horrors of war, the loneliness of imprisonment, and the agony of torture. If there is a glaring shortcoming to *Negotiating Postmodernism*, it is that abstract theorization of the most sweeping variety takes place in the complete absence of empirical reference, even when practical solutions are proffered.

Gabardi's encyclopaedic effort provides many succulent bones to chew on. Yet, little is discussed in depth or justified at length. One is tantalized but left rather hungry. For instance, we are at a loss to learn, in light of the dilemmas of postmodern life, why or how Gabardi's economic and political proposals should or could become implemented. Frankly, I believe that most of his practical proposals are good ones. But that only means he is, like me, a social democrat informed by postmodern sensibilities. People with a different ideological bent would find the author's refusal to justify many of his proposals rather irritating. They would be nonplussed by Gabardi's abrupt leap from a theoretical amalgamation of Habermas, Heidegger, Arendt, and Foucault to the practical advocacy of a negative income tax, universal child care, and a 32-hour work week.

I am also troubled by the celebration of Foucaultian-style transgression. The problem is that such performative action is too easily colonized in the postmodern world. One need only think of the performers featured on Jerry Springer and other day-time talk shows who stimulate the public's appetite for transgressive spectacles. Nietzsche said that decadence can be defined as the need for greater and greater stimulation to achieve the same level of satisfaction. Performative transgression is a facet of postmodern decadence that the media techno-oligarchy well exploits. I would think that Foucault's dallying with sadomasochism bears the same danger. Bread, circuses, and sadomasochistic gladiators—all available on pay-per-view!

To his credit, Gabardi recognizes the capacity of the postmodern world to colonize the most creative acts of resistance. Its capacity to exploit efficiently (even our subversive) desires and actions, to integrate minds, bodies, and souls into what Heidegger called the *Bestand* or standing-reserve, is perhaps the chief reason to fight for leisure. But this fight might best be waged not by spending more time free of work, but by learning how not to *spend* time, whether one is engaged in work or play, theory or praxis.

Containing Nationalism. By Michael Hechter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 256p. $29.95.

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Michael Hechter focuses on three puzzles about nationalism (pp. 3–4). Why is it only a modern phenomenon? Why is it more acute in some countries than in others? And can its dark side of horrendous violence be contained? The title suggests that his principal concern is with the last question, but the bulk of discussion focuses on the second. One can readily answer the first question by saying that nationalism is strictly modern because it is about mass mobilization. Hence, it is kin to democracy, revolution, and socialism, none of which could arise in large countries before mobilization was possible. The democratic revolutions in the United States and France were about changing the locus of sovereignty from a monarch to the people. This is not strictly Hechter's argument, but it is implicit in many of his claims, such as that nationalism requires the existence of organizations that work for the national sovereignty of their subgroup (p. 125).

This answer, of course, merely pushes the question back to ask why mobilization began to be possible little more than two centuries ago. A quick and probably partial answer is that technology, communication, transportation, and aggregation of workforces enabled mobilization as never before. A second quick answer is that Napoleon changed modern warfare and modern states by organizing vast armies, almost all of them composed of conscripts or volunteers rather than mercenaries. (The Romans, Persians, and others had mobilized large armies, but Napoleon was revolutionary in his era.) Military and factory mobilization both tended to produce people who could speak a uniform national language and thereby de facto created modern nations. The first of these nations were driven by territorially inclusive nationalism, as in the cases of France and the United States. But they provoked nationalisms that were culturally inclusive and therefore exclusionary in other respects (pp. 91–2).

Hechter has a different historical account of the reason nationalism arose only recently in Europe. His specific claim is that the world of local control was displaced by the rise of direct rule, of the intrusive state governing a large population (p. 60). When governance was highly local, the very idea of nationalism could not occur to or motivate anyone—it would have no point. State formation in Europe proceeded by the confederation of distinct solidary groups (p. 42). Later, direct rule from the center of such confederated states broke the connection between the nation and the governance unit. Nationalism was therefore a response to growing state capacity for direct rule. Earlier empires had generally ruled indirectly, with governance structures and policies that varied from one group to another throughout the diverse empire.

Hechter's chief answer to the second question is that states have a limited span of control and need to organize more or less federally to manage large populations. The rise of direct rule in large states led to opposition to the center from culturally peripheral groups. In earlier work, Hechter argues that a multiethnic state would be easier to govern because each ethnic group would enforce some behaviors on its members, who therefore would have less energy to spend on more generally directed efforts that might challenge the state (pp. 156–7). Clearly, there is a risk in this arrangement because the subunit itself may organize against the state, especially if it becomes infected with nationalist fervor. In Yugoslavia, the federal organization of politics into ethnically concentrated regions enabled Croatian and Serbian nationalism. But, Hechter supposes, the greater risk is to attempt direct rule that reduces policies to uniformity across a diverse population. He argues that decentralization of government to a cultural minority may give that minority the resources to mobilize protests. Although this may suggest that the move is destabilizing, it may simultaneously undercut demands for sovereignty and, therefore, nationalist fervor (p. 146).

Despite frequent concern with the possibilities for collective action, both in protest actions and in mobilizing nationalist groups, the argument here is almost entirely at the level of the nation and the governing structure, not at the level of incentives or specific individual motivations. As Hechter notes for particular cases, leaders often have motivations of self-interest in gaining leadership positions in a newly created state that is congruent with some nationality, and therefore they may work for the nationalist cause of separate government. The motivations of others in a nationalist movement are merely a desire for policies that differ from the larger state to which they are subject. Hechter's main addition to this simple account builds on social identity theory, as in the work of Henri Tajfel and others, who attempt to explain the commonly spontaneous creation of exclusionary groups (pp. 99–101).

