

appropriation of an individual. Thus, Jaeggi defines her ‘appropriative model’ of the self in terms of the transformative nature of appropriation: there is no beginning or end of such a process since the self is always already involved in and changed with every activity. The author therefore argues for a self that is always in transformation, necessarily re-interpreting her given conditions with every act. This third part of the book ends with an outline of implications concerning the analysis of alienation, which focuses on the social nature of the appropriative model of the self, and its necessary involvement in shaping the social practices and institutions in and through which the individual appropriates herself and the world in a meaningful way. Jaeggi leaves this task for future social theorists, emphasizing that any experience of alienation that might threaten modern society cannot be addressed without critically assessing the extent to which social institutions can become structures for the emancipation of the individual.

The result of Jaeggi’s analysis is a definition of ‘alienation’ not as an exact technical term that isolates a specified ailment affecting an individual. Rather, what emerges from her investigation is a theme that encompasses a large range of conceptual structures that aim to capture the multifaceted relation the subject has with the world. Alienation as a concept for the deficient process of appropriation is thus able to test the conceptual efficacy of the various formal analyses of social structures in contemporary social philosophy. Furthermore, it is important to point out that the method of analysis that Jaeggi develops is not exclusive to the matter under study. Jaeggi’s conceptual re-construction is indicative of the direction that social theory and in some level philosophy itself is taking, namely the move away from metaphysical commitments regarding the theory of the self on either end of the spectrum, i.e., essentialism or certain forms of postmodernism, in order to take a more pragmatic approach to social critique. Jaeggi gives us a sense of this direction social theory is taking in her keen engagement with the literature in her academic community. Consequently, not only does the translation of this book offer English-speaking scholarship a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the concept of alienation, it also provides Anglo-American scholars with some insight into the current debates in German social philosophy.

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Aristote: Métaphysique Epsilon

ENRICO BERTI

Paris: Vrin, « Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques » series, 2015; 238 pp.; €15.00 (paperback)

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This is the latest addition to a new series offered by Vrin and titled ‘La *Métaphysique* d’Aristote.’ The series provides new translations and extended commentaries of the 14 books of the *Metaphysics* in 14 separate volumes. So far, the publications do not follow the initial order of the *Metaphysics*: Δ first launched the series in 2014,¹ E was published last June, and the release of H is scheduled for September 2015.

¹ R. Bodéüs and A. Stevens. *Métaphysique Delta*, 2014, Paris: Vrin.

Besides the translation, the present book contains an introduction (7-61), a substantial commentary (77-204), a thematic bibliography (205-223), two glossaries and two indexes. Since the commentary contains philological remarks, one may regret the absence of the Greek text.

Enrico Berti describes his translation as “très traditionnelle” (*very traditional*, 58) because he adopts the long-established translations of Aristotle’s technical terms (‘essence’ for τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ‘accident’ for συμβεβηκός, etc.). He acknowledges that new translations might sometimes be more accurate (*explanation* rather than *cause* for αἰτία), but argues that his faithfulness to history enables the reader to identify the vocabulary discussed and transmitted by the philosophical tradition. The translation is somewhat wordy. If expansion is occasionally inevitable, many words introduced in angle brackets are superfluous (e.g., 1027a32, b4, b16, b24) or could have been avoided by choosing other formulations (e.g., 1025b25, 27a20), hence preserving the concision that characterizes Aristotle’s writing style. One sentence or two are odd sounding, like the concession ὁμοίως δὲ κἄν ὑπερπηδήσῃ τις εἰς τὰ γενόμενα, at 1027b6-7, in which the verb ὑπερπηδήσῃ is translated too literally (“même si quelqu’un saute dans les choses passées,” my emphasis). Chapter 2 provides some examples of awkward phrasing mostly because the treatment of the modal terminology lacks efficiency (e.g., 1026b5-7, b34, 27a5-6).

