

be defined. Groups tend to form around characteristics that are important to individual welfare or around mere location. In social identity theory, individuals identify readily with high-status groups. If they are in a low-status group, from which they cannot exit, they will tend to revalue the group and will identify strongly with it. Hechter argues that in many multiethnic societies there is a cultural division of labor that contributes in just this way to the heightening of national identity, especially for the group that is lower in the hierarchy of division (chap. 6). Such cultural divisions can be broken down by the conditions of urban life, in which internal enforcement by group members against one another is too weak to sustain the division, which therefore must depend on political enforcement (p. 112).

In sum, nationalism is primarily a result of the irritations of centralized direct rule over cultural minorities who seek autonomy, the kind of autonomy they might have had in the earlier era of indirect rule. They may be placated by grants of partial autonomy, as in various devolutions of governmental authority in recent times. And, if we may read between the lines, they are more likely to be placated if their economic prospects are good enough to displace concern with political status.

**Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750.** By Jonathan I. Israel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 810p. \$45.50.

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This book offers a major challenge to the academic political theory establishment in the United States and United Kingdom. Instead of Hobbes-Locke-Rousseau, the important story is Spinoza-Bayle-Diderot. If you are not teaching Spinoza and his influence in your surveys of early modern and Enlightenment thought, you should be.

This is an epic drama with a cast of dozens. The story opens with Cartesianism and its spread around Europe, with major implications for society, institutions, women, sexuality, and more. Cartesianism is soon replaced by Spinozism, which pushes philosophical radicalism even farther. Important figures making up a new canon include the previously obscure Van den Enden, the Koerbagh brothers, and Lodewijk Meyer. Benedict de Spinoza is the key figure, largely, as Israel argues, because he systematized the radical philosophy advanced since ancient times by less systematic figures, and because he was both vilified and followed by so many. In a nutshell, revelation, a providential God, freedom of the will, and miracles are ruled out on philosophical grounds, and immortality of the soul is denied by a theory that everything is one substance. Politically, this implies secularization, equality, democracy, freedom of expression, and women's liberation.

None of this was accepted quietly. A three-way battle for the hearts and minds of Europe was waged among conservatives, moderate Enlighteners, and radical Enlighteners. Famous names such as Locke, Newton, and Voltaire are only moderates, in Israel's analysis. The radicals are the Spinozists, such as Adriaan Beverland, Johannes Bredenburg, and Balthasar Bekker.

One of Israel's purposes is to push back the accepted dates for the important developments in early modern philosophy and political thought from the high Enlightenment of 1750–1800 to the early Enlightenment of 1650–1750. By 1750, it is argued, most of the work had been done. In the shadow of Spinozism came numerous controversies, from the brouhaha over Bayle's claim that atheists could be good citizens to

Bredenburg's fight with Limborch over the proper relations between reason and religion; from Fontenelle and Van Dale on oracles as political frauds to Leenhof on universal philosophical religion. Not only conservatives but also such moderates as Locke, Leibniz, Thomasius, and Wolff fought rear-guard battles against the growing influence of Spinozism. "Whig history" is a term that means all historical roads lead to the Whigs; here, all roads lead to Spinoza, so this is presumably Spinozist history.

This is cosmopolitan rather than nationalist history. Defying the trend of studying the Enlightenment in a single national context, the book sweeps back and forth across all of literate Europe: from Ireland to Naples, from Sweden to Portugal. A good part of the radical Enlightenment was underground, spread by clandestine manuscripts written by the likes of Boulainvilliers, Du Marsais, and other deists and Spinozists, most often in French. Radical German enlighteners, such as Tschirnhaus, Stosch, Lau, Schmidt, and Edelmann, receive renewed attention here. Vico, Radicati, and Pietro Giannone prove that some Italians were up to date. And Israel shows that Spinozism played a role even in Spain and Portugal.

