the sponsoring of terrorism and in their efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The distinction between internal and external behavior is not always easy to maintain. Thus, in describing recent cases, Litwak writes that, "The Libyan case highlights the challenge that U.S. policymakers face with other outlier states – Iran and North Korea – in addressing breaches of external norms (terrorism and proliferation) without ignoring egregious violations of internal behavioral norms (human rights)" (p. 127).

Litwak develops the discussion of international norms by examining four pathways by which defiant states have been reintegrated in the past century. These include assimilation of a defeated power (Nazi Germany), gradual evolution of a revolutionary state toward orthodox great power behavior (USSR and China), change of regime through foreign intervention (Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and Tanzania's of Uganda in 1979), and change from within (Romania 1989). The book then considers how American strategy toward outliers has evolved, and here he includes case studies of Iraq, Libya, Iran, and North Korea, with an emphasis on the latter two and on the dynamics of nuclear proliferation. Here too, he addresses the question of whether power shifts in the international system, especially the rise of the BRICS and others, will affect existing norms and their enforcement.

An important contribution of the book lies in its knowledgeable treatment of policies toward outlier states, especially in the range of measures that have led to change. The work concludes with policy-relevant findings and with recommendations. In his view, efforts to change outlier behavior must include assurances that there will be no external intervention if the target state changes its external behavior. In Litwak's words, "The outlier states pose a frontal challenge to the global nuclear order whose cornerstone is the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]". With both North Korea and Iran, a retooled strategy of containment – one combining coercive diplomacy, deterrence, and reassurance – would decouple the nuclear issue from the question of regime change and harness internal forces as the agent of social change" (p. 175). Litwak argues that, on a policy continuum, such a strategy lies between the poles of engagement and military action and the policy dilemma that those choices represent (p. 187).

Robert Litwak's book will be valuable for those wishing to grasp not only the history, but also the policy difficulties that characterize serious efforts to combat nuclear proliferation and state support of terrorism. At the same time, there are points to debate concerning this thought provoking book. One issue (a subtle matter of interpretation) is whether, in explaining the behavior of rogue or outlier states, sufficient weight is given to the element of agency, i.e., the extent to which their external behavior is motivated by their own internal logic, preferences, ideology, history, and path dependency, as contrasted with the policies and actions of the United States. In fairness, Litwak does devote some attention to the internal character of these regimes, but the issue here is one of emphasis, and the book's focus in the North Korea and Iran cases may put more of the responsibility for actual or potential outcomes on Washington's policies than on the motivations, priorities, and choices intrinsic to these regimes.

Another caveat concerns a trope altogether too common in the treatment of the Bush era (2001-09), in which a Manichean distinction is drawn between that administration's unilateralism as a departure from those who have come before and after. One example will suffice. As evidence of Bush's unilateralism, Litwak notes that after 9/11, Bush declared that the United States would not "seek a permission slip" from the UN in order to defend itself, and that this logic underlied the decision for preventive war against Iraq in 2003 (p. 179). The quote is accurate, but the sin of omission here is that such impulses were not entirely unique to the Bush administration. A more balanced account would have noted that the fateful decision was supported by a 29–21 majority of the Democrats in the Senate vote on the issue (October 11, 2002). Moreover, those voting in favor included not only party stalwarts such as Harry Reid and Hillary Clinton, but also the party's subsequent 2004 presidential nominee, John Kerry. Indeed, Kerry's acceptance speech at the Democratic national convention in July 2004 included words nearly synonymous with those of George Bush, "I will never give any nation or international institution a veto over our national security."

In all, this is an authoritative, substantive, and well-written account that will be essential reading for students, scholars, and the attentive public who wish to understand the problem of outlier states and the policy challenges they represent.

