

## Phenomenology and Dance: Husserlian Meditations

Anna Pakes

The dimming of the house lights focuses attention on the still darkened stage, although awareness of the others in the auditorium and its quieted bustle does not entirely fade. From the stage, the sound of several people taking five or six measured footsteps in unison, then stopping, momentarily precedes the lights (stage and house) fading quickly up to reveal nine performers. They stand, facing out, dressed in ordinary clothes (shirt and jacket, jumper and skirt, different colors), steady gaze directed at the audience. They stand in the gaps between a series of reflective slabs, each of the same regular dimensions, slightly wider and taller than the performers themselves. Behind the performers is a further line of panels cut from the same material. After a brief pause, the space darkens.

When the stage lights come up again, the world has changed: a strong wind now blows across the stage, and a roar of noise fills the theater. The performers emerge in twos, threes, or fours to walk slowly in an arc before disappearing once more behind the reflective panels, which are now bending and distorting in the stage wind. The walking forms a seamless flow, with one pair or group emerging and relaying another as it vanishes. Each time they appear, the performers sport a new item of clothing (a dressing gown, a feathered headdress, a white doctor's coat) or carry a different object (a torch, a sandwich, a crown, a doll), and perform a different action (shining light on the floor, eating, carrying a pot plant, shaking the baby). Sometimes, the action involves another performer rather than an inanimate object (a fist fight, a passionate kiss). Some actions are ordinary (reading a newspaper, donning sunglasses, putting on a coat), some extreme (shooting a gun, dragging a dead pheasant along the ground with one's teeth, kicking the baby across the floor). There is no apparent connection between actions in terms of their sense, though objects and items of clothing periodically reappear forging a formal link between the instances of their use. Some are thrown away, to form a gradually mounting pile of debris downstage. But the reiteration of certain objects, as well as the pacing and relayed groupings of the movement also create a sense of structure, and a formal coherence, if not narrative or thematic cohesion.

After a time, attention wanders and alights on a cable stretched across the front of the stage, between two spools, one at each side of the space. The cable is (automatically) being gradually unwound from one spool on to the other, in the process dragging across strategically placed strings. This is the source of the roar of noise, which both dominates and forms a constant backdrop to the stage action. When the whole cable has unwound, the noise (perhaps also the action and the

---

**Anna Pakes** is senior lecturer in dance at Roehampton University, London, UK. She began to be interested in phenomenology when studying for a PhD at the Laban Centre in the 1990s, and is now revisiting the phenomenological tradition in the light of current preoccupations in the philosophy of art and philosophy of mind in relation to dance. Her recent work has focused mainly on analytic philosophy. She teaches aesthetics and philosophy on BA, MA, and PhD programs in dance at Roehampton, and is working on a book on dance ontology.

howling wind) will stop. In the meantime, it continues, uninterrupted though punctuated by the occasional drama (a violent slap, a flash of nudity, a contemptuous discarding of one of the objects) amid the unfolding sequence of everyday images.

This description of Maguy Marin's (2004) *Umwelt* identifies salient features from the stream of experiences and activities that comprise its performance. As any detailed account of a dance might reasonably be expected to do, it highlights the presence and actions of performers, the stage props, elements of scenography, the accompanying sound, and the source of that sound, picking them out as objects of conscious attention. In the process, the things that give the dance and its experience their distinctiveness are brought to reflective awareness. But the description also shows, perhaps, how the experienced elements, the performance, even the dance work itself, are constituted in the process of being seen, noted, reflected upon, and described. It is a creative account in forming one image of the dance out of the available range of perceptual materials, sense data, and linguistic resources at the writer's disposal. The dance appears as something that the process of engaging with it partly creates. In other words, an active engagement produces the experienced phenomenon. It is not a case of the already given objects of the dance (in themselves complete) imprinting themselves on a passive consciousness that merely receives their impression. Nor does transparent language simply make visible the already given reality of the dance. Rather, the dance appears as it does by virtue of how it is apprehended and described.

This is evident from the fact that very different descriptions of the same performance could be given, articulating its phenomenal parameters from other perspectives. The above paragraphs constitute the dance as seen by one audience member, in one particular profile. Other profiles are available—to this person on other occasions, and to other people at the same and other performances of the same dance. The performers, for example, experience *Umwelt* differently, required as they are to move behind the reflective panels that block the audience's view. The dancers grasp more fully the complexity of how this work's actions are organized by participating in both the on- and offstage choreography of objects and people. The audience, meanwhile, does not necessarily think of what happens behind the scenes: how the props must be ordered, their sequence marked or memorized; how the presence of particular dancers in certain locations at specific moments is ensured so that they are ready to move into view at the appropriate time. Similarly, the performers do not perceive in the same way as the audience the stage image that their action creates; they may remain engrossed in that action as a series of unfolding tasks. The experience of this performance, as of any object with material existence, is inevitably perspectival: what we see or otherwise experience is one aspect of the dance. But it is nonetheless an aspect of the dance, one of the ways in which this dance is present.

Typically, perhaps, we are not reflectively aware of how the performance, or particular elements of it, appear to us. We are aware of the performance and its features, seeing the performers, what they are doing, what they are carrying, and so on. But the manner of appearance could always be reflected upon, or thematized, maybe consequent on a shift in attention, like the one which suddenly reveals the source of the roar of background noise in *Umwelt*. This work, also, itself heightens awareness of the nature and significance of the images that unfold: the ways they are combined paradoxically isolates individual elements of the dance—a particular prop, posture, way of walking, or item of clothing—their reiteration drawing attention to what they are, what they might mean, and the manner and significance of their combination with other elements. But this attitude of reflexive awareness in relation to how objects and actions appear could, in principle, be adopted in the face of any performance, once the fact that we see what we see (or otherwise experience what we experience) ceases to be taken for granted.

The constitutive activity of consciousness is the focus of Edmund Husserl's philosophy and, more generally, of phenomenology, the philosophical movement he inspired. Husserl's phenomenology is interested in what we experience, but also how experiential phenomena—and the world they

comprise—are shaped by the structures of consciousness. These structures include embodiment and temporality as well as the directedness toward a content (intentionality) characteristic of certain kinds of thinking (perceiving, remembering, and imagining, for example). Husserl's work offers a route whereby our involvement in creating the dances we witness and perform can be probed. It can help us to explore the conditions of experiencing performances and works, what structures must be in place to enable them to appear as such at all, and to allow us to come to know what they are. Husserl's phenomenology does not directly address the phenomena of dance and performance, and indeed barely touches at all on art and aesthetics, but its insights with respect to other phenomena and experiences bear on the endeavor of dance studies at a number of levels. This begins to be highlighted in reflection on the description of *Umwelt* and is developed in more detail in what follows.<sup>1</sup> That discussion implies also a critical reflection on some existing adaptations of phenomenology to dance, and raises broader questions about the “use” and value of philosophy for the investigation of dance practices, addressed in the Conclusion.

