

MSU home economists, UR home economists attempted to contribute to the reconstruction of postwar Okinawa by establishing female leadership within and beyond academia. Particularly intriguing is a discussion of the Japanese home economist Onaga Mikiyo's professional life in relation to empire-building. Onaga's career began in colonial Korea, as a home economics teacher at a Japanese girls' high school, and then soared in occupied Okinawa as a faculty member at the UR. Koikari connects this upward mobility with Okinawa's history of "double colonialism" by Japan and the US, since Onaga's teaching experience, which she had cultivated earlier in colonial Korea by serving the Japanese empire, gave her the opportunity to renew and strengthen her commitment to domesticity in occupied Okinawa while working with the American occupiers. For Onaga and her fellow UR home economists, occupied Okinawa was an exciting space of female empowerment to articulate their concern as women, researchers, and Okinawans. Correspondingly, they passionately promoted domestic education, as they knew from experience that it enabled women to achieve female self-realization, or to "do anything and everything" (p. 159). Thus, Koikari skillfully presents the extraordinarily mobile dynamics of domesticity that crossed national borders within the contexts of Japanese and American empire-building.

Although I understand Koikari's emphasis on mutuality promoted in Cold War cross-cultural engagements, I would wish to have found a more detailed discussion of how Japanese and American women empowered themselves and improved their statuses by "civilizing" racialized Okinawan women behind "egalitarian" feminine bonding. Nevertheless, *Cold War Encounters in US-Occupied Okinawa* is a well-crafted, insightful exploration of the Cold War integrationist politics which painted the occupation as a positive occasion for multicultural understanding and mutual affinity. This volume is a significant contribution to gender and the Cold War studies. It will also appeal to a broad range of both specialists and general readers with interests in female empowerment, US imperialism, the US occupation of Japan and Okinawa, Japanese history, and Okinawan history.

World War Two Legacies in East Asia: China Remembers the War by CHAN YANG. New York: Routledge 2018. 225 pp. \$175.00 (cloth).

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The "history problem" in East Asia has already generated a vast amount of literature. Nevertheless, quality English sources on the domestic side of postwar memory making are still scarce. This applies to Japan, but even more so to Korea and China. In the latter case, only a few authoritative studies exist on the 1945–1982 period, and those that do exist were written mostly by foreign scholars. This book, by a Chinese author, is therefore a welcome addition. It is even more welcome for the open challenge it issues to the current scholarship. Yang Chan argues that Chinese war remembrance has been portrayed as too monolithic and government-centric. In Yang's view, the central authorities were never fully in control of the national memory landscape. She tells us that regional memories as well as civil society actors have had a considerable impact on how China has reminisced about the past. Furthermore, Yang strongly opposes the notion that the Chinese state tried to curb public awareness of the Japanese atrocities before the 1980s in order to buttress its relationship with Japan. And the CCP was apparently not as anti-Kuomintang as often thought either. For example, we learn that certain KMT war heroes were included in the mainland's official

commemoration. Overall, then, the book implies that there was a much greater continuity in the Chinese remembrance before and after the 1980s than is believed today.

In general, I find these arguments reasonable. I agree, for instance, with the author's contention that too much attention has been paid to the top level of the Chinese state and bureaucracy. The interplay of the horizontal (center vs. periphery) and the vertical (state vs. public) dimensions of public memory-making certainly warrants more attention. I also agree with the implied thesis that the anger over the Japanese school textbooks or the Yasukuni shrine visits in the 1980s reflect long-held sentiments in China and not just a change in Beijing's policy. Last but not least, I applaud the author for analyzing a wide range of previously unconsulted primary sources. Still, despite these positive features, I cannot endorse this work.

To start with, I find the author's use of her sources problematic. It is not unusual to find only a couple of newspaper articles in support of inferences about entire decades or even the entire 1945–1982 period. Getting a clear sense of the timing and significance of the presented data is a challenge, too. This is mainly due to Yang's jumping between various eras in her exposition. The author can be describing the 1950s in one sentence and the 1960s or 1970s in the next. Given how drastically different the postwar decades in China were, this is troubling. Her geographical discussion suffers from similar problems. She mixes city, provincial, and national references in one narrative without making clear distinctions. In this regard, I was particularly struck by how freely she assumes that her findings from Nanjing (where she worked in local archives) are representative of all localities across China. Obviously, the city was not just another provincial town. It was the former capital and the site of one of the worst military rampages of World War II. The ransacking of Nanjing shocked even the Japanese, who adopted counter-measures to prevent similar incidents from occurring. The fact that we do not speak of the "Xuzhou Massacre," "Guangzhou Massacre" or "Wuhan Massacre" (other large cities that fell after Nanjing) testifies to the special place that Nanjing holds in the Sino-Japanese conflict. The author's failure to address this issue raises concerns about the extent to which she overgeneralizes by simple extrapolation from Nanjing onto all of China.

