resilient in the face "problem pressures." The authors conceive of these as "objective" or "functional" problems (in that they "do not depend on political choice") that may elicit an appropriate policy response, an inappropriate response, or perhaps no response at all. These problem pressures (pp. 28–9) create a "selective context" that will facilitate the adoption of certain ideas (this is as far as this book goes in accepting a role for ideational influence) but not others.

These problem pressures are linked to what Van Kersbergen and Vis call the four "rationales" or "logics" of welfare states, which structure the rise and development of welfare states as well as the "political opportunities and constraints of welfare reform" (p. 32): the logic of socio-economic development and modernization; the logic of political integration and state-building; the logic of need satisfaction and risk reapportioning; and the logic of class politics, coalitions, and redistribution. Chapters 4 through 8 of the book elaborate on these logics, linking them first to regime theory (a robust defense of Esping-Andersen's "three worlds"), then to an assessment of what welfare states do, and an exploration of the endogenous and exogenous pressures for welfare state reform, including a lucid discussion of globalization and post-industrialism as sources of "functional problem pressure." Chapter 9 uses prospect theory to explain why governments either evade or actively engage with those pressures to tackle unpopular reform, while Chapter 10 asks whether the welfare state will survive the recent recession. The authors answer "yes"—due to the popularity and ongoing success of social policies—even if the weight of reform pressures has increased and has led to retrenchment and expenditure cuts.

The analysis in this book is compelling and rewards a careful reading. This reader, however, was left with a number of questions, mainly about how successfully the authors navigate between the Scylla of political agency and the Charybdis of functional determinism. Their "open functional approach" seeks to steer them through these perilous waters by making much of reform pressures, but also much of the agency of policy makers in responding to them, an agency which is shaped by a combination of ideas and their calculations about the potential electoral damage of risky reform. While the authors accept the notion that "causal beliefs" play a role in decision making, they repudiate the notion that ideas have a context-free independent effect and create by themselves the incentives for action and inaction—an argument that I share.

We are left, however, with a rather mechanistic notion of change and reform, and where it comes from which can be characterized as "problem pressure + political calculation +/- room for electoral maneuver + ideas = reform." But are ideas just "policy ideas," that become useful in the face of reform pressure, or are they part of a broader, more inchoate (and less "means-end" rational) ideology? I assume the latter. But in that case—and as one can easily observe in US and UK politics, and beyond—is ideology (in its liberal-market, right-wing, and sometimes explicitly anti-welfare manifestations) not also a "problem pressure" for the welfare-loving center left (and its academic exponents), one that is subjective, and not objective, and often unrelated to, and even refuting "functional demands" on policy? Ideology as a motivating force can have a profound impact on the shape and extent of redistribution and protection from social risk, pushing for either greater redistribution or greater retrenchment, even in the absence of "functional problem pressures,"or exceeding what those "pressures" may demand. Despite the brilliance of this book, I am not convinced that the authors have grappled as effectively as they might with this core phenomenon in welfare state politics.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law and Policy. Edited by Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 496p. $95.00 cloth, $34.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592715004120

— Neta C. Crawford, *Boston University*

The ways to kill and die in war—or the technology used to assist in that killing and dying—are constantly changing. In previous eras, the hot new technologies of their day—crossbows, machine guns, submarines, aircraft, and nuclear weapons—prompted religious thinkers, scholars, and political actors to argue that everything or nothing about the nature of war had changed, that the weapons were or were not "better" in military or moral terms, and that their use had somehow to be either expanded or controlled.

Armed drones (remotely piloted aircraft) are perhaps the hot new military technology of the post-9/11 era. U.S. drone strikes outside of declared battlefields in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have been declared either wonderfully precise and effective or dangerously destructive of civilian lives, counterproductive, illegal, and unethical. Accordingly, there are many popular and now more than a handful of scholarly analyses of the technology, ethics, military effectiveness, and history of drone warfare and its connection to related questions, such as political accountability for secret programs, the ethics and legality of targeted killing, "collateral damage," and the "war on terror." (There is less controversy about drone use in the declared war zones of Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Syria and little or no controversy about the use of drones for surveillance.)

This volume covers many of these issues. The editors, Peter Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, say that their goal

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is to "encourage and enable an in-depth discussion of drone deployment and its broad implications for the changing nature of war and politics" (p. 5). They have largely met their goal.