## Husserl and the Phenomenology of Dance

Within existing adaptations of phenomenology to dance, there is often a nod in Husserl's direction. Sheets-Johnstone (1978, 1979, 1981, 1984), Fraleigh (1987, 1998), Parviainen (1998), and Kozel (2007) all outline the principles of phenomenological method in terms derived from Husserl's work: A phenomenological approach encourages a fresh look at dance phenomena; it proposes a first person account, descriptive rather than constructively theoretical; and it focuses on those phenomena as they appear or are directly apprehended, once preconceptions and prejudgments about the dance have been suspended. Phenomenological dance writers make evident their methodological debt, even as they emphasize the greater relevance of subsequent thinkers to their projects: Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty used Husserl's writings as a springboard, while subjecting them to trenchant critique; the interest of these later philosophers in corporeality—or at least in the questions of real existence and the nature of being—seems to mark their work as more relevant to the discussion of dance. Thus Sheets-Johnstone draws on Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Fraleigh looks to Heidegger and Sartre. And Parviainen and Kozel seek in Merleau-Ponty's work “an embodied approach to the construction of meaning” in dance and, in Kozel's case latterly, the interactions between dance and technology (2007, 2)<sup>2</sup>.

But rather than simply asserting the greater relevance of later phenomenology, dance scholars often also explicitly distance their endeavors from Husserl's project. Fraleigh, for example, draws a distinction between poetic and “technical” phenomenologists (1987, 6) and emphasizes that she employs aspects of Husserl's method “not in the strict scientific sense that is the aim of some phenomenology” (1987, 6–7). She asserts that existential phenomenology is more significant for her project in maintaining “an attitude of being in the world,” in contrast to Husserl's work which “culminates in a transcendent principle” (7). Husserl is said to have viewed phenomenology's task as “describing the lived world from the viewpoint of a detached observer” (8), an idea that is reiterated in Parviainen (1998, 30).<sup>3</sup> Kozel (2007, 13), similarly, makes clear that her book proposes a “highly existential phenomenology” through “reflections on the lived experience of performing in responsive technological systems.” She too uses a phenomenological method in which “bias, expectations, or prior knowledge” as well as “existing conceptions of the world” are said to be “bracketed” or “suspended,” albeit necessarily imperfectly (Kozel 2007, 18; see also Sheets-Johnstone 1984, 131). But, Kozel makes clear, this is not “a transcendental phenomenology after Husserl” (2007, 13). So even while dance phenomenology outlines its methods in Husserlian terms, there is a resistance to the general character of his approach, particularly its emphasis on “transcendental” inquiry.

The implication is that transcendental phenomenology is not an appropriate or helpful mode of inquiry when it comes to dance. Why is this? Certainly, to confront Husserl's writings is to encounter something that seems radically alien to what is known in dance as phenomenology. Husserl's

texts include statements about the methodical principles applied by phenomenological dance writers: claims about the need to suspend preconceptions and beliefs to clear the investigative ground, for example; the idea of eidetic inquiry seeking to define essences rather than empirically establish facts; the call for a return to “lived experience” from the barren ground of speculative philosophical theorizing. But despite the familiarity of such notions, they do not seem incarnated, in the ways one might expect, in the substantive discussion. There are no lengthy first-person descriptions, reconstructing the agent’s lived experience of reality. Instead, there is talk of phenomenology as a rigorous science, of the importance of pure logic over a psychologistic interpretation, of analyzing intentional acts into noetic and noematic components, and of the focus on transcendental rather than empirical subjectivity. With its barrage of technical terminology and conceptual complexity, Husserl makes for slow and difficult reading, requiring concentrated reasoned attention, and not the sort of intuitive responsiveness demanded by many phenomenological descriptions of dance. As Kozel suggests, drawing on David Gelernter, this is high-focus, “wide awake thought,” not its low-focus, affective, creative, and embodied counterpart (2007, 52).

Indeed, within dance studies, phenomenology is often considered valuable precisely insofar as it responds to a need “to describe concrete lived human life, without forcing it through a methodological framework, or reducing it to a series of inner psychic experiences or conceptual abstractions” (Kozel 2007, 5). As such, it seems a way to avoid both scientifically objectifying the interpretative phenomenon of dance and also imposing a theoretical frame that ignores or excludes bodily experience and the sensuous immediacy of performance; yet it does still provide a sympathetic philosophical context for, and a method of inquiry to guide, reflection.<sup>4</sup> Kozel suggests that phenomenology has also been an important approach to dance students “struggling with how to integrate their own experiences in their academic work” (Kozel 2007, 5), primarily because of its twin emphasis on lived experience and on the first-person perspective. Adopted as a way to orient description, phenomenology thus enables movers to articulate what they felt and continue to feel when dancing. There is an important sense in which the value of dance experience for these performers consists not in seeing their dancing as a means to the end of presentation to an audience, but rather in the richness of the sensations, and indeed the pleasure, experienced in the act of moving. Because it appears to be more concerned with the nature of thinking, and less with the experience of embodiment, the transcendental approach developed by Husserl is a less obvious point of reference than, say, Merleau-Ponty’s poetic reflections on corporeal facticity.

The view of Husserl’s philosophy that has been handed down by dance studies in many ways accords with what Donn Welton (2000, 1, 393–404; 2003, xi) calls the “standard picture” in philosophy, emerging as result of a convergence of deconstructive, analytic, critical theoretical, and postmodern analyses of his work. The standard picture of Husserl takes the first book of *Ideas* (Husserl 1982) as the definitive statement of transcendental phenomenology, and transcendental idealism as the defining characterization of Husserl’s opus. The standard view notes how transcendental phenomenology was challenged, as Husserl recognized, by his later reflections on the body, intersubjectivity, and the life-world, but also how it was not (or could not be) fully reworked to take adequate account of these issues. Hence, the existential phenomenologists figure as those who took up the reins of this inquiry, properly probing the phenomena of corporeality and intersubjectivity. The standard picture is also influenced by Jacques Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s writings as mired in a metaphysics of the subject and of presence to which deconstruction offers a radical challenge (Derrida 1973, 1978, 2003). In this picture, Husserl becomes “a foil for developmental and genealogical accounts that attempt to overturn the very possibility of transcendental philosophy” (Welton 2003, xi).

But what does it mean to develop a “transcendental phenomenology”? And is transcendental inquiry as inimical to the discussion of dance as phenomenological dance writing implies? The term “transcendental” is complex and polysemic. The sense it makes within the context of the philosophical problems with which Husserl was engaged seems at odds with the way it tends to be

interpreted in the dance context. Here, the assumption is often that a transcendental investigation is one that steps away from actual embodied experience to make pronouncements in the abstract about what is, or ought to be, going on. This view derives both from the standard picture through the inheritance of Heidegger and Derrida, and from an acute sense of the specificity of dance as an embodied practice, which it is important to recognize in its philosophical examination. However, re-reading Husserl's own writings alongside recent interpretations of his work (Carr 2003, Welton 2000, and Zahavi 2003b, for example, all based on close attention to unpublished manuscripts as well as the published opus), suggests the standard picture to be flawed,<sup>5</sup> and this in turn challenges that picture's dominance within the phenomenology of dance. A different perspective on phenomenology's relevance to the dance field emerges when Husserl's focus on the transcendent and the transcendental are re-examined.

