



## Language territorial regimes in multilingual ethnic territorial autonomies

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Ethnic territorial autonomy (ETA) is an institutional way to ensure simultaneously the integrity of the state and the rights of ethnic minorities through preferential policies in certain ethnically sensitive spheres. Language preferential policies differ greatly across multilingual ETAs and can be analyzed through the concept of “language territorial regime” (LTR). In this paper, we examine LTRs along two dimensions: (1) the scope of state regulation of language use and (2) the way language rights are perceived and used. The first considers the depth and universality of state regulation of language use – “strong” or “weak.” The second concerns whether the community’s approach to language rights is symbolic or pragmatic. The combination of these two dimensions allows the categorization of LTRs into four main classes: “strong parting-regime,” “strong pooling-regime,” “weak pooling-regime,” and “weak parting-regime.” A comparison of South Tyrol, Vojvodina, and Wales allows conceptualizing LTR as a system of de jure institutional arrangements of linguistic issues and practice of self-organization and perpetuation of multilingual communities.

**Keywords:** language preferential policy; ethnic territorial autonomy; language territorial regime; multilingualism; ethnic minorities

### Introduction

The topic of this article sits at the crossroads of studies into language policies and studies of the political effects of ethnic territorial autonomy (ETA) establishment as a means of resolving ethnic conflicts.

Studies of ethnic conflict resolution consider the instrumental role and political effects of establishing ETAs, which are understood not only as territories but also as subjects of the interaction between national states and ethnic minorities. This type of research does not examine ETAs as political actors. But ETAs secure the interests of their various ethnic groups and maintain balance in interethnic relations through preferential policies. In multilingual ETAs, language preferential policies are especially meaningful; their study should take into account the political role of ETAs, which ETAs use to formulate and change the public status, character, and scope of preferential policies.

We propose an approach that allows a combined examination of the political role of the ETA as a relatively autonomous political actor and language preferential policy issues through the concept of language territorial regime (LTR). The concept of language regime is not new (Pool 1990; 1996; Laitin 1993) and has been recently developed

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(Carla 2007; Gazzola 2014; Cardinal and Sonntag 2015; Liu 2015; 2016). Authors interpret it as both the object and result of a struggle for power and a system of special institutional arrangements of linguistic issues established to shape social communication. This theoretical perspective helps to reveal factors that contribute to the choice of language regime and the effects of this choice for ethnolinguistic minority rights protection. From our point of view, in regard to multilingual communities, it is important to discuss not only the protection of ethnolinguistic minorities, but also the ways in which a language regime ensures the coexistence of various ethnic groups and promotes the development of the community as a whole. The dominant actor of language policy is the state, but the list of real actors and agents involved in language policy-making also includes subnational and local authorities, political parties, NGOs, mass media, and educational and cultural institutions. We argue that two sets of factors determine the character and strength of LTR: (1) the scope of state regulation of language usage and (2) the dominant way language rights are perceived and used (symbolic or pragmatic). Thus, a language regime can be seen as a system of formal and informal institutions and a mindset that determines the usage of language(s) in the community. Our approach allows combining the problems of ethnolinguistic minorities' protection and the development of an autonomous community as a holistic entity that includes members of different ethnolinguistic groups.

The article consists of three parts. The first part discusses the concept of language territorial regime in the context of ETA studies. The second part studies the cases of South Tyrol (Italy), Wales (United Kingdom), and Vojvodina (Serbia). The third part verifies the concept of language territorial regime and its types.

### **Language territorial regime and ETA: concepts and discussions**

Granting ethnic groups ETA is considered one way to prevent, manage, and resolve ethnic conflicts (McGarry and O'Leary 1993; Safran 1994; Wolff 2009; Cederman et al. 2015). There are two elements of ETA: power-sharing systems and preferential policies. The understanding of language policy as a preferential policy and as one of the elements of ETA combines studies of the political effects of establishing ETAs and of language policy.

Studies of ETA as a means of ethnic conflict resolution focus on its efficiency in securing both a balance in interethnic relations and a state's territorial integrity. Granting an ETA is considered a process involving such main actors as ethnic groups, central (national) authorities, and sometimes external parties including a kin-state, international organizations, and supranational institutions. Semenov notes that this approach allows understanding ETA as both an instrument of ethnic conflict resolution and a system of institutional arrangements of interethnic relations (2016). Being interested in the political role of ETA, we propose to understand it as an autonomous administrative unit and political community that has a specific set of public functions, interests, and practices through special preferential policies. There are a number of explanations for how preferential policies resolve ethnic conflicts and provide ethnic minority group rights. Safran offers a taxonomy of institutional and other non-separatist responses (preferential policies) (1994). McGarry and O'Leary highlight eight main preferential policies (macro-methods) grouped into two sets: "methods for eliminating differences" and "methods for managing differences" (1993, 4). Alongside these, the question of the scope of preferences should be considered.

