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THE ROLE OF LYSIAS' SPEECH IN PLATO'S *PHAEDRUS*

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This article argues that the attribution to Lysias of the *erōtikos* (230e6–234c5) in Plato's *Phaedrus* is more significant than has generally been acknowledged. The *erōtikos* is attributed to Lysias because he is a logographer, whose success is dependent on writing speeches for other people. A careful consideration of both the context and the content of the speech encourage us to consider its relevance to Socrates. By attributing an (underwhelming) attempt at Socratic rhetoric to Lysias, the *Phaedrus* frames his speech as an example of the potential pitfalls of putting words into Socrates' mouth. As such, the speech has broader significance for our understanding of what it means to write Socratic *logoi*.

Introduction

For those who believe that Lysias' speech in the *Phaedrus* is an authentic piece of Lysianic rhetoric, its attribution to Lysias is easy to explain. Plato presents the speech as by Lysias simply because *it is* by Lysias.[1] The current scholarly consensus, however, is against Lysianic authorship and the speech is now most often read as a Platonic imitation of Lysias.[2] If this consensus is correct, as I believe that it is, the question naturally follows: why does Plato attribute *this* particular speech, tackling *this topic* in *this way*, to *Lysias* as opposed to any other rhetorician or sophist?[3]

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1 De Vries (1969) 11–14 presents a summary of the debate over the authorship. Some ancient sources, such as Diogenes Laertius (3.25) and Hermias, *On Plato's Phaedrus* (38.14–16), take it to be Lysianic. De Vries doubts the value of Diogenes' testimony and suggests that Hermias may have been defending the speech against contemporary attacks on its authenticity. See also Sales and Monserrat (2013) 63–4.

2 See, for example, Carey (2007a) v, Todd (2007) 5 n. 16 and Yunis (2011) 98. Plato is willing both to parody the verbal style of others (as in the case of Prodicus and Hippias at *Prt.* 336d–338b) and to compose speeches for interlocutors whose writings would have been known independently (such as Aristophanes in the *Symposium*).

3 Those who do scrutinise the choice of Lysias as a target tend to rely on (sometimes biographical) speculation. Robin (1970) xiv–xxii suggests animosity on Plato's part due to Lysias' possible involvement in the prosecution of Socrates. Howland (2004) 203–6 reads the treatment of Lysias in the *Phaedrus* as part of a broader Platonic

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Any answer to this question needs to address the fact that, for all that the speech makes confident use of Lysianic language, it is also notably out of keeping with Lysias in significant ways.[4] Scholars often observe, in agreement with Socrates' critique of the speech within the dialogue, that it is not a particularly impressive piece of rhetoric. In fact, it is often taken to be distinctly inferior to the surviving Lysianic speeches, most frequently in terms of structure and fluency.[5] More significantly for my purposes, its subject matter is strikingly different from what we find in the Lysianic corpus.[6] None of Lysias' surviving speeches shares either the erotic or the encomiastic nature of the *Phaedrus*' speech. Further, although we do find non-forensic speeches in the corpus, there is nothing that comes close to its epideictic playfulness or paradoxicality. Lysias' speech in the *Phaedrus* is much closer in tone and style to the sort of 'intellectual titillation' we find in Gorgias' *Encomium to Helen* or *Defence of Palamedes* than to any surviving speech of Lysias.[7]

The question here, then, is not simply that of why Plato chooses to attack Lysias rather than any other orator, but rather why he chooses to attack Lysias, whose fame is founded on his skill as a logographer, on the basis of a disappointing piece of epideictic.[8] Those scholars who have attempted to answer this question have tended to do so by claiming that Lysias must, at some point or other, have been overtly associated with this kind of epideictic, so that it makes sense for Plato to criticise the logographer Lysias as a representative of sophistic rhetoric.[9] In what follows, I will offer an alternative suggestion. My claim is that the attribution of the *erōtikos* to Lysias is far more significant than has generally been acknowledged. In fact, Lysias is chosen precisely *because* he is a

project to challenge Lysias' account of justice in the *Against Eratosthenes*. Rowe (1988) 136 and Yunis (2011) 8 both suggest that Lysias is suitable as a target appropriate to the date of the dialogue. The question remains *in what way* Lysias is appropriate as a target.

4 Dover (1968) 69–71 notes the verbal similarities between the *Phaedrus*' speech and *Against Eratosthenes*. See also Shorey (1933) and Dimock (1952). Both read the speech's exaggerated use of Lysianic verbal style as parodic.

5 Robin (1970) xviii–xxii emphasises the contrast between Plato's Lysias as a 'mauvais écrivain' producing vague and unoriginal arguments and the Lysias admired by Cicero, Quintilian and modern readers. See also Hackforth (1952) 17 and 31, Thesleff (1967) 143 n. 2, Rowe (1988) 142–5 and Yunis (2011) 98.

6 Dionysius of Halicarnassus lists *erōtikoi* among the works of Lysias (*Lysias* 1 and 3) but says nothing more about them. See also pseudo-Plutarch's (*Vitae decem oratorum* 836a–b) reference to *erōtikoi*. It is quite possible that this tradition is itself informed by the *Phaedrus*.

7 As Dover (1968) 69 notes. Carey (2007b) 248 classifies the *Phaedrus*' *erōtikos* as a distinct type of paradoxical epideictic, related to encomiastic *paignia*.

8 Even if we accept that Lysias did compose erotic and encomiastic speeches, as some ancient accounts suggest, the problem remains that he appears to be targeted in the *Phaedrus* on the grounds of his fame. This, even as it is represented within the dialogue, is a matter of his logographic activities.

9 Ferrari (1987) 92 n. 8 suggests that Lysias used this kind of epideictic speech to attract new customers for his logography. See also Buccioni (2007) 18 and Yunis (2011) 97. Robin (1970) xv–xvi and Hackforth (1952) 16 both cite Cic. *Brut.* 48 as evidence that Lysias gave up teaching rhetoric to concentrate on logography. Hackforth assumes that Lysias achieved equal success in both areas primarily on the basis of the *Phaedrus*. If Lysias were, as is sometimes suggested, a teacher of rhetoric prior to making his reputation as a logographer, there may be some justice in attacking him via a critique of sophistic epideictic rhetoric. The question remains, however, whether he is the most appropriate target for such an attack, bearing in mind that Lysias in the *Phaedrus* is established as a logographer. See de Vries (1969) 14.

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logographer, and the *erōtikos* attributed to him in the *Phaedrus* is intended, its epideictic form notwithstanding, to represent logographic rhetoric, in a broad sense. Lysias is not present in the *Phaedrus* simply as a famous a rhetorician who also happens to be a writer; he is present as someone whose success depends on *writing speeches for other people*. Recognising this fact requires us to reconsider our approach to the *erōtikos* and its role within the dialogue. In fact, I will argue that both the context and the content of the *erōtikos* encourage us to consider its relevance to Socrates. By attributing an (underwhelming) attempt at Socratic rhetoric to Lysias, the *Phaedrus* frames his speech as an example of the potential pitfalls of putting words into Socrates' mouth. As such, the speech has broader significance for our understanding of what it means to write Socratic *logoi*.

Lysias as logographer in the *Phaedrus*

Lysias is clearly present in the *Phaedrus* as the personification of rhetoric in general, to stand as a rival and antagonist to Socrates, the personification of philosophy. Nevertheless, Lysias' particular activity as a logographer is emphasised throughout the *Phaedrus*. The importance of his role as someone who writes speeches for others to perform is most clearly signalled by the manner in which he exerts his influence within the dialogue. Lysias dominates the *Phaedrus*, but he does so only via the presence of the written speech that Phaedrus carries with him. His 'voice' is heard only through Phaedrus reading the speech aloud.[10] This replicates Lysias' absent presence in the law courts, where clients perform the speeches he has written as their own.[11] Phaedrus even attempts to suppress the presence of the written speech by hiding it under his cloak and offering what he claims is his own precis of its arguments.[12] In doing so, he mimics the role of the legal client in memorising and performing a speech written by a logographer as if it were his own.[13]

We see further acknowledgement of Lysias' logographic activity in the message that Socrates gives Phaedrus to relay to Lysias at 278b7–d1. There Lysias is listed as the archetype of logography alongside Homer and Solon, the representatives of poetry and political oratory respectively. Even the pairing and comparison of Lysias and Isocrates at the very end of the dialogue (278e5–b3) can be understood at least in part in terms of their shared status as logographers.[14] Socrates' apparently ironic estimation of Isocrates' potential in comparison to Lysias is usefully informed by Isocrates' claim to have

10 Lysias is never given his 'own voice' in the dialogues. He is a silent presence in the *Republic* (328b4) and mentioned as the audience for a possible critique of Socrates in the *Clitophon* (406a1–6).