This reassessment is on the order of the major works of Peter Gay, Quentin Skinner, John Pocock, and very few others. A few years ago, Steven B. Smith (*Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity*, 1997) gave us a fresh reading of Spinoza's political theory. Israel's book sets that theory in context and spells out its implications for the history of ideas over a century and more.

Repeatedly, Israel takes down the inflated reputations of Hobbes and Locke. He cites dozens of sources from the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that claim Spinoza raised the real issues, not the English writers. It is indeed remarkable how long it takes for insular and nationalist canons to be challenged. For example, in France *La lettre clandestine* reached its tenth annual volume without any significant circulation among Anglo-American political theorists. For those of us who have been reading a large body of German, French, and Italian scholarship on these trends in the last decade, it is about time that a book such as Israel's finally is issued by a mainstream English-language publisher. Since prestige is so important in the diffusion of scholarship, Israel's position as professor of History at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton should add to the conviction created by his arguments.

For political theorists who have little idea about what is going on in the rest of Europe, this volume is a magnificent opportunity to get up to date. What is at stake is the claim, now widely recognized elsewhere, that we moderns are not the intellectual heirs of the courtier Hobbes or the gentry spokesman Locke but, rather, of the former Jewish lens grinder Spinoza and his radical Dutch, German, and French followers.

As with any wide-reaching synthesis, specialists will have bones to pick. Denis Vairasse's *History of the Sevarambes* is described as a "French Spinozistic novel" and dated to 1677, but it appeared first in English in 1675. Israel asserts several times that Bayle was silent on freedom of the press, but what was his famous "Clarification concerning Obscenities" about? Israel claims that freedom of the press was always and only a radical position, but Elie Luzac's defense of it in 1749 was rather clearly a moderate stance.

Specialists will also want to suggest further evidence. For example, Boureau-Deslandes's *Reflections on the Death of Free-Thinkers* (1713) could have been mentioned on page 298. Something could have been made of Martín Martínez in Spain. Israel has materials on libraries, learned journals,

encyclopedias, book catalogs, and other modes of diffusion of ideas, but there is no survey of the recently growing study of correspondence networks. The coda on Rousseau is a bit underdeveloped; much more has been said elsewhere about Spinoza's reception in the period 1750–1800, and one area for future research would be Kant's Spinozism. But any such matters of detail would only confirm the overall message of this book: Major sectors of English-language political theory and history of political thought have been missing a great deal of what was important in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it can be found here.

**Lincoln's Sacred Effort: Defining Religion's Role in American Self-Government.** By Lucas E. Morel. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000. 251p. \$70.00 cloth, \$23.95 paper.

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Lucas Morel presents an excellent survey of Abraham Lincoln's frequent use of biblical language and allusions. Yet, Morel fails the significance test he sets for himself (pp. 1–2): Did Lincoln frequently use such language merely because it was the most common vernacular of his time; the vernacular with which his audiences would be most familiar? Or did he also frequently use such language because he thought that the right ordering of the relationship between religion and politics was critical to the maintenance of a democratic regime and that he actually had something important and original to say about that relationship?

I agree with Morel that the latter is probably the correct answer; he does not show that it is the correct answer. This is far from a personal failure on his part, as he probably does the best he can with the available evidence. The problem is that so little evidence is available. In essence, Morel stretches that evidence into a set of arguments that Lincoln *might* have made about the proper relationship between religion and politics. He shows considerable ingenuity in developing these arguments, but it must be emphasized that he is the one who has developed them, not Lincoln.

Perhaps a useful comparison is between Lincoln and Thomas Hobbes. In both cases, scholars have engaged in extensive speculation about their personal religious beliefs and whether they were atheists or, at most, tepid theists. In both cases, a lack of evidence has fueled this speculation. The two cases appear very different, however, once we move beyond the question of personal religious beliefs and begin to look at their views on the relationship between religion and politics. Much more evidence is available for Hobbes than for Lincoln. Morel tries to analyze Lincoln's views on the relationship between religion and politics as if Lincoln had written something equivalent to parts III and IV of *The Leviathan*. But of course he did not.