Language policy studies discuss a similar question (Alexander 1989; Kymlicka 1993; Patten 2001; Schiffman 2002; Williams 2003; 2013; Spolsky 2004; Carla 2007; Brubaker 2013; Busch 2013; Delarue and Caluwe 2015): what kind(s) of language policy provide individual and/or group rights, secure linguistic diversity, and ensure territorial state

integrity? Language policy is a set of measures that develops the language(s) or stimulates or constrains friction among languages in a community. Establishing a balance between the territorial integrity of a state and a region requires the territorial autonomy to implement a preferential language policy for ethnolinguistic minorities. Language preferential policy secures and perpetuates the titular language of the ETA and (in some cases) non-titular minority mother tongues.

Williams cites three main factors that influence the scope and duration of language policy: (1) the political context of the formulation, implementation, and revision of language strategies; (2) the relationship among politicians, administrators, and engaged interest groups; and (3) the role of legislative reform, court challenges and remedies, and judicial review in protecting or modifying language strategies (2013, 102). Following Williams, we can elaborate on the concept of language regime, which the literature shows is rarely used for analysis of language preferential policy implementation in ETA. For example, Brubaker uses the concept of *linguistic* territorial regime to characterize the measures of language preferential policy in Quebec (2013, 8) but does not make clearer the essential features of the concept. We can use the concept of language regime for different levels of the political sphere: national, regional, and local. The concept allows evaluating the political weight of ETA in protecting ethnic minorities' rights and autonomous community development. The latter seems possible if we consider LTR a significant element of ETA.

Some authors associate the nature of language regime with features of the national political regime (Pool 1990, 246). Liu argues that "when choosing language regimes, governments must balance between cultural egoism, communicative efficiency, and collective equality" (2015, 53). She differentiates "power-concentrating," "power-sharing," "power-neutralizing," and "neutralized-sharing" linguistic regimes (2015, 13). Liu explains how different factors promote development of various types of regimes and demonstrates their economic and political effects through states of Southeast Asia.

We are interested in specific features of multilingual ETA as a special territory within a state, where language diversity is developed and regulated by a special set of measures. Of course, we can find some ETAs that are characterized as monolingual (Åland in Finland or Quebec in Canada), but our research interest is connected with multilingual ETAs, where the distribution of linguistic power is institutionalized. What scope of language preferences do they provide for different linguistic groups and how? In what forms and under what conditions can multi- or bilingual LTR exist?

Cardinal and Sonntag fall back on a historical institutionalism approach to answer questions about the factors and effects of language regime choice (2015). They note that "a language regime refers to language practices as well as conceptions and representations of language and language use as projected through state policies and as acted upon by language users" (2015, 13). This focus provides an insight into two dimensions of language regime: (1) institutional arrangements of linguistic issues and (2) its effects, manifested in the behavior of native speakers. According to Cardinal and Sonntag, the "critical juncture" is an interaction between tradition and policy. They argue that "the state has a relative degree of autonomy," which can be determined "in terms of state traditions – the institutional and normative baggage and patterns of state action" (2015, 13). It seems to be a tautology, but ETA's relative autonomy derives from normative and institutionalized traditions of different ethnolinguistic groups' coexistence within ETA and its interaction with the national authority. This approach just links together state language policy and linguistic usage. As for our claim, it is important to understand what set of structural and contextual factors determines the nature and strength of LTR as an element of ETA. The

strength of LTR is important to ETA's ability to ensure ethnolinguistic groups' rights through regulation.

LTR through preferential policies are most significant in the areas of educational systems and public administration. There are two other important arenas of interaction: (1) the nongovernmental public sphere including mass media, public events, exhibitions, cinema, or theater and (2) the private-household sphere that consists of communication within families and with close friends. But these two arenas are less regulated in free and relatively free societies. In other words, any regulation targeting different spheres of language communication can have just limited relevance because there is always a place for freedom to supply and consume media, public events, or other services. The possibility to regulate language use in the private sphere is even more limited. Thus, in these arenas (unlike in the educational system and public administration), languages compete with one another. The outcome of this competition is determined by factors no one totally controls. Schooling and public administration can be regulated unilaterally, even if this regulation is complex and time-consuming. Among their important functions for individuals and the community, they support the demand for language usage, thereby providing for the perpetuation of the community's language.

One of the most important issues for a minority's status is the extent to which the usage of different languages is allowed and/or required (depth of regulation). The next point is a correlation of the regulation among different arenas (universality of regulation). The combination of these two dimensions – depth and universality – allows us to determine if an LTR is “strong” or “weak” in terms of regulation. In the case of education, we can find different approaches, as in primary and/or secondary schools where curricula include compulsory or optional subjects on native tongue as the first or second language. An ethnic group's language implementation and regulation in public administration might involve just the passage of laws, or could also include legal proceedings and law enforcement. Hypothetically, instances of “weak” LTR could vary by different combinations of depth and universality: high depth and low universality or high universality and low depth, but that is not the concern of this paper. We use a highly dichotomous scheme of “strong” and “weak” LTRs without taking into account possible differences among cases within classes, though the theoretical framework allows for greater variety within the “weak” LTR. “Strong” regimes are more similar to one another and represent a model that defenders of a minority language tend to emulate.