11 Lysias' *Against Eratosthenes*, written in Lysias' own voice, represents a notable exception. Even in this case, however, Lysias may have relied on circulating the speech as a pamphlet, if his metic status prevented him from delivering it in court. It may be that Plato is acknowledging Lysias' civic voicelessness in denying him any speaking role in the dialogues.

12 *Phdr.* 228c5–e2.

13 See Usher (1976) on the speechwriter–client relationship.

14 As noted by Rowe (1988) 215.

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forsaken logography for philosophy.[15] In addition, it should be read in the context of the possibility that Isocrates and Lysias had been real-life rivals in the law courts.[16] Isocrates is not just Lysias' rival in terms of philosophical potential. He is also Lysias' logographic rival.[17]

Lysias' logographic activities are most explicitly addressed in a passage following Socrates' second speech. There, Socrates expresses the hope that Lysias will leave behind the sort of rhetoric represented by Socrates' first speech (and, by implication, Lysias' own), and follow his brother Polemarchus in taking up philosophy (257b1–6). Phaedrus, now apparently convinced of Socrates' rhetorical superiority, voices his suspicion that Lysias may be unwilling to continue the rhetorical contest with Socrates (257c4–7):

> Indeed, my wonderful friend, just the other day one of the politicians was abusing him on this very charge, and all the while he was abusing him, he kept calling him a 'speechwriter' (λογογράφον); so perhaps we will find that he refrains from writing (γράφειν) out of a care for his reputation.

Phaedrus assumes that any speech that Lysias generates in response to the Palinode will inevitably be written. As Yunis notes, he does not even consider the possibility that Lysias could, as Socrates has just done, extemporise a response.[18] Lysias is characterised as someone whose rhetorical ability is inseparable from its presentation in writing.[19]

Socrates' response to Phaedrus' suggestion that speechwriting will, after all, be a source of shame for Lysias is also telling. In the account of political rhetoric that follows (257c8–258d6), Socrates insists (contrary to Phaedrus' view) that politicians are 'especially in love with speechwriting (μάλιστα ἐρῶσι λογογραφίας) and with leaving speeches for posterity'. As is often noted, Socrates' critique of political writing here manipulates an ambiguity in the term λογογραφία, which can be used to refer either (as Phaedrus does) to forensic speechwriting specifically or (as Socrates does) to the writing of prose in general.[20] This ambiguity allows Socrates to shift the discussion from its focus on Lysias as a speechwriter to an analysis of writing as a whole. Nevertheless, Lysias is not

15 See *Antid.* 15.2, 36–8 and 49 for Isocrates' attempts to distance himself from the logographic activity represented by speeches 16–21.

16 See Todd (2007) 31–2.

17 Readers of the *Phaedrus* tend to focus on the rivalry between Plato and Isocrates, as opposed to that between Lysias and Isocrates. It is notable that Isocrates' single mention in the *Phaedrus* has been devoted as much, if not more, attention than Lysias' absent presence throughout, with some treating Lysias as primarily a fifth-century stand-in for Isocrates. Nightingale (1995) 154 n. 44 reads the mismatch between Lysias' forensic focus and the *erōtikos* as indicating that Isocrates, rather than Lysias, is the *Phaedrus*' main target. See also Asmis (1986).

18 Yunis (2011) 170. Yunis acknowledges the strangeness of suggesting that the label 'logographer' would be unwelcome to Lysias, given that this is precisely how Lysias made his reputation. Plato is alluding to the political trope of accusing one's opponent of acting as a speechwriter, unaccountable to the people. But, as a metic denied political franchise, it is hard to see why Lysias would be wounded by this charge.

19 See also 243d8–e1.

20 See Rowe (1988) 192 and Yunis (2011) 172.

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forgotten, and his speech is held up as a test case of writing at 258d7–11. Lysias' logographic activities are not left behind; rather, Socrates' analysis of logography (in general terms) is applied to Lysias' specific activity as a speechwriter.

I noted above the puzzle of why Lysias' speech in the *Phaedrus* is epideictic rather than forensic, given that his fame is as an author of legal speeches. Bearing in mind the essential connection between logography and the forensic, it may seem that this problem is only exacerbated by insisting that Lysias' status as a logographer is fundamental to his treatment within the dialogue. There are two factors to consider here. The first is that the *Phaedrus* adopts a universalising attitude towards what the later tradition will categorise as different branches of rhetoric. This tendency is most clearly established by Socrates' definition of rhetoric at 261a7–b2 as the 'same art' of *psychagogia* 'not only in the law courts and other public gatherings, but also in private'.[21] In fact, this desire to generalise about the practice of rhetoric across all its contexts may, in itself, provide a partial explanation of the fact that Lysias is represented here by epideictic rather than forensic.[22] Making Lysias the author of a non-forensic speech serves to draw attention to the fact that all rhetoric is unified in both its aims and its flaws.

A further factor is that, as we have seen, logography in the *Phaedrus* is a flexible term. In the passage assessing the value of logography at 257c8–258d6, Socrates treats both deliberative political rhetoric and the inscription of successful political proposals as logographic activities. The similarity between Lysias and the politicians as 'logographers' is in their shared *writing of speeches*, rather than in any common genre or content.[23] In targeting Lysias' particular logographic activity, the *Phaedrus* signals its interest in what it means for Lysias to *write speeches for others*, rather than in the fact that he generally writes those speeches for clients to perform in the courts.

Logographic responsibility

In characterising Lysias primarily as a logographer writing speeches for others to perform, the *Phaedrus* also presents a complex assessment of his relation to and responsibility for the content of his *erōtikos*. In introducing Lysias' speech, for example, Phaedrus implicitly raises the question of Lysias' responsibility for its content and his relation to the non-lover in whose voice its arguments are presented. In his very first account of the *erōtikos* at 227c5–6, Phaedrus initially treats Lysias as standing apart from the act of propositioning within the speech, stating that 'Lysias has written of (γέγραφε) someone beautiful being propositioned (πειρώμενον), but not by a lover'. In the next breath, however, Phaedrus attributes the arguments of the speech to Lysias himself, thereby identifying the

21 See also 261d10–e4.

22 Although some, such as Griswold (1986) 45 and Howland (2004) 203, have suggested that the *erōtikos* is in some sense forensic.

23 Rhetorical handbooks would seem to be a different genre of 'rhetorical writing' and are not explicitly connected to Lysias in the *Phaedrus*.

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rhetorician with the non-lover 'giving' the speech: 'For he [i.e. Lysias] says (λέγει) that favours should be granted to a non-lover over a lover.' Phaedrus is hardly unjustified in making this connection, for while Lysias may well write his speeches for others to perform, he *is* the one who writes them. Since Lysias is someone who habitually constructs arguments for others to present on their own behalf and in their own voice, it will always be difficult to establish to what degree he can be held responsible for the content of the speeches he writes (especially if those speeches are then circulated in written form under his name).[24]

We have seen that Socrates connects Lysias' logographic activity to that of political speechwriting at 257c8–258d6. Here again, we see an emphasis on the question of authorial responsibility for written speeches, this time with a specific focus on the *act of writing* itself. At 257e4–6, Socrates notes that politicians are so proud of their status as speechwriters that they incorporate into their speeches the names of those who praise them. As becomes clear in the face of Phaedrus' incomprehension, Socrates is referring to the commonplace of including a statement of ratification at the beginning of an inscribed political decree:[25]

> No doubt the writer says 'Resolved by the Council', or 'Resolved by the People', or both, and 'So-and-so said', referring to himself with great solemnity and self-congratulation (258a4–6).