In addition, the organization of the book and the style in which it is written calls for comment. While I do not believe that reviews of social scientific literature need to harp on language issues (I am myself a non-native English speaker), here an exception is warranted. Many times I found the writing difficult to follow, and I had to re-read sentences to properly understand the text. This served as a great distraction from the book's real arguments. The effort to cram every little detail from archival work into the text was also an unlucky choice. It filled the chapters with inconsequential data that further obfuscated its larger messages. The repeated prefaces outlining what would be said in each chapter, subsection, or subchapter were also distracting. In short, the book should have been much more rigorously edited before it was published.

This problem is also related to frequent inconsistencies in the author's arguments. For example, the following quotations are all from page 157:

"This chapter argues that ... non-official agents were influenced by various factors apart from the state." "the Nanda scholars, the Nanjing farmers as well as workers ... were somewhat influenced by the CCP regime." "The CCP regime's influence is central ... it was [its] top-down influence that paved the way for these unofficial agents, at the same time as it had handicapped them."

Here, in the span of a few sentences, we learn that the non-state actors were not influenced, somewhat influenced, or critically influenced by the state. It is difficult to make sense of such writing. Ultimately, it is up to the reader to interpret the data presented in this book, and therein lies my biggest criticism. Throughout the work, Yang tries to make the case that Beijing had to accommodate to pressures from below, had to pay attention to regional experiences, and had to account for private memories. Yet throughout the book we also find ample evidence of the dominance of

Chinese authorities over all other memory agents. In fact, Yang's materials demonstrate that the CCP was able to manipulate critical aspects of Chinese public remembrance anytime the party deemed it necessary. And if this reading of the evidence is correct, then the ultimate message of this book comes very close to what the existing literature has been saying all along.

Manipulating Globalization: The Influence of Bureaucrats on Businesses in China. By LING CHEN. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018. 232 pp. \$50.00 (Cloth).

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The roles of the state and of foreign capital in economic development and technological upgrading are among the most intensively researched topics in political economy. In recent decades, the rise of global production has created new challenges and opportunities for state actors trying to promote development. Ling Chen's important contribution, *Manipulating Globalization: The Influence of Bureaucrats on Businesses in China*, provides a timely and in-depth assessment of the extent to which China has been able to harness foreign capital for its technological ambition.

The key question that guides Chen's book is why there has been substantial subnational variation in implementing the central government's policy of fostering indigenous innovation. Focusing on the electronics industry, the book points to the different strategies of attracting foreign investment in the 1990s as the origin of the divergent paths taken by localities afterwards. During this crucial period, some cities focused on bringing in large multinationals like Philips and Samsung, while others attracted "guerrilla investors" (mainly from Hong Kong and Taiwan) who made small-scale investments. These strategies would unintentionally impact the implementation of policies geared towards promoting domestic upgrading, which the Hu-Wen administration launched in the mid-2000s in a bid to shift China away from low-cost manufacturing to more advantageous positions on the value chain.

Drawing from an impressive amount of data—including more than 270 interviews, an original survey of 200 firms, a multi-level dataset and local archives—and using both case studies (mainly Suzhou and Shenzhen but also Wuxi and Ningbo in Chapter 4) and quantitative analyses of 159 cities, Chen demonstrates meticulously that these early strategies of foreign investment attraction shaped the upgrading of the indigenous tech industry in two ways. First, they led to different constellations of coalition among local bureaucrats and eventually different upgrading policies. In cities that attracted large and leading multinationals that went on to become major exporters, local bureaucrats in international commerce formed a strong and cohesive coalition that resisted allocating resources to indigenous firms. In cities that attracted small foreign investors, the international commerce coalition was weak and posed limited resistance. Second, FDI-attracting strategies gave rise to different relations between foreign capital and indigenous firms. Large multinationals practiced "group offshoring"—bringing in with them long term foreign suppliers—and provided few opportunities for domestic firms to learn, rendering upgrading policies ineffective. On the other hand, "guerrilla investors," who were often at the bottom of the value chain, subcontracted to indigenous firms. Unexpectedly, these less advanced foreign firms provided more opportunities for indigenous firms to learn and accumulate skills and resources, which together with government-provided incentives for innovation fostered local upgrading.

Taking insights from the varieties of capitalism framework, Chen further traces the origins of alliance between the local state and different types of foreign capital to sticky bureaucratic