

different degrees of issue overlaps and potential institutional tensions—within an environmental field (biodiversity), between two environmental issues (biodiversity and climate), and between environmental and nonenvironmental fields (biodiversity and fisheries; environment and trade). What is more, the nature of the overlap may impact at least one of the key variables. As the author shows for the CITES-FAO case, substitutability of a secretariat may well be a function of the existence and behavior of a rival secretariat.

To be fair, these theoretical considerations are mostly suggestions for follow-up studies. Jinnah has found the right balance between a demanding, but not inflated, framework and its diligent application. She is well aware of the analytical limits and takes into account potential rival factors through her process-tracing methodology. Altogether, with a highly reflected and manageable research design, her remarkable book moves secretariat influence out of the analytical dark to a considerable degree. It stands as an inspiration for much-needed further studies on this institutional phenomenon within and beyond global environmental governance.

Integrating Regions: Asia in Comparative Context.

Edited by Miles Kahler and Andrew MacIntyre. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. 336p. \$65.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592715004260

— Meg E. Rithmire, *Harvard Business School*

Contemporary Asia poses a significant puzzle for those interested in regionalism: Asian regional institutions have long been regarded as weak or shallow, and yet institutional development, both the genesis of new institutional arrangements and the revision of existing institutions, has accelerated since the late 1990s. If the organizations are weak by design, why do Asian governments persist in creating and reshaping them? Does enhanced institutional development signal a change in the nature of Asian regionalism toward greater regional integration?

In a valuably diverse new volume sponsored by the Asian Development Bank, Miles Kahler and Andrew MacIntyre have collected eight essays, in addition to their own introduction and conclusion, that examine the process and meaning of regional institution building in Asia. The volume is authentically comparative. Many reviews say perfunctorily that a book appeals to an audience well outside of the regional one, but in this case, it is very true. Scholars of regional cooperation elsewhere and newcomers to the field alike will find much to learn and consider.

Regional institutions in Asia, one learns from Kahler's introduction, differ from counterparts elsewhere (principally Europe) because they rely on consensus decision making, shy away from legally binding obligations, lack regional courts, are exclusively intergovernmental (i.e., do

not include nongovernmental organizations, individuals, or corporations), and “have adopted a model of membership that produces heterogeneous convoys rather than homogenous clubs” (p. 9). The conventional wisdom holds that this “Asian Way” is a result of the unwillingness of Asian regimes to delegate sovereignty, and that, as a result, Asian regional institutions are unlikely to elevate regional interests above national ones. Major contributions of the work include the idea that, in fact, Asian governments are as willing as any to delegate sovereignty, and the debate within the volume about whether Asian regional institutions can be effective even without the kinds of legalization that constrains states in other regions. In explaining institutional development since the Asian financial crisis, the editors emphasize diplomatic and strategic considerations in a region of rising powers over primarily economic concerns. Although contributors focus on different mechanisms of regional integration, they agree that change in Asia is likely to be piecemeal and gradual, rather than radical.

While the volume clearly sets a coherent research agenda, it does not privilege any particular theoretical approach. Chapters by Simon Hix and Stephan Haggard, for example, have clear institutionalist approaches, while the chapter by Amitav Acharya adopts a constructivist approach to see regional institutions as sites of socialization. The lack of a dominant theoretical approach is a strength rather than a weakness; the chapters offer a comprehensive review of debates in the field and many perspectives on the present and future of Asian regionalism.

The chapters in Part II discuss regional design in theoretical terms and imagine institutional features that may permit greater integration in Asia. Erik Voeten's strong chapter on regional judicial institutions challenges the dominant “sovereignty costs” perspective on Asian regionalism by examining the participation of Asian states in legalized dispute resolution, finding that they are no less likely than states in Europe or elsewhere to turn to global judicial institutions. Voeten argues that for regional courts to become effective, they must allow standing for private parties, who, more than governments, use and strengthen supranational judicial institutions. Chapters by Hix and Judith Kelley examine supranational delegation and membership rules, respectively. While both acknowledge that the preferences and structures of Asian governments are far more heterogeneous than those in Europe, they nonetheless discuss details of institutional design, such as thresholds for delegation, qualified majority voting, membership conditionality and multi-track integration, that Asia may borrow from Europe. While these discussions of possible institutional design are certainly interesting to read—for example, Hix even outlines what the party structure of an Asian parliament might look like (p. 52)—they seem a bit fanciful in a region in which very few countries, if any, agree on

basic principles concerning how to structure economic and political systems.