Socrates is working with a generous notion of 'speechwriting' here to produce a critique of political oratory. It is significant, nonetheless, that he describes how a speech (more specifically, a proposal) is altered *by the act of inscription*, i.e. in being written down.[26] The politician is explicitly named within the inscription as the source of the proposal. The act of writing thus monumentalises the politician's responsibility for the decree.[27]

As Yunis notes, neither the public approval nor the proposer's name is part of the politician's original speech.[28] Yet Socrates clearly claims that the speechwriter is the one who produces the decree *as a whole* (… φησιν … ὁ συγγραφεύς· ἔπειτα λέγει …), so that, in referring to himself in the third person, he is, in a sense, writing in someone else's voice.[29] Unlike Lysias, however, he writes in someone else's voice to establish his own share of responsibility for what is written.

24 Usher (1976) 37–8 suggests that forensic orators, including Lysias, circulated successful forensic speeches in order to attract clients.

25 See Yunis (2011) 172.

26 Nehamas and Woodruff (1995) 50 n. 126 note that such formulae are standard for decisions of the assembly, but not for political speeches (or any other kind).

27 It also allows the politician to address future audiences even in his own absence, whenever they read the inscription. Yunis (1996) 186 suggests that recording the speaker's name reflects a desire to hold them responsible for their advice.

28 Yunis (1996) 185–6.

29 Note, in particular, that the politician is referred to in the third person ('so-and-so said'). Yunis (2011) 173 reads the politician as demoted from advisor to mere epideictic performer.

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There is, of course, an obvious difference between the politician who speaks in the hope that his proposal will be ratified and inscribed, and the forensic logographer who writes a speech for a client to present in order to win a case. Nevertheless, Socrates' account is explicitly related to speechwriting throughout, even if we understand him to be using this term in a more general way. The questions Socrates raises, however implicitly, of authorial responsibility are clearly significant for Lysias as a forensic logographer, not least because Socrates raises them in responding to Phaedrus' speculation about Lysias' ongoing commitment to speechwriting.[30] The politician adopts someone else's voice to name himself as responsible for the content of his decree. A forensic logographer such as Lysias, on the other hand, is typically absent from his writing and tends to avoid any claim of responsibility for its content (at the time of its delivery in court). Unlike the politician, he does not write his name into his speech. If anything, the act of writing is, for Lysias, an act of abnegating responsibility for the arguments he produces and of denying his own voice. Lysias writes himself out of his speeches, as is necessary if they are to be effective as speeches given by his clients. In doing so, however, he deliberately obscures his responsibility for the content of his writing.

The *Phaedrus* provides further examples of Socrates' analysis of logography in terms of its interest in authorial responsibility. At times, Socrates' assessment of Lysias' connection to the content of the *erōtikos* seems to fit his general worry about rhetoricians' lack of interest in the truth of the matters about which they speak. There is perhaps a hint of this criticism in Socrates' assessment of Lysias' speech at 234e5–235a8. There, Socrates suggests that Lysias' reliance on repetition within the speech may indicate his lack of interest in its subject matter ('or perhaps he was not interested in this sort of issue', 235a3–6). If Lysias is not committed to the truth of what he has written, it is hardly surprising that he has not been able to find a compelling range of well-structured arguments in its favour.[31]

This idea of the rhetorician's lack of connection to his own rhetoric may also be identifiable in Socrates' recommendation at 243d3–7 that Lysias should join him in recanting the argument of his speech and write instead that favours should be granted to the lover. Phaedrus' reply to Socrates, stating that he will compel Lysias to write a speech along these lines (243d8–e1), is equally suggestive of an assumption that Lysias writes to order, rather than out of conviction.

Elsewhere, however, Socrates assumes a surprisingly close connection between Lysias and the content of his speech. Perhaps the clearest example of this is to be found at 228d6–e2. In this passage, Socrates goes so far as to suggest that the written speech

30 Socrates' description of the politicians' activity at 258a7 (ἐπιδεικνύμενος) echoes his critique of Lysias' speech at 235a6–7.

31 My aim here is to reconsider the significance of Lysias' relationship to his speech and its role in the *Phaedrus* as a whole. This is not to suggest, of course, that there is no value in considering the arguments of the speech in their own right, nor is my interpretation necessarily incompatible with such readings. See n. 41 for some significant examples.

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Phaedrus carries with him is more than representative of Lysias; it *is* Lysias. Socrates declines Phaedrus' offer to epitomise the speech on the grounds that 'so long as Lysias *himself* is present (παρόντος δὲ καὶ Λυσίου), I do not intend to offer myself up for you to practise on'. Socrates treats the written speech as identical with its author. It is notable that, in doing so, Socrates is resisting Phaedrus' efforts to insert himself into the authorial and performative process by hiding the written copy and offering his own precis of its arguments. By suppressing the presence of Lysias' writing, Phaedrus is attempting both to minimise Lysias' claim on its arguments and to create a role for himself as transmitting or translating the speech from written word to oral performance.[32] His attempt to create a role for himself as intermediary between Lysias and Socrates is both encouraged and enabled by the existence of the written speech. Socrates' response is to insist on the intimate connection between the *erōtikos* and its author.

Socrates' insistence on the identity between Lysias and his speech is repeated in the analysis of rhetoric in the second half of the dialogue. At 263d5–264e2., Socrates asks whether Lysias included the necessary definition of love at the beginning of his speech. Suggesting that they should return to the text to see whether he indicated what definition of love 'he himself wanted' (αὐτὸς ἐβουλήθη), he instructs Phaedrus (263e5):

> Read it (λέγε), so that I can hear the man himself (αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου).

Here, once again, Socrates talks of the speech as if it were Lysias himself. Now, of course, Socrates can claim some justification in doing so, given that Lysias *is* the author of the speech and what it says can therefore justifiably be referred to as 'what Lysias says'. But, as Ferrari notes, to treat the content of the speech as if it were *directly* representative of Lysias' own views on the matter is rather naive.[33] There is no reason to think that Lysias shares the conception of love around which the non-lover builds his argument, just as there is no reason to assume that Lysias is committed to the truth of any of the arguments he provides for his clients.[34]

Socrates' identification of Lysias with his speech can be contrasted with his characterisation of his own relationship to the content of his first speech. In introducing his answer to Lysias' *erōtikos*, Socrates attributes its content to a source outside himself ('I am well aware that I am not the source of any of these ideas', 235c6–8), possibly the poets Sappho or Anacreon or 'some prose writers' (συγγραφέων).[35] He goes on not only

32 At 264e3, Phaedrus laments that Socrates is making fun of 'our speech' (i.e. his and Lysias'), indicating that he has claimed a share of responsibility, presumably by performing what has been written. Ferrari (1987) 209 notes both Phaedrus' desire to co-opt the inspirational power of the speech as his own and Socrates' resistance. Nightingale (1995) 136 classifies Phaedrus as someone with a 'penchant for repeating what other people say'.

33 See Ferrari (1987) 47–8. He goes on (51–2) to suggest that the parallel between non-lover and rhetorician in terms of what they offer (the effects of *erōs* without *erōs* and the effects of truth without truth, respectively) justify Socrates' elision of Lysias and the non-lover.

34 Nussbaum (1986) 205 assumes that Lysias is 'the person-who-is-not-in-love' attempting to seduce Phaedrus.

35 Rowe (1988) 151 plausibly suggests that this is a Platonic self-reference.

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to call upon the muses for inspiration at 237a7–b1, but also to distinguish himself from the professed non-lover of his speech, by adding a preface explaining in whose voice it is given ('and this is what he said', 237b6).[36] Whereas Socrates insists on taking Lysias' non-lover to be identical with Lysias, both in voice and opinion, he is emphatic in rejecting any claim of responsibility for or identity with the non-lover in his own speech.

Why then does Socrates insist on identifying Lysias with his *erōtikos* and assuming that the non-lover's rhetoric is representative of the beliefs of its author? The answer lies in the complexities of Lysias' particular relationship to the content of his speeches, which are written to be performed by someone else. Phaedrus' ambivalence in introducing the speech demonstrates the difficulty of establishing Lysias' relation to its content. On the one hand, insofar as Lysias constructs his arguments solely to support his clients' attempts to persuade, he is an extreme example of rhetorical indifference to truth. On the other hand, the circulation of the speech as a work of Lysias firmly establishes his responsibility for its content. Socrates acknowledges Lysias' likely indifference to the subject matter but insists on holding Lysias responsible for it. In doing so, he emphasises Lysias' status as the *author* of its arguments. Socrates' concern is with Lysias' responsibility for the arguments he writes, precisely because the act of writing is what cements that responsibility.

