

“ONLY THE HUMAN WAY MAY BE FOLLOWED” READING THE GUODIAN MANUSCRIPTS AGAINST THE MOZI

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Abstract

Though the Guodian manuscripts have been viewed as an eclectic mix of texts, this article argues that, viewed in historical context, the collection has more coherence than has conventionally been supposed. Since the texts were interred in Chu c. 300 B.C.E., they should be read against other expressions of that time and place. The *Mozhi*, much of which was likely used or produced by authors active in Chu at the time of the Guodian interment, is particularly illuminating in this regard. Though the individual Guodian texts do frequently contradict one another, they are yet commonly useful for formulating logical and rhetorical attacks on the teachings of the *Mozhi*. The occupant of Guodian Tomb Number One may thus have collected these texts not for their doctrinal consistency with one another, but for their usefulness in use against intellectual opponents (among whom the Mohists clearly ranked). This, in fact, was likely a guiding principle for many Warring States literati in negotiating their production and utilization of texts.

The discovery of the Guodian 郭店 manuscripts in 1993 has provided a unique opportunity for the historical study of Warring States culture. Historical analysis requires that phenomena first be situated in time and space. In this sense the excavation at Guodian is exceptional for providing both a profoundly rich mine of sources and a narrowly determinable temporal-spatial context in which they may be fixed. We can know, thanks to the work of Chinese archaeologists, that the Guodian texts were interred in the state of Chu c. 300 B.C.E.¹ This places us on firmer

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1. Sarah Allan and Crispin Williams, eds., *The Guodian Laozi: Proceedings of the International Conference, Dartmouth College, May 1998* (Berkeley: The Society for the Study of Early China and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2000), 118–20

ground for historical contextualization than exists for virtually any other textual expressions of the Warring States.

To date, efforts to contextualize the Guodian manuscripts have not thoroughly stressed historical concerns. Ren Jiyu's 任繼愈 analysis of the strips (particularly *Taiyi shengshui* 太一生水) in terms of "Chu culture" is an example of the type of historical analysis facilitated by the circumstances of the texts' recovery.² For the most part, however, examination has proceeded from retrospective or anachronistic categories of analysis. Immediate separation of the texts into "Confucian" and "Daoist" writings and consequent suppositions about the relationship between "Confucian" and "Daoist" schools of thought is a case in point.³ Such studies assume the applicability of Han 漢 dynasty (206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.) bibliographical categories to the contents of Guodian Tomb Number One. We cannot assume that the inclusion of texts such as the *Laozi* 老子 and "Zi yi" 緇衣 ("Black Robes," in its status as one chapter of the *Li ji* 禮記) in *Hanshu* 漢書 "Yiwen zhi" 藝文志 categories labeled "Daojia" 道家 and "Liu yi" ('Six Arts' or 'Six Classics') 六藝⁴ accurately reflects the social uses of these texts during the Warring States 戰國 period (c. 450–221 B.C.E.). Much less can we assume that these Han dynasty categorizations in any way informed the tomb occupant's understanding of these texts, their significance, or their application.

One prevalent assertion rooted in the anachronistic application of Han bibliographical categories is that since its contents represent a "mix of schools ... the 'agenda' of Guodian Tomb Number One is one of intellectual fertility and openness."⁵ Even if the "collector" or "collectors" of the Guodian tomb manuscripts perceived them as being intellectually diverse, this does not argue *a fortiori* that he or they were committed to a vision of philosophical pluralism. Such a conclusion is built upon premises that must be tested against historical evidence. As I will argue below, these premises do not hold up under such testing.

If we examine the words of the texts themselves, they do not portray a world of openness and pluralism, but one of strident intellectual

2. Ren Jiyu, "Guodian Chu jian yu Chu wenhua" 郭店楚簡與楚文化, in *Guodian Chu jian guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji* 郭店楚簡國際學術研討會論文集, ed. Feng Tianyu 馮天瑜 (Wuhan: Hubei Renmin, 2000), 1–2.

3. An example would be: Li Cunshan 李存山, "Cong Guodian Chu jian kan zaoqi Dao-Ru guanxi" 從郭店楚簡看早期道儒關係, in *Guodian Chu jian Yanjiu* 郭店楚簡研究, ed. Jiang Guanghui 姜廣輝 (Shenyang: Liaoning Jiaoyu, 1999), 187–203.

4. For the derivation of the category *Liu yi* see *Han shu* 漢書 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1962), 30.1701, 1723. For listing of the *Li ji* among the "Six Arts" see p. 30.1709. For the derivation of the category *Dao jia* see *Han shu* 30.1732, the *Laozi* is listed among *Dao jia* works on *Han shu* 30.1729.

5. Allan and Williams, *Guodian Laozi*, 182.

discord. In the text entitled *Yu cong* IV 語叢四 by the original editors of the manuscripts, we read:

凡說之道，急者為首。既得其急言，必有及之。及之而不可，必文以過，毋令知我。彼邦亡將，流澤而行。

In general the way of persuasion begins with the crux. When you have found the crux of his (i.e. your opponent's) words, always have something with which to match it. Having matched and refuted [his words], always cover up and move on. Do not let him understand [the crux] of our [argument]. When the opposing kingdom lacks a general, rush on like a stream.⁶

This text, at least, evinces an interest in polemics and argumentation. It suggests that its author or reader (or both) were engaged in intellectual disputation with other individuals or groups; figures possessed of their own "words." The tactics outlined in this passage do not anticipate consensus, plurality, or amity, but conflict, victory, and further conflict. Indeed, the appropriation of war as a metaphor for debate gives ample testimony as to the perceived tone of the discourse. A natural question is who these anticipated opponents were. If we can identify whom the occupant of Guodian Tomb One considered to be his intellectual adversaries, we could further fruitfully contextualize the texts with which he was buried.

One way to conduct this search is to juxtapose the content of the Guodian manuscripts to that of other Warring States texts. A focus on content bypasses the use of anachronistic bibliographical categories or taxonomies of Warring States "schools." Like Guodian Tomb Number One, many transmitted Warring States texts may similarly be viewed as "repositories" of writings. Modern scholarship acknowledges that texts such as the *Guanzi* 管子, *Mozhi* 墨子, *Zhuangzi* 莊子, and even the *Analects* (*Lun yu* 論語)⁷ do not represent the work of a single author working at a single time and place, but must be viewed as composites of the work of many hands over time. In this sense these texts represent collations of writings only relatively more cohesive than the corpus of Guodian manuscripts. The question of how the Guodian manuscripts

6. Jingmenshi Bowuguan 荊門市博物館, *Guodian Chu mu zhujian* 郭店楚墓竹簡 (Beijing: Wenwu Press, 1998), 217. See also Li Ling 李零, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji* 郭店楚墓竹簡校讀記 (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2002), 44. Li entitles this entire text *Shui zhi dao* 說之道 ("The Way of Persuasion"). In this and subsequent quotations from the Guodian manuscripts I have followed Li Ling's transcriptions into modern characters unless otherwise noted.

7. Many recent studies of all four texts may be cited in this regard. A survey of scholarly opinions may be consulted in Michael Loewe, ed., *Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide* (Berkeley: The Society for the Study of Early China, 1993).

ended up in a single tomb is not materially different from that of how the chapters of the *Zhuangzi* 莊子 (for example) ended up in a single text.

This being so, one potentially fruitful manner in which to proceed is to treat both the Guodian corpus and other Warring States texts as comparable collections. The occupant of Tomb One (or those who interred him) and the compilers of texts such as the *Zhuangzi* were similarly collecting and associating disparate writings. Since we know the precise time and place in which the Guodian texts were assembled, a comparison of this corpus to transmitted texts can help us historically contextualize these latter collections. At the same time, juxtaposing the Guodian corpus with transmitted texts might give us insight into the organizing pattern of both the Guodian corpus *and* the texts with which it is compared, to the extent that such patterns exist.

I must stress that by treating the Guodian corpus as a whole I am not asserting that it should be viewed as a single “text.” Rather, I propose that we ask why any individual or group would gather together the texts discovered in Tomb One. One possible answer is out of an eclectic curiosity for a wide range of knowledge, but this is not the only or most persuasive answer. If the occupant of Tomb One was engaged in the kind of intellectual combat described above, he would very likely have gathered together texts that afforded him tools to that end. The texts in Tomb One would thus not be a random or eclectic grouping, but ones chosen specifically for their utility in the intellectual struggles within which their owner was engaged. If we compare their content to that of other Warring States texts we might discover how the Guodian texts, whatever their differences with one another, might commonly serve as tools contra the intellectual opponents of the occupant of Tomb One.

In this essay, I will juxtapose the entire Guodian corpus with the text of the *Mozi* 墨子. While this is not the only or necessary comparison that might be made, I hope to demonstrate that it is justified by the sources. Below I hope to show that a focused reading of the Guodian manuscripts *against* the text of the *Mozi* may be highly instructive. Such a reading reveals associations among and between the individual Guodian texts that would not otherwise be apparent. It also provides insights into both the activities and influence of the communities that produced both the *Mozi* and the Guodian corpus, and the distinctive patterns of discourse during the Warring States more generally. I will begin my analysis with the Guodian text known as *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出, as this text is among the intellectually richest of the group. I will then extend my examination to the rest of the Guodian corpus, demonstrating that the same or similar forces operative in the text of *Xing zi ming chu* may be perceived at work in virtually all of the texts interred in Tomb One.

Xing zi ming chu

The text entitled *Xing zi ming chu* by the modern editors of the Guodian manuscripts has rightfully attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. It deploys terms (such as *xing* 性, “inner nature”; or *qing* 情, “feelings”) that we know to have acquired profound significance in the discourse of the late Warring States and Han. Moreover, it constellates and orients these terms in ways previously unseen. However, much analysis of the *Xing zi ming chu* has been methodologically ahistorical. One prominent tendency has been to view the text as an intermediary evolutionary “stage” in the development of “Confucian” philosophy, placing it at the midpoint between landmark figures.⁸ This is not to say that any “evolutionary” reading is perforce invalid. But to view the text as the expression of a “Confucian” school trying to get from Point A (say, the *Lun yu*) to Point B (say, the *Mencius*) robs an evolutionary scheme of most of its interpretive value. If some sort of cultural or intellectual development is afoot, we stand a much better chance of uncovering the forces that are driving this change by comparing *Xing zi ming chu* to the texts with which it was synchronically discursively engaged rather than the texts we have *a priori* judged to be its diachronic genealogical affiliates.

Still, one might fairly ask why *Xing zi ming chu* should be compared to the *Mozhi*. There is much evidence to place Mohists in Chu at the time the occupant of Tomb One was active. The figure who gives his name to the text, Mo Di 墨翟, was born in Lu 魯 and lived and taught from the late fifth century to the early fourth century B.C.E.⁹ The *Mozhi* records a journey of Mo Di to Chu in order to persuade the monarch of that kingdom to desist from attacking Song.¹⁰ After Mo Di’s death the movement he founded persisted as a paramilitary organization led by an officer known as a “*juzi* (literally ‘hammer’)” 鉅子. The *Lüshi chunqiu* 呂氏春秋 gives the name of one such *juzi*, Meng Sheng 孟勝

8. For example Pang Pu 龐朴, “Kong-Meng zhi jian-Guodian Chu jian zhong de Rujia xingshuo” 孔孟之間-郭店楚簡中的儒家性說, *Guodian Chu jian yanjiu*, 22–35. Ikeda Tomihisa 池田知久, “Guodian Chu jian ‘Wu xing’ yanjiu” 郭店楚簡‘五行’研究, in *Guodian jian yu Ruxue yanjiu* 郭店楚簡與儒學研究, ed. Jiang Guanghui 姜廣輝 (Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu, 2000), 92–133.

9. Sun Yirang 孫詒讓, “Mozhi zhuan lue” 墨子傳略, in *Mozhi jiangou* 墨子問詁 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 680–91. Qian Mu 錢穆 gives approximate dates for Mo Di of 444–393 B.C.E., Qian Mu, *Xian Qin zhuzi xinian* 先秦諸子繫年 (rev. ed.) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1956), 89–90.

10. *Mozhi* 50, “Gong Shu” 公輸 (*Mozhi zhuzi suoyin* 墨子逐字索引, Institute for Chinese Studies Concordance [Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996], pp. 115–16). Subsequent citations of the *Mozhi* will provide the location in the *Zhuzi suoyin* edition using the form *juan*/page/line.

(d. 381 B.C.E.), and records that he was a loyal client of the Lord of Yangcheng 陽城君, a Chu noble.¹¹ Han Feizi 韓非子 (c. 280–c. 233 B.C.E.) reports that upon Mo Di's death the movement split into three lineages, that of Xiangli 相里氏, Xiangfu 相夫氏, and Dengling 鄧陵氏.¹² Chapter 33 of the *Zhuangzi* ranks Master Dengling among the “Mohists of the south” 南方之墨者 and notes that these southerners accused the northern disciples of Xiangli Qin (and perhaps also one another) of being “heretical Mohists.”¹³ There is thus good contemporary testimony that the Mohists were active in Chu up to and during the time when the occupant of Tomb One was alive.

The current text of the *Mozi* itself poses challenges to historical analysis. Large parts of the text are lost or corrupted, and the remaining portions exhibit structural idiosyncrasies that complicate any attempt at precise dating or classification. Angus Graham proposed that one series among the “Core Chapters” of the *Mozi* could be identified with what the *Zhuangzi* calls “the southern Mohists.”¹⁴ By his reading these southerners were quite distinctive within the larger tradition of Mohism, they were “deviant” in being willing to compromise some of the most radical values propounded by the founder. If Graham's analysis is correct we would be on firmest ground comparing the Guodian manuscripts only to those “J series” chapters representative of the southern Mohists.

Erik Maeder points out, however, that the synoptic parallels and borrowings between the core chapters are so complex as to defy determining with any confidence what circumscribed the textual arsenal of any particular group of Mohists at any given

11. *Lüshi chunqiu* 19.3 (*Lüshi chunqi zhuzi suoyin* 呂氏春秋逐字索引, Institute for Chinese Studies Concordance [Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1994], pp. 122, ll. 12–23).

12. Han Feizi, “Xian xue” 顯學 (*Han Feizi zhuzi suoyin*, Institute for Chinese Studies Concordance [Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2000], p. 150, ll. 18–19).

