179. Gilan-e Gharb is recorded as Geilan Zarb in several pages and maps. Colonel Zahirnejad is called Colonel Nejad throughout the book; this is as misleading as changing Johnson into Son.

It is a combination of all these considerations that makes this book a less than ideal source for scholars of Iran, Iraq, and the modern Middle East history.

AARON M. FAUST, *The Baʿthification of Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Totalitarianism* (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 2015). Pp. 296. $55.00 cloth. ISBN: 9781477305577

REVIEWED BY JOSEPH SASSOON, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.; e-mail: js824@georgetown.edu
doi:10.1017/S0020743816001392

The availability of millions of documents from the Iraqi archives of the Baʿth Party and its organs, such as the intelligence services and the Presidential *dīwān,* have allowed, and will continue to allow, new research and this scholarship will present readers with different facets of the system that prevailed for thirty-five years under the Baʿth Party (1968–2003). A number of books have been published on that period dealing with the regime from different angles and perspectives. Aaron Faust's book is the result of vast research in these archives and concentrates on the process of Baʿthification in Iraq by discussing its components and attempts to understand the organization of the system and its methods of what he terms "terror and enticement" (p. 147).

Faust's main thesis is that the Iraq of Saddam Husayn was a totalitarian regime similar to Hitler's Nazi Germany or Stalin's Soviet Union. Faust argues that while the Baʿthification of Iraq began after the party's rise to power in 1968, it was only when Saddam Husayn took over in 1979 as president that Iraq changed "from a Baʿthist oligarchy into a Husseini Baʿthist dictatorship" (p. 18). While it is correct that the Baʿthification process intensified after 1979, particularly in connection with the army, Faust gives the reader the impression that the regime's basic characteristics fundamentally changed only after 1979. The hanging of so-called spies after mock public trials and the relentless purge of communists and leftists in the 1970s did not create the impression for those living under the regime that the first ten years were any less repressive or fundamentally different. This leads to Faust's main argument about totalitarianism, which I believe suffers from a few serious pitfalls.

First, Faust totally ignores the economy in his analysis. This oversight is remarkable given his attempt to trace how the regime became totalitarian, which, by definition, encompasses all facets of life. In fact, apart from one sentence and a footnote (p. 253), there is no reference to how the regime ran the economy during two wars and thirteen years of harsh sanctions. No mention is made of how rationing of food was successful during the 1990s, and Faust time and again wonders why the regime lasted so long and why people supported the system. Second, the comparison with Stalin or Hitler is weak when one takes into consideration how many Iraqis were allowed to leave the country. Although citizens needed to undergo a convoluted and bureaucratic procedure to obtain the necessary papers to leave the country, the fact remains that more than one million Iraqis migrated from Iraq from the end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988 until the US-led invasion in 2003. Third, religion under Stalin did not function in the same manner as it did in Iraq, and while Faust details how the Shiʿa were not allowed to engage in some of their ceremonies, the average Iraqi was allowed to pray at home and in a mosque. It is true that the regime saw in religion a threat, particularly after the war with Iran, and it is correct that the security services kept a watch on religious establishments and mosques, but the Iraqi approach is somewhat different from that pursued by Stalin's totalitarianism. Faust unfortunately does not provide a comparative analysis with other Arab countries and does not engage in comparing the Iraqi regime to say, that of the

Syrian Baʿth under Hafiz al-Asad who shared many of the organizational ingredients for running and subjugating the country.

The book also includes some general statements, sometimes even contradictory, that bear scrutiny. For instance: "[Saddam] Hussein discouraged capability, competence, initiative, efficiency, and honesty" (p. 113). Faust does not explain how the regime survived thirty-five years if it had all these traits. Furthermore, if the leader of the country was against capability and efficiency, how did Iraq manage under sanctions and after most of its infrastructure was destroyed during the Gulf War? Another such statement is about the Baʿth Party: "Taken together, the documents discussed above suggest that many Iraqis saw little reason to join or remain active in the party after the Iran–Iraq War and into the early 1990s" (p. 85). However, table 5.1 on the previous page (p. 84) tells a different story, and Faust informs us on the following page that the party gained strength (p. 86). He then states that by 2003 "the Iraqi Baʿth Party enjoyed its largest ever membership" (p. 189).

The book's contribution lies in its detailing certain aspects of Baʿthification, such as the "rights and responsibilities" of its members (p. 88); the Baʿthification of civil society, such as the professional and mass organizations (pp. 91–96); and education (see, e.g., an elementary school examination for sixth grade) (pp. 48–49). Faust details the process of Baʿthification of students and youth, women, and in general all social institutions to ensure support for the regime and its leader. Whether these citizens really believed in the ideology of the Baʿth and why they chose to accept the dictums of the system is hard to answer categorically.

Faust also rightly argues that the violence that the Baʿthists used was "not to inculcate fear but rather to root out, destroy, and deter threats that the regime perceived to its security" (p. 151). Indeed, the system of rewards and punishment was what allowed the regime to survive for more than three decades. Iraq benefitted tremendously from the quadrupling of oil prices after the 1973 October War between the Arabs and Israelis. This in turn allowed the regime to reward its supporters while inflicting harsh punishment and extreme violence on its opponents—real or imaginary.

"Did Baʿthification work?" Faust asks this question and then posits: "There is no one answer" (p. 185). Indeed, the search for answers to this question and many others relating to this period in Iraq's history will continue unabated given the incredible trove of archives available for researchers.

CIHAN TUĞAL, *The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought Down Islamic Liberalism* (London: Verso Books, 2016). Pp. 304. $95.00 cloth, $29.95 paper. ISBNs: 9781784783310, 9781784783327

REVIEWED BY AVITAL LIVNY, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, Ill.; e-mail: alivny@illinois.edu
doi:10.1017/S0020743816001409

Turkey's recent autocratic turn has sent shockwaves through the international community. Long heralded as a model for the rest of the Muslim world, the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP), appeared to be on a successful economic and political trajectory, blending Islamic themes with democracy and development. In the immediate wake of the Arab Spring, this "Turkish model" was deemed an obvious answer to the democratic openings in Egypt and Tunisia. But as Istanbul's Taksim Square came to resemble Tahrir, swelling with protesters in and around Gezi Park, the government's coercive response challenged the image of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as an Islamic democrat. Since then, the jailing of academics and journalists and a protracted military offense in the Kurdish southeast have knocked the Turkish model off of its pedestal, raising questions about its sudden shift in policy.