

the belief that such questions are relevant to contemporary politics only in so far as they pertain narrowly to the present, Booth's argument is a difficult one to make. It is a testament, then, to the many fine qualities of Booth's slender tome that he manages to make it in a convincing and compelling way, offering up careful readings of the texts that he brings to bear on the issues at hand, as well as creative – even poetic – formulations of concepts central to articulating his position for which there are no fixed or pre-existing terms capable of carrying his meaning. Foremost among the latter are “traces” and “archipelagos.” Drawing on examples both empirical and literary, Booth shows how everyday understandings, practices, and ways of speaking about the deceased belie Jefferson's claim that the relationship between the living and the dead is akin to that between independent nations. Rather, he suggests, the absence of the dead is more than mere nullity, there is, instead, a missing something evidenced by “traces” or “small things remembered,” that constitute “bridges across time.” They are, he writes, “the markers, the presence that intimates an absent or missing something, there if only inchoately” (p. 21). Such traces are not, he argues, clear imperatives commanding action, but rather prompts to look at things sensed by their absence, “there but not visible; there but forgotten, and not recognized” (p. 24). The work of justice, Booth suggests, requires effort and engagement on the part of the living toward the dead, with traces serving as “calls for witnesses” (p. 27), who must “struggle to look around corners” (p. 25) in order to see the connections of history and memory that make considerations of justice towards past persons appropriate. It is a delicate argument delicately argued, and in this the author models with his analysis the careful work that this conception of justice demands. His other metaphor for conceiving of the relationship between the living and the dead is similarly generative. There is, Booth suggests, an “archipelago of absence” (p. 25) that connects the living to past persons: the idea of islands capturing their undeniable separation, and the idea that these islands are nevertheless part of a group capturing their continued connection. This conception of community is one drawn from, and elucidated by, the author's engagement with Greek tragedy.

Classical tragedy, Booth argues, captures the way in which a community's past is an integral part of its present. Moreover, he suggests, its recurrent concerns with blindness and forgetting – and the consequences thereof – underscore the necessity of seeking out the “absent invisible” (p. 5) and the importance of identifying its traces. Oedipus, he notes, is blind to his crime, but it is “nevertheless something real” (p. 8). As Booth points out, the idea that the living have a relationship to the dead has a long historical pedigree – evident in the work of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant (p. 71) – but there is something about the way in which community is modeled in Greek tragedy that makes it especially useful for considering questions of

intergenerational justice. From Aeschylus, he draws the image of the “flaxen mesh” (p. 144), and asserts that to “be embedded in that often conflicted mesh is to become part of a plural and persisting subject, a ‘we’.” Crucially, however, for his argument, Booth suggests that this we, or “*moi commun*” is “extended across time” (p. 141). That the dead are a part of that enduring mesh of relations – this archipelago of islands – and the bonds that they share with the living, including, but not limited to, shaping that mesh, Booth argues, gives them standing within the political community, not as tools of contemporary concerns but as agents whose experienced injustice matters. The claim is not that their status is identical to that of the living, rather that “the distance created by time and death does not erode that relational presence” (p. 106). It is, he suggests, “a relationship that is radically altered, thinned, but not entirely nullified by death” (p. 144). To exclude the dead from questions of justice is then, Booth argues, to deny them their status in a political community, a “second death” (p. 145) that is not only to perpetrate a further injustice against them, but also to damage the community itself (p. 106). This is a further example of the way in which this book is not only a meditation on intergenerational justice, but also upon the nature of political community broadly conceived.

The conventions of book reviewing require that the reviewer identify some problems with the text. I must admit that I am somewhat hard pressed to do so. On several occasions the author notes the ways in which a concern with the dead might promote vengeance rather than justice, but does not develop that concern; likewise, he makes a number of allusions to the ways in which his argument might also be applied to future generations. Neither point is, however, essential to Booth's central argument, and while it would be fascinating to see how he might have developed them, his not doing so in no way detracts from the quality of this marvelous book.

Feminist Post-Liberalism. By Judith A. Baer. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2020. 202p. \$99.50 cloth, 34.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592720002996

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The phrase “post-2016” has probably supplanted “after 9/11” as the marker of a moment. For political theorists this requires reckoning with what feels like a sudden lurch rightward amidst the rise of antidemocratic and antiliberal forces worldwide. The assault on liberal democratic institutions and ideals and the specific targeting of feminist politics from the Right has required a recalibration of our political compass and a reconsideration of the entangled fates and futures of the liberal and feminist projects. Judith Baer's *Feminist Post-Liberalism* enters this debate with

neither a radical overhaul nor a rejection of the liberal democratic project but with a suggestion that a robust *feminist* liberalism, animated by a spirit of pragmatism, offers a modest path forward not in spite of, but because of, some of its failures in the past. If Hillary Clinton's apparent ascent to the presidency was critiqued in advance by many on the Left as the triumph of the marriage of neoliberalism and feminism's worst tendencies, Baer pivots to consider how liberalism and feminism were responsible for her loss and can offer a way out (p. xi).