13. Zhuangzi, “Tian xia” 天下 (*Zhuangzi zhuzi suoyin* 莊子逐字索引, Institute for Chinese Studies Concordance [Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2000], p. 98, ll. 23–25).

14. Angus Graham, *Divisions in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core Chapters of the Mo-tzu*. (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1985). The “Core Chapters (8–37)” are all named after the so-called “Ten Theses” that were the basic teachings of Mohism. For each thesis the *Mozi* lists a triad of parallel essays. Seven of these essays are lost and three, by Graham's analysis, consist of “digests and fragments.” Using linguistic and structural analysis Graham analyzed the core triads into three sequences labeled Y, H, and J. Graham asserted that the J series (of which only 10 [“Shang xian, xia”], 13 [“Shang tong, xia”], 28 [“Tian zhi, xia”], and parts of 35/36 [“Fei ming shang/zhong”] remain extant) was the product of the “southern Mohists.”

time.¹⁵ He sees evidence that the extant “chapter (*pian* 篇)” was not the operative unit in which Mohist writings circulated during the Warring States. Rather, “the various schools had on hand a number of short *ce* 冊 ... from which they then quoted as they saw fit when setting out to compose what would thus be entirely new, and once more fully authoritative, pieces of writing.”¹⁶ Graham himself, while noting particular points on which the “three sects” can be seen to diverge, acknowledges that the text as a whole manifests a “general agreement in thought.”¹⁷ Although these structural complexities preclude precise dating, most of the extant text can confidently be dated to the fourth century B.C.E., with the exception of some of the later “logic” and military chapters that may have been composed as late as the third century B.C.E.¹⁸ We can thus use most of the *Mozhi* as a source for the state of Mohism during the lifetime of the occupant of Tomb One and as an index of the intellectual positions against which he was engaged.¹⁹

Yet contemporaneity itself does not argue that juxtaposing the two texts will prove illuminating. Indeed, superficial appearances might be interpreted to imply the contrary. The term *xing* 性 or “inner nature” appears only four times in the entire *Mozhi* as opposed to dozens of times in the *Xing zi ming chu*, despite the fact that the former text is easily fifty times the length of the latter. If a shared terminology is the *sine qua non* of intertextual comparison, then we are much wiser to place the *Xing zi ming chu* next to the *Mencius* or the *Xunzi*.

But an only slightly more discriminating survey of *Xing zi ming chu* yields suggestive leads. First is the prominent place given the term “*ming*” 命 or “fate.” Though it is not discussed in detail, fate is put forward as the source of inner nature: “Inner nature emerges from fate, fate descends from Heaven” 性自命出, 命自天降.²⁰ This is significant, as the *Mozhi* consistently contains strident arguments denying the existence of fate: “Now those knights and gentlemen of the world who want to debate the causes of right and wrong, benefit and harm,

15. Erik W. Maeder, “Some Observations on the Composition of the ‘Core Chapters’ of the *Mozhi*,” *Early China* 17 (1992), 27–82.

16. Maeder, 82.

17. Graham, *Divisions in Early Mohism*, 1.

18. For a review of opinions on the dating of the text see A.C. Graham, “*Mo tzu*,” in *Early Chinese Texts*, ed. Michael Loewe, 337–38.

19. The extant *Mozhi* obviously comes down to us through the mediation of editors and transmitters to which the Guodian manuscripts were not subjected. Even so the former affords us a rich source against which to read the latter. Below I will draw freely from the reliably early portions of the *Mozhi*, making note of Graham’s identification of the “southern” series where it might qualify a comparative reading.

20. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 179; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 105.

cannot but urgently negate those who hold that Heaven [-sent] fate exists. Those who hold that fate exists are a severe impediment to the world, thus Master Mozi rejects them” 今天下之士君子，將欲辯是非利害之故，當天有命者，不可不急非也。執有命者，此天下之厚害也，是故子墨子非之也。²¹ At one point *Mozi* quotes a purported Zhou canon that avers, in language inverting the text of *Xing zi ming chu*: “There is no Heaven [-sent] fate ... [Fate] does not come down from Heaven, it is attained by me” 無天命 ... 不自天降，自我得之。²²

Another concern of the *Xing zi ming chu* that has strong negative resonance with the *Mozi* is that of music:

凡聲其出於情也信，然後其入人之心也夠。聞笑聲，則鮮如也斯喜。聞歌謠，則陶如也斯奮。聽琴瑟之聲，則悸如也斯歎。觀‘資’，‘武’，則齊如也斯作。觀‘韶’，‘夏’，則勉如也斯斂。詠思而動心，□如也。其居次也久，其反善復始也慎，起出入也順，始其德也。

In general sounds that emerge from feelings are faithful, only then can they enter into and profoundly stir people's minds. Hearing the sound of laughter one is sublimely pleased. Hearing the sound of songs and odes one is joyously aroused. Listening to the sound of zithers one dolefully sighs. Viewing the “*Lai*” and “*Wu*” [dances] one becomes reverent, viewing the “*Shao*” and “*Xia*” [dances] one becomes restrained. Reciting and reflecting one moves the heart to flower. If you maintain this a long time, returning to goodness and diligently reverting to the origin, you will become compliant in your comings and goings, giving rise to your virtue.²³

Xing zi ming chu propounds a program of personal cultivation to which music is central. A cursory glance reveals that the *Mozi* is unequivocally opposed to such a perspective. Three chapters of the *Mozi* are entitled “Against Music (*Fei yue*)” 非樂. The text of the last two chapters is missing, but the text of the first is still extant, and enumerates detailed arguments condemning the practice of music, repeatedly intoning the formula, “Therefore Master Mozi says, ‘making music is wrong!’” 是故子墨子曰，‘為樂非也’。²⁴

These two comparisons do not, in and of themselves, prove definitively that *Xing zi ming chu* was written in dialogical response to the *Mozi* (or the teachings of the *Mozi*'s authors). They do, however, provide evidence that further investigation is warranted. Deeper examination of

21. *Mozi* 36, “*Fei ming, zhong*” 非命中, 9.4/61/23–25.

22. *Mozi* 36, “*Fei ming, zhong*,” 9.4/61/22. See *Mozi zhuzi suoyin* n. 7 for emendations to the received text. It is interesting to note that Graham identifies this section of “*Fei ming, zhong*” as belonging to the southern “J series.”

23. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 180; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 106.

24. *Mozi* 32, “*Fei yue, shang*” 非樂上, 8.4/55/25; 56/12, 19, 24, 29; 57/15.

the premises and assertions of the two texts might substantiate the juxtaposition suggested by initial comparison.

Let us begin with the issue of music. Conventionally, the *Mozi*'s opposition to music is understood as prudential; the text condemns music because it entails a wasteful expenditure of resources and time.²⁵ But if we look more closely at the discussion of music in the *Mozi* and how it relates to the larger doctrine that text espouses, we can see that more fundamental concerns are at stake. The *Mozi* does not, in fact, disagree with *Xing zi ming chu* about the subjective impact of music:

子墨子言曰，仁人之事者，必務求興天下之利，除天下之害，將以為法乎天下，利人乎即為，不利人乎即止 ... 是故子墨子之所以非樂者，非以大鍾鳴鼓琴瑟笙簫之聲以為不樂也 ... 雖 ... 耳知其樂也，然上考之不中聖王之事，下度之不中萬民之利。

Master Mozi says: The task of the benevolent person is always to seek what will promote the benefit of the world and eliminate its harms. Selecting models for the world, what is beneficial he will effect, what is harmful he will arrest ... For this reason, Master Mo does not reject music because the sounds of bells, drums, zithers, and flutes is not joyous ... Although ... the ears sense its joyousness, yet above it does not correspond with the affairs of the sage kings, below it does not measure with what is of benefit to the myriad peoples.²⁶

Although one might be tempted to underscore the differences between the *Mozi* and the *Xing zi ming chu*, the striking similarities they share are equally instructive, perhaps more so. The two texts describe the experience of music in virtually identical terms. The *Mozi* writes of the “joyousness” of music just as the *Xing zi ming chu* portrays the listener’s being “joyously aroused” by the sounds of songs and odes. The above passage from the *Mozi* even deploys tropes to be found in the *Xing zi ming chu*: the benevolent person and the sage king. The key departure to be perceived in the *Mozi* is its employment of the terms “benefit” and “harm.” But even here we cannot leap to the conclusion that the texts disagree. The *Xing zi ming chu* describes benefits to be derived from music, albeit benefits won through the mediation of long practice and habitual change. To establish that this is where conflict

25. As Benjamin Schwartz states: “In sum, I think that Mo-tzu, having rejected all the positive ground on the basis of which Confucianism exalts *li* and music, is free to see them as contributing nothing to the real needs of society ...” *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 153.

26. *Mozi* 32, “Fei yue, shang,” 8.4/55/19–25.

lies, we must further examine the *Mozi*'s notion of "benefit." Later in "Against Music," we read:

民有三患： 饑者不得食，寒者不得衣，勞者不得息。三者民之巨患也。然即當為之撞巨鍾，擊鳴鼓，彈琴瑟，吹竽笙，而揚干戚，民衣食之財安可得也？

The people have three worries: that when they are hungry they will have no food, that when they are cold they will have no clothing, that when they are belabored they will have no rest. These three are the great worries of the people. However, if now on their behalf we strike great bells, beat drums, play zithers, blow flutes, and wave staffs and plumes, how will this obtain clothing and food for the people?²⁷

The *Mozi* acknowledges none of the less tangible benefits of music described by the *Xing zi ming chu*. Here, as elsewhere, the text restricts "benefit" to narrowly material terms. In this sense the *Mozi*'s opposition to music, despite the text's fundamental accordance with *Xing zi ming chu*'s description of its "joy," becomes more comprehensible. Music's emotional power makes it more rather than less condemnable. Although it produces no benefit in and of itself, music requires an investment of the very goods the text defines as "beneficial." Having enjoyed music once, people will be tempted to hear it again and again, resulting in a vicious cycle of indulgence and waste. Indeed, at various points the text speaks of music as a kind of addiction with destructive consequences not unlike a dependence on strong wine.²⁸

Though one might be tempted to reduce the *Mozi*'s message to one of strict material utility, this would be a distortion. The opposition of the two texts cannot be put down to a simple divide between crass materialism and moral idealism. A subtler dynamic is at work. As the title of *Mozi* chapter 47, "Valuing Rightness (*Gui yi*)" 貴義, suggests, this text centers upon a vision of the moral society and the duties of the morally conscientious individual. However, within this chapter can be gleaned a key to understanding the divergence of the overall perspective of the *Mozi* from that of *Xing zi ming chu*:

必去六辟，必去喜，去怒，去樂，去悲，去愛，而用仁義。手足口鼻耳從事於義，必為聖人。

One must discard the "six blockages." One must discard pleasure, discard anger, discard joy, discard sorrow, discard love, and use benevolence and

27. *Mozi* 32, "Fei yue, shang," 8.4/56/6–8.

28. For example *Mozi* 32, 8.4/57/20–22.

rightness. When the hands, feet, mouth, nose, and ears serve rightness, one will definitely be a sage.²⁹

Compare the above passage to the opening passage of *Xing zi ming chu*:

凡人雖有性，心無定志，待物而後作，待悅而後行，待習而後定。喜怒哀悲之氣，性也。及其見於外，則物取之也。性自命出，命自天降。道始於情，情生於性。始者近情，終者近義，知情者能出之，知義者能入之。好惡，性也。所好所惡，物也。善不善，性也。所善所不善，勢也。

Although all people have inner nature, their hearts have no fixed will. [The will] awaits things and then arises, awaits assent and then is acted upon, awaits practice and then becomes fixed. The *qi* of pleasure, anger, grief, and sorrow are all inner nature. When they appear externally they have been drawn by things. Inner nature emerges from fate, fate descends from Heaven. The Way originates in feelings, feelings are generated by inner nature. Those beginning are nearer feelings; those at the end are approaching rightness. One who understands feelings can express them; one who understands rightness can internalize it. Liking and disliking are inner nature. What is liked or disliked is things. Goodness or badness is inner nature. Being good or bad is context.³⁰

Both texts adduce “rightness” as a central moral category, but they diverge sharply as to how rightness is constituted. For the *Mozi*, only by eliminating subjective emotional responses can we arrive at rightness. Pleasure, anger, joy, sorrow, and love are all “blockages” to the achievement of morality. This might seem to raise a contradiction, as one of the principle doctrinal chapters of the *Mozi* advocates “Universal Love (*Jian ai*)” 兼愛.³¹ But if we look at how rightness is defined throughout the *Mozi*, we see that there is no paradox. “Rightness is benefit” 義，利也.³² That is to say, rightness consists of producing benefit for the world. Because for the *Mozi* benefit is understood in perfectly material terms, the degree of one’s rightness is likewise objectively quantifiable by how much benefit one generates. In this

29. *Mozi* 47, “Gui yi 貴義,” 12.1/104/25–26. Yu Yue 俞樾 (1821–1907 C.E.) notes that there should be a “hatred 惡” after the “love” to make six blockages. Sun Yirang, *Mozi jiangsu*, 442–43.

30. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 179; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 105.

31. All three texts of “Universal Love” are extant: *Mozi* 4.1/23/27–4.3/30/10.

32. *Mozi* 40, “Jing” 經, 10.1.15/68/1. Though this is one of the “logic” chapters, it is among the earliest. The identification of “rightness” with “benefit” is in any case implicit throughout the earliest doctrinal writings of the text. This definition is discussed in A.C. Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1978), 49–51, 270–71.

sense, “Universal Love” and the “love” of “Valuing Rightness (*Gui yi*)” 貴義 must thus be distinguished from one another. The former denotes one of the objective means by which rightness is realized, through benefiting all people impartially. The latter signifies a spontaneous, subjective emotional response. “Valuing Rightness,” like “Against Music” and virtually all the chapters of the *Mozi*, treats the emotions with a scorn verging on (and occasionally flowing over into) suspicion. Rightness does not depend on our emotional responses, but is an exclusively rational choice based upon an external, objective standard.

