hours worked per week and per year. These opportunities should be equally available to men as to women, because their aim is to erode the current situation where women are preponderantly the ones to take time out of the paid workforce for caring duties or to have their leisure time diminished by these activities. Schouten is clear that her suggested interventions do not exhaust the possibilities for achieving these goals and that the right mix of such policies varies with context. Policies like these would aim to make a gender-egalitarian sharing of paid and unpaid labor less costly than does the current arrangement and even to make the currently dominant gendered division of labor more costly than an egalitarian one. Such policies would tilt individual choices in the direction of gender egalitarianism.

Chapter 1 also includes the book's first reference to Susan Moller Okin, who did pioneering work on this topic three decades ago. Schouten points out that many aspects of Okin's analysis are as relevant now as they were then—which is more evidence of the stalled revolution. But it struck me as odd that the book's 30-page introduction makes no reference to Okin as someone who had blazed Schouten's trail. Chapter 1 then moves from Okin's landmark work to acknowledge Arlie Hochschild's complementary, contemporaneous work on the second shift (p. 40).

Schouten portrays the gendered division of labor as a universal phenomenon (p. 32), but her empirical evidence is drawn from western societies as far as I could see. Although her extensive bibliography lists some cross-national studies, the text draws on western examples only (see pp. 33–35, 207–9, 217–20). Her appeal to political liberalism as a way of addressing the gendered division of labor also limits the scope of her proposed solution, because not everyone lives in a polity with these organizing principles or shared conceptions of the right. But even within liberal societies, Schouten says little about possible variations in this phenomenon across differences of class, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation: it cannot, for example, be a problem for same-sex couples by definition. I found her repeated appeals to "women" unqualified somewhat disconcerting. Schouten's response to my concerns might be that the current regime is built on the obsolete assumption that paid workers have someone at home doing all, or more, of the unpaid caring work and that this disadvantages all workers who are not in that position, irrespective of their other characteristics (pp. 36–37).

Chapters 2 and 4 explore the problems that remaining within the confines of political liberalism might pose for Schouten's advocacy. The neutrality requirement in particular would seem to proscribe her attempts to make a particular set of choices less costly than others. Chapter 2 clarifies that her position is consistent with justificatory neutrality but not neutrality of consequences, because, as she points out, all exercises of state power will be non-neutral in their consequences. Chapter 4 examines the fact that political liberalism's principles of justice apply to the basic structure only but argues that this creates more room for gender-egalitarian policies that affect the family than many have realized. She contends that, regardless of individual behavior, the fact that the current basic structure effectively encourages an uneven distribution of paid and caring work makes it unjust. Of course, the location of the family in the basic structure has been a topic of feminist attention since the appearance of *A Theory of Justice* in 1971, but Schouten engages explicitly with very little of that literature.

One consistently impressive feature of Schouten's densely packed book is the way she clearly and fairly articulates positions that diverge from hers. So although she is very obviously motivated by a particular agenda, she does not give short shrift to those who do not share her position. This admirable honesty and even-handedness are especially on display in the conclusion, where Schouten addresses the challenges of translating her philosophical argument into actual political debate.

Parliamentarism: From Burke to Weber. By William Selinger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 268p. $75.18 cloth, $29.99 paper.

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This book explores the nature and evolution of classical parliamentarism by reexamining its most significant exponents. Probing parliamentarism's main ideological currents against the backdrop of events, it tells a riveting story about the historical ascent and intellectual elaboration of parliamentary institutions, from the eighteenth century to the end of World War I.

William Selinger argues that parliamentarism is a coherent tradition of thought and practice and among the greatest institutional achievements of political modernity. Institutionally, parliamentary government rests on the pillars of a powerful legislature, a constitutional monarch, robust party competition, and ministers present in parliament, while its practice is oriented by the norms of representation, deliberation, executive responsibility, and harmony as well as balance of powers. So understood, parliamentarism originated in Britain as an attempt to resolve the revolutionary crisis of the seventeenth century, yet it was influentially theorized in the course and aftermath of the French Revolution, whose key thinkers helped generalize the English experience into a global model. Arguing that parliamentarism should be considered among the most important legacies of the French Revolution, the book aims to restore its theoretical stature and contemporary relevance.

The inquiry is organized in six chapters, two of which are more contextual, while the rest showcase the great

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champions of the parliamentarian cause: Burke, Constant, Tocqueville, and Mill. Each chapter does substantial work, adding new material and revisiting already established theses in light of new contexts. The argument is framed by a programmatic introduction and a conclusion that takes the inquiry into the twentieth century with a brief homage to Max Weber. Though focusing on England and France, Selinger conceptualizes parliamentarism in contrast to American constitutionalism as the main alternative for how to be liberal in the modern world.