As for the sample, we deliberately chose autonomies in European countries (South Tyrol, Wales, and Vojvodina) because they exist in comparatively common supranational regulatory frames such as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Both documents include overlapping provisions that ensure language rights in educational systems and public administration, the most significant arenas of interaction between members of ethnolinguistic groups and local (regional) powers. In our sample, Italy alone still has not ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (the Framework Convention is ratified by *other* countries). At the same time, the Italian constitution (Article 6), national Act No 482 on “Rules for the protection of historical linguistic minorities” (1999), and the special Statute of the Trentino-Alto Adige provide for the protection of ethnic minorities' rights. As for Serbia and the UK, they have ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and guarantee language rights for ethnic minorities by national acts, constitutions, and/or regional statutes. Obligations that these states have accepted (within an *à la carte* approach) differ across the set of minority languages (Poggeschi 2012). Overall, the two states have taken on a similar scope of obligations. The

EU's role in monitoring and protecting linguistic minorities takes different forms in different countries. In the UK and Italy, "the adoption of Europe-wide minority protection standards has been a matter of free choice and of political expediency" (De Witte 2014). Serbia complies with EU standards in its bid to gain EU membership. Compliance with the EU's "minority condition" stimulates mostly unpredictable processes in these countries (Sasse 2008). The key EU documents on ethnolinguistic minorities' rights formulate basic guidelines and do not determine the specific content of national regulations. For instance, in accordance with Act No 482, Italy recognizes Albanian, Catalan, German, Greek, Slovene, Croatian, Ladin, French, Franco-Provençal, Occitan, Friulian, and Sardinian, but does not recognize, for example, Romani (the most common mother tongue among foreign residents in Italy) and Sicilian as protected languages. This list of languages does not include mother tongues of migrant minorities, which is typical for other countries as well. It means that the LTR is based solely on language preferential policy regarding historical ethnolinguistic minorities (excluding current migrants). A comparative analysis of the charter's application in Serbia and the UK (Application of the Charter in Serbia 2016; Application of the Charter in the United Kingdom 2014) revealed that the implementation of language policy in Wales and Vojvodina is partly fulfilled. Therefore, both the extent of regulation of language preferences and that of implementation of language policy reveal the strength of an LTR.

Why is the scope of obligations broader than their actual performance? Public policy analysis would cite a lack of resources and political will. Moreover, public demand for and perception of the language preferential policy matter. We analyze preferential language policy via three key groups of parameters: (1) actors and agents of the policy, the resources and strategy preferred/chosen by them; (2) the direct activity of the policy (positive preferential or discriminative); and (3) how the right to language is perceived and used – a symbolic or pragmatic mindset. Language as a marker of community integrity and identity has a symbolic status: while the language is still alive, the community does not cease to exist. The pragmatic status of language policy means that language as a communicative tool enables interaction among people both within the community and beyond. The prevalence of either a symbolic or pragmatic mindset is important because it will influence how the autonomy's authorities, who are both agents of state policy and members of the autonomous community, shape state language preferential policy and language planning in the ETA.

Symbolic and pragmatic language policies can lead to different consequences. Agreeing with Agarín (2014), we claim that LTR as regulatory oversight influences relations among different linguistic communities in ETA. Agarín points out that strong language guarantees often appear where "promotion of official monolingualism strengthens the symbolic status of the language but contributes little, if at all, to the functionality of *language communities*" (2014, 366, emphasis in the original). Following the ideas of Carla, we argue that symbolic language policy develops "a parting-regime, which encourages individuals to consider majority and minority languages as two separate entities" while pragmatic policy forms "a pooling-regime, which promotes the joined use of majority and minority languages, considered on an equal basis" (2007, 292). The hallmark of the "parting-regime" type of language policy implementation is the presence of winners and losers, while the "pooling-regime" type omits the winners and losers issue as everyone wins.

Every case of ETA is unique because its functioning depends on a complex constellation of (1) structural factors such as the ethnic composition of the autonomy's population and (2) contextual features, including the history of emergence and development of autonomy, crystallized in the persistent memory of historical resentments. These resentments are



the result of conflicts between the state and ethnic groups and the trajectory of post-imperial development as the context of emerging autonomy.