By contrast, any possibility of morality for the *Xing zi ming chu* rests in the quality of our subjective emotional responses. The rhetorical framing of the feelings in *Xing zi ming chu* does not allow for the possibility of their being “discarded” as the *Mozi* advocates. Emotions are built into the fundamental organic structure of our person. They will inevitably be expressed upon our encountering the phenomenal world; this is not a matter of choice. We can only seek to train our inner nature so that it becomes “good,” so that its emotional responses to “things” will be appropriate to their “context.”

The distinction between *Mozi* and *Xing zi ming chu* thus does not emerge from moral versus materialist perspectives, but is rooted in a dispute over where the source of morality should be sited. *Xing zi ming chu* places the ultimate source of morality, the Way, within the human subject: “The Way originates in feelings, feelings are generated by inner nature.” We have seen that the *Mozi* places the source of morality external to human beings, in the material realm of the phenomenal world. But where within that realm does the ultimate source of moral guidance lie? The *Mozi* is very clear on this score:

子墨子曰：天下從事者，不可以無法儀。無法儀而其事能成者，無有。雖至士之為將相者皆有法，雖至百工從事者亦皆有法。百工為方以矩，為圓以規，直以繩，衡以水，正以縣。無巧工不巧工，皆以此五者為法 ...

然則奚以為治法而可？當皆法其父母奚若？天下之為父母者眾，而仁者寡，若皆法其父母，此法不仁也。法不仁，不可以為法。當皆法其學奚若？天下為學者眾，而仁者寡，若結法其學，此法不仁也。法不人不以為法...

然則奚以為法而可？故曰：莫若法天。天之行廣而無私，其施厚而不德，其明久而不衰，故聖王法之。既以天為法，動作有為，必度於天。天之所欲則為之，天之所不欲則止。然而天何欲何惡者也？天必欲人之相愛相利，而不欲人之相惡相賊也。奚以知天之欲人之相愛相利，而不欲人之相惡相賊也？以其兼而愛之，兼而利之。奚以知天兼而愛之，兼而利之也？以其兼而有之，兼而食之也。

Master Mozi says: Of those who carry out affairs in the world, none can be without a standard and a model. There are none who succeed lacking a

standard and a model. Even superior knights who served as generals and ministers all had a model; even superior craftsmen in their work all have a model. Craftsmen make right angles with the square, they make circles with the compass, straighten with the marking line, level with the water-level, true with the plumb line. There is no craftsman, skillful or no, who does not make use of these five ...

This being so, what can be taken as a standard for governing? How would it be if all took their parents as the standard? There are many parents in the world, but few who are humane. If all took their parents as the standard, this would be taking the inhumane as standard. To take the inhumane as a standard is not permissible. How would it be if we all took the learned as the standard? There are many learned ones in the world, but few who are humane. If all took the learned as the standard, this would be taking the inhumane as the standard. To take the inhumane as a standard is not permissible ...

This being so, what may be taken as the standard for governing? I say: nothing is as good a standard as Heaven. Heaven's conduct is expansive and without selfishness, its activity is generous but not imposing, its brilliance is incessant, thus the sage kings took it as a model. Since they took Heaven as a model, their actions had a basis, they were always measured against Heaven. What Heaven wanted, they did. What Heaven did not want, they ceased. However, what does Heaven want and dislike? Heaven definitely desires that people love and benefit one another, and does not desire people to hate and steal from one another. How do I know that Heaven desires that people love and benefit one another, and does not desire people to hate and steal from one another? Because it universally loves and benefits them. How do I know that Heaven universally loves and benefits people? Because it universally possesses and feeds them.³³

The *Mozi* promotes "benefit" as a standard on the authority of Heaven. The rhetorical power of the text's claim derives from its being rooted in empirical observation. We can be confident that Heaven wants us to benefit one another because we can see Heaven doing so daily in the world around us. Everywhere people live they are able to sustain themselves through agriculture or pastoralism, this is proof that Heaven "universally possesses and feeds them."

The *Mozi* establishes Heaven as an objective gauge of morality, and as we shall see goes to great lengths to sustain it. A natural question that arises is why the authors of the *Mozi* would commit so firmly to this

33. *Mozi* 4, "Fa yi 法儀," 1.4/4/7–24.

idea. An inkling of the answer is contained in the passage quoted above. The *Mozi* repeatedly presents Heaven (or “Heaven’s will [*Tian zhi*]” 天志) as being as consistent and invariable as the measuring standards employed by craftsmen:

子墨子言曰：我有天志，譬若輪人之有規，匠人之有矩。輪匠執其規矩，以度天下之方圓，曰中者是也，不中者非也。近天下之士君子之書不可勝載，言語不可盡計，上說諸侯，下說列士，其於仁義則大相遠也。何以知之？曰：我得天下之明法以度之。

Master Mozi says: My having Heaven’s will is like the wheelwright’s having the compass and the carpenter’s having the square. When the wheelwright and carpenter grasp their compass and square in measuring what is round and square in the world, what matches them is correct, what does not match them is wrong. Now the writings of the scholars and gentlemen of the world cannot be counted, their sayings cannot be reckoned. Above they advocate them to the feudal lords, below they argue them to the arrayed scholars, yet they are all far from humanity and rightness. How do I know it? Because I have acquired the world’s clear standard by which to measure them.³⁴

Heaven’s will, like the wheelwright’s compass and the carpenter’s square, is not bound to any particular time or place. Wherever one travels in the wide world their efficacy remains unchanged. Bury one away, and if it is disinterred in one thousand years (providing it has not decayed) it will still measure accurately. What is true of these instruments for geometric figures, says the *Mozi*, is true of Heaven’s will in measuring benevolence and rightness. Heaven’s will affords us a standard of morality that (just as Heaven does) transcends time and space; it can thus defeat the vagaries of cultural diversity and historical change.

The *Mozi*’s message was extraordinarily persuasive in the unique conditions of the Warring States. The people of that time were experiencing profoundly rapid and disorienting cultural, technological, political, economic, and social change. They had to learn to live with institutions and conditions unknown in the memory of recent generations. Moreover, the development of commerce and the expanding size of individual sovereign realms brought people detailed knowledge of conditions far away, producing an unsettling awareness of regional diversity. These factors, combined with a climate of increasing discord and violence, produced a sense of urgency and alarm. Against this context the message of the *Mozi* was both consoling and empowering.

34. *Mozi* 28, “*Tian zhi, xia 天志下*” 7.3/44/1–4. Graham identifies this chapter as one of the southern “J series.”

Given the persuasive power of the *Mozī's* message in the world of the Warring States, it is not surprising that its authors' opponents would demonstrate great ingenuity in countering its teachings. Whether this was the text's "intention" or no, the *Xing zi ming chu* contains claims and assertions that strike at the heart (what *Yu cong* IV might call "the crux") of the *Mozī's* doctrine. This is one consequence of the central role the text gives the concepts "*xing*" and "*qing*." Not only do these terms ground the root of morality within the subjective self rather than the phenomenal world, they also subvert the very notion of Heaven's will itself as an "objective" standard. This is the (or if not "the," one) import of the lines for which the text has been so celebrated in modern scholarship: "Inner nature emerges from fate, fate descends from Heaven." To the extent that Heaven's will is accessible at all, it can only be done through the physical Heavenly bequest that each of us carries within, the "*qi* of pleasure, anger, grief and sorrow" that is the potential field from which the Way emerges. Thus, the text explains:

凡道，心術為主。道四術，唯人道為可道也。其三術者，道之而已。詩書禮樂，其始出皆生於人。詩，有為為之也。書，有為言之也。禮樂，有為舉之也。聖人比其類而論會之，觀其先後而逆順之，體其義而節文之，理其情而出入之，然後復以教。教所以生德於中者也。

In general, for the Way, the arts of the mind are sovereign. The Way has four arts, only the human Way may be followed (i.e., may serve as a guide for the mind). The other three arts guide it (i.e., the mind), that's all. The origins of the *Odes*, *Documents*, rites and music are all generated by human beings. The *Odes* give it (the mind) a basis. The *Documents* give it speech. Rites and music give it gesture. The sages arrange them into categories and sort through their connections, observe their sequence and regulate them, embody their meanings and structure them, pattern their feelings and assimilate them, only then are they returned as teachings. Teaching is that by which virtue is born from within.³⁵

The filaments of human culture, the *Odes*, *Documents*, rites and music, are all expressions of feelings that the human mind generates on

35. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 180; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 106. The original text is subtle here. I follow Li Ling's interpretation, which has good basis in the context. The Way consists of four "arts," chief of which are the arts of the mind. The other four arts, the "human Way," consist of the expressions of human culture: 1) poetry, 2) prose, 3) ritual and music. Each of these arts of "the human Way" guide (translating the word *dao* as the verb "to guide") the mind in thought, verbal expression, and movement. The arts of the mind are described subsequently in the latter section of the text, and involve getting in touch with the "genuine" responses of one's mind. See the text quoted from the second part of *Xing zi ming chu*, below.

encountering the “things” of the world. The sages take these expressions and form them into coherent and positively transformative patterns, so that they may be turned back on people and condition their minds to respond normatively in the future, generating “virtue from within.” This is the process described in the first passage from *Xing zi ming chu*, cited above. There we were told that music can “enter into and profoundly stir people’s minds ... If you maintain this a long time, returning to goodness and diligently reverting to the origin, you will become compliant in your comings and goings, giving rise to your virtue.” The *Mozi* presents individual subjectivity as an obstacle to a shared morality. *Xing zi ming chu* not only denies that the phenomenon of subjectivity can be avoided, it asserts that within the subjective person of each individual is resident the only resource by which collective moral transformation may be achieved.

There is a logical problem here that the *Xing zi ming chu* does not directly address, although it is accounted for within the text as a whole. How can the sages create morally edifying culture out of the expression of human feelings if they are human beings themselves? The answer lies in the inner nature of the sage. The text allows for the possibility that human beings may spontaneously respond to “things” normatively: “When they have not been taught but the people are constant, it is because their inner nature is good 未教而民恒，性善者也。”³⁶ The “goodness” of inner nature has not become, in *Xing zi ming chu*, part and parcel of a logical dispute over people’s impulses at birth. Rather, it denotes a stage in the individual’s moral development. If a person occupies a point where her inner nature is good (whether she arrived at that point by birth or through practice), she will respond to phenomena with feelings that spontaneously accord with rightness. This raises the question of how one can recognize normatively correct feelings. Here the text puts forward a somewhat ironic but logically coherent standard: “What grows inner nature is the Way 長性者，道也。”³⁷ In other words, moral emotional responses are those that aid the further long-term vitality and dynamism of their source, inner nature. Conversely, “immoral” responses would be those that, given their “context,” are destructive of this vitality and dynamism. This analysis raises further questions and intriguing parallels and correspondences with later Warring States, Han, and even Song literature. While these issues are undeniably worthy of investigation, they are beyond the historical scope and concerns of this article. Suffice it to say that this understanding of morality and moral transformation is a powerful challenge to the doctrine of the

36. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian* 181; Li Ling *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 107.

37. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 179; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 106.

Mozi. Not only does the subjective person contain the only resource for collective moral transformation, it provides the only “objective” standard by which moral value may be measured.

To this point we might view the opposition between the *Mozi* and *Xing zi ming chu* as one of assertion and counter-assertion. The *Mozi* sites the source of morality in Heaven, *Xing zi ming chu* locates it in personal inner nature. The choice between these two is largely a matter of faith. However if we examine these issues against the larger context of the *Mozi*’s program for building a moral society, we see that the polemical perspective of *Xing zi ming chu* has further destructive consequences for the doctrine propounded by the *Mozi*. The *Mozi*’s blueprint for the achievement of the moral society is quite consistent throughout the text. In chapter 11, “Promoting Conformity, Part I (*Shang tong, shang*)” 尚同上, we read:

子墨子言曰：古者民始生未有形政之時，蓋其語，人異義，是以一人則一義，二人則二義，十人則十義，其人茲眾，其所謂義者亦茲眾，是以人是以其義以非人之義，故交相非也 ...

夫明瘡天下之所以亂者，生於無政長，是故選擇天下之賢可者，立以為天子 ... 天子發政於天下之百姓，言曰：“聞善而不善，皆以告其上，上之所是必是，上之所非必皆非之，上有過則規諫之，下有善則傍薦之，上同而不下比者，此上之所賞而下之所譽也，意若聞善而不善，不以告其上，上之所是弗能是，上之所非弗能非，上有國弗規諫，下有善弗傍薦，下比而不能上同者，此上之所罰而百姓之所毀也。” 上以此為賞罰，其明察以審信 ... 天子唯能壹同天下之義，是以天下以治也。

Master Mozi says: In ancient times when the people were first born there was no government. In their speech people all had different [notions of] rightness. In this way one person had one rightness, two people had two rightnesses, ten people had ten rightnesses. The more people there were, the more notions of rightness they espoused. For this reason everyone affirmed his own rightness and negated the rightness of others, so that [everyone] negated one another ...

It is [thus] clear that the chaos of the world arises from the lack of government and leaders. For this reason the most able and worthy in the world is chosen and established as the Son of Heaven ... The Son of Heaven issues edicts to the common people, saying, “When you hear of what is good and what is not, you must tell your superiors. What your superiors affirm, you must affirm. What your superiors negate, you must negate. If your superiors make a mistake, you must admonish them. If your inferiors do good, you must recommend them. Conforming to your superiors and refusing to collude with inferiors will be rewarded by your superiors and praised by those below. If you hear of what is good or not good and intentionally do not tell your superiors, if you are unable to affirm what your superiors

affirm, if you are unable to negate what your superiors negate, if you do not admonish your superiors' mistakes, if you do not recommend your subordinates who are good, these will be punished by your superiors and denigrated by common people." Above rewards and punishments are applied this way, investigating carefully to make them consistent....When the Son of Heaven alone can unify the [standards of] rightness of the world, then the world will be ordered.³⁸

Here again we see the recurrent theme of how individual subjectivity poses an obstacle to the realization of the moral society. The *Mozi* proposes that we may defeat this entropic tendency by establishing a single standard of rightness enforced rigidly from above. The *Mozi's* rightness may be applied this way because it is objective, transparent, and universally recognizable (like the carpenter's square or the wheelwright's compass). The moral society is thus established and maintained by a kind of endless feedback loop: the Son of Heaven promulgates a clear standard of rightness (that of Heaven's will) down through the ranks of society which is then transmitted back to him without distortion. The elegance of this feedback system resides in its being driven by the same principle underlying the very standard of rightness it keeps in circulation: benefit. Compliance with the system leads to increased benefit (in the form of rewards), deviance to decreased benefit (in the form of punishment). This produces a general sense of fairness: compliance with the system naturally affords one a share in the goods it generates.

