

human mind is: a set of capacities or powers. But this new Aristotelianism, for Opderbeck, succumbs to the naturalistic fallacy, for it cannot ultimately justify the shift from 'is' to 'ought'. This does not completely discredit the neo-Aristotelian perspective, but it does make a complement necessary. Which one? Theology. We can understand the importance of 'powers' or 'capacities' in nature, but ultimately a transcendent dimension is needed to explain why nature goes beyond itself in human consciousness or why it can transcend itself. What is needed for nature is a *telos* or end that is beyond itself. And that is where classical theism comes in, which, unlike for example process theology, presents a good model for understanding faith and reason, grace and nature, the human and the divine.

In sum, Opderbeck's book is clear and well argued. It offers a survey of the main question of law, which is conceived as an integral part of human nature, and argues for the need for a restoration of the concept of natural law, based on the notions of critical realism (McGrath), neo-Aristotelianism and classical theism (Aquinas). In short, it is an interdisciplinary work (law, theology, philosophy) in which, although neuroscience is not very present, it aims to confront certain contemporary reductionisms, such as that of neurolaw.

MOISÉS PÉREZ MARCOS OP  
*Catholic University of Valencia, Spain*

**GOD: EIGHT ENDURING QUESTIONS** by C. Stephen Layman, *University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2022, pp. xiii + 294, £26.95, pbk*

Stephen Layman's aim in this book is to provide us with the newest and 'best available' arguments for and against the existence of God. He does this by pitting arguments of naturalism (the materialist, scientific view) against those of theism on eight topics: the existence of God, evil, the goodness of God, his hiddenness and relation to morality, free will, the soul, and re-incarnation. At the end of each chapter he comes to a decision about which side, naturalism or theism, has the stronger arguments in each of these areas, often by the principle of favouring the view which presents the least difficulties. In this way, he wants 'gently' to lead the reader or student to his or her own conclusion, for his view is that generally there are few clear-cut or knock-down arguments in the philosophy of religion.

The book is written in a highly logical format, which makes for clarity and conciseness, and Layman is careful to explain his terms. His method, however, also has some limitations. For example, he only presents one part of the cosmological argument, the argument from contingency. There may be other, better views of God's timelessness than the one he presents,

that of C.S.Lewis. The latest arguments are not necessarily the best, and sometimes it might have been helpful to lead the reader to a fair conclusion, to have mentioned an older argument: for example, Aquinas's point that God's eternity 'surrounds the whole of time' (*ST* 1a, 14, 13). While Layman states the 'mind-body problem' excellently, he discusses the human soul as a straightforward contest between physicalism (and its alternative, non-reductive physicalism) against substance-dualism without mentioning the theory of Aristotle and Aquinas that body and soul constitute a unity. Thus one does not have to be a dualist if, like Layman, one is not a physicalist about the soul: there is an alternative to dualism for those who affirm the existence of the soul. Layman's own reasons are that it is not clear that non-physical souls could not cause events in the body and it is quite possible that animals have souls. This takes us back to Aristotle; so why not mention him?

Perhaps the most notable feature of Layman's book is the emergence of a powerful argument from several chapters taken together for the existence of God from free will. He is quite clear that naturalism does not allow or explain free will. He is, therefore, not only against determinism but also compatibilism, which combines free will with determinism. We know, however, that we are morally responsible beings, but there is no morality without free will. The existence of morality is therefore an argument for theism and for free will. This leads to a detailed discussion, covering two chapters, whether God's foreknowledge does not exclude free will in his creatures. Here again, an old adage like 'knowledge is in the knower' could usefully have been mentioned, as it allows one to see that God's knowing of what I will do does not prevent me from freely doing it on my part. Layman himself favours the view known as 'open theism', that God does not know future contingents, as the best way to maintain God's omniscience with our freedom of will. But surely God knows who will be the next Pope (or win the next presidential election in the United States).

Layman's book is very informative, and some of its chapters, for example, on free will and the soul, could equally well be useful for students of philosophy. But I ask myself at the end, What knowledge does this book provide? Is it knowledge of God or rather knowledge of arguments? John Henry Newman thought that religion should provide *knowledge* just as much as the natural sciences do (*The Idea of a University*, 1976, Discourse II). Linda Zagzebski remarks that philosophy of religion, as it is practised today, is what is left over from natural theology when confidence in the arguments for the existence of God has been lost (*The Philosophy of Religion* p.14). Perhaps the traditional natural theology is not altogether to be eschewed. At least, it started with a definite view, that God exists, and then considered arguments to the contrary in providing knowledge of his attributes, based on Scripture but that can also be reached by the light of reason. When one draws up the balance sheet of the reasons reached at the end of each chapter of this book, one gets the following result.

Chapters 1 and 2, on the existence of God: a positive case for theism. Chapter 3, on evil: as both sides have difficulties, a draw. (Theism is not the only view that faces severe trouble in explaining evil; naturalism does, as well). Chapter 4: that a good God exists is the more plausible thesis. Chapters 5 and 6: Chapter 6 supplies the reasons for the theist view which the theist is unable to show in Chapter 5. The hiddenness of God offers no strong support for naturalism, but the theist position is not conclusive: so a draw. Chapter 7: the argument from natural law supports theism. Chapter 8: no decision is reached. Chapter 9: as ‘open theism’ is favoured, God’s omniscience is partly impaired. Chapters 10 and 11: substance-dualism remains a possibility, but it is also possible for a theist to hold physicalism; so the soul fails to support theism clearly. Chapter 12: re-incarnation is not an alternative or better explanation of suffering than theism; so theism is affirmed. Thus Chapters 1,2,4,7 and 12 are positively in favour of theism. No chapter rules out theism. The other chapters are either inconclusive or fail to make the case for theism sufficiently strong.

If one approves Newman’s opinion; ‘I do not see much difference between avowing that there is no God, and implying that nothing definite can be known for certain about Him’ (*The Idea of a University*, p.49) one might think that the book rather leaves one in scepticism. One does not just want to know which are the best available arguments in the field today but which are *true*, although it is also useful to know, and thus be able to take into account, the most recent arguments in case they may modify one’s view. Layman admirably enables us to do this.

FRANCIS J. SELMAN  
Oscott College, England

**AN INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL’S LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION** by Jon Stewart, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, pp.304, £75.00, hbk

In his impressive new volume, Jon Stewart sets out to introduce Hegel’s *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* within the broader context of the Enlightenment’s criticism of religion and philosophy. The book expounds Hegel’s reaction to what he perceived as the ubiquitous criticism of theology by subjectivity, embodied in thinkers such as Rousseau, Jacobi, and Schleiermacher. In this context, according to Stewart, Hegel sought to defend Christianity against the excesses of Romanticism and the Enlightenment.

The five theses that Stewart sets out to demonstrate are: (1) That much of Hegel’s agenda comes from his reaction to the Enlightenment (p. 19). Hegel tries therein to restore dogmas of Christianity and with them the