## Performances, Works and Other Transcendent Objects

One sense in which Husserl's work is focused on the transcendent is through its concern with objects (immaterial as well as material) irreducible to conscious experiences. As Moran (2000, 60) recognizes, Husserl shares an interest in the perceptual flux of consciousness with numerous other late nineteenth century thinkers, such as William James and Henri Bergson. But throughout Husserl's work, the focus is not the nature of that flux per se, so much as how consciousness engages with things outside of itself. In the constantly shifting stream of experience, we engage in numerous kinds of thought processes—perceiving, imagining, remembering, and so on—processes related to the different kinds of things encountered. These things include material objects such as our living room furniture and animate beings such as other people, but also intangible objects such as ideas—the notion of democracy, for example, or the logical principle of non-contradiction.<sup>6</sup> Husserl's philosophical interest is in how such objectivities emerge in relation to the flux of experience. Psychic processes elapse through time, but the objects intended and known through these processes endure and so must be distinguishable from the psychic processes themselves. This is clear from the fact that we can all perceive the same coffee table, think about the same concepts, or remember the same event (assuming we were there to experience it in the first place, and accepting that it might be remembered from different perspectives). Equally, we can perceive, think about, imagine, and remember the same thing on different occasions. This would be impossible if the objects were immanent in our psychic processes, but is possible insofar as they *transcend* particular acts of perceiving, thinking, and remembering.

Husserl's initial focus in this regard was logic, the principles of which, he argues (at length, in the Prolegomena to the *Logical Investigations*), are not reducible to empirically discoverable facts about thought processes; rather, they are “ideal truths and ideal laws” (Moran 2000, 102), and logic is a “purely theoretical science, the all-important foundation for any technology of scientific knowledge, [...] itself having the character of an a priori, purely demonstrative science” (Husserl 1970a, Vol. 1, 14). This analysis prefigures the more general exploration of how the things we perceive, think about, and remember transcend the acts of perceiving, thinking, and remembering directed at them (Husserl 1970a, Investigations V and VI; 1982, 211–243, 307–318). Included among these objects of consciousness would be dance performances and dance works, which also transcend the processes of thinking about or experiencing them. Although unlike the physical objects of spatial actuality apprehended in ordinary perception, performances and works are objects of consciousness in that they can be the focus of intentional acts, and are not merely constructs of those thought processes by which they are apprehended.<sup>7</sup> I can see the performance of Marin's *Umwelt* in Cork. You can remember watching it in Paris. Someone else can read a review or my description and imagine what it was like. The quality of these conscious experiences is different from one case to another, and the conception under which the object is experienced may also vary. But the experiences are focused on the same thing: *Umwelt*, which is not reducible to any individual's idea, image, or encounter with it. Similarly, of the audience present at a London performance of Marin's work,

each member witnesses the same event, though they might interpret it in different ways. The event can also be given in other ways than (as it is in perception) in its bodily presence: “signitively” through a bare verbal designation, for example, or via the processes of memory. But, however it is given, it is not simply a part or moment of a psychological experience.

What is crucial to Husserl’s phenomenological perspective is the recognition that, despite their transcendence, such objects are only accessible through the activity of consciousness. As Klaus Held suggests, “Phenomena are ‘in themselves’ in the world, but only in such a way as they show themselves in their respective situatedness and as subjectively ‘for me’” (2003, 9). The existence of ordinary material reality tends to be taken so much for granted that the constitutive role of consciousness may be difficult to grasp,<sup>8</sup> but the idea has clear resonance in the context of art and dance. If dance is a form of intentional action that depends on the conscious engagement of the agents involved (Carr 1987; McFee 1992), dance is actively constituted as it is experienced; without interpreting what we are doing or seeing as dance, it remains “just” movement or random activity.<sup>9</sup> But the fact that dance depends on consciousness in this way does not mean that a dance performance is reducible to the way each subject experiences it, that each person perceives a different dance. The performance is not the process of kinesthetically experiencing, seeing, or aesthetically appreciating, but something we share with others. Husserl comments in the *Crisis* on the breakthrough of *Logical Investigations*: “Philosophers were confined by what was taken for granted, i.e., that each thing appeared differently in each case to each person” (1970b, 165; see also Held 2003, 9), but phenomenology focuses on the neglected correlation “between world (the world of which we always speak) and its subjective manners of givenness” (Husserl 1970b, 165), opening exploration of precisely what varies and what remains the same across distinct apprehensions of a given object.

This emphasis is a corrective to an extreme relativism, which would claim that everyone sees something different when they watch a dance. If this were true, there would be no possibility of discussing, researching, or writing about particular dances, since they would be nothing beyond the individual subject’s experience—no shared dance world in which to participate. Dances would be locked in to the private world of an individual’s consciousness. Although dance performances and works are transcendent in this sense, they do of course shape shift—as experienced phenomena—depending on the perspective from, or profile, in which they appear. As the earlier discussion of *Umwelt* suggested, the profiles of this dance include (but are not exhausted by) those available to performers as well as audience members, and, within those broad categories, to different performers depending on role and to various audience members depending on spatial location. Rather than privileging the perspective of the detached observer, Husserl’s early work proposes a sophisticated model for distinguishing between qualitatively different experiences via the analysis of the nature of intentional acts, the perception of a dance performance being an intentional act in Husserl’s sense.<sup>10</sup>

Husserl’s analysis (1970a, Investigations V and VI) posits that each act involves a psychical process (it is an actual episode of perceiving, remembering, imagining, and so on, experienced by a concrete subject), known as its immanent content. It also has an intentional content, characterized in the two dimensions of intentional quality and matter (1970a, 119–139). The quality delineates the type of experience the act is, for example, remembering the opening section of *Umwelt* as opposed to perceiving it. The matter, meanwhile, is what the experience is about: the intentional object, but under a certain conception. In the case of *Umwelt*, for example, the dance might be experienced as a series of tasks to be accomplished, as an elaborately orchestrated choreography of ordinary actions, or as a meditation on humanity’s existential predicament (and so on). The same “dance” is intended in each case, but under different conceptions. The nature of a particular act is also bound up with the object’s givenness—how and how fully it appears to consciousness. An “intuitively” given object is given directly, in its bodily presence—as is the performance of *Umwelt* as I sit in the theater watching.<sup>11</sup> If I read the words “last night’s performance of *Umwelt*,” then the object is given only “signitively” rather than intuitively; it still appears to me, but in an empty way

compared to the fullness of intuitive perception (Husserl 1970a, 738–749). If I read a detailed and vivid description of the work, or maybe see a series of evocative still images, the performance would be given imaginatively: It is not bodily present as it is when I actually sit watching in the theater, but nor does it appear in the empty way it does through the bare verbal description. Similarly, *Umwelt* is given differently to the performer—who perceives some elements proprioceptively, some visually—than to the audience member, for whom it may conversely be easier to perceive the choreographic whole.