As mechanically flawless as the system might seem (or as the *Mozi* might present it to be), it is not wholly divorced from the realm of human emotional responses. This becomes clear when we examine the way rewards and punishments establish and maintain the moral order. In chapter 10, "Elevating the Worthy, Part III (*Shang xian, xia*)" 尚賢下, we read:

子墨子言曰：天下之王公大人，皆欲其國家之富也，人民之眾也，刑法之治也。然而不識以尚賢為政其國家百姓，王公大人本失尚賢為政之本也 ... 今若有一諸侯於此，為政其國家也，曰：“凡我國能射御之士，我將賞貴之。不能射御之士，我將罪賤之。”問於若國之士，孰喜孰懼？我以為必能射御之士喜，不能射御之士懼。我賞因而誘之矣，曰：“凡我國之忠信之士，我將賞貴之。不忠信之士，我將罪賤之。”問於若國之士，孰喜孰

38. *Mozi* 11, "Shang tong, shang 尚同上," 3.1/16/9-17/5. Graham identifies this chapter as one of the northern "Y series," and perceives differences between the "southern Mohists" and northerners within the "Shang tong" triad. However, those differences center on what Graham views as an accommodation of feudal authority structures in the "J series" chapter, chapter 13. That chapter expresses comparable ideas about the dangers of individual subjectivity and the utility of a social-control "feedback loop," only less succinctly.

懼？ 我以為必忠信之士喜，不忠信之士懼。今唯毋以尚賢為政其國家百姓，使國為善者勸，為暴者沮。大以為政於天下，使天下之為善者勸，為暴者沮。然昔吾所以貴堯舜禹湯文武之道者，何故以哉？ 以其唯毋臨眾發政而治民，使天下之為善者可而勸也，為暴者可而沮也。然則此尚賢者也，與堯舜禹湯文武之道同矣。

Master Mozi says: The kings and dukes and grandees of the world all want their states and households to be rich, their people to be numerous, their punishments and ordinances to be orderly. Yet they do not recognize that elevating the worthy is how they should govern their states, families, and people. The kings and dukes and grandees all miss that elevating the worthy is the root of government ... Suppose that now there is a feudal lord who in governing his state and household says, "All those knights within my state that are able archers and charioteers will be rewarded and ennobled; all those knights within my realm that are incapable of archery and charioteering will be punished and debased." If you ask of that state's knights, who will be pleased and who afraid? I take it that certainly those who are able archers and charioteers will be pleased, those who are not will be afraid. Suppose I try to entice them thus, saying "All those knights in my state who are loyal and trustworthy, I will reward and ennobel. All those knights within my realm who are not loyal and trustworthy, I will punish and debase." If you ask of that state's knights, who will be pleased and who afraid? I take it that certainly the loyal and trustworthy knights will be pleased, the disloyal and untrustworthy will be afraid. Now only elevating the worthy will govern the state, household, and people, causing the good to be encouraged, the wicked to be deterred. If one uses it to govern the world, the good of the world will be encouraged, the wicked deterred. Yet why was it of old that the Way of Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu was valued? It was only because in applying it to the multitude, broadcasting it in government and ordering the people it could encourage those who were good in the world and deter those who were wicked. This being so, elevating the worthy is the same as the Way of Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu.³⁹

As this passage attests, the principle of "elevating the worthy" is critical to the moral order the *Mozi* propounds. The worthy are those who understand and adhere to the *Mozi*'s standard of rightness. A dearth of worthies leads to chaos, because without agents at the medial points in the virtuous feedback system detailed in "Promoting Conformity" the system cannot function. Luckily, the *Mozi*'s clearly articulated concept of rightness empowers the ruler to produce "worthies" by a fairly

39. *Mozi* 10, "Shang xian, xia 尚賢下," 2.3/13/23–14/4. Graham identifies this as one of the "J series" southern Mohist chapters.

simple and transparent process, through the same application of reward and punishment advocated in “Promoting Conformity.”

Here is where emotions come into play. The emotions play no more of a role in understanding how to be a worthy than they do in understanding how to be a good archer. Worthiness originates in a standard of rightness that is completely rationally intelligible and which, like archery, produces results that can be objectively observed (and thus sanctioned). But in order for state power to be capable of producing worthies in the same way it might produce able archers, the emotions must be operative. The state’s production of worthies depends on people’s pleasure at the rewards for personal success in this endeavor and their fear of the punishments that will follow failure. The *Mozi*’s vision of collective moral transformation does not depend on people’s feelings being qualitatively good or malleable, but it does necessitate their being consistent and predictable. If people’s individual love of benefits and fear of punishment cannot be relied upon, the whole system is threatened with collapse.

If we closely examine the assertions of *Xing zi ming chu*, we see that this is precisely the possibility that they prefigure:

凡學者求其心為難，從其所為，近得之矣，不如以樂之速也。雖能其事，不能其心，不貴。求其心有偽也，弗得之矣。人不能以偽也，可知也 ...

凡人情為可悅也。苟以其情，雖過不惡。不以其情，雖難不貴。苟有其情，雖未之為，斯人信之矣。未言而信，有美情者也。未教而民恒，性善者也。未賞而民勸，貪富者也。未刑而民畏，有心畏者也。

In all study, searching for the mind is most difficult, following its basis is close to attaining it. This is not as fast as delighting in it. Although one can do a task, if one cannot [compose] its [correct] mind, it is not worthy. If in seeking the mind one is artificial, this loses it. That people are not able through artifice can be known ...

Any human feeling can be moving. If it accords with one’s feelings, though it is a transgression, one will not hate it. If it does not accord with one’s feelings, though it is difficult one will not value it. If it accords with their feelings, though it has no basis people will trust it. When one has not spoken and is trusted, it is because of feelings of beauty. When they have not been taught and the people are constant, it is because their inner natures are good. When they have not been rewarded and are encouraged, it is because they are greedy for wealth. When they have not been punished and are afraid, it is because their minds harbor fear ... ⁴⁰

40. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 181; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 107.

The first part of this passage may be read (or rather utilized) as a critique of the *Mozhi*'s application of its standard of rightness, especially with regard to the production of worthies. No task, argues *Xing zi ming chu*, is devoid of an emotional substrate. If one is rationally capable of some activity but does not have the correct subjective affective disposition it entails, this is artifice. Artifice, asserts the text, is doomed to be ineffectual. Why is this so? The text of this passage is not explicit, but *Xing zi ming chu*'s earlier discussion of music suggests an answer: "sounds that emerge from feelings are faithful, only then can they enter into and profoundly stir people's minds." Inner nature is such that only a genuine expression of inner nature can move it. Unless an expression is "heartfelt" it cannot penetrate and transform another person's mind.

Because all affairs and tasks entail an emotional substrate, success or failure in any social endeavor is contingent on the emotional disposition of the people involved. If people are disposed to love something, even if it is wrong ("a transgression") they will not be averse to it. If people have no affection for some accomplishment, even if it is difficult they will not be impressed. In this sense, the propagation of a moral standard that requires no emotional commitment from either those who apply it or those to whom it is applied is, from the perspective of *Xing zi ming chu*, woefully misguided. Having no feeling for it, none of those involved will either genuinely understand or be genuinely transformed by the *Mozhi*'s form of "rightness."

Even more devastating from the perspective of the *Mozhi*, the efficacy of the structures by which that text's moral order would be instituted is cast into doubt by *Xing zi ming chu*'s analysis of the inner emotional world of the individual. As *Xing zi ming chu* points out, people will be encouraged even before they are rewarded and afraid even before they are punished. Thus the motive power of rewards and punishments does not lie in the benefits and harm they entail, but in the emotional disposition of the person to whom they are applied. Thus if their emotional disposition changes (a contingency the *Xing zi ming chu* persistently argues is not only possible but necessary), the motive power of rewards and punishments can be lost. This is a possibility for which the *Mozhi* does not allow, and that is fatally subversive to the text's whole project of collective moral transformation. If people's emotional response to rewards and punishments is at all flexible, the pristine elegance of the *Mozhi*'s social edifice collapses. This is illustrated by a short narrative contained among the Guodian manuscripts, *Duke Mu of Lu Queries Zisi* (*Lu Mugong wen Zisi*) 魯穆公問子思:

魯穆公問於子思曰：“何如而可謂忠臣？”子思曰：“恒稱其君之惡者，可謂忠臣矣。”公不悅，揖而退之。成孫弋見，公曰：“向者吾問忠臣於子

思，子思曰：‘恒稱其君之惡者，可謂忠臣矣。’寡人惑焉，而未得之也。”成孫弋曰：“噫，善哉言乎！夫為其君之故殺其身者，嘗有之矣；恒稱其君之惡，未之有也。夫為其君之故殺其身者，效祿爵者也。恒〔稱其君〕之惡者，〔遠〕祿爵者也。〔為〕義而遠祿爵，非子思，吾惡聞之矣。”

Duke Mu (r. 407–376 B.C.E.) of Lu queried Zisi, saying: “Who can be called a loyal minister?” Zisi said: “One who always speaks of what his ruler hates can be called a loyal minister.” The Duke was not pleased, [so Zisi] bowed and withdrew. Chengsun Ge had an audience. The Duke said: “Before I asked of the loyal minister to Zisi, Zisi said, ‘One who always speaks of what his ruler hates can be called a loyal minister.’ I am confused, I do not grasp it.” Chengsun Ge said: “Ah! Well spoken! There have been those who will sacrifice their lives for their rulers, but there have never been those who always speak of what their ruler hates. He who sacrifices his life for his ruler does so seeking wealth and status. He who always speaks of what his ruler hates distances himself from wealth and status. To distance oneself from wealth and status for the sake of rightness, were it not for Zisi, how would I have heard of it?”⁴¹

The contrast between this vision of moral public service and that found in “Promoting Conformity” is a stark one. In the *Mozi* we are enjoined to “affirm what [our] superiors affirm, negate what [our] superiors negate.” Here no such compliance is advocated, quite the contrary.⁴² In a move analogous to that of *Xing zi ming chu*, *Duke Mu Queries Zisi* gives priority to subjective emotional states over rational discursive standards. The only way to make the ruler moral is to transform him to love morality. If he is not now moral (as an historically cognizant reader would know of Duke Mu), a moral minister is left with no choice but to talk to the ruler of what he hates. Moreover, the power of the state to impose its will upon its servitors is shown to be contingent on their own level of moral development. If a minister has reached the level of moral awareness (as exemplified by Zisi within the narrative itself) where he no longer fears the loss of wealth or status, the persuasive measures advocated by “Promoting Conformity” and “Elevating the Worthy” are no longer effective.

Xing zi ming chu configures the moral world in such a way that only events and transformations transpiring within what it calls “inner

41. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 141; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 85.

42. Note that the *Mozi*’s injunction that the people should admonish their ruler’s mistakes is not equivalent to Zisi’s dictum. Such admonition is restricted to the application of the shared and objective standard of Heaven’s will to the ruler’s actions. Because this standard is the same in all cases for all people, there is no question of the ruler “hating” it; it does not implicate the emotional faculties of either the ruler or his admonisher.

nature" or "the mind," are fundamentally real. The objective phenomenal world is morally neutral, it is only our subjective emotional responses to "things" that create moral value. Real moral change, on either the individual or collective level, is only attained when people's emotional disposition to the world is transformed. This can only be achieved through the culture produced by the sages, because only this culture encodes the authentic and normatively correct expressions of inner nature. This is the ultimate import of *Xing zi ming chu*'s assertion that "only the human Way can be followed." Only the Way of human culture bears the real potential for effecting moral change, as its source is the same as the object of moral change (and is thus the only type of influence to which it will respond): inner nature. By contrast, the *Mozhi*'s "Way," rooted in its concept of "Heaven's will," is a house of cards built on tertiary concerns.

I have demonstrated how when the two texts are juxtaposed, *Xing zi ming chu* can be shown to have destabilizing consequences for the doctrine propounded in the *Mozhi*. I have also shown how another text of the Guodian corpus, *Duke Mu Queries Zisi* could be used in tandem with *Xing zi ming chu* in a program aimed at deconstructing the *Mozhi*. I will now examine the remaining texts of the Guodian corpus and investigate whether they, too, could serve the same polemical ends.

Zun deyi 尊德義, **Wu xing** 五行, **Chengzhi wenzhi** 成之聞之,
Zi yi 緇衣, **Zhongxin zhi dao** 忠信之道

At first glance, *Xing zi ming chu* might seem to be an exceptional text within the Guodian corpus. In no other text found in Tomb One do the concepts of "xing" and "qing" figure so prominently. But if we look closely at many of the other texts with which *Xing zi ming chu* was interred, especially if we similarly juxtapose them to the *Mozhi*, we see that they are commonly antagonistic to the perspective of that text.

If one of the key polemical moves effected by *Xing zi ming chu* against the *Mozhi* is to shift the locus of genuine moral value from the objective standard of Heaven to the subjective realm of the sage or worthy, this move may be clearly correspondingly perceived in five other Guodian texts: "Honoring Virtue and Rightness (*Zun deyi*)," "The Five Conducts (*Wu xing*)," *Chengzhi wenzhi*,⁴³ "Black Robes (*Zi yi*)," and "The Way of Loyalty and Trustworthiness (*Zhongxin zhi dao*)."

