replied sharply that he cared little for Heckel’s theological opinions, but definitely opposed his actions in promoting Nazism. He wrote in his memorandum that only in Finland had he heard anyone praise Heckel who in his opinion had helped to further Germany’s imperialistic schemes in the ecclesiastical sphere.<sup>85</sup>

Waddams’s impression of Lehtonen was that he was somewhat more broad-minded than his colleagues in the Finnish Church and that he had a genuine interest in the life of the Church of England, which should be promoted. Lehtonen sent *via* Waddams his reply to a letter of condolence from the archbishop of York on the occasion of the death of Archbishop Kaila, together with his own congratulations to the recently appointed archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher.<sup>86</sup>

On Friday 22 December 1944 Waddams attended a coffee reception held in his honour by the Ministry of Education. He describes the fare as ‘real coffee, cream, lump sugar and cakes’, which, in view of food rationing, tallies with Gulin’s account of ‘a sumptuous coffee party’. Present were Minister Uuno Takki, secretary general Arvo Salminen and the organist Edvard Inkinen representing the Ministry of Education; Professor Aarni Voipio; Verner J. Aurola, secretary general of the Helsinki YMCA; Sigfrid Sirenus, secretary general of the Christian Social Settlements; Daniel Orådd, director of the Finnish Seamen’s Mission; Uno Paunu, director of the Finnish Missionary Society; Aimo T. Nikolainen D THEOL; Professor Gulin; Nils-Erik Palmén, who had been a pastor of the Finnish Seamen’s Mission in Hull until 1942<sup>87</sup>; pastors Väinö Forsman and Kaarlo Sylvander; and Bishop Alexander of Vyborg and Fr Johannes Suhola of the Finnish Orthodox Church.<sup>88</sup>

After coffee was served secretary general Salminen made a speech in Swedish, in which he reminded his listeners that although Finland and Great Britain had been on opposite sides in the war, they had certain democratic

<sup>84</sup> Murtorinne, *Veljeyttä viimeiseen saakka*, 54–6, 60. The Luther–Agricola Society was named after Martin Luther and Mikael Agricola, reformers of Germany and of Finland. Agricola (1510–57) was a Finnish bishop, whose ideas on reformation were derived from his studies at Wittenberg.

<sup>85</sup> Memorandum ‘Finland’, 9–10.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.* 11; Ripatti, *Suomen kirkon ulkomaansuhteet*, 86–7.

<sup>87</sup> In his memorandum Waddams mistakenly calls Palmén H. E. Fulman: Memorandum ‘Finland’, 12.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.* 11; Gulin to Lehtonen, 21 Dec. 1944, and Verner J. Aurola to Lehtonen, 22 Dec. 1944, AL 22, 21; Ripatti, *Suomen kirkon ulkomaansuhteet*, 87. The Ministry of Education’s coffee reception was held on 22 Dec. 1944, which means that Gulin’s letter is misdated.

ideals in common and Finland had never fought against Britain. In his reply, Waddams corrected Salminen, saying that even though the British people had no particular grudge against the Finns, they regarded them as 'enemies'. Britain's goal was to beat Germany and in this the success of the Soviet Army was vital. He again pointed out that the Finns should understand that the British valued highly their alliance with the Soviet Union.<sup>89</sup>

At the request of his audience, Waddams also spoke of the international activities of the Church of England during the war. He described the visit of an Anglican delegation to Moscow as the most important achievement in this area, and also stated his views on the role of religion in Europe and on the religious situation in the Soviet Union.<sup>90</sup>

On Christmas Day Waddams was present at the baptism of Verner J. Aurola's nephew and had a conversation with Aurola and with Pastor Kaarlo Mäkinen, vicar's assistant in the Southern Finnish Congregation of Helsinki. Mäkinen told him that he had spent three years at the front and had heard from a Russian officer that any changes in the religious situation in the Soviet Union were based purely on political calculation. Waddams admitted that the Soviet government had 'practical motives', but felt that this did not change the religious aspect of the matter. Mäkinen himself was certain that the Russians were still religious by nature and, like Aurola, was optimistic about the future of Finland. Waddams regarded Aurola, secretary of the Finnish Ecumenical Committee, as a useful and influential figure in seeking contacts with church circles in Finland.<sup>91</sup> On Boxing Day Waddams met Bishop Alexander of Vyborg, and received information on the Finnish Orthodox Church, with Aurola acting as interpreter. That the bishop had been present at the Ministry of Education's coffee reception a few days earlier<sup>92</sup> indicates that the Finns wished to inform their visitor of the situation in their country's other official Church.

