STEPHEN OF BESANÇON'S *PRINCIPIUM IN AULA* (1286): AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE RELATION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

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The inception speeches delivered by graduating masters of theology during the thirteenth century are of paramount interest for the study of the history of theology. Much like the introductions to philosophy written within the Faculty of Arts at Paris during the same period, the so-called principia *articulated the image that theology entertained of itself at that time. Interestingly enough, some graduating masters took the opportunity to present a detailed discussion of the relation between philosophy and theology in an attempt to demonstrate the preeminence of the latter. Thus, they reflected not only upon the epistemological status of theology, but also — and sometimes in considerable detail — upon that of the secular sciences. One very eloquent example of such a comparative inception speech is the* principium *by Stephen of Bensançon (1286), who later became Master General of the Dominican Order. In this article, I focus on Stephen's discussion of the relationship between philosophy and theology, and show that the epistemological criteria he applied to both were drawn directly from one of the most important introductions to philosophy of the thirteenth century, that is, Robert Kilwardby's* De ortu scientiarum. *Stephen's case yields further evidence, therefore, of the interconnectedness of both genres, that is, philosophical introductions and theological inception speeches, and confirms the productive intellectual exchanges between philosophical and theological discourse at the University of Paris during the thirteenth century.*

Over the past thirty years, scholars such as Gilbert Dahan, Nancy Spatz, and Andrew Sulavik have called attention to the literary genre of *principia*, that is, inaugural university speeches concerning Holy Scripture.[1] The increasing number of editions of such speeches by graduating bachelors and masters confirms

[1] For essential scholarship on the *principia*, see, among others, Gilbert Dahan, "Les prologues des commentaires bibliques (XIIᵉ–XIVᵉ siècle)," in *Les prologues médiévaux: Actes du colloque international organisé par l'Academia Belgica et l'Ecole française de Rome avec le concours de la FIDEM, 26–28 mars 1998*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Turnhout, 2000), 427–70; Spatz's *Principia*; and Andrew (Athanasius) Sulavik, "*Principia* and *introitus* in Thirteenth-Century Christian Biblical Exegesis, with Related Texts," in *La Bibbia del XIII secolo. Storia del testo, storia dell'esegesi*, ed. Giuseppe Cremascoli and Francesco Santi (Florence, 2004), 269–321.

the importance of this formal exercise for the development of theology during the thirteenth century and beyond.[2] This is particularly true for the *principia* that had to be delivered by the candidates for a master's degree in theology at the University of Paris, namely the *principium in aula* and the resumption *principium*. The former was delivered on the inception day itself and consisted of a concise introduction to Holy Scripture and theology, whereas the latter, with which the master started his lectures, dwelt on the biblical canon and its division. As Thomas Prügl has recently expressed matters, "the *principium* offered an opportunity to the new master to map out his understanding of *Sacra scriptura* as theology," a fact which turns this genre into a highly valuable "source for examining the epistemological status of medieval theology."[3]

The literature arising from the *principia* proves crucial, however, not only to a reconstruction of theology's self-image and of its scientific status during the thirteenth century, but also to philosophy, for in their attempt to delineate theology and to demonstrate its preeminence, some graduating masters offered detailed comparisons between theology and philosophy, with a view to establishing a clear hierarchy between human and divine science. For the history of philosophy, this "comparative type" of *principia*, as Prügl has labeled them, is highly illuminating, particularly when read against the background of the so-called introductions to philosophy.[4] The medieval introductions to philosophy, much like the *principia* themselves, have for many decades been the object of neglect. In recent years, however, attention has been drawn to this prolific literary genre which flourished at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris during the mid-thirteenth century. The introductions in question, published thus far thanks to the efforts of Claude Lafleur and others, show the masters' concern to provide a solid foundation for the study of philosophy as a distinct science through the presentation of key definitions of philosophy along with a systematic

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[2] This notwithstanding, many *principia* still remain unpublished. Sulavik, "*Principia* and *introitus*," 269, counts more than one hundred and fifty *principia* that have survived in manuscript sources, of which at present some ten percent have been edited. References to the editions can be found in Sulavik, "*Principia* and *introitus*," 270–72. More recently, Benson has argued that Bonaventure's *De reductione artium ad theologiam* should also be counted among the *principa*. See, for example, Joshua C. Benson, "Identifying the Literary Genre of the *De reductione artium ad theologiam*: Bonaventure's Inaugural Lecture at Paris," *Franciscan Studies* 67 (2009): 149–78.

[3] See Thomas Prügl, "Medieval Biblical *Principia* as Reflections on the Nature of Theology," in *What is 'Theology' in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (11th–15th Centuries) as Reflected in their Self-Understanding*, ed. Mikołaj Olszewski (Münster i. W., 2007), 253–75, at 255.

[4] For the definition of comparative *principia*, see Prügl, "Medieval Biblical *Principia*," 257–60.

overview of its parts.[5] Thus, if the *principia* articulate the self-image of theology, the introductions fulfill this very same function with regard to philosophy.[6]

The fact that the comparative *principia* offer not only an account of theology but also a complementary outline of philosophy raises the question of how this image of philosophy, as conveyed by the theologians, relates to the self-image of philosophy as expressed in the introduction-literature. In other words, what was the theologians' perception of philosophy during the thirteenth century, and what sources were they using? Recently, I was able to show that a very famous *principium* called *Girum celi* (1258–59), by the Benedictine monk Galdericus, draws not only upon Hugh of St. Victor's *Didascalicon* and the division of philosophy therein, as Jean Leclercq and Nancy Spatz had surmised, but also upon the *Divisio scientiarum* by Arnulf of Provence — a text dating from 1250 which constituted one of the most influential introductions to philosophy of its time.[7] In his attempt to demonstrate the preeminence of theology, Galdericus, who was to become the first Benedictine regent master of theology in Paris, introduced four criteria, namely, *perpetuitas*, *pulchritudo, nobilitas*, and *utilitas*, which he then applied within a detailed comparison between the philosophical disciplines and theology. Natural philosophy, mathematics, metaphysics, the speech-related disciplines, and ethics are each painstakingly described — in a manner that depends almost exclusively on Arnulf of Provence's *Divisio scientiarum* — both with regard to the general division of the philosophical disciplines and to their respective contents. As a result, Galdericus states that theology surpasses natural philosophy in terms of the eternity of its object, mathematics in terms of its beauty, metaphysics in terms of its nobility, and the rational or speech-related disciplines, together with ethics, in terms of its utility. Galdericus's theological approach to philosophy reveals a very high degree of familiarity with the contemporaneous philosophical discourse occurring within the Faculty of

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[5] See Claude Lafleur, *Quatre Introductions à la philosophie au XIIIᵉ siècle: Textes critiques et étude historique* (Montréal/Paris, 1988). See also Ruedi Imbach, "Einführungen in die Philosophie aus dem XIII. Jahrhundert: Marginalien, Materialien und Hinweise im Zusammenhang mit einer Studie von Claude Lafleur," *Freiburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Theologie* 38 (1991): 471–93.