43. The name "*Chengzhi wenzhi*" results from the original ordering of the bamboo strips on which the text was written by the editors of the *Guodian zhujian*. More recently, scholars have suggested that this ordering must be amended, entailing a change in

footnote continued on next page

Zun deyi diverges significantly from *Xing zi ming chu* in giving no discussion to either “inner nature” or “feelings.” But in its discussion of “the human Way” we can see echoes of the latter text:

禹以人道治其民，桀以人道亂其民。桀不易禹民而後亂之，湯不易桀民而後治之。聖人之治民，民之道也 ... 人道為近。是以君子，人道之取先。察者出，所以知己。知己所以知人，知人所以知命，知命而後知道，知道而後知行。由禮知樂；由樂知哀。有知己而不知命者；無知命而不知己者。有知禮而不知樂者；無知樂而不知禮者。善取，人能從之，上也。

Yu ordered his people with the human Way; Jie disordered his people with the human Way. Jie did not change Yu's people and then disorder them; Tang did not change Jie's people and then order them. The sage orders the people with the Way of the people ... The human Way is near, this is why the gentleman gives priority to the human Way. One who examines [looks] outward, this is in order to understand one's self. Understanding oneself is how one understands others; understanding others is how one understands fate; understanding fate one then understands the Way, understanding the Way one then understands conduct. From ritual one understands music (joy); from music (joy) one understands grief. There are those who understand themselves but do not understand fate; there are none who understand fate but do not understand themselves. There are those who understand ritual and do not understand music; there are none who understand music and do not understand ritual. One who chooses the good may be followed by others, this is the utmost.⁴⁴

Although the argument of *Zun deyi* is not as coherent or incisive as that of *Xing zi ming chu*, in their shared terms and tropes we can see a common rhetorical orientation contra the *Mozi*. Both texts give priority to the “human Way” over any objective moral standard grounded in Heaven. Both advocate ritual and music as principal modes of moral transformation. Where *Zun deyi* states that “One who examines [looks] outward, this is in order to understand one's self,” we can see a profound potential challenge to the *Mozi*. The *Mozi* would advocate that people “examine outward” in order to discern the perceptible marks of Heaven's will, while by contrast *Zun deyi* places self-discovery

the name of the text. See Wang Bo 王博, “Guanyu Guodian Chu mu jujian fenpian yu lianzhui de jidian xiangfa” 關於郭店楚簡分篇與連綴的幾點想法, in *Guodian jian yu Ruxue yanjiu* 郭店楚簡與儒學研究, ed. Jiang Guanghui 姜廣輝 (Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu, 2000), 258–61. Li Ling follows an amended order and proposes the new title of “Jiao (Teaching)” 教 (Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 121, 124–25). As the text is still known by *Chengzhi wenzhi* I have followed Li Ling's order but retained the familiar title.

44. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 173; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 139.

as the goal of this process. Though *Zun deyi* and *Xing zi ming chu* may diverge in the fine points of logical structure, both texts assert (contra *Mozhi*) that the search for a moral standard must begin within the person.

The *Wu xing* is a more elaborately sophisticated text and even closer in its perspective to *Xing zi ming chu*. As the text opens we are told that the “five conducts” of humaneness, rightness, ritual, wisdom, and sagehood can only be deemed “the conduct of virtue” when they “take shape within.” Reading on, we discover:

德之行五和謂之德，四行和為之善，善，人道也。德，天道也。君子無中心之憂則無中心之智，無中心之智則無中心〔之悅，無中心之悅則不〕安，不安則不樂，不樂則無德。

When the five conducts of virtue are harmonized this is called “virtue,” when four conducts of virtue are harmonized this is called “goodness.” Goodness is the human Way. Virtue is the Way of Heaven. If the gentleman does not have worries in his mind, then he does not have wisdom in his mind; if he does not have wisdom in his mind, then he does not have pleasure in his mind, if he does not have pleasure in his mind, he is not tranquil; if he is not tranquil he has no joy; if he has no joy, he is without virtue.⁴⁵

The rhetorical vocabulary of *Wu xing* diverges somewhat from *Xing zi ming chu*, in that it ultimately gives priority to the “Way of Heaven” rather than the “Human Way.” Yet when we examine how the Way of Heaven itself is derived, the perspective of *Wu xing* corresponds to that of *Xing zi ming chu* and opposes that of the *Mozhi*. In *Wu xing* the sage ultimately arrives at the Way of Heaven not by observing the phenomenal world as the *Mozhi* advocates, but by cultivating what is within his own mind. Reading on in the text, we see that the means by which it advocates a gentleman cultivate these internal virtues include those advocated by the *Xing zi ming chu* and (at least in the case of music) denigrated by the *Mozhi*: the *Odes*, the rites, and music.⁴⁶

Similar rhetorical moves may be perceived in *Chengzhi wenzhi*. In that text we read: “Only the Way of the gentleman can be sought nearby, and cannot be reached for from afar. Why, of old, did gentlemen have the saying, ‘The sage has the virtue of Heaven?’ This says that one carefully seeks it in oneself, and is then able to perfect compliance with the constancy of Heaven.”⁴⁷ Here again the virtue of Heaven is arrived at by internal cultivation.

45. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 149; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 78.

46. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 150; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 79.

47. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 168; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 122.

The same emphasis on subjective emotional states as we perceive in *Xing zi ming chu* can be seen at work in *Zi yi*. From the very opening of the text as it was interred in Tomb One, the question of the feelings of the ruler comes to the fore:

夫子曰：好美如好緇衣，惡惡如惡巷伯，則民咸力而型不頓。“詩”云：“儀型文王，萬邦作孚。”

The Master said, “When one’s fondness for beauty is like the fondness for ‘Black Robes,’⁴⁸ when one’s hatred of evil is like the hatred of ‘Earl Xiang,’⁴⁹ then the people will all put forth effort without the application of punishments.” Thus the *Odes*⁵⁰ say: “His deportment was modeled on that of King Wen, thus the many states all trusted [him].”⁵¹

The contradiction between the emotions of the ruler and the application of punishments conveys strong negative resonance with the *Mozi*. Again where the *Mozi* would advocate that rewards and punishments might be applied to coordinate the activities of the people, *Zi yi* insists that this is a secondary technique of order. If the ruler aligns his inner emotional life to produce the proper edifying effect, the need for punishments may be obviated. Just as in *Xing zi ming chu* the transformative power of the ruler is tied to the genuineness and intensity of his inner feelings. Many of the subsequent commentarial notes of the *Zi yi* continue and expand upon these themes. Since the *Mozi* also makes use of texts such as the *Odes* and the *Documents*, a commentarial work like the *Zi yi* would have had a special place in a polemical arsenal built in opposition to the *Mozi*, as it attempts to control the meaning of earlier canonical texts so that they may not be harnessed to the *Mozi*’s doctrinal agenda.

The text *Zhongxin zhi dao* or *The Way of Loyalty and Trustworthiness* treats moral values which are shared concerns in the text of the *Mozi*. Above, we have already seen that the *Mozi* endorses loyalty and trustworthiness as qualities the state should seek in the “worthy”: “Suppose I try to entice them thus, saying ‘All those knights in my state who are loyal and trustworthy, I will reward and ennoble. All those knights within my realm who are not loyal and trustworthy, I

48. This is the title of one of the “Airs of Zheng (*Zheng feng*)” 鄭風 in the *Book of Odes* (*Mao shi zhushu* 毛詩注疏 [Shisanjing zhushu 十三經注疏 ed., Beijing: Zhonghua, 1991], 4–2.336.2).

49. This is the title of one of the “Lesser Elegantiae (*Xiao ya*)” 小雅 of the *Book of Odes* (*Mao shi zhushu*, 12–3.456.1).

50. The following is a quote from “King Wen” 文王, one of the “Greater Elegantiae (*Da ya*)” 大雅. (*Mao shi zhushu*, 16–1.502.3).

51. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 129; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 61.

will punish and debase.’ If you ask of that state’s knights, who will be pleased and who afraid?” Though *Mozhi* and *Zhongxin zhi dao* may agree on the positive value of loyalty and trustworthiness, they disagree as to how these values operate as instruments of state:

不訛不孚，忠之至也。不欺弗知，信之至也。忠積則可親也，信積則可信也。忠信積而民弗親信者，未之有也。至忠如土，化物而不伐；至信如時，畢至而不結。忠人無訛，信人不倍。君子如此，故不忘生，不倍死也。· · ·口惠而實弗從，君子弗言爾；心 [疏而貌] 親，君子弗申爾。故行而爭悅民，君子弗由也。三者，忠人弗作，信人弗為也。忠之為道也，百工不糶，而人養皆足。信之為道也，群物皆成，而百善皆立。

Spreading no untrustworthy rumors is the height of loyalty, telling no lies about what one does not know is the height of trustworthiness. Those who accumulate loyalty will be held close, those who accumulate trustworthiness will be trusted. There has never been one who has built up trustworthiness and loyalty and yet failed to be held close and trusted. Perfect loyalty is like the earth, it transforms things without attacking them. Perfect trustworthiness is like the seasons, it brings things to completion without binding them. Loyal people have no falsehood; trustworthy people never rebel. The gentleman is like this, thus he neither forgets life nor scorns death.... The gentleman will utter no flattering words that are not followed in practice. The gentleman will never act intimately toward someone with whom he is estranged in his heart. The gentleman will not adopt conduct that contends for the favor of the people. These three [things] will not be done by one who is loyal or trustworthy. With the Way of loyalty the hundred craftsmen are never overworked yet still there is enough to nurture the people. With the Way of trust the many things all mature and the hundred goods are all established.⁵²

Once again, we see that moral and effective rule lies not in the adoption of a rational and objective standard, but in the subjective dispositions of ruler, minister, and the people at large. In the *Mozhi*’s system of social engineering, loyalty and trust are more ends than means—one fosters them through the consistent application of benefit and harm. In *Zhongxin zhi dao* those priorities are reversed, and the smooth operation of government must begin with a commitment to loyalty and trust *before* the material benefits of good rulership may be enjoyed. The *Mozhi* reads as if loyalty and trustworthiness were objectively quantifiable achievements like the skillful practice of archery. In *Zhongxin zhi dao* these qualities depend as much on what happens within the heart and mind of the gentleman as what is observable in

52. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 163; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 100.

his conduct. Moreover, where the *Mozi* focuses on achieving tangible obedience and conformity, the goals of *Zhongxin zhi dao* are affective and qualitative. Good government does not begin when properly designed institutions operate as they were intended, but when loyalty and trustworthiness produce a state of mutual intimacy and confidence between ruler, ministers, and people.

Liu de

Where the above four texts parallel *Xing zi ming chu* in emphasizing the human Way and the inner emotional life over objective, “Heavenly” standards of morality, the text *Liu de* stands out for placing much less emphasis on the emotions and the inner subjective realm. This is not to say that it accords with the perspective of the *Mozi*, however. A reading of *Liu de* against the *Mozi* reveals different but equally powerful negative resonance between the two texts:

仁，內也。義，外也。禮樂，共也。內立父，子，夫也，外立君，臣，婦也。 . . . 為父絕君，不為君絕父。為昆絕妻，不為妻絕昆弟。為宗族疾朋友，不為朋友疾宗族。人有六德，三親不斷。 . . . 父聖子仁，夫智婦信，君義臣忠。聖生仁，智率信，義使忠。故夫夫，婦婦，父父，子子，君君，臣臣，此六者各行其職，而讒諂箴由作也。

Humaneness is internal; rightness is external. Ritual and music are shared. Internally are established father, son, and husband. Externally are established ruler, minister, and wife.... One can break with one's ruler for one's father, one cannot break with one's father for one's ruler. One can break with one's wife for one's brothers, one cannot break with one's brothers for one's wife. One can disturb one's friends for one's clan, one cannot disturb one's clan for one's friends. When people are possessed of the six virtues, the three kinships are unbroken ... The father is sagely, the son is benevolent. The husband is wise, the wife faithful. The ruler is righteous, the minister loyal. Sageliness generates benevolence, wisdom leads faithfulness, rightness employs loyalty. Thus the husband is a husband, the wife a wife, the father a father, the son a son, the ruler a ruler, the minister a minister. When these six all fulfill their places deception and wickedness cannot arise.⁵³

Where *Xing zi ming chu* and other of the Guodian texts place the source of morality within the subjective self, *Liu de* portrays moral values as rooted in the relative dispositions of individuals within society. The six canonical virtues of the text's title are generated

53. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 174; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 131–32.

through the interaction between the six cardinal stations that constitute the family and the state. While this is a very different argument from what we have seen in virtually all of the other texts we have examined, it is no less hostile to the perspective of the *Mozhi*. Though the source of moral value is not to be found within the human subject, it has yet been transposed from Heaven to the structural dynamics of the human community. In effect, *Liu de* thus reconstructs “the human Way” on a different basis from what we have seen in any of the prior Guodian texts. Moreover, the operation of the six virtues themselves runs strongly counter to the perspective of what is perhaps the most famous and exemplary section of the *Mozhi*, “Universal Love.” In chapter 16 of the *Mozhi*, “Universal Love, Part III (*Jian ai, xia*)” 兼愛下 we are presented with the negative exemplar of the partial knight:

[設] 以為二士，使其一士者執別，使其一士者執兼。是故別士之言曰：“吾豈能為吾友之身若為吾身，為吾友之親若為吾親。”是故退睹其友，饑即不食，寒即不衣，疾病即不侍養，死喪不葬埋。別士之言若此，行若此。

Let us suppose that there are two knights, and that one upholds partiality while the other upholds impartiality. Thus the words of the partial knight say, “How can I consider my friend’s person to be like my own, how can I consider my friends kin to be like my own?” For this reason he withdraws and looks down on his friend. When [his friend] is hungry he does not feed him; when [his friend] is cold, he will not clothe him; when [his friend] is sick, he will not care for him; when [his friend] dies, he will not bury him. The partial knight’s words and conduct are like this.⁵⁴

The text goes on to describe how the words and actions of the impartial knight are diametrically opposed to that of the partial knight, and how the latter is definitely superior to the former. While the *Mozhi* may rhetorically frame the partial knight as a negative exemplar, we can see that his perspective is not very divergent from that of *Liu de*: “One may break with one’s friends for one’s clan, one may not break with one’s clan for one’s friends.” The relationships delineated in *Liu de* are intrinsically partial. Indeed they must be so if they are to serve as a source of moral value. Since there is no standard external to the six stations (such as *Mozhi*’s Heaven’s will) that might regulate the interaction between them, only their fixed disposition toward one another may serve as a point of origin for virtues such as benevolence and rightness. Beyond challenging the legitimacy of its exhortation to “universality,” the prioritization of the partial relationships outlined in *Liu de* further undermines the fabric of the *Mozhi*’s doctrine: “One may break with

54. *Mozhi* 16, “*Jian ai, xia*” 兼愛下, 4.3/27/30–28/1.

one's ruler for one's father, but may not break with one's father for one's ruler." This privileging of the role of father over that of ruler completely subverts the radical centralization of the moral order envisioned in "Promoting Conformity."