It may be tempting here, in deconstructive fashion, to critique the way “full” perception seems privileged at the expense of “empty” representation. But the terminology does not necessarily imply a denigration of signitive appearance: It is recognized as a *different* mode of givenness with in a spectrum (rather than a binary) of such modes. Reflexivity within dance research requires that the modes of givenness of dances and performances be recognized, making clear how claims to knowledge are grounded, and giving credence by opening them to revision, falsification, and correction. This connects with Husserl’s examination (1970a, 773–795; 1982, 326–348) of the nature of evidence, in which knowledge is characterized as “an identification or synthesis between that which is intended and that which is given” (Zahavi 2003b, 32). Evidence is the fulfillment of the mere intention and transforms it into knowledge. True judgments about dances would normally be based not merely on signitive intentions (the bare facts I might read about it in a brief summary) but on these intentions being fulfilled by perceptions of the performance in its bodily presence—or at least, on more detailed descriptions that are in turn based on adequate evidence.<sup>12</sup>

Physical objects (including performances) are perspectival—only one of the profile (*Abschattungen*; see Moran 2000, 115–116) or certain aspects of them appear at any given viewing. As Husserl comments, although the object is given through its perspectival perception, “It is not given wholly and entirely as that which itself is” (Husserl 1970a, 712). Instead, some properties are “illustrated in the nuclear content of the percept,” while others are not, and “[o]n this hinges the possibility of indefinitely many percepts of the same object, all different in content” (Husserl 1970a, 713). This means that intuitive perception can never entirely fulfill the intention and that judgments are subject to revision; the intuitive perception can be fulfilled differently on different occasions, and there can be more or less adequate evidence depending on how good a look one gets at the object. But evidence is not equivalent to the subject’s feeling of certainty about what s/he intends. Instead, it depends on the fulfillment of intentions by the adequate givenness of objects. And this implies the importance of knowledge being recognized as intersubjectively valid, of intentions’ openness to fulfillment or denial by the object’s givenness to others as well as me (Zahavi 2003b, 32; see also Zahavi 2003a). The focus on the shared nature of the objects of experience—which would include dance works and performances—may be surprising in a dance context where phenomenology has become known as a first-person method—a way of describing individuals’ lived experience of dance. But according to Dan Zahavi, phenomenology is “not at all interested in establishing what a given individual might be thinking about. The phenomenological field of research does not concern private thoughts but intersubjectively accessible modes of appearance” (2003b, 54).

In highlighting both the transcendence of objects and the constitutive activity of consciousness, Husserl’s work has potentially radical implications for metaphysics. It rejects realism, on the one hand, which holds that reality must exist in itself, mind-independently. But it also eschews traditional idealism, or the position that the world is a construct of conscious experience. A number of commentators (not least some of Husserl’s own students, such as Roman Ingarden) see the move from the position of *Logical Investigations* (Husserl 1970a) to that of *Ideas* (Husserl 1982) as a problematic shift towards idealism, but revisionist interpreters emphasize the methodological character of the *epochē* (see the discussion in “Transcendental phenomenology, subjectivity and foundationalism” below) and the distinction between transcendental and traditional idealism. For Zahavi, Husserl does not “deny or question the existence of the real world” but rather rejects “an objectivistic interpretation of its ontological status” (2003b, 70); reality depends on subjectivity in the

sense that it “is not simply a brute fact detached from every context of experience and from every conceptual framework, but is a system of validity and meaning that needs subjectivity [...] to manifest and articulate itself” (Zahavi 2003b, 69). However one generally interprets the idealism of Husserl’s mature phenomenology, this rejection of metaphysical realism should be less contentious in the domain of the arts than in general terms. Many philosophers of art have maintained that artworks are not reducible to their material embodiment but depend on the interaction of consciousness in order to exist. Joseph Margolis (1974), for example, claims that art (in the broad sense, including dance) is a culturally emergent phenomenon. Artworks have to have an embodied, spatio-temporal dimension, but are also essentially made up of properties—meanings, and representational and expressive properties—that transcend this embodiment: “These properties [...] emerge through the work’s situation and role in a matrix of cultural practice” (Shusterman in Cooper ed. 1992, 274). Arthur Danto argues along similar lines that, “Art is the kind of thing that depends for its existence upon theories; without theories of art, black paint is just black paint and nothing more” (1981, 135). If art (including dance) has this kind of intentional as well as material existence, then it becomes relevant to open to examination the complex of conscious activity and experience that enables and structures its being.

Regarding the being of dances, the puzzle of dance ontology has yet to receive extended philosophical discussion.<sup>13</sup> Scrutiny of the relationship between dance works and performances has tended to fix on the type/token distinction as a way of explaining that relationship and unpacking the criteria of identity of a given work. In this view, the dance work *Umwelt* is a type—an abstract object—of which there can be many possible instances—or concrete tokens—such as the performances in Cork, Paris, and London mentioned earlier. But conceptualizing the existence of dance works in terms of types does not go very far toward answering the full range of ontological questions one might ask: How do dances come into existence? How do they persist? What is the nature of their dependence on other things, such as dancers, performances, scores, or film records? Within the phenomenological tradition, Roman Ingarden’s (1973, 1989) detailed analyses of the ontology of literary works, musical works, architecture, pictures, and film are suggestive of the value of in-depth investigation of what dance works are. But a precondition of such inquiry would be the kind of approach that refuses to be drawn in to the terms of a metaphysical debate polarized between realist and traditional idealist views.<sup>14</sup> Husserl’s phenomenology, with its twin emphasis on objects’ transcendence and dependence on consciousness, provides such an approach.

## Transcendental Phenomenology, Subjectivity, and Foundationalism

The thrust and mode of Husserl’s writings is also “transcendental” in its epistemological concern with the conditions of knowledge—with how it is possible to know, and with what must be the case if knowledge, indeed experience, is to be possible. This concern too bears directly on dance research. It is relevant to the question of how particular dance performances or works such as *Umwelt* can appear to us, and how understanding of them as such is possible. But it also impinges on the structures and frameworks that ground the various experiences of and within dance, conceived as a set of practices or processes rather than products. Phenomenology is an essentially descriptive philosophy, trying to uncover such grounds and structures rather than construct a world view. In this, Husserl’s approach is continuous with the critical philosophy of other modern Western thinkers such as René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, although it also takes issue with their philosophy in certain respects. Carr (2003) draws a parallel between Kant’s and Husserl’s projects: both present neither “a metaphysical doctrine or theory, but a critique of metaphysics” that is “not a theory but a *research program* or method, a way of looking at and interrogating experience so as to bring to the surface its deepest-lying, uncritically accepted assumptions” (2003, 181).



It is in this sense that Husserl's work is a search for true or "radically unprejudiced knowledge" (Held 2003, 7), that is, one that has set aside or suspended the assumptions on which our ordinary ways of viewing the world—including dance—are based. A key feature of phenomenological method—at least from Husserl's *Ideas* onward—is the *epochē*, or suspension of the "natural attitude." This methodological principle is adapted and applied also in phenomenological writing about dance. For example, Sheets-Johnstone is concerned to "bracket" preconceptions and prejudgments so that "they do not color the descriptive account" (1984, 131); this procedure enables "an attitude of being present to the phenomenon, fully and wholly to intuit it as it appears without pre-shaping it in any way by prior intentions and beliefs" (1978, 34). Fraleigh, meanwhile, writes of "removing commonly held beliefs that obscure our understanding and which may in fact misdirect our attention away from core definitions" (1987, 7).