Given the complexity of questions raised by drones at the tactical and strategic level, *Drone Wars* is appropriately diverse in the professional background of contributing authors—from professors of law, ethics, and religion to activists, journalists, retired military, and former policy-makers. While most of the contributors are Americans, many of the essays are skeptical of the claims of U.S. officials and drone-use advocates that the strikes are surgically precise, effective, and legal. As Peter W. Singer argues in his chapter, new technologies sometimes promote "flawed" (p. 217), or at least confused, thinking about the issues raised by emergent technologies. The chapters later in the book further the analysis between technology and ways of thinking and acting.

This volume is an outstanding introduction to the issues raised by the U.S. use of drones and about related issues in contemporary war. Specifically, the two chapters by Bergen and Jennifer Rowland, and the chapters by Sarah Holewinski, Christopher Swift, Noreen Shah, Rosa Brooks and Megan Braun, are particularly insightful. That is not to say that the other chapters are not well written or informative; all of the chapters included in this well-edited volume deserve their place.

The strengths of this work are many, and it is likely to be very useful for teaching about the issue of drones. One strength, for example, was the attempt to include the perspective of practitioners and people who live in the region where drone strikes occur.

A second strength is the inclusion of diverging perspectives on different issues to do with drone strikes. Three stand out. The first is whether the use of drones for targeted killing outside of war zones poses questions of law, doctrine, or politics that are unique or essentially the same as other technologies and tactics. For instance, Rosa Brooks argues that drones are not unique (p. 233), while Braun suggests that they are (p. 253). Second, several authors argue that drones are more precise and yield fewer civilian casualties than other methods of war, whereas others note that the counts of civilian casualties are imprecise, so that it is not possible to say that they yield fewer civilian casualties than other uses of force (e.g. Holewinski). Third, it is unclear that the drone strikes are strategically productive—they kill very few militant leaders, and may or may not kill more militants than are being recruited because of the strikes.

A third strength of the volume is the overlapping discussion of the legal issues raised by drones within international humanitarian law and human rights law. Since the authors do not always agree on legal issues, the differences in interpretation are instructive.

There are also a few problems with *Drone Wars*. First, I found it to be a bit disorganized. The chapters were organized into parts "on the ground," "law of war," "policy," and "future of war," but the discussion was actually somewhat disjointed. For instance, the chapter "No One Feels Safe" by the pseudonymously named "Adam Khan" appears in the part on the future of war, but it might have come in the section that covers the day-to-day impact of the drones "on the ground." The discussion of changing technology was sprinkled throughout the volume, and it would have been useful to put Singer's criticism next to the chapters by Konstantin Kakeas, Brad Allenby, and Rothenberg.

Second, and much more important, there were some issues that deserved more systematic coverage. Specifically, while several authors mentioned oversight, I longed for more attention to the issue of congressional and judicial oversight of the drone strategy. The most focused discussion of the Congressional role is in the chapter by Shaw (pp. 166–176). William Banks's chapter, "Regulating Drones," also addresses the issue of oversight in his larger focus on the legality of drone strikes. However, a separate chapter or two on oversight would have been useful. I would also have liked to see more attention on the question of civilian casualties. Several authors dealt with this question at some length and great clarity—notably Bergen and Rowland (pp. 17–23) and Holewinski (pp. 49–54)—but I wish there had been a chapter or two devoted specifically to the questions of civilian casualties and militant deaths.

Third, several authors asserted or mentioned the costs of drone strikes and drone technology, but the economics of drone strikes is a much more complicated issue than it appears. There is a widely held view that drone strikes are cheaper than conventional strikes, but it is not so simple. I would have liked to see an attempt made to tally up the costs of the procurement of armed drones and weapons, the cost of fuel for operations, the costs of U.S. and war-zone bases, and the personnel required to operate and maintain the drones. Some of these costs are "black budget" (secret), but many are not.

These are ultimately concerns, however, that belong on a wish list for the perfect volume for the purposes of teaching and research. The overall strength of this work more than compensates for what is not there. The tendency in some other accounts is to treat drone strikes for targeted killings apart from U.S. strategy in the war on terror. It is part of a fascination with tactics at the expense of a holistic understanding of the larger context of the war and its causes and consequences.

This volume helps put drone strikes into their larger context. Indeed, some chapters were incredibly insightful in that regard. For example, Swift's analysis of the impact of drone strikes on Yemen, in part based on interviews, illustrates the complexity of the drone strikes as a tool of targeted killing. He notes that the "fact that AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] ranks swelled to nearly 1,000 fighters between 2009 and 2012 strengthens claims about the connection between drone strikes and indigenous

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radicalization." But he adds that "AQAP typically recruits through economic inducement rather than popular resentment" (p. 79). Swift's interviews thus suggest an opening for further research. Could economic incentives draw youths away from militancy? Do drones impede economic activity? What is the relationship between tactics and strategy?