Tang Yu zhi Dao 唐虞之道

One of the most intriguing texts in the Guodian corpus is the idiosyncratic *Tang Yu zhi Dao*, or *The Way of Tang and Yu*. On the surface, this text would seem to be perfectly out of step with the other writings interred in Tomb One. Tang and Yu are the reign titles of the sage kings Yao 堯 and Shun 舜, the legendary rulers renowned for having abdicated the throne to the worthiest man of the realm rather than passing it to their own sons. The text contains an extreme denunciation of the principal of dynastic primogeniture: "Since the first birth of the people, there has never been [a ruler] who has not abdicated the throne and yet has been able to transform the people" 不禪而能化民者, 自生民未之有也.⁵⁵ As the other texts of the Guodian corpus generally revere the Zhou kings who practiced royal inheritance rather than abdication, this would seem to place *Tang Yu zhi Dao* at odds with the other writings in Tomb One.

Once again, however, if we examine the text in light of the *Mozi*, we see that its polemical thrust runs counter to that text in ways comparable to the rest of the Guodian corpus. The opening of *Tang Yu zhi Dao* reads:

唐虞之道，禪而不傳。堯舜之王，利天下而弗利也。禪而不傳，聖之盛也。利天下而弗利也，仁之至也。故昔賢仁聖者如此，身窮不貪，沒而弗利，窮仁矣。必正其身，然後正世，聖道備矣。故唐虞之[道，禪]也。

The Way of Tang and Yu is abdication, not [dynastic] transmission. The kingship of Yao and Shun was to benefit the world and not [be] benefited by it. Abdicating and not transmitting is the highest flourishing of sagehood. Benefiting the world and not being benefited by it is the utmost of humaneness. Thus the worthies and sages of past ages were like this. They were personally impoverished but not greedy; they died without profit; they exhausted humaneness. They necessarily rectified their persons and only then ordered the age: this was the completion of the Way of the sage! Thus the Way of Tang and Yu was abdication.⁵⁶

The abdication of Yao and Shun is cast as a paradigm of moral action, one that is ultimately subversive of the moral perspective of the *Mozi*. By

55. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 158; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 96.

56. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 157; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 95.

abdicating the throne they forfeited all of the benefits of kingship. The term denoting “benefit” here is *li* 利, the same term that is employed as the material basis of ethics in the *Mozhi*. Having reached the heights from which no further benefit might be acquired, both Yao and Shun were able to relinquish it all. In assessing their sacrifice, one must remember that in ancient religion the material needs of the individual did not end with death. Thus by refusing to pass the throne to their sons and thereby bequeathing them the royal treasury with which to carry on their ancestral sacrifices, Yao and Shun had condemned themselves to an afterlife of penury (this is the significance of the line, quoted above, “they died without profit”).

Both Yao and Shun had been able to transcend attachment to material benefit. As the opening of *Tang Yu zhi Dao* implies, they had reached this moral plateau through their own effort: “They were certain to rectify their persons and then ordered the age.” The text has thus cast them as ultimate case studies of the kind of moral perfectibility discussed in *Xing zi ming chu* and *Duke Mu Queries Zisi*. This is made especially clear in the case of Shun:

古者舜處於草茅之中而不憂，登為天子而不驕。處草茅之中而不憂，知命也。登為天子而不驕，不專也。 . . . 方在下位，不以匹夫為輕，及其有天下也，不以天下為重。有天下弗能益，無天下弗能損。極仁之至，利天下而弗利也。

In antiquity Shun resided among the grass and weeds and was unperturbed, he rose up to be the Son of Heaven and was not arrogant. He resided among the grasses and weeds and yet was undisturbed because he understood fate. He rose up to be the Son of Heaven and was not arrogant because he was not domineering ... When he was in a lower position, he did not view himself lightly for being a commoner, when he possessed the world, he did not on account of the world view himself grandly. Having the world did not increase him, lacking the world did not diminish him. His was the utmost of humaneness, he benefited the world and yet was not benefited by the world.⁵⁷

Here again Shun’s supreme indifference to benefit is something for which the *Mozhi*’s construction of human psychology does not allow. If the gain or loss of the world cannot move him one way or the other, there is truly no way that reward or punishment could hold any sway over him. The fact that Shun was king does not lessen the subversive implications of the narrative for the *Mozhi*. Within the *Mozhi*’s moral universe the king is portrayed as being locked into the same

57. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 157–58; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 96.

top-down structures as the rest of the human world. He is only different from the rest of humanity in being subordinated directly to Heaven. But even so, the king's obedience to Heaven is perceived as being secured by his own love of benefit and terror of punishment.

Whether this account of Yao and Shun was "intended" to be so or not, it can be put to ample polemical use against the doctrine of the *Mozi*. *Tang Yu zhi Dao* presents a vision of kingship based on moral self-development rather than adherence to rational moral principles. It also underscores a logical weakness of the *Mozi*'s vision, as it is difficult to reconcile the constant level of self-interest the *Mozi* assumes for all human beings with the convergence of supreme responsibility and massive temptation toward self-enrichment occurring at the top of the *Mozi*'s ideal society. If the authors of the *Mozi* would admit that the role of king requires any degree of self-control above and beyond that of the average person, then it is only a small logical step to the conclusion that someone like Yao or Shun *should* be king. If this is so the system collapses under the weight of self-contradiction, as the king would rule by virtue of having a quality that his subjects must *not* possess in order for the system to work. The other possibility redeems the system but is only marginally more appealing. This is to say that the personal qualities of the sovereign have absolutely no bearing on the exercise of kingship, the king and all his ministers are effectively reduced to cogs in a machine, and are just as expendable and interchangeable.⁵⁸

Finally, while the occupant of Tomb One may not have assented to all of the extreme views articulated in *Tang Yu zhi Dao*, one polemical use to which the text could be applied in attacking the *Mozi* lies in the fact that both texts make rhetorical use of common historical figures. As we have seen above, the *Mozi* appeals to the sage kings of high antiquity, including Yao and Shun, as among the first discoverers and practitioners of its moral teachings. As Sarah Allan has shown, the *Mozi* adduces Yao's abdication of the throne to Shun as a paradigmatic instance of "elevating the worthy (*shang xian*)" 尚賢.⁵⁹ In one chapter of the extant *Mozi*, "Three Disputations (*san bian*)" 三辯, the text even makes the argument that because Yao and Shun made the least recourse to music, their kingship was the most excellent: "King Cheng of Zhou's ordering of the

58. This would, arguably, in fact be the natural consequence of a total adherence to the *Mozi*'s world view. While the authors and adherents of the *Mozi* might admit it if pressed, it would have been an uncomfortable admission to have to make in the rhetorical culture of the Warring States.

59. Sarah Allan, *The Heir and the Sage: Dynastic Legend in Early China* (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1981), 127.

world was not up to that of King Wu, King Wu's was not up to that of Cheng Tang, Cheng Tang's was not up to that of Yao and Shun. Thus the more elaborate music becomes, the more order diminishes" 周成王之治天下也，不若武王·武王之治天下也，不若成湯·成湯之治天下也，不若堯舜·故其樂逾繁者，其治逾寡。⁶⁰ Just as "Three Disputations" applies a framework of progressive cultural degeneration to the legendary figures of Yao and Shun, *Tang Yu zhi Dao* appeals to the shared lore about their abdications. However, the particular rhetorical implications the latter text derives from this narrative (concerning the sages' orientation toward benefit) highly problematize the *Mozi*'s use of these legendary sage kings as moral exemplars.

Qiong da yi shi 窮達以時

Among all the texts in the Guodian corpus, *Qiong da yi shi* is the most overtly and specifically crafted as a response to particular assertions in the *Mozi*. Though nowhere in the text does it employ the term "fate" (*ming*), the text may be read as an extended refutation of the *Mozi*'s rejection of fate and its doctrine of Heaven's will. In chapter 4 of the *Mozi*, "The Standard and the Model (*Fa yi*)" 法儀, these ideas are succinctly articulated:

故曰：“愛人利人者，天必福之·惡人賊人者，天必禍之。”... 昔之聖王禹湯文武，兼「愛」天下之百姓，率以尊天事鬼，其利人多，故天福之，使立為天子，天下諸侯皆實事之·暴王桀紂幽厲，兼惡天下之百姓，率以誦天下侮鬼·「其賊」人多，故天禍之，使遂失其國家，身死為僂於天下，後世子孫毀之，至今不息·故為不善以得禍者，桀紂幽厲是也·愛人利人以得福者，禹湯文武是也·

Thus it is said: "Heaven will certainly bless he who loves and benefits others; Heaven will certainly curse he who hates and robs others."... Of old the sage kings Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu all universally loved the common people of the world, leading them in venerating Heaven and serving the spirits. They benefited people greatly, thus Heaven blessed them, establishing them as the Son of Heaven, served by all of the feudal lords of the world. The tyrannical kings Jie, Zhou, You, and Li all universally hated the common people of the world, leading them to offend Heaven and insult the spirits. They robbed people intensely, thus Heaven cursed them, making them lose their kingdoms and households. They were slaughtered by the world and died, posterity of later ages has condemned them down to the present day. Thus those who

60. *Mozi* 4, "Fa yi" 法儀, 1.7/8/26–27.

did wrong and were cursed were Jie, Zhou, You, and Li. Those who loved and benefited people and were blessed were Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu.⁶¹

We can see how integrally this vision of Heavenly reward and retribution fits into the *Mozi*'s portrait of the moral society. As was said above (and as is rendered problematic by the implications of *Tang Yu zhi Dao*), the *Mozi* consistently assumes that the ruler is as much a fixture of the system of moral incentives over which he is the human custodian as anyone else. The only difference between the king and his subjects is that where the king is empowered to sanction individuals' actions with rewards or punishments, he himself comes under the direct scrutiny of Heaven. Heaven's relationship to the sovereign is not materially different from the sovereign's relationship to his subjects; it sanctions the king's actions using the same rewards and punishments as those employed by the king, only with much higher stakes. As we have seen, this move is made absolutely necessary by the fact that the *Mozi*'s doctrine requires all agents within its moral system to have the same consistent, predictable degree of self-interest. If no force existed to hold the king accountable, then the efficacy of the system would rest on the state of the king's moral character, which would cause the entire dynamic structure of the *Mozi*'s moral society to unravel.

As we will see, the passage quoted above from "The Standard and the Model" reveals a logical weakness that is exploited in *Qiong da yi shi*. As noted previously, the sanctions employed by Heaven upon the sovereign operate on a superlative scale. This is very clear where "benefits" or rewards are concerned, as Heaven blesses the king with possession of the entire world. The text seems to encounter difficulty in creating equilibrium on the "punishment" side of the royal scale, however. On reflection the reason for this is quite understandable. In logical terms, though the king gains much more from his reciprocal relationship with Heaven than any other human being possibly can, he has nothing more to lose than the least of his subjects: his life. The text countervails this fact with the observation that tyrannical rulers will suffer the ignominy of future generations, presumably as long as human memory persists. This puts the text in a bit of a logical bind, although there is no indication in "The Standard and the Model" that its authors were aware of this fact. The negative sanction threatening the king depends for its force upon a departure from the strictly material standard of value the *Mozi* applies to all other moral judgments.

61. *Mozi* 4, "Fa yi" 法儀, 1.4/4/27-5/4.

As *Qiong da yi shi* demonstrates, memory as a carrier of value cuts both ways:

有天有人，天人有分。察天人之分，而知所行矣。有其人無其世，雖賢弗行矣。苟有其世，何難之有哉？舜耕於歷山，陶埏於河澨，立而為天子，遇堯也。．．．孫叔三射恒思少司馬，出而為令尹，遇楚莊也。初韜晦，後名揚，非其德加。子胥前多功，後戮死，非其智衰也。．．．遇不遇，天也。動非為達也，故窮而不[怨。隱非]為名也，故莫之知而不吝。[芝蘭生於幽谷]，[非以無人]嗅而不芳。．．．窮達以時，德行一也。．．．故君子敦於反己。

There is Heaven and there is humanity, [between] Heaven and humanity there is a division. Discovering the division between Heaven and humanity one understands how to act. Where the [correct] person exists but the [correct] age does not, though he possesses worthiness he will not be able to put it into practice. If the correct age is at hand, what difficulty will there be? Shun plowed on Mount Li, he made pots on the banks of the Yellow River, [yet] he was established as the Son of Heaven, this was because he encountered Yao ... Sunshu [Ao] was thrice dismissed⁶² as the Vice Commandant of Hengsi, yet emerged as Prime Minister [of Chu], this was because he encountered King Zhuang of Chu (r. 613–591 B.C.E.). At first unknown, afterwards celebrated, it was not because his virtue had increased. [Wu] Zixu (d. 484 B.C.E.) originally accrued much merit; eventually he was slaughtered. It was not because his wisdom had deteriorated ... Encountering or not encountering rests with Heaven. One does not act in order to succeed. Thus, on encountering extremity, one is not distressed. One does not enter seclusion in order to [acquire] reputation; thus, although remaining unrecognized, one does not regret. Although the angelica grows in an obscure valley, it is no less fragrant for not being inhaled ... Extremity and success rest with the age; virtuous conduct [remains] the same [in all times] ... Thus the gentleman is resolute in returning to his self.⁶³

Here we see the critique implicit in *Xing zi ming chu*'s prioritization of "the human Way" made explicit by *Qiong da yi shi*. The text's exhortation to discover "the division between Heaven and humanity" is an overt challenge to the *Mozhi*'s doctrine of Heaven's will. We can see this in the subtle difference between *Qiong da yi shi*'s account of the ascendancy of Shun with that of the four sage kings recounted in "The Standard and the Model." From the perspective of *Qiong da yi shi*, the *Mozhi* confuses the actions of Heaven and humanity. The fact that Shun was worthy of being king was a result of his own efforts.

62. Here I accept a variant reading proposed by Qiu Xigui (*Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 146, n. 11).

63. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 145; Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 86.

The fact that he actually became king was a result of his “encountering” Yu. This encounter was Heaven’s only part in Shun’s ascendancy, all of the other work involved in preparing Shun for kingship was done by Shun himself.