[6] Gilbert Dahan has pointed out this parallelism in "La classificazione delle scienze e l'insegnamento universitario nel XIII secolo," in *Le Università dell'Europa: Le scuole e i maestri, 2, Il Medioevo*, ed. Gian Paolo Brizzi and Jacques Verger (Milan, 1994), 19–43, at 29.

[7] For Stephen's dependence on Hugh, see Jean Leclercq, "Un témoignage du XIIIᵉ siècle sur la nature de la théologie," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 15–17 (1940–42): 301–21, at 303; and Nancy Spatz, "A Newly Identified Text: The Inception Speech of Galdericus, First Cluniac Regent Master of Theology at the University of Paris," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 61 (1994): 133–47, at 141–42 and 145. For his familiarity with contemporary divisions of philosophy, see Alexander Fidora, "The Inception Speech of Galdericus as an Introduction to Thirteenth-Century Theology and Philosophy," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 87 (2020): 43–58.

Arts at Paris. Far from drawing upon outdated notions of philosophy, Galdericus was basing his comparison between philosophy and theology upon the very latest philosophical debates of his day.

While other comparative *principia* were more traditional, *Girum celi* does not stand alone.[8] Several inception speeches from the thirteenth century pursued similar strategies using contemporary philosophical literature in order to establish the preeminence of theology. A very eloquent example of the philosophical import borne by the *principia* is offered by Stephen of Besançon, who played a prominent role within the Dominican Order during the second half of the thirteenth century. Having studied theology at St. Jacques in Paris, he incepted as a master of theology in 1286. In 1291 he became Provincial of the French province of the Dominicans, and in 1292 Master General of the Order, succeeding Munio of Zamora once the latter had offered his resignation. Stephen died only two years later, on 22 November 1294, in Lucca, on his way to Rome.[9] His works, which qualify him as a representative of the early Thomist tradition, include sermons and letters along with his *principium in aula* and his resumption discourse from 1286.[10] His *principium in aula* was edited by Nancy Spatz in 1992, although his resumption discourse still remains unpublished.[11] The latter provides first-hand information regarding the form and content of the *principia*. Thus, in the opening remarks of his resumption discourse, Stephen explains that:

> in the *principium* of a science or of a book, the intention of doctors is accustomed to touch on two things. They are accustomed first to commend the science in order to have benevolent listeners. Also, they are accustomed to treat the causes and offer a general division in order to render them docile and attentive. Yesterday we showed, from the word (i.e., verse) proposed, that Sacred Scripture is commendable and surpasses all others. Now the causes will be treated and the division of the books.[12]

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[8]   See, for instance, Peter of Scala, who preferred to stick closely to Hugh of Saint Victor's *Didascalicon*: Andrew (Athanasius) Sulavik, "An Unedited *Principium Biblicum* Attributed to Petrus de Scala, O.P.," *Angelicum* 79 (2002): 87–126, esp. 112–14.

[9]   For Stephen of Besançon's life, see, among others, *Principia*, 127.

[10]   For Stephen as an early Thomist, see Andrea A. Robiglio, *La sopravvivenza e la gloria: Appunti sulla formazione della prima scuola tomista (sec. XIV)* (Bologna, 2008), esp. 31. For his works, see the detailed list in Thomas Kaeppeli, *Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum medii aevi* (Rome, 1980), 3:352–54; and also idem, "Ein unbeachtetes Principium des Stephanus de Bisuntio O.P. († 1294)," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 3 (1933): 185–87.

[11]   For the *principium in aula*, see *Principia*, 218–72. Fragments of the *resumptio* have been transcribed in Spatz, "A Newly Identified Text," 136. Meanwhile, Andrew Sulavik has prepared a preliminary transcription of the entire text, which he has kindly shared with me.

[12]   Hereford Cathedral Library, ms P. 3. III, fol. 113r, quoted and translated in Spatz, "A Newly Identified Text," 136, n. 13: "In principio scientiae vel libri circa duo versari solet doctorum intentio. Solent primo scientiam commendare ut habeant auditores benevolos. Solent etiam causas tangere et generalem divisionem praemittere ut reddant eos dociles et attentos.

Referring to his *principium in aula* delivered the previous day, Stephen here specifies that such a *principium* normally consisted of a commendation of Sacred Scripture. He also emphasises that, in his view, a commendation of the kind in question — based, like a sermon, upon a biblical theme — entails a demonstration of the manner in which theology surpasses all the other sciences.

In what follows, I shall focus on Stephen's *principium in aula* and particularly on how it conceives of the hierarchical relation pertaining between philosophy and theology. As we shall see, Stephen's *principium* not only corroborates the connections between philosophical and theological propaedeutic literature in general, as these appear in Galdericus some thirty years earlier, but more specifically it points to the increasing relevance of epistemological criteria — developed within philosophical discussions — to the matter of assessing the status of theology.