The concept of LTR allows defining the depth and universality of language preferences regulation in multi- or bilingual ethnic territorial autonomies. The differentiation of LTR depends on the configuration of contextual and structural factors of ETA formation and functioning and the ability of the ETA, as a political actor, to influence both top-down and bottom-up requests and demands. As an illustration of how this works, we use small-N comparative research strategy and an in-depth study of several cases.<sup>1</sup> The main sampling criterion is the share of main ethnic (language) group(s) in an ETA – in other words, which language group predominates in an ETA and in what proportion in relation to other language groups. We distinguish a titular language group and other language groups. The ethnonym of the first group is reflected in the ETA's name and for whom the ETA was established. The others include language groups that dominate nationally (the Serbs in Vojvodina) and minority language groups (such as the Ladins in South Tyrol). In accordance with this clarification, the choice of our three cases is primarily dictated by the structural similarities among them. In two of them, a titular language group predominates in the ETA, but this prevalence differs within samples. German speakers as the titular group make up two-thirds of the population of South Tyrol (Italy), Italian speakers (dominant on the national level) about one-fourth. About 74% residents of Wales do not speak Welsh. In Vojvodina, Serbs dominate. The ETA was established for the province's 26 minority language groups, the largest of which are Hungarians (13%). These three cases differ in when the ETA was established, the presence of a kin-state, and the presence/absence of past ethnic conflicts based on mass mobilization.

These cases exemplify the most common trends of 61 ETAs identified around the world today. For instance, South Tyrol is akin to Åland (Finland) and Quebec (Canada) in both ethnic structure and scope of language preferences. As for Wales, it is similar to Udmurtia or Kalmykia in Russia, where ethnic identity is pronounced but use of the mother tongue is relatively weak. The case of Vojvodina is relatively unique, making it interesting for analysis.

## **Language territorial regimes: comparative case study**

### ***South Tyrol***

South Tyrol is one of the most studied ETAs (Carla 2007; Wolff 2009; Alber and Zwilling 2014; Complex autonomy 2005). Before the 1919 Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye, this region along with the Italian-speaking Trentino was part of the Austrian Crownland of Tyrol. Ninety percent of its residents were German speakers while Italian speakers were not more than 4% (Statistisches Jahrbuch 2014, 118). The third language group, the Ladins (who speak a Romance language), was also about 4%. Under the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye, the southern part of the Crownland of Tyrol was annexed to the Italian Kingdom. Not the language borderline but the Alpine Brenner Pass became the border between Austria and the Italian Kingdom. Thus, both the Italian-speaking Trentino and the German-speaking South Tyrol became parts of Italy. For the next several decades, the ethnic structure changed under a mass relocation of Italian speakers to South Tyrol. The relocation was a part of Mussolini's assimilation policy, which also included extremely harsh measures to restrict the use of German in public life and led to a highly conflictual situation.

After World War II, the question of the reunification of South Tyrol and Austria arose in both the region and in its kin-state, with the main political party of the German-speaking

minority, the South Tyrolean People's Party (die SüdTyroler Volkspartei – SVP), initiating a reunification petition. In accordance with the decision of the Paris Peace Conference (1946), however, South Tyrol remained part of Italy, which was made to guarantee the preservation of German language and culture. Italy concluded the “Gruber – De Gasperi” agreement with Austria as a kin-state and the international guarantor of the status and rights of the German speakers in South Tyrol.

The Italian constitution (1947) institutionalizes the autonomous region Trentino-Alto Adige, which includes two provinces – Bolzano in the north and Trentino in the south. The special Statute of the Trentino-Alto Adige Autonomy was passed in 1948, but Austria and the German-speaking minority regarded the implementation and protection of the German speakers' right to self-government as unsatisfactory. As the influx of Italian speakers continued, German speakers became a minority in the whole region of Trentino-Alto Adige. The SVP dominated at the provincial and municipal levels, but not at the regional level, threatening its ability to protect the interests of the German speakers. The period of active struggle for language continued during the 1950s and 1960s. The SVP organized a protest march in 1957. Austria approached the United Nations twice and achieved resolution 1497/XV on “The status of the German-speaking element in the province of Bolzano: implementation of the Paris agreement of 5.10.1946” (1960). A second special statute passed in 1972 transferred significant authority from the Trentino-Alto Adige to both Bolzano (South Tyrol) and Trentino. An extremely complex system of checks and balances in relations between different communities and the state became the primary tool to protect language minorities' interests.

The population census lists three main ethnolinguistic communities in South Tyrol: Italian speakers (23.4%), German speakers (62.3%), and Ladin speakers (4.1%), with others accounting for 10.2% (Statistisches Jahrbuch 2014, 118). An individual's declaration of identity in the census is the basis of eligibility for public posts, employment in public administration or the school system, or eligibility for social housing.

The Italian government has broad and strong obligations to safeguard ethno-regional minority languages (De Witte 2014). The unique circumstances of South Tyrol, including the pressing role of Austria as a kin-state, create great public demand that these commitments be honored. An ethnolinguistic quota system, in effect since the 2000s after 30 years of devolution, regulates the functioning and recruitment of authorities at all levels except for the Defense Ministry, military police units, and privatized infrastructure sectors. Everyone working in public administration must be bilingual, or trilingual in the case of the Ladin municipalities. Job seekers must take a language certification exam, which becomes increasingly difficult the higher the position sought. Linguistic parity remains most elusive in the judicial system, where Italian still prevails. Thus, there are two official languages in South Tyrol (Italian and German) and three in Ladin municipalities of the province (Italian, German, and Ladin). All official documents are produced in two or three languages, all being equally authentic. If a document has a bilingual character, both texts have the same size. At the same time, researchers note the increasing use of German as a trend (Alber and Palermo 2012, 295).

