

ago was portrayed a vivid description of the emotions experienced by a Montana miner attacked by two famished mountain lions one cold winter morning. While he was running his hair stood on end, and he trembled with fear, but when he could control himself sufficiently to turn round and face the beasts he became very calm, although all odds seemed against him. Through the sudden and unexpected appearance of a freight train he lived to tell the story.

The overcoming of the flight instinct is seen clearly in the action of the soldiers at the Front. Henri Barbusse, in describing a charge, says: "We are now as men possessed; we have forgotten our fears, and all we want now is to meet the enemy face to face; we are lusting for blood." Sir Robert himself tells of a young officer who, being overcome by a sudden fear, began to tremble, but by an effort of will this passed off, otherwise his feeling was to get away from where he was. I believe this illustration discloses one of the most important contributions to mental science—the fact that the cure of fear lies in the will. The generally accepted theory has been that expressed by Helen Williams Post: "Fear, which is only another name for ignorance, is all that ails us. Fear is not a thing that one can drop in obedience to the will; it can only be overcome by an intelligent investigation that leads to a full understanding of it. That which we understand we no longer fear. Understanding alone conquers fear."

However, in the case cited of the mountain lion attack, where all reason showed torture and death to be imminent and certain, all the knowledge and understanding in the world would have been of no avail. Will power, and not knowledge, overcame this man's fear. Truth will make you free, but intellect will only hold the links; it takes something else to strike the blow that breaks them.

Most respectfully yours,

F. LE ROY SPANGLER.

3543, 10th Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
August 1st, 1918.

To the Editors of the JOURNAL OF MENTAL SCIENCE.

SIRS,—I am obliged to you for the courtesy afforded me to read Mr. Le Roy Spangler's criticism of my paper upon the "Psychology of Fear" in the *Journal of Mental Science* last year.

He refers to a misapprehension in the use of the terms "instinct" and "emotion," which he himself appears to share, for he states that in fear "we find that the conflicting instincts are those of curiosity and flight"; yet one is an emotion, and the other a so-called instinct. I confess that I experience a difficulty in appreciating a clear line of demarcation between instincts and emotions, and personally I would prefer to regard all the instincts as reflex actions, and, as we know, elaborate reflex acts may need even a more extensive nervous apparatus than an intelligent act.

The origin of the instincts is probably reflex, but as they become more teleological, and their ends become more adapted to the welfare of the organism, they tend to rise above mere reflexes, and to be expressed either without consciousness along congenitally prepared nervous pathways, or to rise and be presented to consciousness.

The modern definition of the instincts is "inherited perceptual disposition," and if this is accepted the instincts are clearly mental states. We know that they are best seen in the lower animals such as the social bees and ants among the invertebrates and in birds and some of the lower mammals among the vertebrates. Witness the migratory tendencies of birds and the constructive acts of the beaver, and although we have no means of reading mental states into these acts—for only in man can this be effected—yet there must be mental elements present as in man, and we often use the term "instinct" in animals to express mental states.

Further, I fail to see a distinct demarcation between "feeling" in the psychological sense and the emotions, unless it be in the organic visceral sensations which accompany the latter; yet there are probably some *hormones* with corresponding internal sensations accompanying every hedonic tone, as the experiments of Cannon appear to suggest.

My critic denies that danger necessarily produces fear; but if, as I maintain,

fear is a biological reflex, then this primary emotion must be present in the unconscious mind, and I cannot conceive an actual present state of danger without the emotion (or instinct) of fear. But here we are upon the elusive territory of the subconscious, and is it possible to be unconscious of the conscious?—*i.e.*, is it possible to have impressions without the mind acting?—or, in other words, is it possible to have a state of pure physiological activity present without mentality? I am unconscious of the various ears of corn and straws in a cornfield, although my reason tells me they are present; I hear the wave on the pebbled beach, but I am unconscious of the sound caused by each pebble. I think, judging by my actions, that there are many and different emotions in my own mind, but because they do not rise to consciousness I may be tempted to deny they are there.

Lastly, he refers to the control of the emotions by the exercise of the will, and I think the will rather than the intellect is the claim of man to rise to a higher sphere. It is well known that the assumption of a movement associated with an emotion tends to create the emotion. The work of the actor is of this kind. The substitution by an effort of the will of a movement contrary to the emotion that will often best control it. A boy whistles when he passes the cemetery at night; a girl who is annoyed will play her piece of music to divert her emotion, and a child is taught to count ten before replying in anger.

An assumption of calm will overcome an emotion. One cannot feel chivalrous or martial when leaning on a lamp-post with hands in pocket. The reason can do much to show the unreasonableness of an emotion, but it is the will-power that finally exercises the control, and I cannot help feeling that the muscular element of thought has been very inadequately studied in connection with the will. I am obliged to Mr. Spangler for his criticisms.

I am, Sirs,

Your obedient servant,

ROBERT ARMSTRONG-JONES, M.D.

105, Harley Street, W.;
September 10th, 1918.

EXAMINATION FOR NURSING CERTIFICATE.

List of Successful Candidates.

FINAL EXAMINATION, MAY, 1918.

Chester County.—Sarah J. Partin, Minnie Lloyd, Margaret J. Griffiths, *Lily E. Robinson, Nellie Griffiths, Annie Elizabeth Eyton, Alice Crook.

Macclesfield, Chester.—Annie M. Craib, Jeanie Killough, Annie M. Peden, Sarah J. Leigh, Minnie Leigh.

Cornwall.—Annie Redmond.

Carlisle.—Lena Hardy, Ebenezer J. Barton, Hannah Willis, Flora Gray.

Severalls, Essex.—Kathleen V. Murphy, Henrietta E. Hood, Elizabeth A. Robinson, Ethel A. Kent, Ethel F. Randle, Ellen A. Davies, Eleanor W. Griffiths, Arthur H. Markland.

Bridgend, Glamorgan.—Edward Byrne, Tom Griffiths, Henry A. Murphy, Clara A. Prew, Sarah J. Tarr, *Maggie Jones, Elizabeth M. Williams.

Barming Heath, Kent.—Mildred C. Tiver, Mildred A. Oliver, Lilian Owen, Annie F. Burr ridge, Ellen Cotter, Lillian M. Leverett.

Rainhill, Lancs.—Alice Pemberton, Elizabeth M. Taylor, Mary Coghlan, Annie E. Yates.

Cane Hill, L.C.C.—Olive Jibb, Emily A. E. Amos, Olive M. Clavey, Annie M. Talbott, Kathleen C. Mawn, Laura L. Payne, Lilian M. Corby.

Claybury, L.C.C.—Edith M. Simons, Annie E. Reeve, Margery C. Barker, Edith E. Woodford, Maud E. Wiese, Gretto Hyland, Elsie Blake, Ada E. Parrish.

Colney Hatch, L.C.C.—Louisa Jones, Elsie Fisher, Kathleen M. E. Shaw, Alice N. Fenn, Lois Root.

Hanwell, L.C.C.—Rosa G. G. Brentnall, Jenny Lapidge, Rose Young, Emily C. Manley, Rose M. Brown, Alice Wildin, Violet G. Smith, Edith L. Knight.

Bicton, Shropshire.—Catherine A. Hogan.

Long Grove, L.C.C.—Grace Banwell, Horatio J. Johnson, Edmund J. Tomkins.