The generality of the suspension advocated by both Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh raises questions—about how far it is possible to suspend familiar frameworks for understanding, but also about whether the effort not to prejudge phenomena is distinctive of a phenomenological, as opposed to any other, research approach. The general way in which it is characterized in dance phenomenology also moves away from the specifically metaphysical inflection of the *epochē* in Husserl.<sup>15</sup> That inflection relates to the challenge to both realism and idealism via the analysis of consciousness in its constitutive role. For Husserl, the *epochē* "brackets" the natural attitude and its realist assumptions—the assumption that the world is "out there," existing independently of our conscious engagement with it. In suggesting that this attitude be suspended, Husserl is not denying that the world exists: "I am not negating this 'world' as though I were a sophist; I am not doubting its factual being as though I were a skeptic; rather I am exercising the 'phenomenological' *epochē*" (Husserl 1982, 61). In other words, he is using the suspension as a methodological device that enables him to focus on how the world is given in conscious experience (Zahavi 2003b, 69–70). Only by effecting the *epochē* can the role of consciousness in constituting the world be revealed. To see the world as simply a set of mind-independent objects is to offer no route for interaction between this reality and conscious beings, and to stop phenomenological investigation dead in its tracks.

One aspect of what this might mean for dance concerns the body. Under the natural attitude, we assume our bodies exist as physical facts, as part of the spatial and temporal physical world, interacting causally with other objects within that world.<sup>16</sup> While we may be able to objectify our bodies in this way, they are not given to us simply as physical objects, as just other pieces of the mind-independent reality that makes up the fabric of the physical universe. Pre-reflectively, the body is a *lived* body: It is the subjective locus of worldly experience rather than an objective fact, a complex of subjectively felt sensations or embodied thoughtfulness, not something separable from consciousness. By suspending the objectivist assumption that our bodies are physical facts, the constitutive role of the body as the "medium of all perception," "of significance for the construction of the spatial world," can be uncovered (Husserl 1989, 61–62). As Zahavi interprets Husserl's analysis (2003b, 98–109), perception of spatial objects is premised on kinesthetic experience—on the mobility of particular parts of the body (in the sense of eyes moving, head turning, for example) and on the potential for the body to move around the object to approach it from a different perspective. Normally, this kinesthetic experience accompanies perception, although it is not typically thematized. (It might, of course, be more frequently thematized in the experience of the dance performer, whose mode of embodiment suggests a particular attunement to kinesthetic sensation.) But even unthematized kinesthetic experience is indispensable to the constitution of perceptual objects. When I watch a dancer performing *Umwelt*, walking in an arc between two reflective panels, my eyes move, my head may turn, I can in principle if not in fact shift my position to take in a different profile of the dancer and the object she carries. The possible profiles of the dancer correlate with the kinesthetic system of my body and its movement. That system makes available the sense of the object as having a number of absent, alongside its present, profiles. It makes it appear perspectively, as something spatial and distinct from the experience of its perception. Phenomenologically

speaking, then, the embodiment of consciousness appears as a condition of possibility of experience rather than a physical fact.<sup>17</sup>

These sorts of insights become available through an analysis that begins from the perspective of subjective experience, which is a radically different starting point from that of the natural sciences. To recall, extending the Husserlian project to dance implies uncovering how (embodied) consciousness is structured to make dance knowledge and experience possible. It might be claimed that only by understanding the brain processes going on in choreographers, dancers, and audiences will we properly be able to say what the grounds or conditions of dance are.<sup>18</sup> But Husserlian phenomenology is not interested in reducing conscious experience to its physical or biological substrate, as is clear, for example, in the way he distinguishes between the intentional and real relationships between consciousness and object (Husserl 1989, 227–228).<sup>19</sup> Phenomenological inquiry is focused rather on conscious experience “from the inside,” a dimension that the objectifying methods of natural science have tended to ignore.<sup>20</sup> To paraphrase Thomas Nagel’s famous insight (1974), there is something it is like to perform or watch dance, to have that experience, which measuring electrical current and blood flow in the brain cannot elucidate, although the observable neurological processes—accessible through an objectification of the mind/body as physical fact, and the application of objective methods—may invariably accompany the experience. But, “[t]he Object stimulates me in virtue of its experienced properties and not its physicalistic ones, of which I need know nothing” (Husserl 1989, 228). As Zahavi comments, “Husserl wants to describe our experiences as they are given from a first-person perspective, and it is no part of my experience of, say, a withering oak tree, that something is occurring in my brain” (2003b, 13). Similarly, a phenomenology of dance viewing might reasonably claim that the firing (or otherwise) of mirror neurons is irrelevant to my *experience* of a dancer’s movement on stage; phenomenology’s own analysis centers on the experience in its subjective dimension, focusing on its structure and meaning for consciousness. Phenomenology’s first-person perspective, then, is not a question of always speaking from the point of view of an individual “I,” but of elucidating the “what it is like” of experience.<sup>21</sup>

The brief summary above of some of Husserl’s reflections on the body point to some interesting avenues for further exploration, for example, examining the alternation between unreflective and thematized bodily awareness as constitutive of the dancing experience; or investigating how that alteration links, in dance as in Husserl’s work, to the relation between self and other, and to the experiences of empathy and alterity as preconditions of worldly perception. The summary of Husserl also begins to challenge the view, sometimes implied if not asserted in dance writing, that a “transcendental” approach entails a focus on consciousness to the exclusion of the body—a focus on the rational thinking subject as origin and determinant of experience, which ignores how embodiment shapes our encounters with the world. It is easy to conflate the notion of transcendental subjectivity with the Cartesian idea of the subject as essentially a thinking thing, and to assume that this means subjectivity reduced to its rationally reflective dimension.<sup>22</sup> Equally, associating the transcendental ego with “the viewpoint of the detached observer” and an objectifying Cartesian gaze paints Husserlian phenomenology as incapable of understanding dance in terms other than the visual. It also removes the sense, very clear in the revisionist interpretation of Husserl, that transcendental subjectivity is not some mystical entity, or a “view from nowhere,” hovering above real world interaction, but a dimension of any human consciousness that becomes accessible through the phenomenological approach. As suggested by Husserl’s analysis of perception and the implication of embodiment therein, “There is no pure point of view and there is no view from nowhere, there is only an embodied point of view” (Zahavi 2003b, 98).

Particularly in Husserl’s later work, embodiment, the relationship with other subjects, and the context of the wider “lifeworld” are explored as dimensions of transcendental subjectivity, challenging the received view that his philosophy is solipsistic in its concern with the individual consciousness (see particularly Husserl 1970b, 121–189). Zahavi also notes how Husserl’s emphasis on the embodied nature of the subject distinguishes his concept of transcendental subjectivity from that

of Kant: In the latter's writings, the transcendental subject is a "transpersonal abstractly deduced principle of justification" rather than a concrete subject (2003b, 108). Within dance studies, one of the concerns about the relevance of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology has been centered on its apparent abstraction from human facticity, especially corporeality, which misrepresents the extent of Husserl's interest in embodiment, relations with others, and the lifeworld in general. Also questionable is the understanding of Husserl's enterprise as a quasi-Cartesian endeavor to establish first principles—as "an attempt to disclose a number of certain and indubitable truths that could serve as the systematic foundation and point of departure for all other types of knowledge" (Zahavi 2003b, 66). If the idea of a descriptive philosophy is taken seriously, then the result is something very different from the findings of a deductive approach modeled on mathematics. Phenomenology is an effort to characterize the structures that make knowledge possible, but does not purport to establish absolutely certain truths, since descriptions are always corrigible and open to revision in the light of new evidence. Thus "the full and conclusive truth about the transcendental dimension is a regulative ideal" and something that "can only be realized in an infinite historical process" (Zahavi 2003b, 67).