Waddams also met foreign residents of Helsinki and discussed with them the international situation, the Finnish people and the Finnish Church. He met George P. Pimenoff, Finnish secretary of the British and Foreign Bible Society, on two occasions. Pimenoff was of Russian extraction and was also a translator for the Finnish Foreign Ministry. Among other things, he spoke of the situation of Orthodox Christians and Russians permanently resident in Finland. He considered narrow-minded nationalism to be the Finns' original sin and accused them of complacency. Nor did he flatter the Finns in other

<sup>89</sup> Memorandum 'Finland', 11–12.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* 12.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.* 14; Aurola to Lehtonen, 22 Dec. 1944, AL 21.

<sup>92</sup> Memorandum 'Finland', 14. Aleksanteri had been appointed bishop of Vyborg in 1935; Heikki Koukkunen, *Tuiskua ja tyventä: Suomen ortodoksinen kirkko, 1918–1978*, Heinävesi 1982, 30–2. The Orthodox Church of Finland was dependent on the Russian Orthodox Church until the Russian Revolution; since 1923 it had been under the jurisdiction of the patriarchate of Constantinople.

respects. He felt that they still had a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union and hoped for a breakdown of its relations with Great Britain. Pimenoff's opinions were greatly influenced by the fact that during the war he had been imprisoned for two years without trial upon suspicion of treason.<sup>93</sup>

S. J. F. Palmgren, vicar of the Olaus Petri Congregation of Helsinki, which belonged to the Church of Sweden, was in Waddams's opinion more broad-minded than the clergymen whom he had met in Sweden. Waddams was surprised to hear Palmgren say that he felt that Soviet demands regarding Estonia and Latvia were natural and that the Russians were entitled to demand ports in the Baltic countries. Palmgren felt that the situation in Finland had improved and that the country would recover. According to Waddams, Palmgren confirmed his view that the Finns tended by nature towards extremes: 'either very religious or very drunk'. The two men agreed that the Finns primarily thought only of themselves and that they should be guided to take a broader view.<sup>94</sup>

Palmgren said that he had always assured the Finns that the Soviet Union did not want to occupy the whole country. This had also been the position of the Swedish Embassy in Helsinki.<sup>95</sup> It is difficult to say whether Waddams misunderstood him or whether Palmgren was simply presenting an embellished picture of his far-sightedness. In June 1944 Palmgren had written to Archbishop Eidem, expressing his fear of the inevitable advance of Russian troops to Helsinki. He had felt that it would be impossible to stop them. On the other hand, he had maintained that the Finns themselves were partly responsible for their situation.<sup>96</sup> Palmgren described post-war Russian actions in Finland as strict but highly correct. He said that both he and his embassy urged the Finns to be open in their relations with the Russians. Waddams considered Palmgren to be a broad-minded and useful contact.<sup>97</sup> Palmgren's statements, in turn, illustrate the close contacts between the Olaus Petri Congregation and the Swedish Embassy in Helsinki. Waddams's talks with both Palmgren and Pimenoff seem to have reinforced his negative views of the Finns and their attitudes. Waddams also met Docent B. Sove, who had studied at the Russian Theological Academy in Paris and was now employed in the Slavonic section of Helsinki University Library. He had had to stay in Finland after visiting his mother in the early stages of the war. Sove said that he had no opportunity to teach at the Finnish Orthodox Seminary, because the Orthodox Church of Finland wanted to have as little to do with Russians as possible.<sup>98</sup>

Waddams returned to Stockholm on 28 December. During his visit to Finland he had experienced the effects of Finland's wartime food rationing. In his memorandum he complained that the food at the Seurahuone Hotel in

<sup>93</sup> Memorandum 'Finland', 7–9, 15.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.* 12–14.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.* 13–14.