The separate chapters weave together ruminations on the larger principles of liberalism's commitment to reason and common sense and feminism's concrete desire for gender equality, suggesting that together they yield a general commitment to concrete problem solving—detangling specific political issues in the present by illuminating past failures. Individual chapters tackle examples of these failures as a means of both illustrating the postliberal component of her approach—specifically, the ways liberalism has upheld gender inequality and patriarchal power—and the value of feminist critique in laying bare the shortcomings of liberalism in achieving the ends of feminists. As her theoretical commitments suggest, Baer moves through these questions not in the abstract but in tackling a set of concrete problems.

Baer stakes out her theoretical position as one of “imperative theory”—a persistent question of “What can we not do without?” or “What is to be done?”—which is identified in her initial chapter but refined later in addressing the problem of “guilt” as a defining feature of liberalism (committed to a set of abstract principles) and feminism (often saddled with a gendered burden of responsibility). As political positions built on self-reflection and critique, she suggests that both have been hobbled by a tendency toward reason, reflection, and reflexivity that has not always been politically useful. Baer is not critical of the self-reflection but of its political consequences. She points to a liberal tendency toward accommodation of opponents—especially when liberals attain power—that has actually hampered the achievement of liberal ends. Similarly she is critical of feminist critiques of status privilege for women who have entered the labor force; she views them as a consequence of the exploitation of the labor of domestic workers that avoids a discussion of how economic structures have made this appear to be a women's issue as opposed to a larger issue of justice, family structures, and economic distribution. Conservatives, in contrast, have been more than willing to take political advantage of liberal guilt, piling on to liberal and feminist self-critiques of elitism, hypocrisy, or exclusion without ever engaging in a similar self-analysis.

Baer's imperative theory, therefore, suggests that a feminist post-liberalism, while imperfect, can help us navigate a concrete political terrain by continually drawing our attention to the ways that liberal principles fall short in

practical terms of achieving feminist ends—requiring a deeper consideration of the complexity of the contexts that, in turn, may require a revision of liberal principles or commitments. The argument is strongest in chapter 3, in which Baer unfolds the logic of constitutional jurisprudence read as liberal democratic theory, revealing the ways that adherence to liberal principles can, in practice, be problematic for feminist politics. Reading *Johnson Controls*, *VMI*, and *Casey*, Baer makes a compelling argument that the rulings in these cases reflected liberal values of “reason over emotion, law over fiat, autonomy over paternalism” in advocating for the treatment of women as individuals capable of making their own choices about employment and reproduction. Yet, she argues, “They increased women's freedom without ending male supremacy” (p. 44) by ignoring the ways women's freedom is limited not only by capitalism but also by a system of male supremacy in which the capacity to bear children is a concrete limitation on the ability of some subjects to be free and substantively equal. Feminists will be familiar with the argument about the gendered nature of the liberal subject, and the analysis could have been supplemented by some engagement with feminist literature critiquing both capitalism and the nuclear family as sites of “freedom.” When Baer says she has become increasingly skeptical of capitalism as compatible with postliberal and feminist principles, she would find good company in a wide range of feminist texts past and present.

The danger of any timely text is, of course, its being overtaken by contemporary events. And Baer's text feels like a response to 2016 in a way that already feels dated. This is clearest in chapter 4 on “Gentlemen's Rights and Gender” equality that reflects on critiques of carceral feminism, suggesting that feminists have been too quick to seek legal remedies that criminalize behavior (or persons) in ways that have contributed to mass incarceration and its racialized components. Addressing problems of male dominance like domestic violence and sexual assault via the criminal law, these critiques suggest, has contributed to the veneration of “law and order” solutions and mass incarceration in ways that have weaponized state power against marginalized communities, especially Black men. Baer is resolutely critical of the carceral state but is quick to point out that women remain vulnerable to gendered violence, which is, she suggests, underpoliced. Pointing to cases like that of Brock Turner, the Stanford swimmer who received a six-month sentence for rape, she suggests that gendered violence that upholds the “gentleman's prerogative” is still not taken seriously. In this particular moment in which state violence, particularly racialized violence, has become painfully visible, this analysis falls short. In not engaging with the extensive feminist literature, particularly among Black feminists, about the carceral state and race, gender, and sexual violence, Baer does not go far enough in complicating