As we have seen, in addition to its focus on rhetoric and writing, the *Phaedrus* has an interest in the relationship between the two, as represented by Lysias and his *erōtikos*.[37] The speech's status as a written text is what encourages and enables the suppression of authorial responsibility (insofar as it is possible for a reader to memorise or represent it as their own). It is also what ensures that its author can be held to account, insofar as it has been written by no one other than the author. When Lysias writes a speech of a non-lover seeking to persuade a young man to succumb, it is justifiable to read it as in some sense representative of Lysias. At the same time, it is reasonable to assume a certain indifference to its content, insofar as Lysias is not the non-lover. The *erōtikos* itself instantiates not only the complexities of the relationship between Lysias as author and Phaedrus as performer, but also the ambiguity of Lysias' relationship to the non-lover for whom he provides arguments.[38] This prompts the question for whom the non-lover's speech is actually written. As we shall see, both the context and the content of the *erōtikos* encourage us to consider the possibility that it was written, either seriously or in jest, with Socrates in mind.

36 At 242d11–e1, Socrates attributes his first speech to Phaedrus: 'nor by your speech, which came from my mouth'. Contrast this with Socrates' use of direct address to present the Palinode as if it were his own.

37 Ferrari (1987) 46 n. 14 reads Lysias' speech as a paradigm of writing as opposed to a paradigm of rhetoric. My claim is that it is criticised *as rhetorical writing* and that Lysias is treated as essentially a *writer of rhetoric*.

38 It is notable that both the non-lover and the addressee are anonymous. See Griswold (1986) 46 and 50. Brunschwig *et al.* (2011) 165 see a contrast between Lysias' *imitation* of a nonlover pursuing a young man and Socrates (in his first speech) narrating the conversation. Nichols (2009) 100 suggests that Lysias wrote the speech 'for Phaedrus (or some other) to deliver to a youth, just as the historical Lysias wrote defense speeches for accused men to deliver in Athenian courts.'

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Socrates and the non-lover

At 227c3–5, pressed by Socrates to give an account of what he has heard from Lysias, Phaedrus responds:

> In fact, Socrates, it is fitting (προσήκουσα) that you hear it, since the speech on which we were spending our time was, in some sort of fashion, about love.

This passage is generally read as a reference to Socrates' 'erotic expertise'.[39] Since the speech is ('in some sort of fashion') about love and Socrates has a special interest in love, he will naturally be interested in the speech. It is notable, however, that Socrates' response to Phaedrus is not concerned with the general topic of the speech. Rather, his immediate reaction is to question the relevance of its central argument to his own seductive efforts (227c9–d2):

> What a wonderful fellow! If only he would write that that they must be granted to a poor man rather than a rich one, or someone older rather than his junior, *and all the other sorts of qualities that I* and most of us have. Then his speeches would be truly urbane, and for the common good.[40]

Both Phaedrus and Socrates consider Lysias' speech in terms of its relevance to Socrates. That relevance is not simply a matter of Socrates' special interest in *erōs*, but of the degree to which he (or someone else) might usefully employ the arguments within the speech for their own benefit. Phaedrus' brief introduction of the speech and Socrates' immediate response thus do two things. First, as I argued above, they serve to flag up the question of Lysias' relation to the non-lover in whose voice the speech is given. Second, they ask us to consider the speech's relevance to Socrates himself, in terms of the degree to which its argument may or may not work in his favour. When we read the speech in this context, considering to what extent its content may be appropriate to Socrates, we find much that looks plausibly Socratic.

Scholars have often dismissed the content of Lysias' speech as unworthy of close study. For some it is simply too trivial to take seriously; for others, too immoral.[41] On occasion, readers have identified allusions to certain Socratic or Platonic ideas.[42] As we shall see

39 As asserted most famously at Pl. *Symp.* 177d7–8. See also *Phd.* 257a6–9, *Lysis* 204b8–c2 and Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.28, where Socrates moots the possibility that his erotic expertise will be useful in helping Critobulus in his seductive endeavours. At Xen. *Symp.* 4.57–60, Socrates connects his skill as a 'procurer' to the ability to teach others to speak well.

40 Yunis (2011) 88 notes the irony of Socrates seeking advice on securing the attention of young men. Adkins (1996) 225 also sees an allusion to Socrates' tendency to attract young men.

41 Rowe (1988) 144 warns that we should not take the speech too seriously. Brunschwig *et al.* (2011) 166 dismiss it as 'mal formé et impie'. By contrast, Griswold (1986) 45–51, Ferrari (1987) and Buccioni (2007) all treat the content of the speech as worthy of analysis.

42 Nussbaum (1986) 203–13 argues that both Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech recall the psychology of the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, although her focus is on Socrates' first speech.

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below, a close reading of the speech demonstrates that the non-lover's argument, both in its details and its apparently paradoxical position, bears some significant similarities to the picture of Socratic erotic ethics that we find in the works of Plato and Xenophon.

Before setting out these similarities in detail, it is worth emphasising that I am not suggesting that the Platonic and Xenophontic Socrates should be read as a doctrinal unity, or that the significant differences between the two sets of Socratic writings should be ignored. Rather, the fact that the *erōtikos* bears similarities to Socratic ideas as they are represented in *both* Plato *and* Xenophon suggests that these ideas may have been more generally recognised (and recognisable) as Socratic. As I will argue below, the *Phaedrus* is interested in authorial claims to write in Socrates' voice and to represent his ideas.

It is also worth noting that many of the ideas I identify below as Socratic are recognisable reworkings of contemporary Athenian sexual mores.[43] This need not preclude their being Socratic in some specific sense. Socrates, after all, is active within an Athenian pederastic context. I am not claiming that these elements are Socratic *as opposed* to Athenian, but that the context in which the speech is introduced encourages us to consider their compatibility with Socratic erotic ethics as expressed elsewhere in the Socratic literature.[44]

Emphasis on benefit

The opening of Lysias' speech at 230e6–7 sets out a central tenet of the non-lover's argument:

> You know how things stand with me, and you have heard that I think it is to our advantage (συμφέρειν ἡμῖν) that these things should happen.

Throughout the speech, the non-lover appeals to the prospective benefit of his proposed arrangement.[45] At 233a4–5, he promises the young man that 'you will become a better person if you listen to me rather than a lover'. He goes on, at 233b6–c5, to state his concern for the long-term benefits of the association. Again, at 233e5–234a3, the non-lover urges that

> favours should not be granted (χαρίζεσθαι) to those who are most in need of them, but rather to those best equipped to repay them (ἀποδοῦναι χάριν); . . . not to those who will exploit your youthful bloom, but rather to the sort of person who will share their goods (τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν μεταδώσουσιν) with you when you become older.

Finally, at 234c3–4, the non-lover concludes his speech by recommending that 'it should not be the source of harm, but should only benefit both parties (ὠφελίαν δὲ ἀμφοῖν)'.

43 See Ferrari (1987) 89–90.

44 See Dover (1978) 153–65 for an assessment of the relation between Socrates' erotic persona and contemporary Athenian morality.

45 As noted by Griswold (1986) 47.

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In addition to emphasising the mutual benefits of the association, the non-lover sets up a contrast between his own rational concern for his self-interest and the lover's willingness to harm even himself in pursuit of his goal. At 231a4–6, we are told that the non-lover voluntarily offers what he has to give 'as they [i.e. non-lovers] would best look after their own affairs'. The lover, by contrast, cares so little about his self-interest beyond satisfying his sexual appetite that he will come to regret the damage he has done to his own interests (231a6–8) when in the grip of erotic passion.

The non-lover claims that he approaches the relationship on the basis of rational consideration, that he has something to offer in return for the favours he might receive, and that he is choiceworthy as a result. The lover, in contrast, lacks rationality and has so little to offer and so little regard for his own interests that he is likely to bring more harm than benefit to the younger man.[46]

For some readers, this emphasis on mutual benefit within an erotic context renders Lysias' speech distinctly unpalatable.[47] It is notable, however, that Socrates' own erotic teachings are themselves represented as having provoked distaste on similar grounds. At *Mem.* 1.2.51–5, Xenophon discusses the accusation that Socrates encouraged his companions to neglect their family and friends in favour of those who could combine affection with some kind of benefit. On Xenophon's account, the accusation extended to the claim that Socrates used this argument in his own favour, encouraging his companions to believe that no one offered a greater benefit by association.[48] Xenophon admits that there is some truth in this account of Socrates' ethics (1.2.53) but explains it as a Socratic exhortation to consider what benefit one can offer those for whom one feels affection (*Mem.* 1.2.55):

> He wanted to show that a lack of sense (ἄφρων) is unworthy, and encouraged the cultivation of utmost sense and usefulness (φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον), so that anyone who wanted to be valued by his father or brother or anyone else would not simply put their faith in the connection and neglect them, but would make an effort to be useful (ὠφέλιμος) to all those by whom they wanted to be valued.