Of the three autonomous schooling systems in the province, two function throughout South Tyrol, and a Ladin-speaking schooling system also operates in the Ladin municipalities. The size of linguistic groups determines the size and number of schools, the level of subsidies, and the number of staff.

Language groups in the provincial assembly are also important. If ethnic group members of the assembly (MAs) believe that a bill threatens the equality of rights for ethnic groups, a majority of them can require a separate vote. In a dispute, ethnic group

MAs can address the Constitutional Court. The strictest rules are for the provincial budget acceptance procedure, in which a majority of an ethnic group's members can request a separate vote on its sections. If a separate vote does not bring a resolution, a joint commission of representatives of all ethnic groups makes a binding decision. If the commission cannot reach a majority decision, the matter goes to the provincial administrative court for the final word.

In general, it is a stable system of mutual guarantees, including on language. Thus, the focus of policy has shifted toward the agenda of "dynamic autonomy" (Palermo 2008, 158), which does not allow the development of real bilingualism in the social sphere of South Tyrol. Recent studies show "rather limited proficiency in the second language" among members of German- and Italian-language communities and the widespread perception that society is deeply divided (Alber and Zwilling 2014, 58–59; Carla 2007, 308). The drive to counter former linguistic opposition led to a strong territorially concentrated linguistic regime, where each language community benefited by getting political and institutional guarantees for its survival. As the "strength" of language preference groups depends on their share of the ethnic population of the ETA and kin-state activity inspired by historical memory, the Ladins in South Tyrol have fewer preferences than the Germans and the Italians. Guarantees for the language community's survival are largely symbolic. This has led to a new wave of discussions about possible changes in the ethnic quota system and approaches to schooling. Nevertheless, there is strong resistance to attempts to change the status quo.

### *Wales*

British statehood did not conform to the classical model of the nation state, based on ethnic unity. The Welsh and the Scots did not have a close ethnic kinship with the English but were foes. From the beginning, Great Britain developed as a political nation, the result of extensive colonial policy that incorporated ethnic discrimination and assimilation, and violent suppression of ethnic conflicts.

The conflict between England and Wales persisted for at least several centuries. Under the Wales Act of 1535, Wales was subjected to English law and got 26 seats in parliament. Historians note that the text of act included 7500 words, and 150 of them concerned Welsh. English became the only language of jurisdiction in Wales, and non-English speakers were barred from official positions in England and Wales.

London took a dim view of education in Welsh. For example, British newspapers attributed riots in Wales (1830s) to the Welsh people's lack of education. Westminster sent a special commission to Wales that produced a report on the deplorable condition of education in the region and blamed the fact that students were taught in Welsh. As a result, "the ordinary Welsh people began to believe that they could only improve themselves socially through education and the ability to speak and communicate in English" (The Blue Books, n.d.).

Demands by Scots and the Irish for independence stimulated the growth of Welsh regionalism. Plaid Cymru, the nationalist party of Wales, was founded in 1925. Among its demands was institutional assistance for the Welsh culture and language. As a result, the first Welsh-language school, a primary school in Aberystwyth, opened in 1939. The first Welsh-language secondary school was established in Rhyl in 1955. The Welsh Language Act of 1967 permitted the use of Welsh in courts and made contracts written in Welsh equally enforceable with those in English. TV and radio began broadcasting in Welsh in the 1980s. The Welsh Language Act of 1993 conferred official status on the



language in the public sphere. Today, the majority of Wales is still English-speaking, though Welsh dominates in the Western areas such as Anglesey and Gwynedd. Furthermore, two-thirds of the residents of Glamorgan and Rhondda Cynon Taf are Welsh speakers (Census-Wales 2012).

Wales saw the most progress in the sphere of Welsh language (Welsh Language Act 1993) and the local government regulation up to reform the municipal authorities (Wales Act 1998, Wales Act 2006). The Wales Act of 1998 transferred executive functions to the National Assembly for Wales.