Epistemological Arguments for the Preeminence of Theology

The biblical verse that opens Stephen's *principium in aula* and serves as its leitmotif is 1 Cor. 2:2: "For I judged not myself to know anything among you, but Jesus Christ." Accordingly, Jesus Christ is the source not only of Christian doctrine, but also of all knowledge and science in general, as Stephen argues alongside Origen and Augustine. Thus, Jesus Christ is the "principle of everything according to nature, of all Christian doctrine, but also generally of all the sciences."[13] Throughout his *principium in aula*, Stephen aims to substantiate this programmatic claim via an epistemological discussion regarding the division and hierarchy of knowledge and science, which is based upon four criteria, namely, certitude, dignity, utility, and accessibility. These criteria are introduced as follows:

> With regard to the commendation of Sacred Scripture [that is, theology], here there are four criteria according to which it surpasses all the other sciences. For sometimes a particular science is made preferable to another on account of its form (*ratione formae*) or manner of proceeding as regards certitude, for the reason that it conveys the truth in a way that is more certain and more clear; and sometimes a science is made preferable to another on account of its subject matter (*ratione materiae*), as a result of whose loftiness that science is raised above the other sciences in terms of its worth . . . A third way in which a particular science is made preferable to another is by reason of its end (*ratione finis*), which guides it more directly towards the uprightness and honesty of human life, and thus it proves more useful, as is the case with moral philosophy, whose end is that we become good, as the second book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* has it . . . A fourth way in which a particular science is made preferable to another lies not in the fact that it is more certain, more worthy or more useful (*certior, dignior vel melior*), but rather in the aptitude itself of the person approaching

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Heri ex verbo proposito sacram scripturam commendabilem ostendimus, et omnes alias praecellentem. Modo causae tangendae sunt et librorum divisio."

[13] *Principia*, 244.

it, namely, for the reason that the other sciences are ill suited to that person's capacities.[14]

In other words, there are four principles according to which a particular science may surpass another: first, it may do so on formal or methodological grounds, that is to say, via the certainty attaching to it; second, it may do so on material grounds, that is to say, as regards the status of its subject matter or specific object; third, it may do so with respect to its final cause or, in other words, its utility. These three criteria are summarized as *certior*, *dignior*, and *melior*. The fourth criterion, in turn, refers to the intellectual capacities of the person who studies a given science, for not all human beings seem to be disposed equally well towards the acquisition of the sciences.

At first sight, Stephen's approach appears to be similar to Galdericus's treatment of the question. The principles they invoke are not identical, however. Basing himself upon the circle metaphor that appears in the Wisdom of Sirach, which latter gives its name to his *principium*, Galdericus claimed that theology is more perfect than the philosophical disciplines because of its perpetuity, beauty, nobility, and utility. Of these four criteria, which flow from the exegesis of Ecclus. 24:8, only the latter two feature correspondingly in Stephen's account.[15] Moreover, Galdericus applies his principles solely within binary comparisons between theology and individual branches of philosophy, that is, perpetuity serves to account for the relation between natural philosophy and theology, beauty for that between mathematics and theology, and so on. Stephen, in contrast, explicitly presents his principles as a general rule for assessing the epistemological status of all kinds of scientific knowledge, that is to say, of

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[14] *Principia*, 246–47: "In quo quattuor ad commendationem sacrae scripturae in quibus omnes alias scientias antecellit. Aliquando enim una scientia praefertur alii ratione formae vel modi procedendi in ea secundum certitudinem, quia tradit certius et clarius veritatem, et aliquando ratione materiae propter cuius altitudinem scientia super alias obtinet dignitatem . . . Tertio praefertur scientia alteri ratione finis quia directius ordinatur ad humanae vitae rectitudinem et honestatem, et sic habet maiorem utilitatem: sicut moralis, cuius finis est ut boni fiamus, secundo *Ethicorum* . . . Quarto praeeligitur una [*scil.* scientia] alii non quia certior, dignior, vel melior, sed secundum eligentis aptitudinem, vel quia aliae non conveniunt secundum propriam capacitatem."

[15] See Galdericus's account in Leclercq, "Un témoignage du XIIIᵉ siècle" (n. 7 above), 308: "Quia igitur theologia considerando Deum et divina ad modum rotae utitur motu girativo, ideo sola inter omnes scientias potest dicere *Giro celi etc* . . . in quo notatur eius praeeminentia vel dignitas non solum in modo eius proprio, verum etiam in materia respectu cuiuslibet facultatis. Modum eius proprium innuit *Circuivi*, sed subiectum vel materiam eminentem dat intelligere *Girum celi*. In giro enim celi est perpetuitas, pulchritudo, nobilitas et utilitas; perpetuitatem habet ex remotione a contrarietate, plenitudinem [*leg.* pulchritudinem] in dispositione stellarum et ordine, nobilitatem in formali continentia et situs altitudine, sed utilitatem multiplicem in efficacia et virtute."

philosophical disciplines as well, inasmuch as these may be compared to each other.

The general character of Stephen's epistemological principles is confirmed as he unfolds his four arguments. With the first (*ratione formae*), he sets out to prove that theology is a science possessing greater certitude than any other. To this end, he first explores the division of theoretical philosophy in terms of the degree of certainty (*certitudo*) that each of its parts is capable of attaining. Basing himself on a quotation from Ptolemy's *Almagest*, he holds that mathematics is the most certain of all the human sciences, followed in this respect by metaphysics and physics, the latter two of which can only be considered "estimations."[16] This quotation, and the sequence of theoretical philosophy it proposes, is in itself worthy of note, as we shall see below. For the moment, suffice it to say that mathematics is said to be the most certain branch of human knowledge because it proceeds by means of demonstrative syllogisms which rely on univocal and necessary middle terms. Sacred Scripture or theology, on the other hand, Stephen continues to argue, clearly surpasses this kind of certainty, since its middle term is the most efficacious of all possible syllogistic means, namely, the mediator between God and mankind, that is, Jesus Christ.[17] As Andrea A. Robiglio has noted, for Stephen, Christ is the foundation of a supernatural syllogism that reflects the ontological structure of creation.[18] The certainty of such theological knowledge, Stephen adds, extends beyond all human disciplines not only by virtue of its degree, but also by that of its scope, since, unlike all other disciplines, theology produces knowledge which possesses certitude not only with respect to the present time, but also to that of the past and the future.[19]

Stephen's second epistemological criterion (*ratione materiae*), namely, the dignity attaching to a science, concerns the status of the subject matter such a science considers. Again, Stephen sets out by illustrating this principle with

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[16] *Principia*, 248: "Dico ergo quod una scientia alii antefertur propter eius certitudinem sicut mathematicae. Unde Ptolomaeus in principio *Almagesti*: 'O quam bonum fuit quod Aristoteles divisit theoricam cum eam in tria prima genera distribuit in naturale, doctrinale, theologicum,' VI° *Metaphysicae*. Et post 'dico quod duo genera divisionis theoreticae sola aestimatione cognoscuntur et non scientiae veritate comprehenduntur: theologicum quidem quia nunquam videtur neque comprehenditur; naturale vero propter motionem materiae, et levitatem sui cursus et velocitatem suae alterationis.'"