On Xenophon's account, Socrates is recommending a concern with enhancing one's own value to one's friends and relatives. Yet Xenophon's description of the charge against Socrates, and particularly of the connection drawn between Socrates' teachings on benefit and friendship and the ardent admiration of his companions, indicates that there were some who perceived Socrates as using this sort of teaching to attract or impress followers. Here we find the first of several parallels between (reported perceptions of)

46 As Ferrari (1987) 88–9 notes, the non-lover does not deny that there is benefit to be had from lovers, but emphasises that any good is counterbalanced by bad.

47 See Hackforth (1952) 31.

48 The parallel between Socrates and the non-lover is therefore not only the emphasis on the instrumental value of others, but also the way that emphasis is used in one's own favour.

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Socrates' interactions with young men and the argument of the non-lover. The non-lover recommends that he should be preferred as more able than the lover to benefit the younger man. According to Xenophon, some accused Socrates of encouraging his companions to prefer him above all others on the basis that he was best able to benefit them by sharing his wisdom.

We see something similar in Plato's *Lysis*. At 210d1–3, Socrates offers advice in keeping with what we find in the *Memorabilia*:

> But if you become wise, my boy, then everyone will be your friend and everyone will feel a connection with you – because you will be useful and good.

This recommendation forms part of a discussion of *philia*, within the broader context of an explicitly pederastic exchange. Socrates has offered to show Hippothales how to attract the affection of Lysis (206c4–7) but, as the conversation continues, Lysis becomes smitten with Socrates himself.[49] Both the *Memorabilia* and the *Lysis* show Socrates encouraging younger men to take care to make themselves useful as a means of attracting affection. The *Memorabilia* suggests that Socrates was perceived as using this lesson to render himself more attractive. The *Lysis* shows him enchanting Lysis partly through the deployment of this advice. There are thus two parallels to be drawn between the non-lover and Socrates in this respect. The first is their shared emphasis on benefit within personal relationships.[50] The second is that both express this desire in the context of apparently pederastic exchanges, thereby establishing a connection between the concern for benefit and the attractions of the person expressing that concern.[51] This is the first hint of a significant connection between the content of Lysias' *erōtikos* and Socratic erotic ethics.[52]

Erotic self-control

Another key feature of the non-lover's speech is his repeated denigration of the lover as lacking in self-control. At 231d2–4, the non-lover claims that the lovers will admit their failings in precisely these terms:

> For they themselves agree that they are sick (νοσεῖν) rather than in their right mind (σωφρονεῖν), and they know that they are not thinking straight (κακῶς φρονοῦσιν) but are unable to control (κρατεῖν) themselves.

49 As indicated at 211a2–4.

50 Yunis (1996) 190 notes that Socrates' first speech shares the emphasis on benefit found in Lysias' speech.

51 Note the non-lover's claim at 232a6–b5 that conversation (διαλεγόμενοι) between the lover and the younger man is often assumed to be either a prelude or follow-up to 'passion spent'. Non-lovers, on the other hand, are not faulted for keeping company with younger men in the same way, since those observing them 'know that it is necessary to converse either on account of affection or on account of some other pleasure'. Griswold (1986) 50 insists that the non-lover does not mean Socratic dialogue here.

52 Hackforth (1952) 28 n. 1 notes the 'pleasant irony in the twisting of a Socratic precept . . . into propaganda for the sensualist' with 232a4–6's promise of concern for 'what is best' over reputation. See also De Vries (1969) 63.

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Again, at 232a4–6, the non-lover refers to 'non-lovers, who have control (κρείττους) of themselves' and promotes his own case at 233c1–2 as someone 'not at the mercy of passion, but in control (κρατῶν) of myself'. Of course, the denigration of *erōs* as something that deranges is in keeping with traditional Athenian sexual discourse, but the prominent approval of self-control is also a point of striking similarity with Socratic erotic ethics. Xenophon, in particular, is explicit in emphasising both Socrates' erotic self-control and his recommendation of the same to others (*Mem.* 1.3.8):

> He advised strict avoidance of sexual relations with beautiful people. For he said it is difficult to keep one's composure (σωφρονεῖν) when one gets caught up in such things.[53]

Xenophon goes on to praise Socrates' own impressive erotic self-control at *Mem.* 1.3.14–15:[54]

> As for his own conduct in these matters, he had clearly trained himself so that he could more easily abstain from the most handsome and attractive types than others abstain from the ugliest and least attractive.[55]

Xenophon's description of Socrates' erotic self-control has parallels in Plato. In the *Charmides*, Socrates himself describes his ability to suppress the apparently erotic urge he felt while sitting next to the handsome young Charmides (*Chrm.* 155d3–e3):

> Then, my wonderful friend, I saw what was inside his cloak and I caught fire and was no longer in possession of myself . . . Nevertheless, when he asked if I knew the cure for his head, I just about managed to reply that I did.

Plato's *Symposium* offers perhaps the most famous example of Socratic erotic self-control. Towards the end of the dialogue, Alcibiades describes his sustained attempts to seduce Socrates.[56] It is worth noting that Alcibiades expects precisely the sort of reciprocal exchange that Lysias' non-lover appears to be endorsing, believing that 'I was in a position, if I granted my favours (χαρισαμένῳ) to Socrates, to hear from him everything that he knew' (217a4–5). Socrates, famously, is unmoved by Alcibiades' efforts.

The non-lover and Socrates are thus strikingly similar in their erotic self-control as well as in the fact that, in some cases at least, this self-control is explicitly based on a rational

53 See also Xen. *Symp.* 4.10–26.

54 *Mem.* 1.3.14 seems to permit the sort of dispassionate sexual contact that some see endorsed by Lysias' non-lover.

55 Xenophon goes on to note that Socrates saw the advantages of avoiding the troubles that follow from indulging such passions. Compare the non-lover's concern to avoid the harm that lovers suffer as a result of their lack of self-control.

56 *Symp.* 216e7–219e5. There is a notable difference between Xenophon's and Plato's versions of Socrates' self-control, in that the former presents Socrates as overcoming temptation, whilst the latter generally represents him as immune.

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consideration of what is most beneficial overall.[57] Whilst Socrates does not, in the way that the *Phaedrus*' non-lover does, advertise that self-control as a means of attracting partners, there is a clear implication in the *Symposium* that Alcibiades' interest is sustained by Socrates' own lack of interest. As we shall see, the attractive power of erotic indifference provides another point of similarity between Lysias' non-lover and Socrates.

Erotic indifference

One of the most notable aspects of Alcibiades' narrative in the *Symposium* is his tenacity in the face of Socrates' indifference to both his beauty and his seductive efforts. In fact, Socrates' final rebuff leaves Alcibiades in a state of enslavement to the older man (219d3–7). The dialogues provide further examples of the apparently seductive appeal of Socratic indifference. In the *Charmides*, for example, Socrates is initially agitated by Charmides' youthful beauty but then turns his attentions to Critias in a way that excites the violent interest of the younger man. By the end of the dialogue, and on the basis of some rather ambiguous and brief flattery, Charmides is so besotted with Socrates that he declares himself to 'have no objection to being charmed by you every day until you say I have had enough' (*Chrm.* 176b2–3). Despite, or perhaps because of, Socrates' lack of interest in him, Charmides is seduced. In the *Lysis*, Hippothales succeeds only in making himself less attractive by acting out the stereotype of the desperate lover. Socrates, meanwhile, manages to enthral Lysis precisely as he demonstrates his own cool-headed lack of interest.

In none of these cases does Socrates appear actively to be attempting to seduce his companion. Rather, he attracts their attention at least partly as a result of his lack of interest. It is worth relating this habit of seduction by indifference to the advice that Socrates almost offers to Hippothales at *Lysis* 210e2–4:[58]

> This, Hippothales, is how you should talk to your darling, humbling them and undermining them, instead of puffing them up and giving them airs as you do.