In the 2000s, language policy became a main point in parties' agendas and interparty collaboration. Part of a 2007 coalition agreement formed by the Labour Party and Plaid Cymru after elections to the National Assembly of Wales reads:

The Welsh language belongs to everyone in Wales as part of our common national heritage, identity, and public good. We will work to ensure that more people, young and old, can learn Welsh and encourage it to thrive as a language of many communities all over Wales. We will be seeking enhanced legislative competence on the Welsh Language. Jointly we will work to extend the scope of the Welsh Language Legislative Competence Order included in the Assembly government's first-year legislative program, with a view to a new Assembly Measure to confirm official status for both Welsh and English, linguistic rights in the provision of services, and the establishment of the post of Language Commissioner. (One Wales 2007, 34)

The Welsh Language Act of 1993 set up a board to promote Welsh culture and the use of the Welsh language. In 2008, the National Assembly initiated the Investing in Welsh Schemes, which promoted Welsh in the private sector. In 2012, the language board's powers and duties were transferred to the government of Wales and the politically independent Welsh Language Commissioner. As for education, more than 440 primary schools and 50 secondary schools teach in Welsh. Syllabi of Welsh universities and colleges include particular disciplines conducted in Welsh. Experts deem the regional language policy implemented in the last 20 years a success: while more than 80% of Welsh residents 45–49 years old do not speak Welsh, about 47% of students ages 10–14 years old do not (Welsh language skills 2011). The UK has partly fulfilled its broad obligations for securing Welsh language in Wales (Application of the Charter in the United Kingdom 2014).

Most people in Wales identify as Welsh, but not on the strength of the language, which over centuries had been edged aside in social life by English by the time devolution happened.

Due to a lack of resources and political clout in Wales, the Welsh LTR is relatively weak. The drive to institutionalize a language policy encouraged devolution and the institutionalization of ETA. By including language policy in its devolution agenda, the Labour Party took on the pragmatic task of revitalizing Welsh. Westminster and the Labour Party were external actors who played a leading role in institutionalizing the language preferential policy. Unlike Scotland and Northern Ireland, Wales did not formulate coherent and major demands for devolution while the language rights were granted without strong public demand.

### *Autonomous province of Vojvodina*

After the collapse of Yugoslavia, Serbs retained their dominant position in Serbia. According to the 2011 census, they make up 83.3% of the population (without Kosovo). Other ethnic groups include Hungarians (3.9%), Roma (1.4%), Bosniaks (1.8%), Montenegrins (0.9%), and others (9.1%). Ethnic and linguistic composition are closely correlated: the official language, Serbian, is the primary language of 88% of the population.

The appearance of Vojvodina province on the map of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a result the imperial policy of Vienna, which granted selected preferences to Serbs in Hungary. In the Communist era, Serbia was a complex component of Yugoslavia and included two special regions, Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija. Vojvodina had the formal status of an autonomous province where Hungarians dominated among other ethnic minorities. Tolvaisis notes that “the institutionalization of collective rights of nations and nationalities in Vojvodina was rooted in the Yugoslav communist ideology” (2012, 64). Tito used Communist ideology to ensure the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and to neutralize Greater Serbian nationalism. For the same reasons, he granted Vojvodina and Kosovo the status of ETA. But it was only after the coming to power of Slobodan Milošević that Vojvodina more fully developed its status as an ETA (Tolvaisis 2012, 70–75).

The province consists of 45 municipalities, of which 41 are multiethnic. According to the 2011 census, just six municipalities are mostly Hungarian and another is relatively Hungarian; the rest are primarily Serbs (Census RS 2011, 38). In general, Orthodox believers dominate in Vojvodina. The Catholic population predominates in eight municipalities with concentrations of Hungarians. Thus, ethnic heterogeneity is an important feature of this region. According to the census, 27% of Serbia’s population lives in Vojvodina. Serbs account for 67% of the province’s residents, Hungarians 13%, and Roma 7.6% (Census RS 2011, 20). Twenty-nine ethnic groups live there: Serbs, Hungarians, Roma, Albanians, Bosniaks, Bulgarians, Bunjevci, Vlachs, Goranis, Macedonians, Muslims, Germans, Slovaks, Slovenes, Ruthenians, Russians, Ukrainians, and Romanians. Belić characterizes Vojvodina as the most multiethnic Balkan region (Belić 2014, 4).

According to §1 Article 24 of the Statute of Vojvodina, Serbian and Cyrillic are the official languages and alphabets of policy and governance in the province. Hungarian, Slovak, Croatian, Romanian, Ruthenian, and their alphabets also have official status in the province (Vojvodina Basic Facts 2015). The list of languages used in policy and governance is wider on the local level. The Statute of Vojvodina (Article 6) and the Serbian constitution (Article 79) guarantee ethnic minorities’ rights and freedoms and protect the use of ethnic groups’ languages and alphabets. Serbia also has ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minorities Languages. In accordance with these documents, the Vojvodina government ensures the official use of the Serbian language, in Cyrillic and Latin scripts, as well as Hungarian, Slovak, Croatian, Romanian, and Ruthenian and their scripts. The official use of ethnic groups’ languages and scripts means that residents can use their native languages when addressing authorities in writing or verbally, as well as having acts and laws available in that language.

The Statute of Vojvodina and the national law “On ethnic minorities’ rights and freedoms” (2009) requires that any municipality, city, town, or community allow any minority groups that account for at least 15% of their population to use their native languages in public affairs. A 2014 report on the official use of languages in Vojvodina’s local governments notes that Serbian is used in clerical work, governance, and schooling throughout the province, Hungarian in 31 municipalities, Slovak in 13, Croatian in four, Romanian in 10, Ruthenian in six, Czech in one, and Montenegrin in one (Languages and Alphabets 2014).