In making this comparison, my intention is not to stress the difference between analyzing the works of a philosopher and a statesman so much as it is to emphasize the difference between analyzing Morel's chosen topic and other possible topics in Lincoln's works. The writings and speeches of Lincoln can bear a fairly high level of analysis on such subjects as democracy and slavery, as has been shown by, among others, Harry Jaffa, who is mentioned so prominently by Morel (pp. ix, 14). They simply cannot bear the same level of analysis on Morel's chosen topic. There is a very good reason that, as Morel claims (p. 11), such a book has never been written before.

The one possible exception to Lincoln's relative silence on the relationship between religion and politics is his famous Lyceum speech of 1838 (chap. 2). Yet, as Morel emphasizes,

the political religion of that speech is not really a political *religion* but, rather, a civil disposition of obedience to law that religion then might be used to foster (pp. 8–9, 14–5, 31–2). Lincoln understands the relationship between religion and politics in this speech quite narrowly. But Morel is also very interested—and claims Lincoln is as well—in that relationship more broadly defined to include the ways in which politics should accommodate religion (chap. 3), in which religion might be misused politically (chap. 4), and in which religion teaches men the limits of politics as well as of religion itself (chap. 5). It is on these more strictly religious topics that Lincoln says so little and Morel says so much.

This gap is especially yawning in chapter 4, which is the weakest of the book. (Chapter 5, which deftly but still too expansively for my taste analyzes Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, is the strongest chapter.) In chapter 4, Morel analyzes Lincoln's temperance address of 1842 and elaborates one of the major motifs of his book: The abolitionists were Lincoln's exemplar for the political misuses of religion (pp. 9–10, 26, 125–6, 140). Yet, the abolitionists were not Lincoln's explicit targets in this address; self-righteous temperance reformers were. Furthermore, even when the abolitionists were Lincoln's explicit targets, as in his celebrated 1858 campaign debates with Stephen A. Douglas, his attacks seem grounded much more in political expediency than in personal disdain for either the principles or tactics of the abolitionists. However moderate Lincoln's own antislavery principles and tactics may have been, they eventually coalesced with those of the abolitionists (pp. 175–80). There is a large measure of truth to Wendell Phillips's gloss on Lincoln's victory in the 1860 presidential election: "Lincoln is in *place*, Garrison is in *power*" ("Lincoln's Election," in Wendell Phillips, *Speeches, Lectures, and Letters*, 1864, p. 305; emphasis original).

Where does this leave us? Morel provides some very interesting speculations about Lincoln's views on the proper relationship between religion and politics, but he stretches the evidence beyond what it can bear.

**Worlds of Difference: European Discourses of Toleration, c. 1100–1550.** By Cary J. Nederman. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. 157p. \$40.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

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This book is novel, attending more to the history than to the logic or morality of tolerance. It propounds, against the popular grain, a significant presence for tolerance in medieval Europe. Cases are made for Abelard, Marsilius, and others as significant exponents. The result provides students with an opportunity briskly to explore work too often ignored. If this study hits methodological sandbanks, it is hoped that will not deter others from voyaging in premodern times and in non-European waters.

Nederman takes aim at two key notions: The doctrine of tolerance is exclusively modern, and, more narrowly, tolerance is the lineal progeny of "liberalism." He is right to target the second, but he has invented the first. He is right to counter the view that "the Christian Middle Ages has [sic] *nothing whatsoever* to contribute to our understanding . . . of tolerance" (p. 3, emphasis added). Except that only one of four whom he "counters" arguably takes this view. A traveller who is construed to claim "there is no water *whatsoever* in the desert," is proved wrong by the little rain that will eventually fall. An observer who claims that no medieval writer can "readily" be conceived to oppose tolerance, or that medieval