Here, Socrates endorses the seductive power of critique, rather than indifference as such. But, when placed in the context of Socrates' success in attracting affection, we can plausibly read this advice as indicating an awareness on Socrates' part of the seductive power of rejection. He is surely not blind to the effect he has on Alcibiades and the others. Even if Socrates never presses his case on the grounds of his self-control or indifference, the *Lysis* gives us reason to think that he is aware of its seductive power.[59]

57 Griswold (1986) 48 suggests that the 'detachment from sexual desire represented by the nonlover is a necessary ingredient of philosophical knowing'.

58 Socrates bites his tongue in order to avoid drawing attention to Hippothales.

59 Consider also the case of Euthydemus in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2. Socrates attracts his attention by talking about (rather than to) him in less than flattering terms. At 4.2.39–40, we are told that Euthydemus, led to a point of self-disgust by his conversations with Socrates, became his passionate follower. At *Mem.* 1.2.29 Socrates scolds Critias for humiliating himself in his pursuit of Euthydemus.

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Both Lysias' non-lover and Socrates endorse self-control and the pursuit of benefit within relationships. Both also draw a connection between indifference and erotic success. For the non-lover, this is part of his argument in his own favour. For Socrates it is a fact of the way he attracts and fascinates his young companions.

We have seen that some central aspects of Lysias' speech are significantly close to elements of Socratic erotic ethics as they are represented by both Xenophon and Plato.[60] This is not to suggest that every aspect of the non-lover's characterisation or argument is obviously and explicitly Socratic. There remains, however, one further, fundamental, aspect of the speech which provides a point of continuity between the non-lover and Socrates' erotic activity.

Erotic ambiguity

When Socrates offers his response to Lysias' *erōtikos*, he introduces it as the speech of a wily lover masquerading as a non-lover, despite being 'no less in love [than the others]' (237b4–5). It is often assumed that Lysias' non-lover is also either a lover masquerading as someone not in love or a genuine non-lover, lacking erotic passion, who nonetheless seeks sexual favours from his companion.[61] In fact, however, there is no explicit request for sexual favours anywhere in the non-lover's speech.[62] He only ever speaks obliquely of how the relationship will benefit him. So, for example, the non-lover begins his speech at 230e7 by expressing the desire 'that these things should happen' (γενομένων τούτων). He goes on to refer to the young man's decision to 'give away something like that' (τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα προέσθαι, 231c7), which he also calls 'what you value most' (ἃ περὶ πλείστου ποιῇ, 232c1) and, as is standard, 'granting favours' (χαρίζεσθαι, 233d5).

My aim is not to deny that these phrases can or should be read as oblique references to sex.[63] After all, this vagueness in the non-lover's language is entirely in keeping with the norms of Athenian erotic discourse.[64] The fact remains, however, that the non-lover never *explicitly* requests sex, so that the sexual connotations of the non-lover's language always remain at the level of connotation and, insofar as this is true, the indirectness of erotic discourse introduces a degree of ambiguity into the non-lover's motivation.[65] It is worth noting, in support of this suggestion, that the lover's desire is characterised in more

60 It is worth emphasising that my interest is in parallels between the non-lover's case and the representation of Socratic erotic ethics found in our surviving Socratic texts, as opposed to any historical fact of the matter. Below I argue that this intertextuality supports reading Lysias' speech as an example of some kind of *sōkratikos logos*.

61 See, for example, Griswold (1986) 48 and Buccioni (2007) 19.

62 Buccioni (2007) 19–20 notes that the non-lover 'neither affirms nor denies *outright* that he himself feels sexual desire'.

63 Nehamas and Woodruff (1995) 7 n. 20 gloss 231a: '"What I am asking for": sex'. See also Yunis (1996) 194 n. 34.

64 See Dover (1978) 44–9.

65 As Buccioni (2007) 19–20 notes, χαρίζεσθαι occurs several times in the speech to describe non-sexual favours. At 233d5 it is used in the sense of 'granting favours to the needy'. At 231b7 and 231c3–4, it describes the apparently non-sexual services that the non-lover offers to his companion. The non-lover never specifies what advantages he

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explicit terms than that of the non-lover, as an interest primarily in the young man's body. At 232e3–4, for example, we are told that many lovers 'desire someone's body before they know his ways'. This relatively explicit language is contrasted with the oblique reference to the activities of non-lovers who 'were friends with you before they did these things (ταῦτα ἔπραξαν)' (233a1–2).[66]

What could the non-lover possibly want from his companion, if not sex? In establishing the parallels between the non-lover's emphasis on self-control and Socratic erotic ethics, I noted that both Plato and Xenophon represent Socrates as endorsing or practising erotic restraint. He necessarily does so in ostensibly erotic contexts. In Xenophon's *Symposium*, we are reminded both that Socrates tends to discourage succumbing to erotic passions (4.23) and that he is not entirely blind to erotic stimuli himself (4.28). At the beginning of Plato's *Charmides*, Socrates admits to the passion he experiences on catching a glimpse inside Charmides' cloak. This example is particularly pertinent, since it hints at the fact that Socrates' eroticism is something that requires interpretation. As M. M. McCabe explains, 'what Socrates has a view *of* is not fully explicit. It is Plato's readers who suppose that what Socrates sees are Charmides' genitalia.'[67] If Socrates has been inflamed (at least in part) by a glimpse of Charmides' philosophical potential, then this too represents an example of Socrates' erotic ambiguity.

The most notorious case of Socrates' erotic ambiguity is one we have already considered. In the *Symposium*, Alcibiades pursues Socrates on the basis of his failure to interpret correctly Socrates' erotic status and interests. At 217a2–219d5, Alcibiades explains that he had formed the belief that Socrates felt a 'serious enthusiasm for my youthful bloom', only to be disappointed by Socrates' lack of interest.[68] In rejecting Alcibiades, Socrates not only questions whether he can offer what Alcibiades is after, but also expresses a disdain for physical favours. Alcibiades has 'misread the signals' in chasing Socrates and assuming his interest is in sexual gratification.[69]

The non-lover never explicitly requests sexual favours from his companion but is plausibly interpreted as doing so. Likewise, both Xenophon and Plato represent Socrates' erotic persona as either ambiguous or easy to misread. Just like the non-lover, Socrates is

will offer, just as he never specifies what benefits he seeks from his companion. See Wersinger (2001) 91–3 on the ambiguity of Lysias' language of gratification etc. within the speech.

66 Ferrari (1987) 91 n. 4 claims that the non-lover's argument at 231e3–232a6 is open to no other construal than that he is offering discretion on achieving what other lovers boast about. In fact, it is possible to read a contrast between the lover who will boast that 'they have not laboured in vain' and the non-lover, whose choice of what is best (as opposed to reputation) is not related to any specific object.

67 McCabe (2007) 12–13.

68 At 216d1–7, Alcibiades appeals to his fellow symposiasts' awareness that Socrates is 'erotically disposed' (ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται) towards handsome men and always in their company but goes on to suggest that he is 'full of moderation'.

69 Some may object that the non-lover's oblique language is too easily aligned with the common indirectness of Athenian erotic discourse to be open to interpretation in any other way. I take it that critics of Socrates' interaction with young men and, indeed, Alcibiades himself would have said much the same thing about Socrates.

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someone who recommends and practises erotic restraint whilst both speaking and acting in a manner that encourages a sexual interpretation.

Socrates' response to Lysias' speech

I have argued that both the introduction and the content of Lysias' *erōtikos* invite us to draw parallels between the non-lover and Socrates. Before I consider the possible implications of such parallels it is worth looking at two further pieces of evidence in favour of such a reading, both of which are to be found in Socrates' response to Lysias' speech.

On finishing his reading at 234c6–7, Phaedrus asks Socrates what he thinks of the speech ('Does it not seem to you to be fantastically good, especially in the choice of words?'). Socrates replies:

> Divinely (δαιμονίως), my friend. I am dumbstruck (ἐκπλαγῆναι).

Socrates' term of approval for the speech (δαιμονίως) is noteworthy. It carries specifically Socratic connotations via its connection to Socrates' *daimonion* and is one of his common terms of affection.[70] More significantly for my reading, it is precisely the term that Alcibiades uses to describe Socrates in his account of Socrates' final rejection (219b7–c2):

> I threw my arms around this truly divine and wonderful creature (δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῷ), and lay there all night long.