In sum, we need to know more. *Drone Wars* is both an excellent introduction and a useful resource for those who are already steeped in the issues.

All Necessary Measures: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention. By Carrie Booth Walling. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 320p. $75.00.
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— Patrick A. Mello, *Technische Universität Dresden*

The challenges of "humanitarian intervention" have been of pressing concern to policymakers and academics ever since the end of the bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. This became most evident when the international community failed to respond decisively to the genocide in Rwanda, despite having forces on the ground, as well as when it did not stop the atrocities of the Bosnian war: as during the shelling of Sarajevo after United Nations peacekeepers had left the city to its fate and when "safe havens" in Srebrenica were attacked and overrun by Serbian forces. In other conflicts, the UN Security Council did authorize a military response using "all necessary means," as in Somalia, Sierra Leone, and, as the most recent humanitarian intervention, in Libya. However, the problem of selectivity in its responses to grave human rights violations continues to haunt the international community, most visibly in the deadlock of the Security Council in the face of the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria.

In *All Necessary Measures*, Carrie Booth Walling explores the social construction and evolution of humanitarian intervention discourse and subsequent action at the UN Security Council. In a nutshell, the book argues that Security Council members shape the likelihood of force being used in defense of human rights by constructing narratives about the character and cause of a conflict. According to Booth Walling, these "causal stories"—a concept borrowed from Deborah A. Stone (*Policy Paradox*, 2012)—can be "inadvertent," "complex," or "intentional" in kind. The latter type of story seeks to "identify perpetrators and name victims," which increases the prospect for subsequent forcible action by the Security Council (p. 23). By contrast, inadvertent causal stories contain a "narrative of moral equivalency" whereby multiple warring parties share responsibility for human rights violations and the actors are perceived as morally equivalent (p. 24). If the inadvertent story predominates among Security Council members, ensuing action will likely amount to the monitoring and observation of human rights violations, or include palliation efforts, such as the provision of humanitarian assistance. Finally, complex causal stories describe "multifaceted, complicated, and tragic situations in which multiple and often fragmenting groups are responsible" (p. 26). For Booth Walling, the main difference between inadvertent and complex causal stories is that the latter describe the violence as the result of both political decision making and structural factors that are "beyond the realm of individual human control" (p. 26), making these conflicts particularly resilient to outside intervention.

The book is comprised of seven empirical chapters, framed by an introduction and conclusion. In addition to her analysis of "positive cases," that is, where the Security Council endorsed humanitarian intervention, Booth Walling also examines cases where human rights violations could have led to outside intervention with UN authorization but did not. The carefully crafted case studies on Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo, Sudan, Sierra Leone (included in the Kosovo chapter), and Libya amount to nothing less than a contemporary history of humanitarian intervention. This begins with the formation of no-fly zones in Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War and ends with Libya as the first case in which the council explicitly authorized the use of "all necessary measures" in reference to the principle of the "responsibility to protect" (RtoP), adopted at the 2005 World Summit of the UN General Assembly.

The theoretical argument made by Booth Walling, namely, that it is "no longer about whose military can win but also about whose story can win" in Security Council debates (p. 5), resonates with a large body of constructivist work that challenges purely rationalist accounts of phenomena in international politics. While this book is neither the first on humanitarian intervention nor on the selected conflicts, the author provides new insights and concise accounts of Security Council debates and negotiations in the run-up to the selected interventions (and noninterventions). For example, it is intriguing to read how France and Britain eventually withdrew their support for the inadvertent story in Bosnia and rallied around the intentional story "in the face of mounting expert testimony" (p. 118), leading to a (belated) military intervention. In other cases, such as in Kosovo, competing stories were being embraced, without any substantial movement on the part of the member states, resulting in a stalemate and preventing "effective and unified UNSC action" (p. 166).

This book is empirically rich while being parsimonious in theoretical terms. The "causal story" framework provides a valuable heuristic device for analyzing UN Security Council discourse and behavior when it comes to humanitarian crises. But there are also a few shortcomings. First, the book's argument concerning the evolution of a norm of humanitarian intervention seems overstated. Booth Walling concludes that the "international normative context has changed such that it is now

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