[17] *Principia*, 248–49: "Inter ergo omnes humanas scientias mathematicae certiores sunt quia utuntur medio demonstrativo determinato ad unum et necessario. Sacra autem scriptura habet unum medium efficacissimum, scilicet, mediatorem Dei et hominum dominum Iesum Christum, cuius comprehensio sufficit ad omne verum certitudinaliter et indubitanter cognoscendum."

[18] Robiglio, *La sopravvivenza e la gloria* (n. 10 above), 70. Robiglio also refers to similar expressions in other authors, such as Peter of John Olivi.

[19] See *Principia*, 250–53.

attention to the theoretical parts of philosophy, explaining that "as one observes in speculative philosophy, the discipline which considers those objects which are loftiest (*altissima*) and absolutely primary (*simpliciter prima*) guides all the others and provides their principles."[20] This is also true, he continues, for practical philosophy, "where the discipline that considers the superior and final goal (*supremum et ultimum finem*) determines the way of proceeding of the inferior ones, as is the case with political and military science, or military science and bridle-making."[21] While Stephen does not specify the particular part of theoretical philosophy he is invoking, later on, referring back to this passage, he identifies the science in question with metaphysics.[22] As regards this epistemological criterion, Stephen likewise claims that divine science surpasses all human such, for Jesus Christ is both the "first principle of everything" and the "ultimate goal." Theology, therefore, "guides all theoretical aspects of philosophy towards the contemplation of truth, since Jesus Christ constitutes the truth, just as it guides all its practical aspects towards the performance of good, since Jesus Christ constitutes life."[23]

Turning to his third epistemological criterion (*ratione finis*), that is, utility, Stephen explains that, "while among the human sciences the mathematical ones are more certain (*certiores*) and metaphysics is more worthy (*nobilior*), ethics is better (*melior*), because it teaches uprightness of life more directly and possesses greater utility."[24] Stephen fleshes out this argument with the help of Seneca's famous letter on liberal studies (*Moral Letters to Lucilius*, Ep. 88), a letter in which the Roman philosopher extols the benefits of ethics over those of the other philosophical disciplines. Each of Seneca's comparisons between ethics and other realms of human knowledge is surpassed by Stephen via an additional comparison between the former and theology. If ethics, for example, according to Seneca, is superior to the speech-related disciplines for the reason that it teaches virtue, which is more useful (*utilius*) than speaking correctly, then theology is superior to both ethics and the speech-related disciplines because it teaches

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[20] *Principia*, 258: "Sicut videmus in speculativis quod illa scientia quae considerat altissima et simpliciter prima dirigit alias, et eis principia administrat."

[21] *Principia*, 258–59: "Et in practicis ita est quod quae supremum et ultimum finem considerat, inferioribus ponit modum, sicut politica militari, et militaris frenifactivae." I have corrected the misleading punctuation of the edition, which fails to make reference to the opening paragraphs of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as the source of this passage.

[22] See n. 24, below.

[23] *Principia*, 258: "Haec autem quoad utrumque suprema est quia considerat Iesum Christum qui est primum omnium principium et ultimus finis . . . Et ideo haec dirigit omnem scientiam speculativam in contemplatione veri, quia Iesus Christus est veritas; et omnem practicam in operatione boni, quia Iesus Christus est vita."

[24] *Principia*, 261: "Licet enim inter humanas scientias mathematicae sint certiores; licet metaphysica nobilior; tamen moralis melior quia directius docet vitae rectitudinem, habet maiorem utilitatem."

both of these in a more perfect way, that is, virtue and correctness of speech.[25] The same is likewise true with regard to Seneca's pairings of ethics-geometry, ethics-arithmetic, ethics-music, and ethics-astronomy, and so on, which are all shown to be inferior to theology. In sum, ethics surpasses all the liberal arts, as Seneca says; theology, however, altogether surpasses both the former and the latter.

Stephen's final epistemological principle concerns the accessibility of knowledge (*secundum eligentis capacitatem*). Drawing his evidence mainly from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Stephen reminds his readers that not all of the sciences are equally accessible to everyone, but rather all people acquire knowledge according to their individual capacities and, therefore, the philosophical disciplines should not be taught indiscriminately to all and sundry.[26] In contrast, "the knowledge of Sacred Scripture is common to all, without exception, since it adapts to the capacities of all individuals," and its message is one and the same for all: Jesus Christ.[27]

As a result of the foregoing arguments, theology is said to surpass philosophy with regard to all four epistemological principles, with the result that at the very end of his *principium*, Stephen is able to summarize his position as follows:

> Sacred Scripture is the most certain (*certissima*) of all the sciences, for Jesus Christ is the light and the truth. And it is the worthiest (*dignissima*) of all, for Christ is the cause of everything, 'through him all things were made' (John 1:3). It is also the best (*optima*) of all, since Christ is our salvation and our life. And it is accessible to all (*omnibus communissima*), as 1 Pet. 4:11 has it: 'in all may God be praised through Jesus Christ, to whom be the glory and the power for ever and ever, amen.'[28]

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[25] *Principia*, 263: "Si Seneca praefert philosophiam moralem et sermocinales scientias parvipendit quia viam ad veritatem non sternunt, haec sapientia quae Christus est et de Christo 'sobrietatem docet,' temperantiam 'et iustitiam et virtutem quibus nihil utilius in vita hominibus,' Wisdom 7:7. Si tota utilitas earum in recte loquendo, haec rectissime docet loqui."

[26] *Principia*, 268–69: "Unde et Aristoteles, tertio *Metaphysicae* [1000a9–11], dicit quod Elyodus et omnes quicumque theologi solum ad ipsos persuasionem curaverunt, nos autem neglexerunt. Et prope finem secundi *Metaphysicae* [994b23–995a15] tractat idem quomodo diversi secundum diversas complexiones vel consuetudines diversa recipiunt; vel propter hoc in civitatibus ordinabatur antiquitus qui et quas scientias et quantum discerent, ut tangitur primo *Ethicorum* [1094a29–1094b3]."