Socrates' assessment of Lysias' speech can be read as an allusion to his peculiar erotic indifference in the *Symposium*.[71] It represents an acknowledgement on Socrates' part of the parallels between Lysias' non-lover and his own (non-)erotic identity.

Socrates' assessment and reformulation of Lysias' arguments in his own first speech provide a further indication that he recognises Lysias' non-lover as in some sense Socratic. Pressed by Phaedrus to improve on the rhetorician's effort, Socrates qualifies his original claim to be able to do better, insisting that he must adopt the central tenets of Lysias' argument (235e5–236a2):

> Take, for example, the subject matter of the speech. Who do you think could argue that one should grant one's favours to the non-lover rather than the lover, but fail to praise the good sense of one and reproach the lack of sense of the other – since these are essential points – and still have other things to say?

70 Socrates calls Phaedrus ὦ δαιμόνιε twice (235c5 and 268a5). At 242b8–c3, Socrates explains that his *daimonion* has prevented him from leaving until he had rectified the offence caused by his first speech on *erōs*.

71 De Vries (1969) 71 notes that Socrates' description of his own state on hearing Lysias' speech (ἐκπλαγῆναι) echoes his ironical praise of Agathon at *Symposium* 198b5. The verb can carry the sense of 'struck with desire' and could represent a further acknowledgement on Socrates' part of the connection between the non-lover and his own erotic identity. The possibility that Socrates' use of δαιμονίως at *Phdr.* 234c6–7 is self-referential may be supported by Yunis' (2011, 105) suggestion that γάνυσθαι here is a pun on Phaedrus' name.

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Socrates is true to his word, in part at least. In presenting his own speech, he maintains the position both that the lover is undone by irrational desire and that the worth of a companion should be assessed in terms of the advantage he offers. In making this case, he adopts a more recognisably Socratic method of argument, eschewing probabilities in favour of arguments from necessity and working from a definition of *erōs*.[72] In fact, as Nussbaum has argued, he formulates a critique of the lover that bears striking similarities to the psychology put into Socrates' mouth in the *Republic*.[73] In reformulating Lysias' speech, Socrates accepts (at least temporarily) the truth of its central claim, but presents it within a more philosophically respectable argumentative framework.[74] Socrates thus renders Lysias' content in a manner consistent with what and how he argues elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues. The point is that Socrates' non-lover is similar to Lysias' non-lover in voicing a position consistent with some of the views attributed to Socrates elsewhere. In this respect, at least, both Lysias' and Socrates' non-lovers can be considered in some sense Socratic, albeit in different ways.[75]

One final point is worth making in support of reading Socrates' response to the *erōtikos* as indicating an awareness of its parallels between the non-lover and Socratic erotic ethics. I noted above Phaedrus' attempt to hide Lysias' speech from Socrates by keeping it under his cloak. There is an echo of this episode in Socrates' preparations to give his first speech. At 237a4–5, Socrates covers his head, ostensibly out of a sense of shame. It is striking that this action leads Socrates to mimic physically the circumstances in which the *erōtikos* first finds its way into the dialogue.[76]

Writing for Socrates

I have argued that Lysias' status as a logographer is fundamental to his role within the *Phaedrus*. The dialogue treats him as someone whose rhetorical activity is always and essentially written. He is present in the *Phaedrus* only via his written text and Phaedrus assumes that any further engagement in the rhetorical contest with Socrates will also be written. His speech is analysed by Socrates as a paradigm of both rhetoric and writing, but it is also a paradigm of *written rhetoric*. Written rhetoric, as it is represented in the form of Lysias' speech, is written to be vocalised by others, as if it were their own. Phaedrus' attempts to co-opt Lysias' arguments and to suppress the presence of Lysias' speech are encouraged and enabled by the fact that he has a written copy in his

72 Yunis (2011) 111. Rowe (1988) 154 asserts that neither the content nor the vocabulary of Socrates' first speech is 'un-Platonic' but expresses doubts (155–6) about its the Socratic credentials, particularly in relation to its apparent denial of *akrasia*.

73 Nussbaum (1986) 203–13.

74 Dorter (1971) 287 sees a connection between the relative 'sobriety' of the two speeches.

75 Ferrari (1987) 92 n. 6 notes that Socrates refers at the end of his Palinode (256e4–257a2) to the non-lover in general, without distinguishing between the two previous speeches.

76 See Griswold (1986) 55 for a similar suggestion.

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possession. They are also encouraged by the fact that, in writing speeches for others, Lysias deliberately obscures his own voice. As we have seen, the phenomenon of speeches written for others to perform creates a puzzle about authorial responsibility. Both Phaedrus and Socrates demonstrate some ambivalence about Lysias' relation to the content of his speech. Nevertheless, Socrates is insistent not only on holding Lysias responsible for its content, but also on assuming that it represents Lysias' own views.

The *Phaedrus* prompts us to consider what assumptions we can make about Lysias' relation to the non-lover of his speech. As I have argued, the context and content of the speech establish a connection to the Socratic erotic ethics we find elsewhere in Plato and in Xenophon. Insofar as the *Phaedrus* represents Lysias as someone who writes for others and the speech itself can be read as in some sense Socratic, we are encouraged to read the *erōtikos* as a (Platonic version of a) Lysianic attempt at Socratic rhetoric. Lysias' non-lover is intended to be recognisably Socratic and the *Phaedrus* represents Lysias attempting to write in and for the voice of Socrates.

The suggestion that Lysias' speech can be read as an attempt at Socratic rhetoric finds support in the ancient tradition that attributed an *Apology of Socrates* to Lysias.[77] If, as this tradition suggests, Lysias was plausibly thought to have authored at least one Socratic text, then the attribution of a Socratic speech to Lysias within the *Phaedrus* is particularly appropriate.[78] The *Phaedrus* characterises Lysias as someone who writes speeches for and in the voices of others; Socrates himself is among the crowd of voices for which Lysias was thought to have written. If we read Lysias' *erōtikos* as an essentially written attempt to represent the sorts of things that Socrates says, we can see that Lysias' status as a logographer also allows him to function in yet another significant, and necessarily implicit, role within the dialogue. He is present as a Socratic author, i.e. as someone who writes words to put into the mouth of Socrates.

What is the significance of reading Lysias' speech as an implicit representation of an attempt at Socratic rhetoric? The first point to note is what it indicates about the relation between the *Phaedrus*' three speeches on love. Lysias' speech is present not simply as a piece of trivial and disposable epideictic, the content of which is more or less irrelevant to all that follows. Rather, it marks the first of three attempts at a Socratic account of love. Lysias' speech represents one interpretation and representation of Socratic erotic ethics, a version that Socrates himself finds unsatisfactory in a variety of ways. Socrates'

77 The story is first attested in Cic. *De or.* 1.54, 231. See also Diog. Laert. 2.5.40–4. Carey (2007a) 456–60 gathers the testimonia for Lysias' *Apology*. See also Hunter (2012) 109–10.

78 See Carey (2007a) 456 for the suggestion that the Lysianic *Apology* was a response to an *Accusation of Socrates* written by Polycrates. It is possible, as Usher (1976) 36 n. 15 notes, that Lysias' name was attached to an anonymous defence speech at some point after his epideictic style became well known. Even if the tradition stems from a speech attributed to Lysias, as opposed to an authentically Lysianic piece, this need not undermine the significance of the tradition for my interpretation. I have argued that Plato is concerned with questions of authorial responsibility for texts attributed to others: the existence of an *Apology of Socrates* passing itself off as (in some sense) Lysianic aligns with my reading of the *erōtikos*, whether or not that tradition had or was influenced by the *Phaedrus* or was known to Plato.

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first speech offers a revision of that ethical position, which, although supported by more recognisably philosophical argumentation, is a disappointment. The Palinode then marks a revision and rejection of the apparently Socratic ethics of the first two speeches.[79] If we are to understand the revisionary erotic ethics of Socrates' second speech, we must do so against the background of the ethics it explicitly rejects. Lysias' speech therefore has a significant role to play in our understanding both of what Socrates rejects and of what he accepts within the *Phaedrus*.

