

working legislatures with a strong history of anti-systemic actors in parliament (Italy) or talking legislatures without such a history (Ireland, Spain, and so on).

Rather than allow for the possibility that the role of anti-system actors *may be sufficient* (during specific historical periods), but is *not necessary* for the development of a talking legislature, Koß appears in some cases to interpret history to fit the model; he states, for example, that in Italy despite the fact that “the Communists obstructed the passage of legislation...[they] never posed a vital threat to legislative democracy . . . [because] they participated in the work of powerful committees” (p. 243). In addition to this assertion being certainly contestable, it avoids the fact that the presence of a strong anti-systemic Communist Party in parliament during the initial period of democratization after World War II should, according to the theory presented in this volume, have led the pro-system “followers” to empower “leaders” through the centralization of agenda power to protect Italy’s nascent legislative democracy. Instead, Italy followed a very different trajectory, actively including the anti-system actors and decentralizing agenda control to an unprecedented level. Similarly, Koß argues that in the cases of talking parliaments that emerged without active obstruction from anti-system actors (Spain, Ireland), it was the mere fear of the potential emergence of such actors that led to the ceding of power by the followers within the parliament. After the careful analysis of the previous chapters, this explanation feels ad hoc and unsatisfactory.

These efforts to make *every* case fit the theory are unnecessary. There is no reason to expect universality from a theory of legislative development, especially not one that is embedded within careful analyses of path dependency and specific historical exigencies. In the effort to replace previous theories reliant on factors related to political parties and party systems, Koß misses the possibility that his own contribution may add substantially to our collective understanding of parliamentary development without comprehensively supplanting existing explanations. The theoretical contributions of the book, as valuable as they are, would have been strengthened had the conclusion instead sought to accept the cases that do not perfectly fit the theory. Rather than attempting to explain away these anomalies, Koß might have encouraged additional investigation into multicausal, historically embedded analyses that investigate the ways in which political party and party system development interact with the presence of anti-system actors, particularly in democratic legislatures that emerge after the advent of modern political parties or after long periods of democratic breakdown.

Overall, *Parliaments in Time* is a valuable contribution to the literature on institutional development in general and the evolution of parliaments in particular. The four cases analyzed in depth are well researched, and the

insights into the role of anti-system obstruction, particularly during the early phases of institutional rationalization, are both innovative and instructive. The initial three chapters are quite dense, but the reader will be rewarded for their efforts in the empirical chapters that provide careful applications of the theory. I am hopeful that the author and others will pick up the mantle of integrating the new insights from this book into the existing literature, in particular examining not only the effective number of parties or volatility but also their implications for party discipline and internal party hierarchy: these factors may also explain the willingness of followers to cede procedural power to leaders, particularly within post-“state of nature” parliaments.

Contesting Authoritarianism: Labor Challenges to the State in Egypt. By Dina Bishara. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 204p. \$82.99 cloth, \$29.99 paper.
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In the years leading up to Egypt’s 2011 protest uprisings, an unprecedented number of labor union members brought their demands for better wages and fair treatment to the institutions of the Mubarak regime. Although it was perhaps not surprising that industrial workers were engaged in demonstrations of this sort, the participation of white-collar bureaucrats in labor protests confounded scholarly expectations. Dina Bishara grapples with this puzzling and important phenomenon. In particular, she asks why and how 27,000 real estate tax collectors were able to break out of the state monopoly on trade unions to establish Egypt’s first independent trade union in 2009.

The starting point for Bishara’s exploration is a clear and convincing account of state–society relations in Egypt, with a focus on the country’s long-standing system of state-controlled trade unions. Founded in 1957, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation monopolized the formal representation of Egyptian workers for decades. According to Bishara, union leaders first offered their support to Gamal Abdel Nasser “in exchange for guaranteeing workers’ economic rights, most importantly job security” (p. 27). But under what conditions did the prevailing corporatist bargain erode? Beginning in 1974, Anwar Sadat’s “open door” economic policies liberalized aspects of the Egyptian domestic economy. This reform process accelerated under Hosni Mubarak with a restructuring of public-sector enterprises as demanded by international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. This process set into motion a deterioration of state–labor relations as workers became increasingly aggrieved as a result of the byproducts of neoliberal reform efforts.