[27] *Principia*, 269: "Sed sacra scriptura sine exceptione omnibus est communis et secundum singulorum capacitatem omnibus se coaptat . . . Non quin idem proponeret hiis et aliis, scilicet Christum?"

[28] *Principia*, 272: "Sacra scriptura est ergo omnium certissima, quia Christus est lux et veritas. Est omnium dignissima, quia Christus omnium causa, 'omnia enim per ipsum facta sunt' (John 1:3). Est omnium optima, quia Christus est salus et vita. Est omnibus communissima, ut sicut scribitur 1 Pet. 4:11: 'in omnibus honorificietur Deus per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum cui est gloria et imperium in saecula saeculorum, amen.'"

STEPHEN OF BESANÇON AND ROBERT KILWARDBY

Comparing Galdericus's and Stephen's approaches, Nancy Spatz has observed that the latter's *principium in aula* does not offer a division of the sciences as systematic as that of Galdericus.[29] This is certainly true, for even though Stephen refers to schemes of division, such as that of the tripartite structure of speculative philosophy and that of the sevenfold liberal arts, he seems to take these schemes for granted. Rather than dwelling on the description of the philosophical *ordo scientiarum* and its components, Stephen puts his emphasis on the four epistemological principles by means of which he analyzes philosophy and establishes its relation to theology.[30]

As previously noted, Galdericus's introduced his four principles, that is, perpetuity, beauty, nobility, and utility, as a corollary of the biblical verse he adopted as his theme, that is, Ecclus. 24:8; Stephen, in contrast, offers no arguments in support of his choice. The question thereby arises, of course, as to how he arrived at his particular epistemological principles. I should like to suggest here that Stephen, in fact, borrowed these criteria, namely, certainty, dignity, utility, and accessibility, from one of the most important thirteenth-century introductions to philosophy, namely, *De ortu scientiarum*, written by his confrère Robert Kilwardby. A regent master of arts at Paris, Kilwardby joined the Dominican Order shortly before the year 1250. It is presumed that he wrote *De ortu scientiarum* at this precise point in his career — when making the move from philosophy to theology — and that he probably did so at the request of his Provincial, with the aim of providing his brethren with a solid introduction to philosophy and the parts thereof.[31]

As José Filipe Silva has recently pointed out, Chapter 63, entitled "On the Threefold Order of the Sciences, according to their Discovery, their Nature and their Teaching," constitutes a pivotal segment of this seminal work.[32] The first section of this chapter deals with the order of the philosophical disciplines according to the chronology of their discovery — a subject clearly reminiscent of Hugh of

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[29]   *Principia*, 208: "Although Stephen alludes to the theoretical or speculative philosophy of Aristotle, and to the disciplines that comprise the seven liberal arts, he does not present a systematic division of the sciences, as Galdericus does."

[30]   This shift may be explained by the fact that during the second half of the thirteenth century the division of philosophy had become less controversial, to the point that many authors even accommodated competing schemes, such as that proposed by Aristotle and the one specifying liberal arts. See, for instance, Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on Boethius's *De trinitate*, q. V, a. 1.

[31]   See Albert G. Judy's introduction in *De ortu*, XIV–XVI.

[32]   See José Filipe Silva, "Robert Kilwardby," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, online at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/robert-kilwardby/ (accessed 9 June 2021).

St. Victor's *Didascalicon*.[33] The historical line that Kilwardby traces starts with the invention of the mechanical arts, followed by that of speculative philosophy, ethics, and the speech-related disciplines. Although Kilwardby develops this account in quite some detail, he nevertheless judges that "one should not be greatly concerned about the origin of the sciences or the names of those who discovered them, because both these questions relate more closely to curiosity than to utility."[34] If Stephen read this chapter of Kilwardby's *De ortu scientiarum*, as I suggest, he took this advice seriously and ignored Kilwardby's remarks on the sequence of discovery surrounding the sciences.

Different is the case of the following two parts of the chapter, the first of these being dedicated to the order or division of the sciences according to their nature, a division which is itself threefold, namely, as pertains to their subject matter (*subiectum*), their end or purpose (*finis*), and their form (*forma*).[35] In terms of their subject matter, the philosophical sciences are ordered as follows:

> The order as regards subject matter is identical to the order of the objects [pertaining to a science]. Hence, just as the divine matters discussed by the speculative sciences are prior to their human counterparts, so, in this order, the speculative disciplines are prior to the practical and the speech-related such. Within the speculative disciplines, the order refers to the simplicity (*simplicitatem*) of their objects and the priority (*prioritatem*) of their nature, as a result of which some are more abstract than others; and thus, in this context, the more abstract they are, the greater the priority they enjoy in virtue of their subject matter (*ratione subiecti*).[36]

While Kilwardby does not use the terms dignity or nobility as feature in Stephen's *principium in aula*, it is clear that both Dominicans are making the same point when they speak of the criterion *ratione materiae* or *ratione subiecti*: a science is

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[33] See Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon de studio legendi* 3.2, ed. and trans. Thilo Offergeld (Freiburg i. Br., 1995), 217–28. See also José Filipe Silva, "Hugh of St. Victor and Robert Kilwardby on Science," in *La compilación del saber en la Edad Media*, ed. María José Muñoz, Patricia Cañizares, and Cristina Martín (Porto, 2013), 515–31, at 524.

[34] *De ortu*, 214: "Sed nec multum de hoc curandum sicut nec de nominibus inventorum, quia haec duo plus habent curiositatis quam utilitatis."

[35] *De ortu*, 214: "Ordo vero naturalis earum multum alius est, et iste triplex est. Potest enim ordo considerari in illis penes subiecta vel fines vel formam." José Filipe Silva, "Robert Kilwardby," is mistaken when he describes only the first of these criteria, that is, the subject matter, as pertaining to the natural order. For Kilwardby, all three criteria, that is, the subject matter, the end or purpose, and the form, constitute the natural order of the sciences.