If Lysias' speech does represent an attempt at Socratic rhetoric, with Lysias putting words into Socrates' mouth, there may be further significance in Socrates' critical response. I have suggested that Socrates' reaction to the speech indicates his recognition that it is an attempt at representing his erotic persona. In revising its content to produce a speech that is more recognisably philosophical in method and argument, Socrates can be read as expressing an implicit preference for one sort of representation over other versions of his persona. Of course, Socrates seems to reject even this more philosophical version of the *erōtikos* in giving his Palinode. Nevertheless, by having Socrates reject Lysias' representation of one sort of Socratic rhetoric in the first instance, the *Phaedrus* implicitly dismisses rival accounts of Socratic erotic ethics, perhaps even those found elsewhere in Plato.[80]

The possibility that Lysias can be read as misrepresenting Socratic rhetoric is further supported by the details of the tradition that he wrote an *Apology*. In the versions of both Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, Socrates is said to have rejected Lysias' speech on the grounds that it was unsuitable.[81] Even if we think, as seems plausible, that these accounts rely more on imagination than historical fact, they do at least indicate that Lysias, at some point, gained a reputation for failing to write appropriately Socratic rhetoric.

One final implication is worth considering. We have seen that Socrates adopts a relatively naive approach to the interpretation of Lysias' speech, insisting on the identity between Lysias and his non-lover. I noted above how odd it is to assume that Lysias' own views are present in the arguments he provides for his clients. In fact, Socrates' insistence on reading the non-lover as speaking for Lysias is even more surprising when we consider what he has to say about the interpretation of written *logoi* in his critique of writing towards the end of the *Phaedrus*. At 275d4–e5, Socrates reflects on the similarities between the products of painting and writing as unyielding to interpretative inquiries.

79 Note also the possibility that Socrates' physical relation to the speeches itself marks a progression. We begin with a Socratic text initially hidden under a cloak and then read aloud to Socrates himself. This is followed by a more Socratic speech from which Socrates physically separates himself by covering his head and which he presents in the voice of an anonymous 'wily lover'. We end with Socrates uncovered, presenting the Palinode in his own voice.

80 Note Hunter's (2012) 110 suggestion that Plato puts himself into a logographic role by writing an *Apology* for Socrates.

81 See n. 77 for references. In Cicero's version, Socrates rejects the speech as seeming 'fluent and rhetorical' but not 'strong and manly'. According to Diogenes Laertius, Socrates rejected the speech as 'more forensic (δικανικός) than philosophical'.

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Written accounts may seem to encourage questions but, inevitably, they offer no response to analysis:

> And when it has been written once, every discourse is spread around everywhere in the same way, among both those who understand it and those who have no business with it, and it does not know how to address those it should and not those it should not. And when it is abused and unjustly traduced, it is always in need of help from its father (πατρός). For it lacks the capacity to defend or help itself.

The pertinence of this passage to Lysias' speech is clear. The inert written copy of the *erōtikos* is being 'spread around' by Phaedrus. He performs it for Socrates, as someone who knows about its subject matter (whether we understand that to be love in general, or Socratic love specifically) but we are told that it has been performed already for others (no doubt with less understanding) and presumably it will be again. And yet, despite the relevance of this passage to Lysias' speech, Socrates' sensitivity to interpretative difficulties here seems to be out of step with his treatment of the *erōtikos*. Here, Socrates carefully distinguishes the text and its 'father' and notes that the former is orphaned in the absence of the latter. We have seen that, elsewhere, he treats the *erōtikos* not as Lysias' offspring, but as identical to Lysias himself. What are we to make of this contrast between what Socrates has to say on the matter of interpreting written texts and his actual practice in respect of Lysias' speech?

The answer may well lie in how we understand Socrates' reference to the 'father' of the abandoned *logoi*. Scholars are generally inclined to read Socrates as analysing the interpretative problems a text faces in the absence of its author.[82] It is notable, however, that when Socrates uses the father–offspring metaphor elsewhere in the dialogue, it is not to describe the authorial role as such. At 274e9–275a2, Theuth is described as the 'father of letters' (πατὴρ γραμμάτων) in deference to his status as the inventor of writing, rather than as the author of a text. At 261a3–5, Socrates refers to 'Phaedrus of the beautiful offspring' (καλλίπαιδα). Phaedrus is, of course, not an author of *logoi*, but someone who 'fathers' them in his commissioning role, by prompting Socrates and Lysias to produce speeches.[83] Finally, and most tellingly, Socrates refers to Lysias as the 'father of the speech' (τοῦ λόγου πατέρα) at 257b1–6. Here, Socrates is not talking about Lysias' role as the author of his own speech, but as the person who bears the responsibility (and blame) for the nature of everything that has been said about love up to this point, including Socrates' own first speech. In each case, the father is the *instigator* of *logoi* in some more general sense than that of author.[84]

Once we recognise that the father of *logoi* in Socrates' critique of writing may be someone other than their author, the apparent conflict between Socrates' theory and practice falls away.

82 Yunis (2011) 231. De Vries (1969) distinguishes between πατήρ at 257b2, which he takes to mean 'instigator', and at 275e4, which he reads as '"author" in the modern sense of the word'.

83 Phaedrus is referred to as 'πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου' in this sense of 'instigator' at *Symp.* 177d4–5.

84 Presumably this does not exclude the author as a father, but the point is that the sense is not restricted to authorship.

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Socrates can insist that the written text represents Lysias whilst acknowledging that it is prone to be misinterpreted and abused in the absence of its 'father'. Who is its father, if not Lysias? Once we acknowledge that Lysias' speech is an attempt at Socratic rhetoric, the answer seems obvious. Lysias may be the author of the *erōtikos*, but Socrates is its 'father'. Just as Lysias and Phaedrus, each in their own way, inspire the speeches in the *Phaedrus*, so Socrates 'begets' a vast array of Socratic *logoi*. Each such text offers an account of Socrates' words and actions. Each is necessarily read in the absence of Socrates' interpretative authority and subject to misinterpretation as a result.

Conclusion

Lysias' speech in the *Phaedrus* should be understood in the context of his logographic activity. The dialogue characterises Lysias as someone whose reputation is founded in his success in writing speeches for others to perform. Insofar as the content and context of Lysias' speech support reading it as an attempt at Socratic erotic rhetoric, Lysias himself can be understood as a Socratic author. The *Phaedrus* therefore offers an implicit lesson in the complexities of reading and, perhaps, writing Socratic texts. Phaedrus and Socrates present alternative perspectives on how we assess the relationship between a Socratic author and their writing. Phaedrus models an approach which acknowledges that the author is to be distinguished from the characters to whom he gives voice. Yet it is natural also instinctively to regard those voices as somehow identifiable with their particular author. Socrates' treatment of the speech represents a similar but slightly different point. Like Phaedrus, Socrates treats the author as responsible for and identifiable with the views he gives to his speakers. Just as Lysias is responsible for what the Socratic non-lover has to say, so any Socratic author should be held responsible for his particular representation of Socrates. As a logographer, Lysias is, like Plato, always absent from the texts he writes. The *Phaedrus* reminds us, however, that this absence does not free the author from accountability for what they write. In fact, the very act of writing is an assertion of responsibility.

In his critique of writing, Socrates introduces a further figure of significance, that of the father of the *logos*. As I have demonstrated, there is good reason to read the 'father' of the *logos* not as its author, but as its inspiration. In the case of Socratic texts, that inspiration must be Socrates. The *Phaedrus* insists on the responsibility of an author for the content of their writing, even and perhaps especially where their own voice is absent, as in the case of Lysias' logography or Plato's dialogues. It also asserts the inevitability of misinterpretation of Socratic *logoi* which are written and read in the absence of Socratic authority.[85]

I have hinted that Plato may be drawing attention to his own activities as a Socratic author in representing Lysias as aspiring to be such. I do not want to go so far as to argue that the *Phaedrus* is an outright claim of Platonic authority in contrast to other

85 Socrates' critical and revisionist response to Lysias' speech stands in contrast with the claims of Socratic ratification made by Euclides at *Tht.* 142d6–143a5 and Apollodorus at *Symp.* 173b1–6. These claims may indicate that some Socratic authors made explicit claims to have their writings endorsed by Socrates himself.

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Socratic authors. Nor do I want to suggest that it signals Plato's desire to undermine the authority of his representation of Socrates. My suggestion is rather that Lysias is present in the *Phaedrus* at least in part as an example of someone who aspires to put words into Socrates' mouth. As such, he also functions as an implicit warning that we, in reading any Socratic text, must always be aware of the complexities of the relation between what Socrates is made to say and those who make him say it.

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