

M. Waelkens's excavation report entitled 'Sagalassos. Religious Life in a Pisidian Town during the Hellenistic and Early Imperial Period', which confirms a virtually complete Hellenization of this city.

Part 3 begins with M. F. Baslez's overview of the reception of Atargatis in central and northern Greece, which reveals the strong local support for the goddess, followed by C. Bonnet's and V. Pirenne-Delforge's discussion of a *vexata quaestio*: the relationship between Astarte and Homer's Aphrodite, whom the authors consider a truly syncretistic 'product'. G. Sfameni Gasparro revisits Franz Cumont's first 'hero', Lucian's Alexander of Abunoteichos, and demonstrates Lucian's use of oracular practices at Delphi, Didyma, and Claros in constructing his pseudo-prophet. The section concludes with M. Waegeman's return to the hypothesis, proposed by Cumont and rejected by Gordon, that Dio Chrysostom's *Or.* 36 contains the nucleus of an authentic Zoroastrian–Mithraic hymn. She concludes that the hymn might not have to be entirely fictional—Dio might have received some insights through Posidonius of Apamea, who might have had first-hand knowledge.

J. Arce's contribution to the methodological problems regarding Roman funerary practices (as opposed to funerary monuments) responds to Cumont's fundamental works on the subject, emphasizing that only one subsequent monograph (G. Wesch-Klein, *Funus Publicum* [Stuttgart, 1993]) details funerary practices in the western part of the empire. His brief overview, which opens Part 4, highlights the interplay between 'fixed' and 'flexible' parts of funerary rituals, which reflect the cost and the social status of the deceased rather than chronological, regional, or religious differences. D. Briquel's essay on the 'renaissance' of Etruscan religion, the *Etrusca disciplina*, as an anti-Christian movement in late antiquity, and P. F. Beatrice's reconstruction of the fate of the so-called *Book of Wisdom of Hystaspes*, a widely known anti-Roman Mazdean apocalyptic text written during Trajan's reign, in Christian hands (primarily Lactantius'), complete Part 4. R. Turcan's summary concludes the volume.

Cumont's far-reaching interests provide the matrix for this collection of equally far-reaching essays, and his work, concretized in the concept of 'syncretism', should also be the force unifying them into a cohesive whole. This is, of course, a tall order, yet one that the volume achieves in the end thanks to Cumont's method. Each contribution investigates the multivalent notion of 'syncretism' in a specific period and region by resorting to a detailed analysis of material and textual documents. The result is a series of *Einzelstudien* of great interest and high scholarly standards by authors who also reflect Cumont's *Sitz im Leben*, Belgium, France, and Italy. The theoretical discussions might have benefited from greater 'geographical' diversity, but the volume remains a fitting tribute to a great scholar.

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PERIPATETIC DIALECTIC

H. BALTUSSEN: *Theophrastus against the Presocratics and Plato. Peripatetic Dialectic in the De sensibus*. Pp. xiv + 285. Leiden, etc.: Brill, 2000. Cased, \$90. ISBN: 90-04-11720-2.

This book has an excellent project, but its execution leaves something to be desired. The project lies at the intersection of two of the liveliest areas of ancient philosophical studies in recent years. First, there is the development of Theophrastan

studies through the concerted investigation of the fragments of his lost works—where Professor Fortenbaugh and his colleagues have blazed the trail. Secondly, there is renewed interest in commentaries and doxographic works in themselves, a recognition that these are types of writing that follow conventions of their own and that deserve analysis in their own right, and not simply for the information they contain on the texts they report and discuss. Here Professor Mansfeld (Dr Baltussen's doctoral adviser) is one of the leading exponents and an inspiration to others. So the auspices under which B. did his thesis, of which this book is a revised version, could not have been more propitious.

The subject he tackles is Theophrastus' *De sensibus*. B. does not engage in a line-by-line commentary, but studies such questions as the genre the work belongs to and how this affects how we should use the information it contains. His statement of his methodological principles is impeccable. He insists from the outset that the text must be treated as a whole and warns against the type of dismemberment that results from isolating the 'fragments' it contains from their context. If, as Regenbogen already pointed out, the text combines reports and criticism, the further analytic hypothesis that B. explores is that Theophrastus' methods of argument broadly follow the models set in Aristotle's *Topics*. Theophrastus' tactics are 'dialectical sensu Aristotelico'. This prompts B. to spend a good deal of time discussing Aristotle himself.