This may go some way toward addressing the concern raised by, for example, Philipa Rothfield (2010) about the universalizing tendencies of phenomenology.<sup>23</sup> Part of this concern centers on phenomenology as a philosophy of the subject, which is a contentious notion for poststructuralism and its inheritors. As Rothfield articulates it: "The realm of subjectivity is no longer taken to furnish a ground of knowledge adequate in itself," because "the subject is a false universal" (Rothfield 2010, 303). But Husserl's phenomenology, in the revisionist reading, does not claim that knowledge is grounded purely in the subject's self-givenness and self-presence. As the discussion of transcendent objects above suggests, the otherness of the perceptual, as well as social and cultural, worlds is something that structures the experiential capacities of consciousness. If Zahavi, Carr, and Welton are correct in interpreting his idealism as methodological rather than metaphysical, Husserl does not—as Heidegger argues—posit the subject as the primary substance. He does not reduce the world to representations belonging to this subject. Nor does the idea of subjectivity, as a perspective on experience from the inside, equate with the humanist notion of the self: Self-givenness is not a question of "self-knowledge in the substantial sense of 'who am I?'" (Zahavi 2003b, 94), but of how experience is given differently to the experiencing subject. And Husserl's phenomenology of time consciousness (Husserl 1990) suggests that knowledge is not confined within the horizon of present: "Our intuitive consciousness of the present profile of the object is always accompanied by an intentional consciousness of the object's horizon of *absent* profiles" (Zahavi 2003b, 96). The same corrigibility applies to dance knowledge as to the experience of perceptual objects: "To speak of transcendent objects is to speak of objects that are not part of my consciousness and that cannot be reduced to my experience of them. It is to speak of objects that might always surprise us, that is, objects showing themselves differently than expected" (Zahavi 2003b, 70). The otherness of dance phenomena always has the potential to challenge, when we look again, more closely, or from a different perspective.

## Conclusion

Why has Husserl's work received such short shrift in dance studies, despite the latter's appeal to phenomenology? There are multiple possible answers to this question. Perhaps his work has been misunderstood, as his contemporary revisionist interpreters claim it has in other domains, not least philosophy. Perhaps it remains less accessible than the work of others within the phenomenological tradition, less palatable than Heidegger, Sartre, and (particularly) Merleau-Ponty whose words, "swallowed and digested, [...] become imbued with meaning and relevance to our times and cultural metamorphoses" (Kozel 2007, 5–6). Perhaps the new interpretations of Husserl, themselves contested within Husserl studies, are wrong. Certainly, Husserl's writings are far from transparent and subject to a variety of interpretations, compounded by the growing wealth of materials

and increasing with the publication of lecture notes and manuscripts. Perhaps there is also something about Husserl's writings—their difficulty, apparent abstraction, or (in some instances) lack of poetic veneer—that makes them difficult to apply to a specific domain such as dance. Inevitably, relating dance to philosophical insights developed with quite other purposes in mind entails a process of translation. This may betray, even as it extends, those insights—the kind of process that Kozel calls “a cyclical corporealizing of the thought of our predecessors [...] both respecting and disrespecting the tradition” (2007, 6). The inevitable transfiguration of philosophical thinking when applied in other eras and domains is not news to the field of phenomenology. Ricoeur (1987) comments on how phenomenology, in the broader sense, comprises both Husserl's work and the long history of its “heretical” adaptations.<sup>24</sup> This article's account of Husserl's ideas also, inevitably, transforms (distorts?) them in the process of exegesis and application. It may add, productively or otherwise, to the long history of Husserlian heresies.

Another reason why Husserl's ideas have not been extensively explored is suggested by the way that this discussion has moved further and further from where it began—that is, away from the reflection on a specific dance, in this case Maguy Marin's *Umwelt*. It is difficult to apply Husserl's ideas at the level of dance analysis. Perhaps they find a choreographic parallel or illustration in certain works: *Umwelt*, for example (as already noted in my introduction), encourages the kind of heightened awareness to the process of making sense (in this case of the stage action, or series of images presented) also fostered in more abstract and systematic terms by Husserlian phenomenology. But the point of this discussion has not been to argue that this dance in particular, or that dance in general, is an instance of phenomenology in action, showing us consciousness constituting its world. Rather, the argument is that Husserl's work—an intricate study of the conditions of experience and knowledge—“bites” at a more general level, offering an account of fundamental structures that underlie the particular acts of perception, interpretation, and judgment involved in engaging with specific dances. The value of Husserl's philosophy lies not in a method of analysis or a set of concepts that could be applied at the level of interpreting particular dance works. Its value is in encouraging us to probe the philosophical foundations of dance epistemology and ontology—to explore, in other words, the nature of conscious engagement with dance, what performances and choreographic works are, and how knowledge of them is possible.

The lack of philosophical literature addressing these issues suggests that there is resistance within dance and performance studies to framing general questions of this kind and engaging with them in general terms. To some extent, this resistance stems from a justified skepticism about the scope of generalized answers, and concern about the political ramifications thereof. By assuming that such questions can be answered, once and for all, for everyone, we run the risk always incurred when we speak for others (other dance works, other historical periods, other dance cultures) from the perspective of this particular work—this “now,” “our” culture—without clearly recognizing its specificity—the risk that the other is suppressed, otherness excluded or violated, in a normative account of what is assumed to be fundamental. But engaging with the detail of Husserl's arguments—and recognizing the significance of Husserl's own ceaseless revisions of his views—shows them to be far from assuming totalizing answers. Rather, Husserlian phenomenology fosters an increasingly meticulous attention to distinctions between types of experience while endeavoring to elucidate common structures *and* the grounds of individual, cultural, and historical difference.

Raised here are also general issues about the kinds of appeals dance makes—and should make—to philosophy and other kinds of theory. Should dance look to philosophy to confirm what is already understood, believed, or assumed, or to increase the repertoire of critical tools which can open dance phenomena to scrutiny? Should one expect to find in particular philosophies—existential phenomenology, say – a program or a system into which dance can fit, and look to match the philosophical perspective to features of dance practice? Or can a more troubled relationship between dance and philosophy—where the fit is not comfortable or straightforward—cause productive

friction that offers different kinds of insights to each domain? The process of thinking one's way back into a complex philosophical corpus creates sites of tension as well as connection with dance practice. But restlessly probing this tension as well as the many profiles of an object, be it dance or philosophical text, enables understanding's constant renewal, like Husserl's working and reworking of his ideas in a torrent of manuscripts, the ongoing re-envisioning of his work by contemporary commentators, and my own returns, again and again, to richly multifaceted dances like Marin's *Umwelt*.

## Notes

1. The title of Marin's work refers to a concept employed by both Husserl and Heidegger, although Marin's own discourse around this work references Spinoza and Deleuze rather than phenomenology. The significance of the "Umwelt," meaning "environment" or "surrounding world," is discussed by Husserl (1989) and developed in his later work into the better known notion of "Lebenswelt" or "life-world" (see, for example, Husserl 1970b, 103–189). Moran (2000, 224, 182) notes that the "Umwelt" makes an appearance in Heidegger's lecture course of 1920–1921, "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion," and maintains that Husserl's account in the Second Book of *Ideas* is a clear influence on Heidegger's concept of "*In-der-Welt-sein*," which figures prominently in *Being and Time*.