[36] *De ortu*, 215: "Ordo vero penes subiecta idem est quod ordo subiectorum. Et ideo sicut res divinae de quibus sunt scientiae speculativae priores sunt rebus humanis, sic in hoc genere ordinis priores sunt scientiae speculativae practicis et sermocinalibus. Ordo autem speculativarum est penes subiectorum simplicitatem et penes prioritatem naturae in illis, propter quam quaedam sunt maioris abstractionis quam aliae, et ideo ibi quanto abstractiores tanto priores sunt ratione subiecti."

considered to be superior with regard to another when its subject matter is simpler and enjoys greater priority than that of the other, two notions — *simplicitas* and *prioritas/primum* — which appear in both Stephen's and Kilwardby's accounts. Thus, the speculative parts of philosophy surpass the remaining disciplines, while, among the speculative parts themselves, metaphysics occupies the highest position.

With regard to the second criterion, Stephen's *ratione finis* principle, the *De ortu scientiarum* establishes the following hierarchy among the philosophical disciplines:

> The order pertaining to end is different, and I speak of proper ends, each of which has been defined above, as have the various subject matters. Just as Averroes says in his commentary on the third book of the *Metaphysics*, 'that which is prompted by the good constitutes the final cause,' so must the order of the sciences according to their ends be considered in view of the goodness of such ends. Since spiritual good is unconditionally better (*melius*) than its corporeal counterpart, the other sciences are unconditionally better than the mechanical ones, and hence in terms of this order enjoy greater priority. And since among the spiritual goods virtue is better (*melior*) than knowledge, and among the sciences ethics strives for virtue while the others strive for knowledge, ethics is better than the others and prior in terms of this order.[37]

For Kilwardby, just as it would be for Stephen some thirty years later, the highest philosophical discipline in terms of its utility is ethics, which in this ordering precedes all other philosophical disciplines, including speculative philosophy. For the spiritual good to which it gives rise is better (*melius*) — a term characteristic of both Kilwardby's and Stephen's accounts — than that elicited by speculative philosophy, that is to say, respectively, virtue in contrast to mere science.

Kilwardby's third criterion concerns the form of a science, that is, Stephen's *ratione formae* principle, which equates to the certitude attaching to a science. Here the *De ortu scientiarum* proposes the following sequence or order:

> According to their form, by which I mean the certainty (*certitudinem*) attaching to their demonstrative method, the order among the sciences differs from the previous such. Since some sciences rely on certain demonstrations (*certis demonstrationibus*), others on conjectures and still others on plausible arguments, in this order, therefore, those are considered to enjoy priority which offer demonstrative

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[37] *De ortu*, 216–17: "Penes fines autem alius est ordo, et loquor de finibus propriis penes quos supra assignatae sunt singularum definitiones sicut et penes subiecta. Quia autem, ut dicit Averroes super III *Metaphysicae*, 'illud quod disponitur per bonum est causa finalis,' ideo ordo scientiarum penes fines attendendus est penes bonitatem finium. Quia igitur bonum spirituale simpliciter melius est corporali, et mechanicae finis est bonum corporale, aliarum vero aliquod bonum spirituale, simpliciter meliores sunt aliae scientiae quam mechanicae, et ideo in hoc ordine priores. Et quia de spiritualibus bonis melior est virtus scientia, quarum ethica virtutem intendit et aliae scientiam, melior est aliis ethica, et hoc ordine prior."

proof, while those which yield dialectical or rhetorical proofs suffer the disadvantage of posteriority. And hence, it is reasonable that the speculative disciplines enjoy priority over the practical such, and that within the speculative disciplines those enjoy priority which entail a higher degree of abstraction and which apply their proofs to more immutable subject matters.[38]

Kilwardby, much the same as Stephen, attributes the certitude attaching to a science to its capacity to provide demonstrative proof, something which gives the speculative disciplines a clear advantage over the practical ones. In this context, he adds further considerations as to whether mathematics or metaphysics should be considered the most certain theoretical science — an interesting question to which we shall return below. Instead of giving a clear answer to this problem, however, Kilwardby avoids issuing a definite pronouncement on the matter, pointing, rather, to logic and its unrivalled demonstrative force.

Kilwardby's three criteria for assessing the philosophical sciences according to their nature all reappear in Stephen's *principium in aula*, and the same is true for Kilwardby's division of the sciences in terms of the teaching thereof or, rather, their capacity to be taught. The order of teaching is a topic that the English Dominican may have come across in Dominicus Gundissalinus's *De divisione philosophiae*, a text wherein each discipline is considered from this particular perspective.[39] In *De ortu scientiarum*, Kilwardby recommends to students of philosophy that they begin their careers by learning the branches of knowledge pertaining to language, followed by the speculative and practical sciences. With regard to the speculative sciences, he formulates some doubts, namely, whether one should start with metaphysics, as some say, or rather with mathematics, as others do, or even with physics. His capacity-oriented answer runs as follows:

> It seems to me that more sensuous people should keep to the latter path [that is, begin with physics], while those who possess a very lively intellect should take the first path [that is, start with metaphysics], and those who have a very lively imagination the middle one [that is, mathematics].[40]

In other words, the subject area with which one begins one's intellectual journey depends very much upon the individual student's particular capacities. Those

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[38] *De ortu*, 218–19: "Penes formam autem, quam voco certitudinem in modo ostendendi, alius est in eis ordo a praedictis. Cum enim quaedam certis demonstrationibus utantur et quaedam coniecturis et quibusdam probabilibus rationibus, illae in hoc ordine priores sunt quae demonstrant, et illae posteriores quae dialectice vel rhetorice ostendunt. Et sic rationabiliter priores sunt speculativae quam activae, et inter speculativas illae priores quae maioris sunt abstractionis et de rebus immutabilioribus ostendunt."

[39] See Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae – Über die Einteilung der Philosophie*, ed. and trans. Alexander Fidora and Dorothée Werner (Freiburg i. Br., 2007).

[40] *De ortu*, 219: "Mihi autem videtur magis sensibilibus hominibus hanc viam ultimam esse tenendam, multum autem vigentibus secundum intellectum viam primam, multum autem vigentibus secundum imaginationem viam mediam."

whose inquiries are better suited to sensory matters would do best to start with physics, while intellectually versatile students should begin with a consideration of metaphysics, and imaginative ones with that of mathematics. There may, of course, also be people who undergo more serious problems regarding the acquisition of knowledge, however. Kilwardby recommends that such people ought consistently to direct their attention to the mechanical arts, in accordance with their lower degree of intellectual aptitude:

> Those who are obtuse and inept as regards the liberal arts should start by learning the mechanical arts and should persevere in the practice thereof. And each of these people should be assigned that mechanical art which is most suited to his intellectual and corporeal disposition. Then, should such a person succeed, he may proceed with the other mechanical sciences.[41]

Consequently, as Stephen would stress in his *principium in aula*, philosophical knowledge is not universally accessible, but probably limited to all except a very few.