<sup>96</sup> Murtorinne, *Veljeyttä viimeiseen saakka*, 187.

<sup>97</sup> Memorandum 'Finland', 13–14.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.* 14.



Helsinki was ‘rather trying’, mainly because of the lack of sugar, jam and marmalade. The menu never changed and became boring after only a few days. He estimated that there was a thriving black market in foodstuffs, for the places he visited during the Christmas season offered food in abundance – cakes, shortbread and ham.<sup>99</sup>

Overall the Finns had not made a very good impression. Waddams accused them of being parochial, self-centred and unable to understand the international situation ‘correctly’. In making contacts abroad an element of self-interest was always involved, which Waddams felt eroded the value of friendly relations. Moreover on several occasions he had had to correct the Finnish belief that Great Britain had not actually been an enemy during the war.<sup>100</sup> Waddams also chastised the Finns for their ignorance, especially about the prevailing situation in the Soviet Union. As an example, he mentioned the fact that the Finnish clergy knew nothing of developments over the past ten years which had improved the position of Churches in the Soviet Union. Waddams felt that it was his important task to dispel ignorance and to persuade the Finnish Church to use its influence to create friendly relations with other peoples, especially the Russians. Some people already seemed to accept the fact that Finland’s future would depend on good relations with the Soviet Union, but there were still those who did not understand this in practice.<sup>101</sup>

As a result of the impressions he had gained during his trip, Waddams proposed that the British Ministry of Information send to Finland material especially aimed at the clergy, which could broaden their viewpoints and ways of thinking. Waddams underscored the role of the Finnish clergy and their opportunities to shape opinions. By educating the clergy it was also possible to prevent anti-Russian sentiments from gaining a religious tone.<sup>102</sup> Waddams stressed that the Finns should not be encouraged to regard themselves as more important than they really were. He blamed the Winter War for fostering the wrong ideas:

One of the ill results of the first Winter War was that Finland saw herself as the champion of Western Democracy against the Bolshevik hordes, and the publicity given to that war in the world press resulted in a dangerous swelling of Finland’s head, which was already rather too big for its hat.<sup>103</sup>

In future the British should avoid sending to Finland church-related visitors who tended to ‘exaggerate the virtues’ of the Soviet Union’s small neighbours. Waddams did not mention specific individuals. The Finns had to be persuaded to give up their provincial way of thinking, they had to be given truthful information about the war and they had to be helped to understand their real importance and role in international developments.<sup>104</sup> This he

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.* 16.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.* 1.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.* 1–2.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.* 2, 16–17.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.* 2.

regarded as very slight. He thus projected a fairly negative image of Finland and the Finns in the memorandum, which he prepared mainly for his employer, the British Ministry of Information. This memorandum, and documents on the visit to Sweden, was also distributed in church circles. The archbishop of Canterbury, for example, received a copy. The press was not informed of the mission.

Waddams travelled to Sweden and Finland primarily as an official of the Ministry of Information, although he also nurtured certain contacts of the Church of England at the same time. It appears, however, that both Waddams and the ministry wished to stress that he travelled as a representative of the Church. Waddams's main assignment was to chart the propaganda situation and the climate of opinion, and this he did thoroughly.<sup>105</sup>

Seen from a British perspective the political views of Swedish and Finnish churchmen were unrealistic and based on an incorrect evaluation of the situation. Waddams was disturbed by the excessively positive attitudes towards Germany of both Swedes and Finns, and he appears to have had no understanding of the thinking or opinions of Finnish churchmen in particular. It should be remembered, however, that the Allied war effort against Germany was still in progress and that Finland had been forced to turn against its former comrade-in-arms. At the same time Waddams continually sought to defend Soviet policies and bolster confidence in the possibility of friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Waddams's opinions can hardly be regarded as reflecting the official position of the Church of England, particularly since he travelled mainly as an official of the Ministry of Information committed to certain policies. An example of different attitudes within the Church is a pro-Finnish article by Dean Arthur Duncan-Jones of Chichester, published in June 1944 in the *Manchester Guardian*.<sup>106</sup> Waddams, however, may not have been quite as 'blind' in his opinions as is suggested by his reports. He told Mme Kollontay that he considered asking her for an extra salary for having undertaken so much propaganda for the Russians.<sup>107</sup> Writing to Williams before going to Lund around the middle of his visit, Waddams noted with a touch of irony: 'If I am not careful I shall talk myself into a state of mind in which I can see nothing wrong with the Soviet Union. But perhaps you thought that I had attained this state of mind before I left!'.<sup>108</sup>