After discussing date, transmission, content, structure, and previous interpretations of the *De sensibus*, he devotes the first two sections of Chapter II to Aristotle's dialectic as described in the *Topics* and practised in *Physics* Δ. The latter part of the chapter then deals with Theophrastus' own methods. Chapter III offers a rather cursory analysis of Theophrastus' own views on perception. Chapter IV is devoted to Theophrastus on Plato's *Timaeus* and Chapter V similarly tackles Theophrastus on the Presocratics, with particular attention to Democritus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras. Chapter VI tests the hypothesis that the *De sensibus* is applied dialectic, defined in terms of four characteristics, the use of *endoxa*, that of dialectical argument forms, being embedded in a systematic context, and aiming to obtain first principles, *archai*. B. finds the first two of these criteria are fully met, but the second pair only partially. Chapter VII offers conclusions and looks forward to further work needing to be done. The book has four appendices, on textual problems, a special bibliography on work on the *De sensibus*, and two on *doxai* and *archai* in Theophrastus, as well as a general bibliography.

There is a good deal of overlap and repetition in this structure. We are given a run-down on previous scholarship—Diels, Regenbogen, Steinmetz, and others—both in Chapter I, pp. 25ff. and in Chapter V, pp. 140ff., and even also in the Epilogue, Chapter VII, pp. 239ff. Plato has the whole of Chapter IV, but also figures in Chapter V. Much of the material in those two core chapters is repeated when B. analyses Theophrastus' argument patterns in Chapter VI. The content of Chapter V, p. 125 n. 89, is repeated verbatim at p. 203 n. 23. That is only a tiny point, but it is symptomatic of poor organization and sub-editing. Neither of the two bibliographies gives the details of 'Osborne 1987', nor does 'Laks 1991' correspond to any of the Laks entries those bibliographies cite. In the general bibliography we are told that 'for single references the relevant footnote is given', but unfortunately this is often incorrect—as is the case with Burnyeat 1982 and O'Brien 1968. The typographical mistakes in the Greek include a rash of occasions when an apostrophe appears as ζ' (three times with $\omicron\delta\delta'$ on p. 119 and again with $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda'$ on p. 125), and there are many in the English too.

So this is an aggravating book to use. What of the principal theses? I have space for

only two strategic comments. First, as regards Theophrastus following Aristotle's dialectical recommendations, there is something of a dilemma. The better the job Aristotle himself does, in the *Topics*, setting out the types of argument that are most useful in debate, the less need we have to see Theophrastus as following specifically Aristotelian advice. Thus, when Theophrastus focuses on consistency, there is no necessity to postulate an Aristotelian debt, even though we may agree that elsewhere Aristotelian models are in the background. Theophrastus is just being sensible and he has many other predecessors besides Aristotle, not least Plato. B. has usefully drawn attention to occasions when Theophrastus' performance *does* correspond to the recommendations of the *Topics*. Yet he tends to diagnose 'technical terms' more readily than is justified, and he has to concede that on the controversial claim in *Topics A 2* that dialectic helps in the search for principles, Theophrastus' programme does not yield substantial results.

But what of the tricky issue of the genre to which the *De sensibus* belongs? This is not (just) history evidently, since criticism is more prominent than reportage. B.'s tentative suggestion is that it is a 'preparation for, but not necessarily a prologue to, the exposition of Theophrastus' own doctrine' (p. 244). I would agree, but qualify *how* it is meant to be such a preparation. If *On Fire* (for instance) is anything to go by, when Theophrastus is being constructive he mostly leaves 'critical endoxography' behind. That in turn would leave us with the conclusion—banal to us, but maybe not then—that Theophrastus may well have believed you always needed to do your homework on others' views on your problems, before embarking on positive theories, first just to find out what they had said, and then, as Aristotle also wanted, to identify the difficulties they encountered.

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PYRRHO

R. BETT: *Pyrrho, his Antecedents and his Legacy*. Pp. x + 264. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Cased, £35. ISBN: 0-19-825065-7.

Pyrrho was not a Pyrrhonist. I would like to think that this is not a particularly shocking piece of news, but it is still by no means the orthodoxy. Richard Bett is the foremost exponent of such a view writing in English, and his various papers on the thorny problems of Pyrrho and the Pyrrhonists are now followed and complemented by a full-length exposition of his views. The detail and quality of argument is high, and B. is never less than scrupulous and clear in his exposition, so this book deserves to be read and thought about seriously.

B. begins with a long and careful discussion of the major source for Pyrrho's philosophy, Aristocles *ap. Eus. PE* 14.18.1–4, and then turns to look to Pyrrho's predecessors and his legacy in the light of the position thus uncovered. B.'s general picture is that Pyrrho held a metaphysical thesis about the world. Things are radically indifferent—neither this way nor that—and as a result he declared that our senses and opinions were no use to us as guides to reality. This sceptical consequence—coupled with Pyrrho's famous and charismatic equipoise—formed the inspiration for the Pyrrhonist tradition, who orientated their philosophy to a different starting point, namely the question of whether we can be sure that our senses and opinions are reliable.

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