In sum, Robert Kilwardby proposes three categories possessing overall five epistemological criteria whereby to assess the status of a science: its status according to the history of its discovery; its status according to its nature, which is threefold: subject matter, end or purpose, and form; and its status according to how and to whom it may be taught. The first category, whose importance the English Dominican himself questions, is absent from Stephen of Besançon's account. The remaining two categories, however, with their altogether four principles, are identical to those four that feature in Stephen's *principium in aula*. Hence, there remains little room for doubt that Stephen's theological inception speech drew directly upon one of the major introductions to philosophy of its century.

The Influence of Thomas Aquinas

As I remarked above, when discussing the order of the sciences according to their form or degree of certainty, Stephen quotes a passage from the beginning of Ptolemy's *Almagest*. Along with the Greek mathematician, he classifies mathematics as the most certain of all sciences, on account of its cogent demonstrations:

> Ptolemy says at the beginning of the *Almagest*: 'O how good it was that Aristotle divided theoretical philosophy, since he split it into the following three principal genera, namely, physics, mathematics, and theology,' in the sixth book of the *Metaphysics*. And subsequently, 'I say that two of the genera pertaining to the division of theoretical philosophy attain knowledge solely by means of guesswork,

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[41] *De ortu*, 219: "Obtusi enim et inepti ad artes liberales primo addiscant mechanicas et in illarum usu permaneant, et unusquisque talium tali primo detur mechanicae cui secundum ingenium et usum corporis aptior est. Deinde ad alias, si valet, proficiat."

that is, they fail to understand by virtue of scientific truth: theology is thus, for the reason that it never sees or grasps its object, and physics thus, on account of the motion of matter, the instability of its course and the speed of its alteration.' Of course, he speaks about the theology that was invented by men, not the one that is divinely inspired. Thus, among all the human sciences, the mathematical ones are the most certain, because they use a demonstrative middle which is univocal and necessary.[42]

In the context of Kilwardby's *De ortu scientiarum*, Stephen's straightforward identification of mathematics as the most certain of all the philosophical disciplines — more certain than even metaphysics (*theologia*) — is remarkable.[43] For, as we have already mentioned, Kilwardby was far more reluctant to decide this matter; thus, in Chapter 63, he explicitly refers to a controversy surrounding the question at stake:

> In this order (*penes formam*), wherein physics undoubtedly succeeds metaphysics and mathematics, one person might say that mathematics precedes metaphysics because of the most certain demonstrations that obtain in the former. A different person, however, might claim the opposite, since metaphysics is the supreme part of philosophy, and therefore its principles must be self-evident and have the power to explain the common principles of the particular sciences. And perhaps each of these statements is true, namely, that mathematics is more certain than and prior to metaphysics as regards its demonstrations, while metaphysics is more certain than and prior to mathematics as regards its explanations and elucidations of the other sciences.[44]

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[42] *Principia*, 248–49: "Ptolomaeus in principio *Almagesti*: 'O quam bonum fuit quod Aristoteles divisit theoricam cum eam in tria prima genera distribuit in naturale, doctrinale, theologicum,' VIᵒ *Metaphysicae*. Et post 'dico quod duo genera divisionis theoreticae sola aestimatione cognoscuntur et non scientiae veritate comprehenduntur: theologicum quidem quia numquam videtur neque comprehenditur; naturale vero propter motionem materiae, et levitatem sui cursus et velocitatem suae alterationis.' Et loquitur de theologia quae est inventa ab hominibus, non de illa quae est divinitus inspirata. Inter ergo omnes humanas scientias mathematicae certiores sunt quia utuntur medio demonstrativo determinato ad unum et necessario."

[43] Charles Burnett has analyzed the Latin translation(s) of the introduction to the *Almagest*, paying particular attention to the concept of *theologia*, which, in Latin, he sees as being closer to theology in the proper sense than to metaphysics. With regard to Stephen, however, there can be no doubt that he understood *theologia* in the sense of metaphsyics, as did Ptolemy. See Charles Burnett, "'Ptolemaeus in *Almagesto* dixit': The Transformation of Ptolemy's *Almagest* in its Transmission via Arabic into Latin," in *Transformationen antiker Wissenschaften*, ed. Georg Toepfer and Hartmut Böhme (Berlin and New York, 2010), 115–40.

[44] *De ortu*, 218: "In hoc autem ordine cum absque dubio physica sit posterior metaphysica et mathematica, aliquis tamen diceret mathematicam esse priorem metaphysica propter certissimas demonstrationes quae sunt in mathematica. Aliquis forte diceret e converso eo quod metaphysica est suprema philosophiae pars, et ideo eius principia oportet esse per se notissima et aliorum communium principiorum specialium scientiarum explanativa. Et forte utrumque verum est, scilicet quod mathematica est certior et prior in demonstrando, sed metaphysica certior et prior in explanando et alias declarando." The same question

While it is clear that among the speculative parts of philosophy physics occupies the lowest position with regard to its certainty, mathematics and metaphysics compete for first place, there being solid arguments in support of each side. Kilwardby arrives at a Solomonic solution, explaining how each of them stands out in its own way as regards their respective claims to certainty.