The key here is that the *Mozi*’s notion of Heaven’s will provides very little guidance to those, like the young Shun laboring at farming and pottery, whose just desserts have not yet arrived. This point is underscored if we contemplate the existential position of Sunshu Ao as described in the same passage. During the time he was repeatedly being censured in his capacity of a minor official, what was to sustain Sunshu Ao in his continuing endeavors? The *Mozi* would promise that, thanks to Heaven’s intercession, he would eventually win through to glory. Although this does, in fact, happen, this would have been cold comfort to Sunshu Ao after his second unjust dismissal.

As the subsequent example of Wu Zixu 伍子胥 suggests, history provides ample testimony that Heaven’s will is not as infallible as the *Mozi* would suggest. Thus though the notion of Heaven’s will may have some abstract logical appeal, it is inadequate as a guide to conduct *right now*. This is the import of the assertion that “discovering the division between Heaven and humanity one understands how to act.” If we want people to pursue morality in the present moment, we must ask them to understand that moral conduct is its own reward. Or, if it is rewarded, it will not be in the tangible terms promised by the *Mozi*. Here is where the logical fallacy of the *Mozi* lies exposed. Just as the severity of the tyrants’ crimes may be redressed by the excoriation of subsequent generations, the unjust injuries of those like Wu Zixu who suffer blamelessly may be redeemed in the same realm of human memory. The *Mozi*’s recourse to a non-material measure of value is the top of a slippery slope, the contours of which are elaborated by *Qiong da yi shi*.

We can see that though it treats very different concerns and employs little of the same key terminology, *Qiong da yi shi* arrives through an historical and cosmological argument at the same point reached by *Xing zi ming chu*. The labors of Shun, Sunshu Ao, and Wu Zixu were praiseworthy precisely because they were undertaken without expectation of reward, Heavenly or otherwise. In any given moment, whether one is suffering extremity or enjoying success, the imperatives of virtuous conduct remain the same. Thus our true moral worth is not to be found in our objective circumstances but in our subjective response to those circumstances. Heaven cannot serve as a guide to inform our moral choices in the current moment, thus “the gentleman is resolute in returning to himself.”

Taiyi sheng shui 太一生水 and the Laozi 老子 Parallels

Much of the presumed “eclecticism” of the Guodian corpus adduced by recent scholarship centers on the inclusion of four texts among those interred in Tomb One. Three of these texts have been labeled *Laozi* A, B, and C by the editors of the Guodian texts because of their close relationship to the transmitted text of that name. The fourth, *Taiyi sheng shui* (*Supreme Unity Generated Water*), because it treats the concept of “the Way” in terms quite congruent with the three *Laozi* texts, has generally been grouped with them. In fact, *Taiyi sheng shui* is inscribed on strips of equal length to those of *Laozi* C, so they may have been bound as a single text.⁶⁴

Although there are other reasons that might be cited for this analysis,⁶⁵ these four texts are principally deemed “Daoist” because of the transmitted *Laozi*’s inclusion in the *Han shu* “Yiwen zhi’s” catalogue of *Dao jia* 道家⁶⁶ writings. I do not mean to join battle with those who insist that these writings are Daoist. I would only contend that we cannot be sure that the *Han shu*’s perspective on these texts (or rather, on their transmitted textual cousin) would have been shared by the occupant of Tomb One (or those who interred him). Moreover, even if the collector(s) would have recognized the texts in question as “Daoist” in some form, we cannot leap to the conclusion that he (they) interred these texts in Tomb One out of an impulse to eclecticism or pluralism.

Analyses of the “eclecticism” of the Guodian corpus have centered on a comparison of the individual texts interred in Tomb One to one another. While this type of study is intrinsically intriguing and important, it is not guaranteed to illuminate the social uses of the text at the time they were interred. As I have been suggesting over the course of this article, comparing all of the Guodian texts in tandem against some other contemporary text or texts produces a radically different picture of their interrelationship. Thus if we press forward with a reading of *Taiyi sheng shui* and the three *Laozi* texts against the *Mozhi*, they appear less exceptional within the larger Guodian corpus.

64. Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 32.

65. The issue of why the *Laozi* parallels might be deemed “Daoist” enters into the long history of how “Daoism” has been constructed as a category of analysis in modern Early China studies and the ongoing controversy over its “proper” significance. Here I reductively collapse this complex tale by reference to the *Han shu* “Yiwen zhi” only to indicate that, although there are many ways these four Guodian texts might be adduced as Daoist (a judgment with which I do not incontrovertibly disagree), they are almost all anachronistic or at least ahistorical.

66. *Han shu* 30.1729.

Taiyi sheng shui has created much excitement among scholars because it is perhaps the earliest genuine cosmogony in the known world of Chinese letters. The text describes how “Supreme Unity (*Taiyi*)” 太一 generates water, setting off a cosmogonic cycle that ultimately results in the emergence of the entire phenomenal universe. The text then goes on to state:

是故太一藏於水，行於時，周而又[始，以己為]萬物母。一缺一盈，以己為萬物經。此天之所不能殺，地之所不能埋，陰陽之所不能成 ... 天道貴弱，削成者以益生者，伐於強 ... 下，土也，而謂之地。上，氣也，而謂之天 ... [天不足]於西北，其下高以強。

For this reason Supreme Unity is lodged in water, it impels the seasons. Cycling and beginning again, it is itself the mother of the myriad things. Now empty, now full, it is itself the regularity of the myriad things. It is what Heaven cannot kill, Earth cannot cover, what Yin and Yang cannot complete ... The Way of Heaven values weakness, it depletes the mature to increase what is being born. It cuts down the strong ... Below is soil and is called “Earth.” Above is air (*qi*) and is called “Heaven ...” Heaven is incomplete in the northwest, below [this point the Earth is] tall to buttress it ... ⁶⁷

Taiyi sheng shui’s establishment of a cosmic force prior to and surpassing Heaven poses a direct challenge to the moral cosmology of the *Mozi*. If Heaven and Earth are both either secondary or tertiary creations of the Supreme Unity, then Heaven’s status as the final arbiter of right and wrong is called into question. This implication is reinforced by the pronouncement that the Supreme Unity is “what Heaven cannot kill,” thus it, at least, lies beyond the power of Heaven to reward and punish. Beyond this, neither Heaven nor any of the discrete phenomena of the perceptible world are genuinely autonomous. Although analytically distinct, they continue to be pervaded and impelled by the Supreme Unity out of which they emerged. Heaven is thus thoroughly “dethroned” as the supreme authority of the universe.

Moving from the ultimate to the contingent realm, we see that *Taiyi sheng shui*’s Way of Heaven conflicts significantly with the *Mozi*’s doctrine of Heaven’s will. Heaven’s movements evince no compliance with human values. It favors the weak over the strong, paring down the mature to provide fodder for the newly born. The *Mozi* is particularly vulnerable to a critique based on the *Taiyi sheng shui* because both texts share a fundamentally materialist perspective. The *Mozi* proposes

67. Guodian Chu mu zhujian, 125; Li Ling, Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji, 32; Allan and Williams, Guodian Laozi, 230–31.

that morality be grounded in the material realities of food, clothing, and shelter. The *Taiyi sheng shui* demonstrates that the extension of this materialism to the cosmic realm subverts the *Mozi*'s attempts to anthropomorphize the cosmos. In material terms Earth is soil; Heaven is mere air. Moreover Heaven is tilted, implying that it is far from flawless, resulting in the skewed course of the sun, moon, and stars across the sky during the cycle of the seasons.⁶⁸

Thus the *Taiyi sheng shui*'s description of Heaven's Way, like the *Mozi*'s articulation of Heaven's will, draws rhetorical power from being empirically verifiable. This is the consequence of expanding the cosmic perspective beyond Heaven to that of the Supreme Unity. When one views the universe from an angle beyond the narrow focus on Heaven's relation to humankind, Heaven can be seen as obeying no rule other than that of the Supreme Unity's unvarying circularity ("cycling and beginning again ... now empty, now full"). All new life in the phenomenal world is predicated on recent death. The "benefits" that the *Mozi*'s Heaven bestows so impartially are no exception. Humanity's "reward" necessarily entails another creature's "punishment." This change of focus destroys the value of "benefit" and "Heaven's will" as fixed and objective standards of moral value.

If we examine the content of the Guodian *Laozi* Parallels interred in Tomb One we can see similar consequences for the *Mozi*'s moral cosmology. Guodian *Laozi* A describes a cosmic vision consonant with that of *Taiyi sheng shui*: "Humanity models itself on Earth, Earth models itself on Heaven, Heaven models itself on the Way, the Way models itself on the self-so" 人法地, 地法天, 天法道, 道法自然.⁶⁹ "The Way of Heaven is cyclical, all things return to their root" 天道芸芸, 各復其根.⁷⁰ Just as in *Taiyi sheng shui* we see a universe in which Heaven has been demoted to a tertiary place in the cosmic order. At the same time, the circularity of Heaven's Way precludes its being adopted as a fixed moral standard.

One might object that these cosmological ideas are irreconcilable with the perspective of the rest of the Guodian corpus. Combining all these texts in an attack on the *Mozi* would be hypocritical at best, self-destructive at worst, as the rhetorical stance of such an individual would sink into the shifting sands of self-contradiction. I would disagree.

68. This celestial observation, "that the ecliptic ... does not coincide with the celestial equator," is a common fixture of ancient cosmological texts. John S. Major, *Heaven and Earth in Early Han Thought: Chapters Three, Four and Five of the Huainanzi* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 62–64.

69. Guodian Chu mu zhujian, 112; Guodian Laozi A11, Allan and Williams, 205.

70. Guodian Chu mu zhujian, 112; Guodian Laozi A13, Allan and Williams, 207.

Although there might be tension between texts such as *Wu xing* and *Taiyi sheng shui*, these belie certain less apparent similarities. These become more discernible if we compare *Taiyi sheng shui* to *Qiong da yi shi*. Although these texts' orientations toward morality differ, their representations of the cosmos are not fundamentally in conflict. Both texts affirm that, from moment to moment, Heaven's dispositions do not necessarily accord with human desires. The circularity of Heaven's activity described in *Taiyi sheng shui* does not destabilize *Qiong da yi shi*'s depiction of Heaven's fickle agency in human history. Indeed, it would take little hermeneutical effort to reconcile *Taiyi sheng shui*'s circular motion of Heaven with the alternating phases of "extremity" and "success" portrayed in *Qiong da yi shi*. In general, both *Taiyi sheng shui* and the Guodian *Laozi* parallels do not contradict, but rather affirm a central perspective put forward in common by *Qiong da yi shi*, *Xing zi ming chu*, *Wu xing*, *Zun deyi*, and *Chengzhi wenzhi*: that Heaven or Heaven's Way is inadequate to serve as the sole and objective standard of human morality.

Other than their uses in critiquing the *Mozi*'s moral cosmology, the Guodian *Laozi* parallels evince a further perspective that would have intrigued opponents of the *Mozi*. The opening passage of Guodian *Laozi* A is suggestive in this regard:

“絕智棄辯，民利百倍。絕巧棄利，盜賊亡有。絕僞棄詐，民復孝慈。”三言以為辨不足，或命之，或呼屬：“視素保樸，少私寡欲。”

“Break off wisdom, discard disputation, and the people's benefit will increase one-hundredfold. Break off cleverness, discard benefit, and there will be no robbers and thieves. Break off artifice, discard deceit, and the people will return to filial piety and compassion.” If these three sayings do not suffice in disputation, then command him (i.e., your opponent) or call [him] to submission thus: “Focus on plainness, embrace simplicity, reduce selfishness, lessen desire.”⁷¹

My translation of the text is somewhat provocative. As I have interpreted it here, it, like the passage from *Yu cong* IV translated above, describes a strategy to be used in oral argumentation. Although it is arguable whether this was the “intended” significance of the passage, it is undeniably one way that the text might have been understood by the occupant of Tomb One. Viewed in this light, we can see how the strategy described in Guodian *Laozi* A1 would support the rhetorical agenda of a text like *Xing zi ming chu*, especially as it was applied against the *Mozi*. Like *Xing zi ming chu*, Guodian *Laozi* A1 rejects artifice

71. Guodian *Chu mu zhujian*, 111; Guodian *Laozi* A1, Allan and Williams, 195.

and cleverness. Contra *Mozi* it denigrates benefit as a standard of value, implying that the *Mozi*'s attachment to benefit is a self-fulfilling prophecy that creates ostracized categories such as "robbers." Most importantly, Guodian *Laozi* A1 reinforces a theme that we have seen propounded not only in *Xing zi ming chu*, but in many of the Guodian texts: the dynamic transformability of the individual's subjective dispositions.

This is the significance of the last lines of Guodian *Laozi* A1: "Focus on plainness, embrace simplicity, reduce selfishness, lessen desire" 視素保樸, 少私寡欲. Reading the whole passage as a strategy for oral argumentation, we can imagine why these last "commands" might be construed as a final fatal blow, à la *Yu cong* IV, against the "crux" of an argument defending the *Mozi*. Like *Xing zi ming chu*, these lines call into question a fundamental premise of the *Mozi*, that people's affective disposition toward "benefit" is universal and consistent. The possibility that a person might be able to "reduce selfishness" and "lessen desire" calls into question the fundamental necessity, and wisdom, of the *Mozi*'s complex program of moral social engineering.

Guodian *Laozi* A1 is only one point where the three Guodian *Laozi* parallels address this issue. At many points these texts talk about the potential to control or change human consciousness so as to liberate the mind from the control of fear and greed: "There is no curse more great than to not know what is enough. If one can know enough as enough, one will always be content" 禍莫大乎不知足. 知足之為足, 此恒足也.⁷² Harold Roth suggests that the Guodian *Laozi* parallels allude to particular techniques of personal cultivation that could be used to induce these changes in consciousness.⁷³ One intriguing example he points to is found at Guodian *Laozi* A15:

閉其兌, 塞其門, 和其光, 同期塵, (銑其穎),⁷⁴ 解其紛, 是謂玄同. 故不可得而親, 亦不可得而疏. 不可得而利, 亦不可得而害. 不可得而貴, 亦不可得而賤. 故為天下貴.