Learned, stimulating, and highly readable, Selinger's account lays the groundwork for rethinking liberal institutions and norms—an urgent task today—and raises the fundamental questions that such a rethinking must address. Engaging with numerous literatures, it navigates astutely between history and theory; between recasting celebrated thinkers in a new, often contentious, light and canvassing the intellectual context, in which figures largely forgotten today such as Jean-Louis de Lolme or the so-called Edinburgh Reviewers are given their historical due. The book as a whole offers an informed reflection on the aspirations that have underpinned parliamentary institutions, helping us appreciate their intellectual and moral foundations.

"Appreciate" is an important verb here. Although much contemporary scholarship is animated by the urge to deconstruct traditional narratives about liberalism and to unmask their oppressive hypocrisy, this account makes a spirited case for liberal norms and practices. To make that case, it paints the complex panorama of events and considerations within which parliamentary politics unfolded, and of the political and moral trade-offs with which it was confronted. Nor is hypocrisy passed over in silence. Zooming in on the problem of corruption, the troubling question of whether parliamentary government, premised on persuasion, negotiation, and consensual social change, is achievable in practice is the book's central concern.

Admirably ambitious, Selinger's inquiry is not equally successful in all it proposes to achieve. For one, the aspiration to attend to individual thinkers, often against the grain of scholarly consensus, while also fitting them into a larger narrative, is productive of tensions that are not easy to reconcile. This problem is especially acute in the case of Montesquieu, who is targeted in every chapter yet not systematically discussed. If the contention, running through the book, that Montesquieu got England wrong is to be persuasive, a more sustained engagement with his complex constitutionalism would be necessary. Tocqueville is another uneasy fit in Selinger's narrative. The claim that Tocqueville preferred British-style parliamentary government to the United States's one forces the question (pondered by François Furet) of why it was to America, not England, that Tocqueville traveled to gather constitutional wisdom. Also, by assuming a linear progression, the narrative obscures the degree to which earlier authors may have been aware of possibilities that transpired later in time, as well as the role this awareness played in the constitutional solutions they championed. Weber's worry, for example, that democratization elevates the executive would not have surprised Tocqueville or the American framers.

If closer attention to individual authors would have been desirable, so would bringing in more context, especially at junctures where theory and practice seem to part ways. Queen Victoria is a case in point. Selinger avers that Constant's idea of a neutral monarchy elevated above the political fray became a constitutional common sense in Victorian Britain, to which the monarch herself scrupulously adhered. In the same breath, however, he notes that Victoria "was quite involved in political affairs behind the scenes" (p. 166). Though flagged, the distance between appearance and reality is not probed; and without probing how parliamentary principles worked (or did not) in practice, their value cannot be fully appreciated. Full appreciation likewise demands an engagement with the empire. Is it a coincidence that parliamentarism achieved its historical zenith at the time when Britain attained global hegemony? How did the Victorians reconcile parliamentary norms with ruling over dependencies? And to what extent did "the culture of political deliberation" (p. 177) they celebrated require the systematic exclusion of certain groups, views, and policy areas? Without an honest reckoning with these questions and with Parliament's role in shaping imperial and social policy, parliamentarism cannot be fully understood.

A comment on the conceptual frame. In explicating parliamentarism's core values of representation, deliberation, and responsibility, Selinger leaves out of the account (and from the index) a pivotal one: sovereignty. This is all the more striking because the concept, present throughout the book, pervades the Victorian debates. As chapter 6 shows more than tells, the gist of Selinger's story and its key dilemma—the problem of corruption—cannot come into full view without the lens of sovereignty. Take Macaulay's *History of England*, which argued that patronage had become necessary in a period Selinger dubs "transitional" when "the House of Commons was no longer overawed by the Crown but not yet dependent on public opinion" (p. 190). Patronage, on that view, was deployed to manage the change from monarchical to popular sovereignty. Once the Commons were recognized as the "true sovereign of the state" (in Mill's words, p. 167), its "daily practical supremacy" (in Bagehot's, p. 175) made patronage, for some at least, no longer necessary.

If glossing over sovereignty leaves out crucial aspects of the conceptual history, it stands in the way of realizing Selinger's agenda to reclaim classical parliamentarianism for political theory and contemporary concerns. This agenda is often articulated in the language of regimes.

