

the “League of the Child-Rich Parents” that was founded in 1939 in order to lobby for special social legislation for families with many children, and the final enactment of the pro-natalist “Law for Large Bulgarian Families” in 1943 that foresaw several reliefs and a loan for existing families with more than two children and couples intending to found large families. Being a child of its times the law rested on preceding pro-natalist legislation of the Third Reich and excluded citizens who were not of Bulgarian ethnic descent.

With her study on social legislation in interwar Bulgaria, in particular with respect to families and maternity, Baloutzova has certainly blazed the trail for other studies on similar topics to be expected on East and Southeast European countries. In an exemplary manner, she has shown that social legislation is not the direct result of social struggles alone, but also of the ruling elites’ concepts of society and nation. Thereby, both concepts and legislation appear as authentic adaptations of pendants originally created in Western and Central Europe or even in the United States.

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Norman M. Naimark, *Stalin’s Genocides*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pp. 176. \$26.95 cloth (ISBN: 978-0-691-14784-0); \$16.95 paper (ISBN 978-0-691-15238-7).
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There is little doubt that Joseph Stalin, despotic ruler of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) for more than a quarter century, was responsible for atrocities that included mass murder. The question for Norman Naimark is whether those atrocities, individually and collectively, amount to genocide, and how Stalin’s crimes compare to Hitler’s. In answering, Naimark proposes a broader than usual definition of genocide, albeit one with historical pedigree, and insists on blaming Stalin for indirect forms of killing as well as direct ones. If one accepts these two premises, it is easy to declare Stalin a perpetrator of genocide(s), which is the core argument of Naimark’s elegant book.

The coiner of the word “genocide,” Raphael Lemkin, wanted the word to be applied to mass killings based on not only *genos* (race or ethnicity) but also other social categories, such as religion, class, and political beliefs. The early drafts of the genocide convention included political groups, but this category was removed from the final version of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide at the insistence of the Soviet Union, whose leaders understood their own vulnerability.

Naimark proposes that analysts return to the original broader understanding and treat as genocide the killing of groups defined by class or politics, as well as race, ethnicity, and religion. For historians of the U.S.S.R., this approach renders moot the longstanding debate over whether the artificial famine in the Ukraine (in 1932–1933) was directed against peasants or ethnic Ukrainians; either way it could still qualify as genocide. (Even with the traditional definition of genocide, the Ukrainian Holodomor may still count, as long as one includes, as does Lemkin himself, the earlier Soviet attacks on Ukrainian intellectual and religious leaders.)

Although Stalin's crimes did feature instances of direct killing (such as the massacre of Poles at Katyn or Stalin's identifying persons to be shot during the Great Terror), many of his worst atrocities constituted indirect killing. The deportation in the early 1930s of several million peasants declared to be "kulaks" (rich peasants) and the forced relocation of ethnic minorities (Koreans in the 1930s, Chechens and other Caucasian peoples in the 1940s) resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, whereas the unwillingness of Stalin to stop taking grain from peasant growers in Ukraine, West Siberia, and the North Caucasus ensured death by starvation of at least several million persons.

Naimark rightly insists that Stalin's repeated mass killings were a product of his personality, including its paranoid elements, rather than of the Soviet system per se, and he treats Lenin's moments of savagery as serving concrete goals, in ways that Stalin's did not. He pictures Stalin as becoming genocidal gradually. Although Naimark recognizes that the Holocaust was the worst genocide of modern times, because of its scope, direct killing, and goal of exterminating a people, he still sees Stalin's culpability for mass murder as "not unlike that of Hitler's," surely a debatable proposition (137).

The book includes chapters on Stalin, dekulakization, the famine in the Ukraine, the removal and deportation of ethnic groups, and the Great Terror, each of which provides a terse and compelling account based on the latest archival research. Some readers might learn for the first time about the repeated persecution of ethnic Germans and Poles (key targets before and during the Great Terror) or about the targeting of social marginals (including returning kulaks and criminals) in the same periods, and the inclusion of both groups in the regional quotas for repression by security police. Ethnic groups and social marginals accounted for the bulk of the persons shot or sent to labor camps during the Great Terror, as Naimark recognizes. For my taste, however, he gives too much emphasis to the traditional view of the Terror, including its political dimension and the supposedly random or capricious aspect of the killings. But this does not detract from his argument that Stalin was a mass killer.

Naimark's is a passionate and carefully constructed account, fairly and judiciously elaborated, respectful of the viewpoints of others, and thought

provoking. His call for a broader understanding of genocide makes sense from a moral point of view; mass killing of innocent persons chosen on any basis is wrong. This approach also makes sense for historical analysis, especially if one understands concepts such as nationality and race as constructs rather than permanent categories. Just who is thought to belong to an ethnic or racial group may be just as arbitrary as who is seen as belonging to a social class or political group, and arbitrary attributions seem especially common when groups are treated as alien or deviant. At least this was the case with Stalin and Soviet history.

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Steve Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. Pp. 664. \$25.00 paper (ISBN 978-0-300-17143-3). doi:10.1017/S0738248012000090

This is a book of big arguments repeated often: 1688 marked the first modern revolution; it was violent, divisive, and popular. Most previous scholars have missed this because so few have wanted 1688 to be revolutionary. Steve Pincus strives to repair their error in a lively book built on a massive foundation of manuscript and printed sources. The result will renew interest in a moment long lost between the excitement of Britain's mid-seventeenth-century civil wars and the apparent promise of the later eighteenth century.

After surveying theoretical literature on revolutions, Pincus centers much of his analysis on the notion that "revolutions occur only when states have embarked on ambitious state modernization programs" (33). Conflict arose between two approaches to modernization; revolution resulted as one conquered the other. Thus Pincus makes one of his most intriguing claims: that the original proponent of modernization was James II. His modernization program was not just Catholic, but Gallican: imitative of Louis XIV's independence from the Pope and of France's large army and navy. New military and administrative means enhanced James's authority, the chief end of which was Catholic emancipation.

In pursuing this end by these means, however, James misread his countrymen, who had "gone Dutch" by the time of his accession in 1685. As in the Netherlands, England's growing colonial trade financed new industries and cultural practices. Turnpikes, improved urban spaces, and deposit banking were "recognizably modern" (74). The coffeehouse, providing a place for new modes of political exchange, exemplified England's vitality. The people's