Stephen, in contrast, does not hesitate to attribute the highest degree of certainty to mathematics. It seems to me that in this he is following Thomas Aquinas and the latter's commentary on Boethius's *De trinitate*, q. VI, a. 1, regarding the respective methods followed by the theoretical parts of philosophy. In this text, written between 1255 and 1259, during which period Aquinas became regent master at Paris, one finds the following account in reference to mathematics:

> The method of mathematics is also more certain than the method of divine science, because the objects of divine science are further removed from sensible things, from which our knowledge takes its origin . . . But mathematical entities do fall under the senses and they are objects of our imagination, for example, figures, lines, numbers, and the like. So the human intellect, which takes its knowledge from images, knows these things with greater ease and certainty than it does a separate intelligence, or even the nature of substance, act, potency, and the like. It is clear, then, that mathematical inquiry is easier and more certain than physical and theological, and much more so than that of the other sciences that are practical; and for this reason, it is said especially to proceed according to the mode of learning. This is what Ptolemy asserts in the beginning of the *Almagest*: 'Let us call the other two kinds of theoretical knowledge opinion rather than science: theology because of its obscurity and incomprehensibility, physics because of the instability and obscurity of matter. The mathematical type of investigation alone will give the inquirer firm and unshaken certainty through demonstrations carried out by unquestionable methods.'[45]

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was discussed some twenty years earlier by Richard Rufus in his *Memoriale quaestionum in Metaphysica Aristotelis*, dating from 1231–35: "An metaphysica sit scientia certissima. De tertio: videtur enim esse certissima, cum sit de causis certissimis; est enim de causa omnium prima quae certissima est. Contrarium videtur — certior est scientia quae procedit ex principiis quam quae est ad principia; haec autem est ad principia — nisi quod hic solvit prior distinctio," ed. Rega Wood and Neil Lewis (2013) online at https://rrp.standford.edu/MMet.shtml (accessed 11 June 2021).

[45] Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate*, ed. Bruno Decker (Leiden, 1965), 209: "Est etiam processus mathematicae certior quam processus scientiae divinae, quia ea, de quibus est scientia divina, sunt magis a sensibilibus remota, a quibus nostra cognitio initium sumit . . . Mathematica autem ipsa in sensu cadunt et imaginationi subiacent, ut figura, linea et numerus et huiusmodi. Et ideo intellectus humanus a phantasmatibus accipiens facilius capit horum cognitionem et certius quam intelligentiae alicuius vel etiam quam quiditatem substantiae et actum et potentiam et alia huiusmodi. Et sic patet quod mathematica consideratio est facilior et certior quam naturalis et theologica, et multo plus quam scientiae aliae operativae, et ideo ipsa maxime dicitur disciplinaliter procedere. Et hoc est quod Ptolemaeus dicit in principio *Almagesti*: 'Alia duo genera theorici potius

Thomas, very much like Stephen after him, combines the discussion of epistemological certainty with Ptolemy's remarks on the division of theoretical philosophy, arriving at the same result, namely, that mathematics surpasses metaphysics with regard to certainty because of the very nature of its demonstrations.[46] Nancy Spatz and Andrea A. Robiglio have pointed to the fact that Stephen borrowed from Aquinas, particularly as regards the former's quotations from Aristotle.[47] The present case confirms this proximity, although it shows that Stephen himself had a good command of the philosophical sources used by Aquinas, for Stephen's quotation of the *Almagest* is more literal than that of Aquinas.

The fact that Stephen was reading Kilwardby's *De ortu scientiarum* along with Aquinas's commentary on Boethius's *De trinitate* is not surprising, since the second part of this commentary must be considered Aquinas's particular approach to the genre of introductions to philosophy.[48] Both works, in fact, that is, Kilwardby's *De ortu scientiarum* and Aquinas's commentary on Boethius's *De trinitate*, represent the principal epistemological accounts of philosophy produced by Dominicans during the thirteenth century. That Stephen based his *principium in aula* on these texts is therefore the expression of a well-thought-out strategy: his comparison between philosophy and theology draws upon the leading and most authoritative accounts of philosophy of his day, at least within the Dominican Order.

The fact that theological *principia* and philosophical introductions fulfil a similar function in their respective fields while also sharing certain characteristics, such as the commendation of the discipline in question and the division of its parts, either according to biblical books or areas of philosophical inquiry, has led Gilbert Dahan and others to wonder whether the introductions were, in fact, modelled on the *principia*.[49] In the present situation, it is barely possible

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quis opinionem quam conceptionem scientialem dicat: theologicum quidem propter inapparens ipsius et incomprehensibile, physicum vero propter materiae instabile et immanifestum. Solum autem mathematicum inquisitionis firmam stabilemque fidem intendentibus dabit, velut utique demonstratione per indubitabiles vias facta,'" trans. Armand Maurer, in Thomas Aquinas, *The Division and Methods of the Sciences. Questions V and VI of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius*, 4th ed. (Toronto, 1986), 68–69.

[46] The passage from the introduction of Ptolemy's *Almagest* is referred to several times in Aquinas's commentary, for example, q. 5, a. 1, s.c. 3; q. 5, a. 3, arg. 8; q. 5, a. 3, ad 8; and q. 6, a. 1, s.c. 11. It also appears in the philosophical introductions, for example, in the *Accessus philosophorum* (ca. 1230). See Lafleur, *Quatre Introductions à la philosophie* (n. 5 above), 184, as well as 152, n. 113, where Lafleur observes that the introductory chapter of the *Almagest* was widely read at the university (in contrast to the rest of the work).

[47] *Principia*, 258; and Robiglio, *La sopravvivenza e la gloria* (n. 10 above), 31.

[48] See the introduction in Thomas Aquinas, *Kommentar zum Trinitätstraktat des Boethius II*, ed. and trans. Peter Hoffmann and Hermann Schrödter (Freiburg i. Br., 2007), 7–12.

[49] See Gilbert Dahan, "Une introduction à l'étude de la philosophie: *Ut ait Tullius*," in *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle: Autour du 'Guide de l'Étudiant' du ms.*

to answer this question, which is particularly complex since the introductions to philosophy fairly consistently exclude theology and any reference to it from their discussion of the sciences, defining the latter in terms of strictly human knowledge. The fact, however, that some *principia*, such as the ones by Galdericus and Stephen, engaged with questions concerning the status and division of philosophy, for which purpose they drew upon the introduction-literature, proves that both genres were more closely connected than has been assumed so far. Thus, as I have endeavored to show here, there can be no doubt that, for their epistemological assessment of theology, some thirteenth-century *principia* relied heavily upon the philosophical literature of their day.

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Ripoll 109, ed. Claude Lafleur (Turnhout, 1997), 3–58, at 5–6. See also Claude Lafleur, "Une figure métissée du platonisme médiéval: Jean le Page et le Prologue de son Commentaire (vers 1231–1240) sur l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre," in *Une philosophie dans l'histoire: Hommages à Raymond Klibansky*, ed. Bjarne Melkevik and Jean-Marc Narbonne (Québec, 2000), 105–60, at 110–11, and n. 1.