Shut the openings, block the doors, harmonize the lights, settle the dust, blunt the points, untie the bindings, this is called the "mysterious merging." Thus you will not be able to be bound, you also will not be

72. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 111; *Guodian Laozi* A3, Allan and Williams, 197.

73. Harold Roth, "Some Methodological Issues in the Study of Guodian *Laozi* Parallels," in Allan and Williams, *Guodian Laozi*, 85–86.

74. Here I am following Li Ling's suggestion that the two characters which appear in the Guodian manuscript (the first a 奮 on the left and a 刀 on the right; the second a 尔 on top and two 貝's on the bottom) might be alternate forms of the characters that appear in the received text (Li Ling, *Guodian Chu jian jiaodu ji*, 13, n. 9). The original editors of the manuscript note that these graphs "await investigation" (*Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 116, n. 65).

able to be cast away. You will not be able to be benefited, you will also not be able to be harmed. You will not be able to be ennobled, you will also not be able to be debased. Thus you will be the most noble in the world.⁷⁵

Right away we can see the implications of this for a polemical attack on the *Mozi*. If one could reach a state where one was neither “benefited” nor “harmed,” in other words, if one no longer felt the joy or terror these phenomena normally occasion, this would place one beyond the *Mozi*’s entire edifice of social control, and thus cast doubt upon the efficacy of its whole program. One cannot deny that there are manifest tensions between some of the material in the *Laozi* parallels and other texts in the Guodian corpus. As I will explain, below, however, the clear uses to which all these texts could be put in countering an advocate of the *Mozi* might well have overridden any doctrinal inconsistencies betwixt and between them in the eyes of the person(s) who collected them.

Implications and Conclusions

The reading of the entire Guodian corpus against the *Mozi* is obviously a hermeneutical technique and might be criticized as arbitrary. Equally profitable readings could be derived by juxtaposing the Guodian texts to other antecedent, contemporary, or near-contemporary writings. A thorough historical study of the Guodian material would necessitate not only that all these comparative readings be done, but that they be cross-referenced and cross-compared, and that the entire project be extended backward and forward in time to include the texts composed prior to and, especially, after the interment of the texts in Guodian Tomb Number One.

One objection that might be raised against reading the Guodian texts against the *Mozi* is that these texts never mention that text or its eponym. This is by no means a determinative critique, however. None of the readings I have proposed necessitate the texts in question having been written in explicit opposition to the *Mozi*, only their being useful to intellectual debate against an advocate of the *Mozi*’s ideas. If only one or two of the texts in Tomb One could be used that way it might be a coincidence arising from the collection’s “eclecticism.” The fact that *all* the texts can be used that way (beyond this, *all* the texts contain assertions that are radically destabilizing to the socio-moral edifice of the *Mozi*) precludes such coincidence. Moreover, not mentioning a text can not be equated with registering no opposition to it. The *Analects* never

75. *Guodian Chu mu zhujian*, 112–13; *Guodian Laozi* A15, Allan and Williams, 209.

mentions the *Mozi*, but it would be foolish to insist that there is nothing in the former text which opposes the latter. The *Guanzi* never mentions Confucius, but it is easy to find places in that text where the teachings of Confucius are explicitly rejected. Finally, if I am right that the occupant of Tomb One collected these texts for their utility in combating Mohist opponents, their mentioning the *Mozi* would not add to that utility. The one who collected the texts would need no reminder of their intended use.

Further support for reading the Guodian corpus against the *Mozi* can be derived from a study of their mutual similarities. As much as the texts in the Guodian corpus are opposed to the *Mozi*, they also evince that text's influence. An interest in logical argumentation pervades the texts discovered at Guodian, especially the *Yu cong* texts which contain strings of definitions reminiscent of no other Warring States writings more than the "Canons" and "Explanation of the Canons" chapters of the *Mozi*. Given this evidence of shared focus and interests, the diametrical polarity of the *Mozi* and the Guodian texts is made even more remarkable. If the collector(s) of the Guodian texts possessed truly "eclectic" tastes or intellectual dispositions we would expect that at least some of the texts concerning logical disputation would define and constellate terms or construct arguments in ways that support rather than subvert the logico-ethical vision of the *Mozi*, but we do not. This simultaneous convergence of practical interests and polar opposition of social and moral ideas strongly suggests a process of purposive selection.

Together with the *Mozi* the Guodian texts provide evidence of a heated intellectual contest in a particular place and time. Circa 300 B.C.E., the collector(s) of the Guodian manuscripts was locked in intellectual combat with (an) adherent(s) of the *Mozi* in the state of Chu. Although this might seem like sparse information, it alone opens up a new potential vista on the intellectual world of the Warring States. As Li Xueqin 李學勤 has noted, our initial reaction to even finding such a cache of "Confucian" texts in Chu might well be one of surprise.⁷⁶ Chu was depicted even in the texts of the late fourth century as a cultural backwater, and by 300 B.C.E. had entered a long period of political decline leading to ultimate collapse.⁷⁷ Yet if such radically opposed thinkers were staking such divergent and sophisticated claims in the cultural landscape of the Chu court, its intellectual life must have been much more rich than the rhetorically slanted historical sources would allow us to believe.

76. Li Xueqin, "The Confucian Texts from Guodian Tomb Number One: Their Date and Significance," in *Guodian Laozi*, ed. Allan and Williams, 110.

77. Constance Cook and John S. Major, *Defining Chu: Image and Reality in Ancient China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 1–20.

At this point, complex questions arise. Exactly what the social context of this intellectual struggle might have been, and how it might have been played out at the Chu court, we cannot be sure. Chinese scholars have speculated that the occupant of Tomb One might have been the tutor to the Chu heir apparent.⁷⁸ If so, it is unclear what institutions or circumstances would bring him into contact with advocates of the *Mozi*. *Yu cong* IV suggests that the author and/or owner of the text was engaged in highly competitive oral debates. It is thus possible that the occupant of Tomb Number One was called upon in his capacity as an educator to face off with other scholars, either bureaucratic servitors of the Chu throne or guest clients of powerful Chu princes, or both at once, in oral debates held at the royal court or in princely households.

Although all this is speculative, there are some more concrete inferences we can make from a reading of the Guodian manuscripts against the *Mozi*. Up to this point I have studiously avoided characterizing the Guodian manuscripts as belonging to a particular “school,” as the assignment of individual texts to these categories is based on anachronistic criteria. But if we are to conclude that the occupant of Tomb One was a member of a group in conflict with other groups, it is fair to ask to what group he belonged, or rather, to what group he perceived himself as belonging. I would venture that we can determine this by a close comparative reading of the texts under study, but that we would be best served to cleave as closely to the evidence as possible.

Comparing the Guodian texts to the *Mozi*, it is evident that these two texts do not only evince the propagation of two different doctrines. In fact, as I will explain below, a strict analysis into two “doctrines” would distort the evidence. Taken together they express two fundamentally different approaches to intellectual social organization and participation, both individual and collective, in the cultural life of the Warring States. On the one hand, in the text of the *Mozi*, we can see a strict attention to unity and discipline of doctrine. Although doctrinal deviations and distortions can be detected as one moves from chapter to chapter in the *Mozi*, these are amazingly slight given the probable range of time and space over which the individual chapters of the text were written.⁷⁹ The “Mohists” (i.e., the adherents of the *Mozi*) as a group

78. Li Xueqin 李學勤, “Xian Qian Rujia zhuzuo de zhongda faxian” 先秦儒家著作的重大發現, *Guodian Chu jian yanjiu*, 13–17.

79. For example, despite his ideas on the differences between the “Three Sects,” Angus Graham notes of the *Mozi* that “... except in the Military Chapters, and in chs. 1 and 2, it displays everywhere the distinctive thought of the Mohist school ...” (*Early Chinese Texts*, 337). Maeder states further, “I see ... far greater sharing of primary material among the different ‘schools’ of Mohism, and hence among the ‘sects’ themselves, than Graham seems to have allowed for.” (*Early China* 17 (1992), 81).

were thus distinguished in the Warring States *not only* by their unique doctrine, but also by the stress they laid upon doctrinal consistency and conformity in the constitution of group identity.

By contrast, the group represented by the occupant of Tomb One, to the extent that he can be taken as representative, obviously did not view doctrinal consistency as a *sine qua non* of group coherence or participation. Many of the claims and assertions made by the various texts gathered together in Tomb One contradict one another, even among the texts deemed to be of the same “school” through the application of Han bibliographical categories. Whatever group the tomb occupant belonged to, it obviously viewed (certain⁸⁰) texts more as polemical instruments than regulating and canonical touchstones of orthodoxy. Although the Guodian texts do not afford a coherent and internally consistent set of theories and principles, they do present an impressive array of concepts, tropes, narratives, and arguments available for deployment in rhetorical and philosophical combat with the Mohists.

What then of the group identity of the occupant of Tomb One? Must we rest content with labeling him an “Anti-Mohist?” Despite the lack of a unifying “orthodoxy,” the Guodian corpus does provide evidence of a basis for a positive identity of its collector(s). A common theme throughout almost all the texts is a commitment to the set of practices which come under the rubric of what *Xing zi ming chu* would call “the human Way”: poetry, exemplified by the *Odes*; prose, exemplified by the *Documents*; ritual and music.⁸¹ If we range throughout the corpus of Warring States letters, we find that this unique constellation of practices is exalted and given primacy in certain texts: most especially the *Analects*, the *Mencius* 孟子, and the *Xunzi* 荀子. We are thus justified in surmising that the occupant of Tomb One belonged to the same group with which the authors of these texts identified themselves,⁸² the Ru 儒. Though this is a category that appears in the Han bibliographical literature, we may apply it to the compiler(s) of the Guodian corpus if we do so with due historical caution. To call the occupant of Tomb One a Ru is not to call all or any of the writings with which he was

80. This qualification is necessary because within the passages of many Guodian writings texts such as the *Odes* 詩 and *Documents* 書 are treated as canonical. Nowhere is there an attempt to distill a coherent orthodoxy from these texts, however. Rather, they are treated as somewhat plastic funds of wisdom accessible only through exegetical treatment such as that exemplified by the *Zi yi*.

81. A “master practice” that might be added to and subsume all of these four would be “learning (*xue* 學),” although this is a much more expansive and protean phenomenon than these others.

82. This *Analects* is less explicit in this regard than the *Xunzi* or the *Mencius* for chronological reasons.

buried “Ru” texts, nor is it to invite facile equation or conflation of these texts with other Warring States writings. The chief benefit of identifying the tomb occupant as a Ru is to elucidate the fact that Ru identity during the Warring States was constituted in fundamentally different ways from that of the Mohists, and that individual participation in a larger “Ru” project was driven by fundamentally different concerns. Where a logically consistent doctrine was central to the Mohist sense of common purpose, the Ru placed much greater emphasis on a shared devotion to revered cultural practices.⁸³

This is not to argue that we would be wise to scrap the terms Ru and Mohist in favor of sobriquets like “Practitioners” and “Doctrinists.” The Ru were not wholly without doctrine, but as a group each individual Ru could exercise much more autonomy and flexibility in composing (or compiling) the doctrinal basis of his participation. The doctrinal parameters of the group were elastic enough to accommodate diverse positions, individuals could stray quite far from one another doctrinally and still acknowledge common fellowship⁸⁴ as long as each other’s commitments to the core practices remained unimpeachable. The Mohists likewise were not wholly without a body of praxis, but doctrinal considerations played a prime role in determining one’s participation in the group, even in the realm of practice.⁸⁵ A key lesson to be learned from Tomb One is that the application of any category drawn from Warring States discourse, especially those, like Ru and Mohist, which enjoyed a longevity beyond the Warring States, must be done with a close sensitivity to the way that category is being renegotiated and reconstituted even within the evidence under study.

The last inference we can make from the evidence contained in Tomb One concerns the history of the Ru movement that the tomb occupant

83. Robert Eno has made a similar observation through his own reading of transmitted Warring States texts: “[We are] led to picture Ruism more as a community of men than as a body of doctrine. Programs of ritual activity will appear as the distinguishing core of that community.” See Robert Eno, *The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 7. Although I would argue that Eno’s identification of “core” Ru praxis must be expanded to include poetry, prose, music, and study, I would otherwise fundamentally agree with his analysis.

84. The paradigmatic instance of this is the *Xunzi*’s acknowledgement of Mencius and Zisi as fellow Ru.

85. Doctrine had a powerful role in negatively determining the parameters of practice, the ban on music is a case in point. But even positive practical participation was largely mediated by doctrine. The best example of this is afforded by disputation, perhaps the central Mohist art. Although disputation was undeniably a form of practice, it entailed a thorough knowledge of doctrine and was largely undertaken to defend and promulgate doctrine.

exemplifies. If conditions in Chu were at all representative of the state of the Ru community in 300 B.C.E., the Guodian corpus evinces that at that moment the polemical engagement between the Ru and Mohists was particularly intense. Whether because of the inherent persuasive power of their message or some fortuitous turn in geopolitical events, the Mohists seem to have risen to a position of such prominence as to draw the concentrated rhetorical fire of Ru scholars c. 300 B.C.E. (in Chu, at least). In the process, the Mohists exerted, at least in the case of the Guodian corpus and its collector(s), a kind of gravitational influence on the rhetorical and philosophical expressions of their Ru opponents. We can see that in the realm of doctrine, the authors and collector(s) of the Guodian corpus were driven by their focused antipathy to the *Mozhi* to emphasize the internal subjective life and the inner workings of consciousness. If we view in this light the textual record of the subsequent Ru movement, particularly the *Xunzi*, we might analyze many of the developments it manifests as a response to the historical trend evinced in the Guodian corpus.

唯人道為可道也：讀郭店楚簡對於墨子

麥安迪

摘要

虽然郭店楚简的几篇文章被认为杂乱混合，其实它们的采集比较有道理。即使简文于公元前 300 年左右在楚国被埋葬，我们应该把它们和同时同地的文章比起来。做为这种比较，墨子特别有用。虽然郭店简文互相有矛盾，可是它们都一样对反抗墨子的教导有用。郭店第一墓的墓主，采集文章的时候，大概是选择能用反对知识对手的材料，不管它们之间有没有冲突。这果然是战国时代文士创作与应用文章的基本原则。

Keywords: Warring States, intellectual history, Guodian texts, *Mozhi*
戰國思想史, 郭店楚簡, 墨子