Waddams also appears to have managed to hide any annoyance and displeasure which he felt during his conversations, for both his Swedish and Finnish hosts were satisfied with his visit. When he asked Nils Ehrenström bluntly how the Swedes had judged him, the response was that he had been

<sup>105</sup> Williams's comment in the margin of Waddams to Williams, 17 Nov. 1944, Inf 1/774.

<sup>106</sup> Murtorinne, *Veljeyttä viimeiseen saakka*, 192; Ripatti, *Suomen kirkon ulkomaansuhteet*, 74.

<sup>107</sup> Memorandum 'Sweden', section 4.13.

<sup>108</sup> Waddams to Williams 17 Nov. 1944, Inf 1/774.

criticised for excessive caution towards the Soviet Union on the Baltic issue. On the other hand, Eidem described Waddams as ‘clear headed, discerning and of a mature judgement, with an ability to see what is essential’.<sup>109</sup>

The Finns, too, were satisfied and appeared to be unaware of Waddams’s critical attitude towards them. Writing to Gulin after Waddams’s visit, Lehtonen noted that it had been ‘a pleasure to talk about many acquaintances and of theological and church matters’. Waddams appears to have enjoyed his stay in Tampere.<sup>110</sup> Contacts between the Churches had now been initiated. Lehtonen was so confident of Waddams’s positive attitude towards Finland that when the British Ministry of Information published an appeal for assistance for the Church of Finland in the journal *Spiritual Issues of the War*, he assumed that he was involved.<sup>111</sup> In fact, Waddams’s annoyance with the Finns seemed quickly to fade away; in 1946 he was ready to give his assistance to the Finnish Seamen’s Mission in its housing problems in London and to Archbishop Lehtonen’s son who came to England as an exchange student.<sup>112</sup>

In 1945 Waddams was chosen to be general secretary of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, and went on to play an important role in that field. On his mission to Sweden and Finland he had carefully followed the current British foreign policy line: good relations with its ally, the Soviet Union, were considered so important that they overshadowed relations with smaller countries. He criticised the Finns and the Swedes for being too suspicious of the Soviets, and eagerly assured them of the Soviet government’s good intentions. His, one might say, naïve belief in Soviet goodwill towards Finland and the Baltic countries – and a genuine change in their religious policy – is even more astonishing given that as an official of the Ministry of Information, he had closely followed the information that was available on the Soviet Union, and in 1943 he had even visited Moscow. Thus he should have been better informed than most British churchmen on the realities of Soviet policy. The Soviets’ behaviour in the Baltic States, and in Eastern Europe, proved soon enough that his expectations had been over-optimistic.

<sup>109</sup> Memorandum ‘Sweden’, section 4.3. See also Johansson to Eidem, 3 Nov. 1944, EEA CI/73.

<sup>110</sup> Lehtonen to Gulin, 22 Dec. 1944, EG 11; Waddams to Margareta Lehtonen, 22 Dec. 1944, AL 52.

<sup>111</sup> Lehtonen to Gulin 25 Apr. 1945, EG 11; Ripatti, *Suomen kirkon ulkomaansuhteet*, 88.

<sup>112</sup> Mika Pajunen, ‘“Me tarvitsemme sitä johtoa, jonka Canterbury on antanut”’: Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon suhde Englannin kirkkoon Aleksii Lehtosen arkkipiispakauden alkuvuosina, 1945–1947’, unpubl. MA diss. Faculty of Theology, Helsinki 2000, 71–2, 93.