the “gentlemen” in question *or* the women and femmes who are most vulnerable to both gender and state violence. In the shadow of the “Black Trans Lives Matter” march that drew attention to violent patriarchal, racial, and capitalist power on specific bodies that are subject to societal and state violence, calls for a more complex interrogation of incarceration make the subsequent chapter’s discussion of trans issues that spends more time on pronouns than material consequences feel inadequate. Although Baer is correct to worry about feminism’s political potential being hobbled by excessive self-critique—as she suggests in the discussion of cultural appropriation—her argument would be improved with greater attention to the often searing critiques from within feminism that have drawn attention to the complex and shifting dimensions of power that have yielded not just critique but also transformative political action.

Across the Great Divide: Between Analytic and Continental Political Theory. By Jeremy Arnold. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020. 232p. \$90.00 cloth, \$28.00 paper.
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The “great divide” between analytic and continental philosophy announced in the title of this book is often presented by advocates on both sides as a necessary choice for political philosophers: you can be an analytic philosopher or a continental philosopher but not both. It is a welcome feature of this book that it rejects the straitjacket of this false either/or. However, Jeremy Arnold’s ambition is not merely to reject the necessity of a choice between analytic and continental modes of political philosophy but to advocate a specific approach to negotiating their relationship. The intriguing proposal at the heart of this approach to political philosophy is based on what the author calls “aporetic cross-tradition theorizing,” which is designed to demonstrate that working across the competing commitments of both analytic and continental approaches is necessary to come to grips with fundamental issues of political philosophy and that doing so discloses the limitations of each approach.

The argument is offered through a series of case studies that are selected to make it appear plausible and attractive. The first two are intended to perform the negative role of suggesting that an alternative approach that seeks to work across the divide through what Arnold calls a “synthetic” approach does not hold out much prospect of success. The final three offer examples of Arnold’s preferred aporetic approach. The strengths and limitations of a case-study approach in empirical social science are well known, and related considerations emerge here. On the one hand, Arnold’s studies provide him with the opportunity to

engage in some depth with his chosen examples and, thereby, to make his argument through them. On the other hand, this methodological choice entails that the strength of his overall argument is contingent on the persuasiveness of his treatment of these examples and the scope of his argument is dependent on the representativeness of his examples.

It is presumably with this latter point in mind that Arnold begins with a rather sketchy account of the emergence of the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy (one that does not notice the role of analytic Marxism in promoting the distinction between analytic and continental *political* philosophy). In Arnold’s telling, this distinction amounts to something like the claim that analytical political philosophy is largely ahistorical, largely liberal (in some very broad sense), and preoccupied with justificatory projects, whereas continental philosophy often engages with history, is often skeptical of liberalism, and pursues critical reflection on our current practices of reasoning. As a very rough gloss, this has some surface plausibility, but it is notable that the two continental thinkers with whom Arnold engages—Arendt and Derrida—both emerge from the tradition of post-Heideggerian phenomenology; by contrast, there is no more than very occasional passing references to other traditions in “continental” thought such as, to pick an obviously relevant example for social and political philosophy, the Frankfurt School. The question of scope is a serious one for this book to which I return.

The first two chapters address, respectively, political realism in its Raymond Geuss and Bernard Williams variant and the work of Stanley Cavell. Arnold takes each of these to represent “synthetic” approaches to the analytic–continental divide, by which he means approaches that seek to draw on the resources of each tradition in a way that does not treat their relationship as aporetic. Political realism is said to aim at combining the historical orientation and attention to ideology–critique of the continental tradition with the conceptual idiom and justificatory focus of analytic political philosophy. Cavell is portrayed as offering a practice of reading texts that extends across both traditions. Arnold’s strategy in relation to both approaches is to argue that they are, for different reasons, unable to come to grips with the problem of state violence.

In the case of political realism, Arnold focuses on Williams’s reorientation of political theory around the basic legitimation demand and argues that this approach is unable to offer justifications of state violence to those persons subject to it. This matters on his account because, for political realism to be an attractive form of cross-tradition theorizing, it needs to be able to show that it can combine the analytic justificatory project with the focus on contingency, history, and ideology of the continental tradition. In the case of Cavell, Arnold argues that