By the mid-2000s, Bishara argues that there was a clear rupture in state–labor relations culminating in the notorious 2006 trade union elections: these were characterized by significant state intervention in candidate selection, in addition to outright election fraud. State economic resources in support of labor had been declining for years, meaning that there were fewer financial incentives tying members to the official labor union system; those rents that did flow to labor went primarily to co-opt union leaders, who became increasingly out of step with the preferences of rank-and-file members. Indeed, Bishara argues that co-optation of union leadership was so pervasive that ordinary union members no longer viewed their leaders as credible representatives of member interests. Because of both the decreasing returns to participation in the state-sponsored union system and the widespread co-optation of union leadership, everyday union members saw little value in remaining part of the state-organized labor monopoly.

But how did real estate tax collectors become the vanguard of independent labor organizations? Bishara draws an important distinction between civil servants and state-sector industrial workers. Although both sets of workers were employees of the state, civil servants were viewed as unlikely challengers of state power. It was this very history of quiescence, however, that provided an opening for real estate tax collectors to mobilize. Factory workers, like those in the textile industry, had a history of protest mobilization. But neither the regime nor the co-opted union officials expected sit-ins and demonstrations from civil servants like the tax collectors. By catching the regime off guard, the tax collectors were able to elude repressive tactics. And given the salary compression suffered by white-collar bureaucrats, Bishara convincingly argues that “civil servants increasingly consider themselves part of Egypt’s working class” (p. 6).

In December 2007, thousands of real estate tax collectors from across Egyptian municipalities protested, demanding that they receive wage parity with Cairo-based collectors employed by the Ministry of Finance. The underpaid bureaucrats eventually extracted a major salary increase. In December 2008, the real estate tax collectors informally announced the establishment of an independent union, separate from the state-sponsored system of organized labor. By focusing on economic issues rather than political grievances, the tax collectors did not pose a direct political threat to the Mubarak regime. Bishara argues, however, that the creation of an independent worker organization by the real estate tax collectors challenged the Mubarak regime through its demands to end the state monopoly over trade unions. A small number of other white-collar workers and pensioners went on to found independent unions along the model of the real estate tax collectors.

What impact did the creation of independent trade unions have on the 2011 protest uprisings? Bishara treads

carefully here, reluctant to draw a direct line between the mobilization of white-collar bureaucrats and the uprisings. According to Bishara, workers participated in the 2011 protests as individuals, although there is some evidence that small groups of white-collar workers mobilized collectively as the uprisings unfolded (p. 132). She acknowledges, however, that the actions of labor unions and their members were characterized by a number of complexities. In some cases, union leaders discouraged workers’ participation in protests. Regime-aligned union leaders even played a role in attacks on protesters during the infamous “Battle of the Camel” violence in Tahrir Square on February 2, 2011.

Bishara’s bottom line is that labor activism had “important repercussions for state–society relations and for the nature of authoritarian rule in Egypt” (p. 18). Although beyond the book’s scope, open questions remain about the precise mechanisms by which the independent labor union movement influenced the 2011 protest uprisings. To what extent did activism by the real estate tax collectors encourage a culture of protest or delegitimize the Mubarak regime? Bishara approaches these issues cautiously. This is likely due to concerns that both the independent labor movement and the protest uprisings were rooted in the important structural economic changes that Bishara identifies, such as the decline in state economic resources and implementation of neoliberal economic reforms.

In sum, *Contesting Authoritarianism* makes a vital contribution to the study of civil society in Egypt. Scholars have long recognized the vitality of Egyptian civil society, including the ways that organized labor has challenged the authoritarian regime through demands for rights and representation. Bishara carries these themes through the late Mubarak period, demonstrating the bottom-up capacity for mobilization in Egypt, as well as the reasons why regime officials may have underestimated the potential for independent labor organization of this sort. The book also speaks directly to core questions in political science, including why and how previously co-opted groups formally defy state-sponsored corporatist structures and establish their own interest groups that are independent of the state.

Envy in Politics. By Gwyneth H. McClendon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. 248p. \$29.95 cloth.
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Gwyneth McClendon’s new book provides a thoughtful exploration of intragroup status dynamics. Drawing on various disciplines including psychology and anthropology, McClendon demonstrates with three empirical investigations the role of intragroup status motivations in shaping political preferences and behavior. As McClendon