2. Other phenomenological dance writing includes Klemola (1991a, 1991b), Stewart (1998), and Jaeger (2001), although none of these writers has devoted book-length studies to phenomenology and dance.

3. In this respect, Fraleigh cites, while Parviainen references, Mickunas and Stewart (1974): "Whereas Husserl saw the task of transcendental phenomenology to be that of describing the lived world from the viewpoint of a detached observer, existential phenomenology insists that the observer cannot separate himself from the world" (64).

4. The motivations for seeking out this philosophical ground vary from one dance writer to another. For example, Sheets-Johnstone seems concerned to avoid approaches that fragment and dissect dance works, preserving the integrity and particular qualities of dance experiences (1979, xii); in some passages (e.g., 1979, xii; 1978, 47–48), this links with the aim of valuing dance as art, and for its own sake, within education, rather than treating it instrumentally. Kozel, meanwhile, turns to phenomenology in reaction against the emphasis within philosophy of dance (Suzanne Langer's work, as well as Sheets-Johnstone's) on virtual force and gesture: By asserting the lived experience of the body over the formal constructions of choreography and aesthetics, phenomenology offers a philosophical framework "less hostile to [dance's] essence" (Kozel 1994, abstract; see also Kozel 2007, 81).

5. The ongoing project to publish Husserl's lectures and working manuscripts, alongside critical, annotated editions of works published during his lifetime, has produced multiple volumes of *Husserliana*, with many of the collected works and related manuscript materials many now available in English translation. See the Web site of the publisher, Springer, <http://www.springer.com/>. The reference list below includes a number of volumes from this series.

6. I.e., the principle that "it is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect" (Book IV of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, cited in Gottlieb 2007), or that the statements "A is B" and "A is not B" are mutually exclusive (both cannot be true simultaneously).

7. This is not to deny that performances unfold through time and that dance works are also historical artifacts, coming into being at particular moments and persisting over given stretches of time. The terms "object" and "thing" are used here in a very general sense, which includes events and processes: The terms point to that which is apprehended in the engagement with dance, without making ontological assumptions about exactly what kinds of things performances and works are. Thus, *Umwelt* is, or can be, an *object* of consciousness both as performance event and as a choreographic work (i.e., that which performances of *Umwelt* are performances of). There is insufficient

space here to develop the ontological discussion, though (as suggested earlier) Husserl's philosophy is suggestive of a productive approach to elucidating more precisely the nature of dance performances and works.

8. Hence Husserl's attempts to suspend the "natural attitude," a key feature of which is this kind of "naive" realism. For discussion of the *epochē*, see the section entitled "Transcendental phenomenology, subjectivity and foundationalism".

9. Ordinary movement (or, indeed, random activity) can of course be incorporated into (or wholly comprise) a dance, and dances can be about "just" moving. The point (elaborated in Arthur Danto's work, for example, as well as McFee 1992) is that, when framed as dance, movement is about something: it becomes thematized in a way it is not in many other kinds of behavior (Danto 1981). For an extension of Danto's argument to dance, see Carroll (2003).

10. In this context, "intentional act" does not mean a deed effected deliberately, or with particular aims in mind, but refers rather to a form of conscious experience directed at a particular object. Seeing a tree, imagining a unicorn, remembering an event from my past, or appreciating a dance performance are all intentional acts because they are directed towards, respectively, the tree, the unicorn, the event from my past, and the dance performance. As these examples suggest, it is not necessary for the object actually to exist in order for the act directed at it to qualify as intentional; even imagining a unicorn involved imagining something, albeit something without real existence in the tangible world. Intentional objects can also be ideal: They may concern the square root of four or the idea of freedom as well as rocks, stones, and trees. Although Husserl recognizes that not all conscious experiences are intentional, intentional acts are important in dramatizing the relation between subjective experience and the objective content of that experience. The analysis of intentional acts enables exploration of the intentionality of consciousness more generally—that is, of the way consciousness is structured to reach out towards the world, rather than being a passive entity that is causally influenced, stimulated, or impressed by it.

11. "Intuition" has the sense here of direct awareness. This is distinct from its meaning in, for example, the phrase "creative intuition," i.e., instinctive, or quasi-instinctive, understanding.

12. Of course, there are dances the intentions of which *can* no longer be fulfilled via perception—say in the case of a dance that is no longer performed, and of which there is no tangible record or prospect of reconstruction. Other modes of access provide other kinds of evidence, the adequacy of which is scrutinized when the basis of claims is made clear.

13. Work on the ontology of music, by contrast, has proliferated in the last few decades within the analytic philosophical tradition: see, for example, Levinson (1990), Kivy (1993), and Dodd (2007).

14. In this respect, Ingarden drew essentially from Husserl's early *Logical Investigations* (1970a), i.e., the phenomenological work developed prior to what was perceived as Husserl's problematic shift towards transcendental idealism. For an illuminating discussion of their dispute, the secondary literature about it, and Ingarden's ontology of artworks, see Mitscherling (1997).

15. Husserl comments in the First Book of *Ideas*: "It is not now a matter of excluding all prejudices that cloud the pure objectivity of research, not a matter of constituting a science 'free of theories,' 'free of metaphysics,' by groundings all of which go back to the immediate findings, nor a matter of means for attaining such ends, about the value of which there is, indeed, no question. What we demand lies in another direction" (Husserl 1982, 61).

16. There is an important sense in Husserl in which the assumptions of the natural attitude are shared by all human beings, though differences of culture and language may shape that attitude in particular ways. See Zahavi (2003a) for a discussion of the constitutive role of consciousness's social and linguistic situation.

17. On the role of the body in perception and the constitution of the spatial world, see Part I, Chapter 3, "The Aestheta in their Relation to the Aesthetic Body," in the second book of *Ideas* (Husserl 1989, 60–95) and also Section IV, "The Significance of Kinaesthetic Systems for the Constitution of the Perceived Object," of Husserl (1997, 131–170). Drummond (1979) as well as Zahavi (2003b) offer useful commentary.

18. This view can be broadly characterized as “physicalist” and appears to underwrite at least a portion of neuroscientific work conducted in relation to dance (see Pakes 2006).

19. “[T]he Object T stands in a real-causal relationship to me, to me as a human being, thus first of all to that Body which is called mine, etc. The real relation collapses if the thing does not exist; the intentional relation, however, remains. That each time the Object does exist a real relation runs ‘parallel’ to the intentional relation, namely that in such a case waves are propagated in space from the Object (the real actuality), strike my sense organs, etc., and that my experience is connected to these processes, all this is psychophysical fact. But nothing of the kind holds for the intentional relation itself, which suffers nothing through the non-actuality of the Object but, at most, is modified through its consciousness of the non-actuality” (Husserl 1989, 227).