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The introductory chapter suggests that the rise of parliamentarism should be understood in contradistinction to democracy (p. 5). Later on, the US Constitution is said to be the "defining antagonist" (p. 144) and "a political regime very different from parliamentarism" (p. 145). These claims and the meaning of regime that undergirds them are puzzling and unexplained. So is the assertion that parliamentarism constitutes "an entirely different tradition" (p. 83) from the ideological legacy—republicanism, democracy, human rights—usually associated with the French Revolution. What Selinger gestures at is that classical typologies, which define regimes according to the locus of sovereignty, are no longer relevant in a world where most polities, including Weber's "decisive political alternative" (p. 203)—the USSR—are (or were) based on popular sovereignty and representative institutions. So how to rethink the notion of regime, and of political alternatives, in the twenty-first century is a question that may restore parliamentarism, as Selinger envisions it, to the frontline of theoretical debates.

This brings me to Carl Schmitt, parliamentarism's greatest detractor. Making two cameo appearances, Schmitt is the *éminence grise* lurking behind Selinger's account and its stated concern with reconciling parliamentarism and democracy. Schmitt famously insisted on the incompatibility between the two and the necessity to choose between undemocratic liberalism and democratic dictatorship. Although not engaging with it directly, Selinger dubs Schmitt's analysis "prophetic" (p. 204). If the intellectual history of classical parliamentarism can bear on contemporary concerns, it is by helping us address the Schmittian challenge. As it stands, Selinger's argument is not yet up to this task. It is, nevertheless, an impressive beginning.

Raymond Aron and Liberal Thought in the Twentieth Century. By Iain Stewart. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 316p. $99.99 cloth.

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The name Raymond Aron is virtually synonymous with French liberalism, both with the nation's Tocquevillian "revival" and its antitotalitarian turn. But as Iain Stewart observes in *Raymond Aron and Liberal Thought in the Twentieth Century,* Aron's relationship with liberalism is simply assumed, "taken for granted," so much so that it "needs to be explained, not proclaimed" (p. 5). By tracing the thinker's development from his early political associations through the Aronism of the 1970s and '80s, Stewart complicates the assumptions behind a straightforwardly liberal Aron. What emerges from this intelligent book is an image of Aron the critic, the pessimist, even the sometimes anti-liberal, whose intellectual trajectory reveals as much about the complexity of French liberalism as it does about the thinker himself.

Aron's putative liberalism spans different parts of the French tradition. For his rediscovery of "the political" (*le politique*), he is credited with releasing the Marxist hold on the French academy. His attention to Alexis de Tocqueville, Benjamin Constant, and other nineteenth-century thinkers purportedly restored their relevance for twentieth-century readers. And he is among the exemplars of Cold War liberalism and antitotalitarianism. For Stewart, these assumptions-turned-accolades conceal essential features of Aron's intellectual position. They also lead to an unsophisticated, monolithic view of French liberalism. Stewart's corrective for such assumptions lies partly in the book's method: to understand Aron, we have to go back to his beginnings, because "a detailed knowledge of Aron's very earliest political commitments is essential to reaching a full understanding of his intellectual ethic and Cold War liberalism" (p. 17). Chapters 1 and 2 offer a thoroughly researched, deep dive into these formative commitments, discussed by way of Aron's student activism and associational activities at the École normale. As he dissects these episodes, Stewart maintains that Aron's brand of liberalism actually emerged from critical and anti-liberal foundations; specifically, from a conscious break with his liberal teachers and from the non-French, nonliberal influences of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Martin Heidegger. The early Aron often sounds like an accidental liberal, led by a "critical attitude" (p. 46) to reject the prevailing academic currents of his day—Marxism and even individualist liberalism among them—only to find himself eventually on the liberal side of things.

The book's central arguments rely on the method of its first chapters. Aron's political origin story influences how we ought to understand the theories for which he is best known: antitotalitarianism (chap. 3) and the end of ideology (chap. 4). Stewart reinterprets Aron on totalitarianism in light of his criticism of the "venerable liberal historian" Élie Halevy, set against the overarching inspiration of Schmitt's work, which was formative for Aron in the interwar years (p. 119). The author follows others in raising questions about the "theoretical coherence" of so-called Cold War liberalism that originated neither during the Cold War nor from liberal sources (p. 15). Still, the reader might wish for more than questions on this point. Although Stewart reiterates that Aron's example "could be used in support" of arguments against the tradition's coherence, he never makes the argument himself, allowing the arc of Aron's intellectual development to drive the conclusions for his readers (p. 236). But insofar as the book aims to say something about liberalism and not only Aron, it misses an opportunity to engage with the analytical concerns about European liberal *tradition* and the *traditions* that the subject matter raises.

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