The essays in Part III provide excellent overviews of regional integration in Latin America and in Europe that are contributions in their own right, regardless of their relevance to Asia. Jorge Domínguez describes and assesses efforts at regional cooperation in Latin America, finding that regional integration efforts did enhance trade liberalization and that some regional organizations (NAFTA and MERCOSUR) “built on and contributed to” efforts at interstate peace (p. 108), but that no region achieved a common market. Moreover, Domínguez notes that efforts at regional integration will always play a supporting role in the pursuit of growth, which is determined mostly by domestic politics and policy.

Kevin O’Rourke’s readable chapter provides a history of European integration with an eye to explaining why the European Union chose a supranational form, that is, deep integration, over the many other forms proposed since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. Rather than viewing the process of integration in some Whiggish way, O’Rourke narrates the process with attention to important political dramas, such as the fights over agriculture and British participation and exclusion at various points. His chapter contains a richer discussion of politics than any other part of the volume.

If O’Rourke’s chapter has the most politics, the chapter by C. Randall Henning on crises and regional institutions is a close second. Henning’s basic insight is that regional integration efforts benefit from economic crises when those crises are generated outside of the region and responses outside of the region are inadequate. In addition, the power and preferences of states inside and outside the region matter tremendously, especially when regional states find themselves together in clashing with the preferences of global financial institutions or when the preferences of a hegemonic power, such as the United States, are at odds with those of member states.

Part III goes into the most depth on Asian regional institutions. The chapter by Haggard surveys the landscape of Asian regional institutions, and in doing so, lays out the greatest amount of empirical detail and analytical structure to explain why Asian regional institutions, while expanding in number and membership, have not deepened the regional commitments of Asian states. Haggard argues that “widening” has traded off with “deepening,” and that multiple regional institutions have only exacerbated the heterogeneity that has long challenged regional cooperation. His chapter devotes the most attention of any to the actual politics and preferences of Asian states. The chapter by Acharya analyzes possibilities for socialization through Asian regional institutions. Instead of engaging the debate about instrumental versus intrinsic socialization, he proposes a “Type III contingent socialization,” by which “agents act both instrumentally and normatively,

concurrently” (p. 230) but in a contingent fashion, waiting to feel the effects of new roles and positions before fully committing to new norms. While the concept of Type III socialization seems more difficult to identify and measure than Types I and II, it does seem to capture the multiple motivations adopted by Asian governments during times of strategic uncertainty.

The volume’s greatest weakness is the lack of attention to real politics and preferences of Asian governments and regional groups. But perhaps detailing the interests and positions of agents with regard to various regional institutions trades off with the synthetic, comprehensive, and comparative contributions of the volume. If so, the editors and contributors of *Integrating Regions* have organized a clear set of empirical and theoretical questions and debates so that those working in this field may take up the detailed politics of Asian regional cooperation with these questions and debates in mind.

Rethinking Sovereign Debt: Politics, Reputation, and Legitimacy in Modern Finance. By Odette Lienau. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. 344p. \$52.50. doi:10.1017/S1537592715004272

— Cameron Ballard-Rosa, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

When the apartheid regime fell in South Africa, the newly elected African National Congress (ANC) government enjoyed an incredible outpouring of goodwill and a general recognition of the illegitimacy of the previous regime. If ever there was a case for forgiveness of a country’s debts, incurred under a repressive regime without the benefit of most citizens in mind, South Africa in the mid-1990s would have seemed a good fit. And yet, once the ANC came to power, they acknowledged the debts of the apartheid government, maintaining the common norm of debt continuity across regimes. To many observers, this was the only reasonable response to a monolithic international financial system that demanded that new governments honor previous borrowing commitments. However, as argued by Odette Lienau, this need not necessarily have been the case.

Lienau’s *Rethinking Sovereign Debt* is a thought-provoking account of the historical development of norms of repayment in sovereign debt markets. At its core, the book rests on a critical yet often ignored point: Any analysis of sovereign debt requires an inherent understanding of “sovereignty.” What sovereignty properly entails has evolved over the past century, especially following movements toward popular rule (in various waves of democratization) along with self-determination (during waves of independence from colonial powers). Each of these developments in the international system prompted a reconsideration of sovereignty—beyond simple control of a bounded area—to also incorporate notions of rule via popular will for the public benefit.