Some translation choices remain open to question. Berti renders the word διάνοια by ‘pensée rationnelle’ (*rational thought*), stressing that the adjective ‘rationnelle’ highlights that διάνοια does not describe any kind of thought. Indeed, the *De Anima* and the *Ethics* depict διάνοια as a specific type of thinking that combines images (φάντασμα) and proceeds by reasoning rather than by intuition. Yet, those specificities would be better captured by the adjective ‘discursive,’ a translation previously adopted by J. Tricot and more recently by A. Stevens.² ‘Rationnelle’ also has the inconvenience of suggesting the existence of another sort of thinking that would not be rational, which does not fit with the rest of Aristotle’s psychology (thinking is the prerogative of the rational part of the soul alone). The confusion is made obvious by the translation of ἐπιστήμη διανοητική by “science rationnelle” (1025b6) where ‘rationnelle’ is at best redundant. The few weaknesses of the translation are minor, however, since the main value of the book lies in the commentary.

E is among the most influential and widely-read books of the *Metaphysics*, despite its brevity—about three pages in the Bekker edition (1025b3-28a5). It owes the most part of its notoriety to its first chapter. In E 1, Aristotle makes a famous division between productive, practical and theoretical sciences. The latter includes physics, mathematics and what Aristotle calls the ‘science of being *qua* being’ (‘metaphysics’ is coined long after Aristotle’s death). E 1 is the only place where that ‘science of being *qua* being’ is also referred to as ‘first philosophy’ (πρώτη φιλοσοφία) and as ‘theological’ (θεολογική). The two epithets have generated a prodigious amount of discussion, from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Martin Heidegger. The millenary debate gravitates around two main issues: can ontology (the study of being in general) be reduced to theology (the study of the supreme being), and what is the exact meaning of ‘first’ in ‘first philosophy.’

Berti offers answers to both questions in a meticulous line-by-line commentary. A large portion of it exposes the relatively recent controversies (second half of the 19th

² I am not convinced that Aristotle regards as trifling the distinction between διάνοια and νοῦς, as Berti suggests on the basis of Γ 1012a2-3 (91). Although it is true that the contrast between the two appears less relevant in the *Metaphysics* than elsewhere.

century and after) surrounding the interpretation of E. At some point, the reader may get the impression that Aristotle scholarship is the focus of Berti's attention rather than the text itself, and that the rest of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* is exploited to the extent that others refer to it. The pages that present Berti's own analysis are often more engaging and contain many convincing arguments (e.g., about the universal understood as a cause rather than as a predicate (126-128)).

The emphasis on the history of the reception of E probably is the defining characteristic of Berti's approach in this work. The importance given to the scholarly tradition shapes the commentary and accounts for the orthodoxy of the translation. Therefore, the volume may not succeed in providing a renewed encounter with the Aristotelian text, but should prove very useful to a specialized readership.

References

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1953 *La Métaphysique*. 2 volumes. Paris: Vrin.

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Intellectuals and Power: The Insurrection of the Victim

FRANÇOIS LARUELLE

in conversation with Philippe Petit. Translated by Anthony Paul Smith.

Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015; v + 155 pp. \$17.00 (paper)

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François Laruelle's work has recently found a North American audience, resulting in a bloom of English translations over the past five years. *Intellectuals and Power*, Laruelle's long interview with Philippe Petit, joins the list of Laruelle translations in 2015, which also includes his *General Theory of Victims* (Polity), *Introduction to Non-Marxism* (Univocal), and *Christo-Fiction: The Ruins of Athens and Jerusalem* (Columbia University Press).

The translator's preface by Anthony Paul Smith immediately situates the book in relation to the media frenzy that followed the Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013. Smith highlights Laruelle's critique of public philosophers' ignorance of victims in favour of "media friendly concepts," thereby situating the book in relation to a contemporary event characterized by violence and injustice (vii). Laruelle's critique of what he calls the 'dominant intellectual' constitutes a critique of the self-styled experts and pundits who take refuge in abstraction while claiming to care about the victims and injustices of the world. Philippe Petit's interviewer's preface then summarizes Laruelle's recasting of the role of intellectuals in the context of his pursuit of 'non-philosophy.'

The Prologue of the book begins the interview, with Petit setting the stage for the exchange by placing Laruelle in the long line of French intellectual self-reflection (alongside Aron, Sartre, Lyotard, and Debray). While Laruelle joins this lineage he also