20. It remains a matter of debate whether the natural sciences are in principle incapable of investigating subjective experience on account of the objective character of their methods, and the (apparent) need to objectify phenomena in order to examine them via those methods. Recent cognitive and neuroscience has sought to integrate the philosophical (including phenomenological) accounts with biological approaches, in the effort to overcome what David Chalmers has termed the “hard problem” of consciousness (Shear 1999; Thagard 2010).

21. In this respect, in this focus, Husserl’s work foreshadows recent interest within analytic philosophy in qualia or phenomenal consciousness or qualia (Tye 2007). See also Mensch (2001, 89–118).

22. Even Descartes works with a broader conception of thinking than consciousness in its rational mode. In the second *Meditation on First Philosophy*, he asks, “What then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels” (in Wilkinson, 2000, 158). Husserl’s work both draws from and critiques Descartes: See, for example, Husserl (1977), the title and spirit of which finds an echo in this article’s title; and Husserl (1970b, 73–83).

23. Kozel is similarly skeptical of transcendental phenomenology’s commitment to universality and absolute truth in her characterization of the existential project: “When approaching the question of origins, as with that of truth, existential phenomenology has had to crawl out from under the transcendental burden, the weighty implication that the goal of a phenomenological investigation is a kernel of undying, eternal truth—the origin of any experience, shared by all over time” (Kozel 2007, 26).

24. “Si bien que la phénoménologie au sens large est la somme de l’oeuvre husserlienne et des hérésies issues de Husserl” (Ricoeur 1987, 9). See also Moran (2000, 2–3).

## Works Cited

- Carr, David. 1987. “Thought and Action in the Art of Dance.” *British Journal of Aesthetics* 27(4): 345–57.
- . 2003. “Transcendental and Empirical Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition.” In *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*, edited by Donn Welton, 181–98. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Carroll, Noël. 2003. “The Philosophy of Art History, Dance, and the 1960s.” In *Reinventing Dance in the 1960s: Everything Was Possible*, edited by Sally Banes, 81–97. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Cooper, David, ed. 1992. *The Blackwell Companion to Aesthetics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Danto, Arthur C. 1981. *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Derrida, Jacques. 1973. *Speech and Phenomena*. Translated by David B. Allison. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- . 1978. *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*. Translated by John Leavey. New York: Nicholas Hays.
- . 2003. *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Dodd, Julian. 2007. *Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Drummond, John. 1979. "On Seeing a Material Thing in Space: The Role of Kinesthesia in Visual Perception." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 40: 19–32.
- Fraleigh, Sondra Horton. 1987. *Dance and the Lived Body: A Descriptive Aesthetics*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- . 1998. "A Vulnerable Glance: Seeing Dance Through Phenomenology." In *The Routledge Dance Studies Reader*, edited by Alexandra Carter, 135–43. First edition. London: Routledge.
- Gottlieb, Paula. 2007. "Aristotle on Non-Contradiction." In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Online at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-noncontradiction/>, accessed February 2, 2010.
- Held, Klaus. 2003. "Husserl's Phenomenological Method." Translated by Lanei Rodemeyer, in *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*, edited by Lanei Rodemeyer, in 3–31. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1970a. *Logical Investigations*. Translated by J. N. Flindley. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- . 1970b. *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*. Translated by David Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- . 1977. *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- . 1982. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*. Translated by Fred Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- . 1989. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
- . 1990. *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*. Translated by J. B. Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
- . 1997. *Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
- Ingarden, Roman. 1973. *The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic and Theory of Literature*. Translated by George G. Grabowicz. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- . 1989. *Ontology of the Work of Art: The Musical Work, the Picture, the Architectural Work, the Film*. Translated by Raymond Meyer. Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Jaeger, Suzanne. 2001. "Dancing in a Virtual Moment: Look Mom No Flesh!" *Proceedings of the Society for Dance History Scholars* 24: 43–8.
- Kivy, Peter. 1993. *The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Klemola, Timo. 1991a. "Dance and Embodiment." *Ballett International* 14(1): 70–81.
- . 1991b. "Frame, Look and Movement: The Phenomenology of Dance." *Ballett International* 14(2): 12–5.
- Kozel, Susan. 1994. *As Vision Becomes Gesture*. PhD thesis. Colchester: University of Essex.
- . 2007. *Closer: Performance, Technologies, Phenomenology*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Levinson, Jerrold. 1990. *Music, Art and Metaphysics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Margolis, Joseph. 1974. "Works of Art as Physically Embodied and Culturally Emergent Entities." *British Journal of Aesthetics* 14(3): 187–96.
- Marin, Maguy. chor. 2004. *Umwelt*. Première at the Centre Culturel de Decines – Le Toboggan, 30<sup>th</sup> November.
- McFee, Graham. 1992. *Understanding Dance*. London: Routledge.
- Mensch, James Richard. 2001. *Postfoundational Phenomenology: Husserlian Reflections on Presence and Embodiment*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Mikunas, Algis, and David Stewart. 1974. *Exploring Phenomenology: A Guide to the Field and Its Literature*. Chicago: American Literary Association.



- Mitscherling, Jeff. 1997. *Roman Ingarden's Ontology and Aesthetics*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.
- Moran, Dermot. 2000. *Introduction to Phenomenology*. London: Routledge.
- Nagel, Thomas. 1974. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" *Philosophical Review* 83(4): 435–50.
- Pakes, Anna. 2006. "Dance's Mind-Body Problem." *Dance Research* 24(2): 87–104.
- Parviainen, Jaana. 1998. *Bodies Moving and Move: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Dancing Subject and the Cognitive and Ethical Values of Dance Art*. Tampere, Finland: Tampere University Press.
- Ricoeur, Paul. 1987. *À L'École de la Phénoménologie*. Paris: Vrin.
- Rothfield, Philipa. 2010. "Differentiating Phenomenology and Dance." In *The Routledge Dance Studies Reader*, edited by Alexandra Carter and Janet O'Shea, 303–18. Second edition. London: Routledge.
- Shear, Jonathan. 1999. *Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 1978. "Phenomenology: An Approach to Dance." In *The Dance Experience: Readings in Dance Appreciation*, edited by Myron Howard Nadel and Constance Nadel Miller, 33–48. New York: Universe Books.
- . 1979. *The Phenomenology of Dance*. Second edition [first edition 1966]. London: Dance Books.
- . 1981. "Thinking in Movement." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 39(4): 399–407.
- . 1984. "Phenomenology as a way of illuminating dance." In *Illuminating Dance: Philosophical Explorations*, edited by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, 124–45. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press.
- Smith, Barry, and David Woodruff Smith, eds. 1995. *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Stewart, Nigel. 1998. "Re-Languaging the Body: Phenomenological Description and the Dance Image." *Performance Research* 3(2): 42–53.
- Thagard, Paul. 2010. "Cognitive Science." Second edition. In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Online at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognitive-science/>, accessed February 2, 2010.
- Tye, Michael. 2007. "Qualia." Second edition. In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Online at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia>, accessed February 2, 2010.
- Welton, Donn. 2000. *The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Welton, Donn, ed. 2003. *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Wilkinson, Robert. 2000. *Minds and Bodies: An Introduction with Readings*. London: Routledge.
- Zahavi, Dan. 2003a. "Husserl's Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy." In *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*, edited by Donn Welton, 233–51. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- . 2003b. *Husserl's Phenomenology*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.