The educational system provides ethnolinguistic diversity. Under the Statute of Vojvodina (Article 13), citizens have a right to receive education in their native tongue and to learn it. Vojvodina schools provide different training options. It is possible to choose the bilingual program (Serbian + native tongue) or the monolingual program (Serbian as the main language of instruction + the other tongue as a second language). In fact, there is a relatively weak multilingual regime in Vojvodina. The preferential language policy is aimed not at territory but rather at members of ethnic minorities living in different parts

of the province. Its implementation is key to the process of institutionalizing multiethnic territorial autonomy in Vojvodina that guarantees the survival of even the smallest ethnic group. The main agent of this policy were the Hungarians (Tolvaisis 2012), as the first among Vojvodina's ethnic minorities.

Vojvodina's LTR is weaker than that in South Tyrol but stronger than that in Wales. The Serbian and UK governments face similar obligations to secure regional and minority languages, but Serbia is farther along in implementation (Application of the Charter in Serbia 2016). One major factor might be Hungary as a kin-state for Vojvodinian Hungarians. Meanwhile, all of the province's linguistic communities are dwarfed by the Serbian majority. Some non-Serbian ethnic groups might dominate at the local but not on the sub-national level. It is important that the territorial autonomy in Vojvodina was not granted for one or two ethnic groups: equal preferences (including language) are applied to all officially recognized ethnic minority groups. Therefore, Vojvodina's language preferential policy has a discrete character, combining elements of the symbolic and pragmatic. Both structural features of the regional community and the context of the ETA's establishment led to a moderate LTR in Vojvodina.

### *Case analysis*

The LTR that developed in South Tyrol is "strong." The set of language preferences for language groups is deep and universal in the vital areas of education and public administration. The ethnic groups' languages are the primary languages of instruction at all levels of schooling throughout the autonomy. Also, the ethnic groups' languages are used, with some exceptions, by all authorities at all levels in all areas, including the judiciary and law enforcement. A relatively weak LTR developed in Wales, where language control is less deep and universal, and where use of the minority language is much lower than in South Tyrol. Vojvodina's LTR can be characterized as intermediate.

These findings, however, require some qualifications.

First, South Tyrol's "strong" regime does not apply to all languages used in this ETA. In practice, there are only two languages, German and Italian, in South Tyrol. The main structural characteristic of these language communities is the numerical dominance of the native speakers in the region. And Italian also enjoys the status of national language. Ladin speakers, however, did not get the same scope of preferences as did speakers of other languages. Thus, there are two LTRs in South Tyrol: "strong" for Italian and German and "weak" for Ladin. The first is technically bilingual, with deep and broad preferences for the two languages, although it does not in fact promote bilingualism. It is essentially two monolingual LTRs under one bilingual roof.

Following Carla's approach, we identify the South Tyrolian LTR as a "parting regime," where language takes on the symbolic role of a divide. This means that the pragmatic intention of ethnic groups (especially Germans) to ensure the survival of their mother tongue as a symbol of group integrity and identity played a leading role in establishing South Tyrol's ETA. Now practices are changing, because the goal of preserving the mother tongue is joined by a new aim: to institutionalize interethnic and inter-linguistic communication within ETA.

In Wales, we find one relatively "weak" LTR. As the dominant language in Wales, English neither has nor needs any special preferences. However, for the purpose of conceptualization, it is preferable to consider the ratio of Welsh and English in the frame of the one bilingual regime. Their relations are not zero-sum in every sense: if the depth and the universality of preferences for Welsh were to increase, English could require additional

support. That is what happened with Italian as the official national language in South Tyrol: significant preferences for German produced the emergence of explicit rules on Italian use in South Tyrol. Welsh has preferences in Wales, though not broad or deep: situations where individuals are compelled by law to speak it rather than English are uncommon and easily avoided. Unlike South Tyrol and Vojvodina, Welsh did not have a kin-state to exert external pressure; therefore, it is a “weak pooling” LTR.

In Vojvodina, Serbian has the status of national language and dominates because the Serbs are the majority group. Other minority language groups concentrated in different municipalities differ in strength and configuration of multilingual regimes. Some language minorities in Vojvodina have kin-states (Hungary, Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, etc.), some of which in turn have formulated policies for its kin-group. Croatia institutionalized dual-nationality for kin-groups in 1993, and Hungary did a few years ago. The factor of kin-state activity is relatively significant. The dominance of Serbs in the multilingual composition of Vojvodina, the long tradition of state balance in ethnic policy under Tito, and the LTR’s institutional reconstitution in other ideological conditions (European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages) promote a “moderate pooling” LTR.