If we are to identify with a group, that group must already

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be defined. Groups tend to form around characteristics that are important to individual welfare or around mere location. In social identity theory, individuals identify readily with high-status groups. If they are in a low-status group, from which they cannot exit, they will tend to revalue the group and will identify strongly with it. Hechter argues that in many multiethnic societies there is a cultural division of labor that contributes in just this way to the heightening of national identity, especially for the group that is lower in the hierarchy of division (chap. 6). Such cultural divisions can be broken down by the conditions of urban life, in which internal enforcement by group members against one another is too weak to sustain the division, which therefore must depend on political enforcement (p. 112).

In sum, nationalism is primarily a result of the irritations of centralized direct rule over cultural minorities who seek autonomy, the kind of autonomy they might have had in the earlier era of indirect rule. They may be placated by grants of partial autonomy, as in various devolutions of governmental authority in recent times. And, if we may read between the lines, they are more likely to be placated if their economic prospects are good enough to displace concern with political status.

Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750. By Jonathan I. Israel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 810p. $45.50.

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This book offers a major challenge to the academic political theory establishment in the United States and United Kingdom. Instead of Hobbes-Locke-Rousseau, the important story is Spinoza-Bayle-Diderot. If you are not teaching Spinoza and his influence in your surveys of early modern and Enlightenment thought, you should be.

This is an epic drama with a cast of dozens. The story opens with Cartesianism and its spread around Europe, with major implications for society, institutions, women, sexuality, and more. Cartesianism is soon replaced by Spinozism, which pushes philosophical radicalism even farther. Important figures making up a new canon include the previously obscure Van den Enden, the Koerbagh brothers, and Lodewijk Meyer. Benedict de Spinoza is the key figure, largely, as Israel argues, because he systematized the radical philosophy advanced since ancient times by less systematic figures, and because he was both vilified and followed by so many. In a nutshell, revelation, a providential God, freedom of the will, and miracles are ruled out on philosophical grounds, and immortality of the soul is denied by a theory that everything is one substance. Politically, this implies secularization, equality, democracy, freedom of expression, and women's liberation.

None of this was accepted quietly. A three-way battle for the hearts and minds of Europe was waged among conservatives, moderate Enlighteners, and radical Enlighteners. Famous names such as Locke, Newton, and Voltaire are only moderates, in Israel's analysis. The radicals are the Spinozists, such as Adriaan Beverland, Johannes Bredenburg, and Balthasar Bekker.

One of Israel's purposes is to push back the accepted dates for the important developments in early modern philosophy and political thought from the high Enlightenment of 1750–1800 to the early Enlightenment of 1650–1750. By 1750, it is argued, most of the work had been done. In the shadow of Spinozism came numerous controversies, from the brouhaha over Bayle's claim that atheists could be good citizens to Bredenburg's fight with Limborch over the proper relations between reason and religion; from Fontenelle and Van Dale on oracles as political frauds to Leenhof on universal philosophical religion. Not only conservatives but also such moderates as Locke, Leibniz, Thomasius, and Wolff fought rear-guard battles against the growing influence of Spinozism. "Whig history" is a term that means all historical roads lead to the Whigs; here, all roads lead to Spinoza, so this is presumably Spinozist history.

This is cosmopolitan rather than nationalist history. Defying the trend of studying the Enlightenment in a single national context, the book sweeps back and forth across all of literate Europe: from Ireland to Naples, from Sweden to Portugal. A good part of the radical Enlightenment was underground, spread by clandestine manuscripts written by the likes of Boulainvilliers, Du Marsais, and other deists and Spinozists, most often in French. Radical German enlighteners, such as Tschirnhaus, Stosch, Lau, Schmidt, and Edelmann, receive renewed attention here. Vico, Radicati, and Pietro Giannone prove that some Italians were up to date. And Israel shows that Spinozism played a role even in Spain and Portugal.

This reassessment is on the order of the major works of Peter Gay, Quentin Skinner, John Pocock, and very few others. A few years ago, Steven B. Smith (*Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity,* 1997) gave us a fresh reading of Spinoza's political theory. Israel's book sets that theory in context and spells out its implications for the history of ideas over a century and more.

Repeatedly, Israel takes down the inflated reputations of Hobbes and Locke. He cites dozens of sources from the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that claim Spinoza raised the real issues, not the English writers. It is indeed remarkable how long it takes for insular and nationalist canons to be challenged. For example, in France *La lettre clandestine* reached its tenth annual volume without any significant circulation among Anglo-American political theorists. For those of us who have been reading a large body of German, French, and Italian scholarship on these trends in the last decade, it is about time that a book such as Israel's finally is issued by a mainstream English-language publisher. Since prestige is so important in the diffusion of scholarship, Israel's position as professor of History at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton should add to the conviction created by his arguments.

For political theorists who have little idea about what is going on in the rest of Europe, this volume is a magnificent opportunity to get up to date. What is at stake is the claim, now widely recognized elsewhere, that we moderns are not the intellectual heirs of the courtier Hobbes or the gentry spokesman Locke but, rather, of the former Jewish lens grinder Spinoza and his radical Dutch, German, and French followers.

As with any wide-reaching synthesis, specialists will have bones to pick. Denis Vairasse's *History of the Sevarambes* is described as a "French Spinozistic novel" and dated to 1677, but it appeared first in English in 1675. Israel asserts several times that Bayle was silent on freedom of the press, but what was his famous "Clarification concerning Obscenities" about? Israel claims that freedom of the press was always and only a radical position, but Elie Luzac's defense of it in 1749 was rather clearly a moderate stance.

Specialists will also want to suggest further evidence. For example, Boureau-Deslandes's *Reflections on the Death of Free-Thinkers* (1713) could have been mentioned on page 298. Something could have been made of Martín Martínez in Spain. Israel has materials on libraries, learned journals,

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