For all this motley assortment of LTRs and their complex configurations, they fit into two broad categories: “strong” LTRs, such as that in South Tyrol, and “weak” LTRs, as in Wales. The primary distinctions between them are the numerical dominance and political clout of the language group in the ETA. The population share of the titular groups in Wales and South Tyrol is similar, for instance, but their demands for preferences differ. In Wales, the predominance of Welsh (in terms of ethno-regional identity) does not mean the predominance of Welsh speakers. Just one-fourth of residents have some Welsh skills, and one-sixth can speak Welsh.

Vojvodina is the most linguistically fragmented ETA. “Striped” population patterns, overlapping of language groups, and mismatched administrative and community boundaries discourage the development of deep and universal LTRs. Hungarians are the biggest minority group in Vojvodina. Despite the fact that they are concentrated mainly in two of the autonomy’s seven districts, they have just a plurality there (The Population of Serbia, n.d.). The number of language groups is important too. Just six languages have official status in Vojvodina; yet, there are 26 language groups. Any attempt to develop a “strong” multilingual regime at least for six official languages would be prohibitively expensive. Thus, fragmented language diversity hinders the development of a “strong pooling” LTR.

It stands to reason that language composition is not directly related to the strength or weakness of an LTR. The key contextual factor is the bargaining power, measured in various ways, of each language group. In South Tyrol, the German community had a strong political leading actor (SVP) able to mobilize the majority of the community and a proactive kin-state (Austria) involved in the ETA affairs.

Neither Wales nor Vojvodina presents the same constellation of factors. There was no kin-state, huge conflicts, or mass mobilization in Wales. The ETA was bestowed from above. It was not just Welsh demands to save their native tongue that spurred the preferential language policy. Welsh devolution had a passive character, compelled by devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Economic demands and manifestations of cultural identity or confessional otherness played no role in Welsh regionalism. Being a historical part of the union with England, Wales was “given” preferences by Westminster. The Welsh language was an easy concession for London, as it was relatively absent in Welsh public life. The Laborites included a renaissance of Welsh in their political agenda and then stimulated devolution.

## Conclusions

The conceptualization of LTR as a system of de jure institutional arrangements of linguistic issues and practice of self-organization and perpetuation of multilingual communities can bring to light new aspects of language preferential policy in ETA. Ethnolinguistic minorities are protected through a system of special institutional arrangements on linguistic issues established to shape human interaction in ETA. These arrangements regulate the choice of the languages used in education and public administration especially. The concept of LTR helps us to determine the depth and universality of language preferences regulation. It is a suitable tool for comparative case study revealing correlations between the scope of preferences and related factors. This correlation helps us to gauge the strength of an LTR. The research demonstrates that a particular type of language policy aimed at preserving a community's cultural identity may either be the result of the community's pragmatic desire to survive and develop (regional, minority, or endangered languages, etc.) as in Serbia and Wales, or be symbolic (South Tyrol).

A strong LTR in an ETA guarantees practical use of a minority language by an ethnic minority. At the same time, a strong LTR promotes the split of a local autonomy into closed linguistic communities. A strong LTR in a multilingual ETA has multi- or bilingual institutional form, but it tends to strengthen and reproduce monolingual practices in everyday life. Language protection has a symbolic meaning and inhibits the development of bilingualism. Therefore, a symbolic language policy results in a zero-sum game, while there are no losers in a pragmatic language policy.

The combination of the strength of state regulation on language use and the way language rights are perceived and used (mindset) produces different regimes. Theoretically, we mark out next key variants that highlight polar points of analytical continuum (see Table 1). Strong state intervention in the protection of ethnolinguistic minorities can combine with both symbolic and pragmatic mindsets that respectively produce "strong parting-regime" or "strong pooling-regime." The reverse is true when weak state intervention combines with symbolic or pragmatic mindsets – we find "weak parting-regime" or "weak pooling-regime." The case analysis shows that South Tyrol tends toward a "strong parting-regime" and Wales is a relatively "weak pooling-regime." Vojvodina is a "moderate" primary "pooling-regime," where configuration of structural and contextual factors stipulates a mix of symbolic and pragmatic mindsets that are a check on strong state intervention. We suppose the optimum alternative is the "strong pooling-regime," as it protects ethnolinguistic minorities and ensures interaction within a multilingual community. Therefore, the empirical verification of this assumption might be a subject for further research about the possibility and logic of transformation from one type of LTR to another.

Table 1. Ideal types of language territorial regimes.

		Scope of state regulation of language usage	
		High degree	Low degree
Mindset: way of perception and usage of the right to language	Symbolic	Strong parting-regime	Weak parting-regime
	Pragmatic	Strong pooling-regime	Weak pooling-regime




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## Note

1. In 2015–2016, the general sample of our research project includes profiles of 61 ETA in different countries of the world. For the full list (about 100) of autonomies in the database, see: [http://identityworld.ru/index/database\\_eng/0-22](http://identityworld.ru/index/database_eng/0-22) (Accessed 30 April 2016).

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