Responding to Genocide: The Politics of International Action. By Adam Lupel and Ernesto Verdeja, eds. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013. 299p. $58.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592714000711

— Karen E. Smith, *London School of Economics and Political Science*

Responding to Genocide is an important contribution to the burgeoning field of genocide (and mass atrocity) prevention. This is social science at its best: the attempt to use research findings about causes of genocide and other mass atrocities (crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing) to suggest policies that can mitigate or eliminate those causes. But it is still an academic field in its infancy, and there are numerous aspects that need to be investigated. In this volume, editors Adam Lupel and Ernest

Verdeja try to move the debate further by exploring how "political factors shape the nature of international responses" to genocide and other mass atrocities and how those factors "limit or enable the chances of success" (p. 3). Their collection brings together contributions by well-known authors on genocide prevention, conflict prevention, and the responsibility to protect. It should be read by all policy-makers and scholars interested in preventing genocide.

In the first part of the book, two chapters summarize the current state of debates regarding the causes of genocide. Frances Stewart compares quantitative studies on the causes of civil war and of genocide. While there are numerous similarities in the causes of both civil war and genocide, Stewart notes that there are three major differences: Countries with low per capita incomes are at the greatest risk for civil war but those with intermediate levels of income are the most associated with genocide; autocratic or totalitarian regimes are most likely to initiate genocide, while civil wars are more likely in intermediate regimes; and civil war is a predisposing condition for genocide (p. 70). These differences are important – particularly because policy-makers and officials often assume that policies designed to prevent conflict will also prevent genocide (so genocide prevention requires no additional or special policy measures). The findings raise thorny problems for policy-makers, since fostering a transition from authoritarianism to a more democratic regime will lessen the risks of genocide but increase those of civil war, which in turn is associated with an increased risk of genocide.

Barbara Harff, who a decade ago developed a model to assess the risks of genocide, then reviews efforts to develop and use early warning models to try to inform policy responses to potentially genocidal situations. She notes that work is still needed to understand the process leading to genocide, why elites choose to carry out genocide, and which policy interventions at what point are most likely to lead to genocide prevention. In any given situation, these questions could be answered differently, which highlights the need for well-informed analysis.

In his chapter, I. William Zartman considers the role that mediation and diplomacy can play in preventing genocide, and points out that the parties on the ground – "especially the repressing party" – have to be willing to be mediated (p. 131). Without this, third parties may have to impose sanctions to encourage the repressing party to consent to mediation. Unfortunately, *Responding to Genocide* does not include a chapter on the role that sanctions and other coercive measures may play in preventing genocide, which would complement Zartman's argument and provide further analysis of some of the tools available to policy-makers to try to prevent genocide and other mass atrocities, as well as what limits exist on the use of sanctions.

The second part of the book considers the roles that various actors – transnational civil society, regional organisations, the United Nations – play in genocide prevention efforts. The overall message is that these actors could do considerably more to strengthen their capacities to prevent genocide. Iavor Rangelov's chapter offers a useful corrective to the oft-heard argument that civil society can press governments and international organizations to take preventative action against massive human rights violations such as genocide. Instead, civil society does not speak with one voice when it comes to questions such as "is it genocide" and "what should be done." Rangelov argues that civil society should focus instead on advancing "those humanitarian norms and novel legal and policy instruments that, once in place, set the terms of the debate and guide the international response to any particular crisis" (p. 152).

Regional organisations are also divided. Timothy Murithi argues that the internal divisions and the lack of capabilities within the African Union and Arab League have inhibited their responses to incipient or ongoing genocides, as in the AU's efforts in Darfur and the Arab League's response to repression in Syria. He proposes that regional organisations should focus on providing early warning and trying to de-escalate tensions, but that they will still need to "develop coherent genocide prevention strategies" if they are do this effectively (p. 176).

The ups and downs of the UN's responses to mass atrocities are reviewed by Colin Keating (New Zealand's former ambassador to the Security Council) and Thomas Weiss. Keating argues that despite the Security Council's many failures to prevent or halt mass atrocities, there is hope for "better outcomes in the future" (p. 181). Even after a "pushback" following the 2011 intervention in Libya, there is still support for interventions in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali. Weiss is less sanguine, pointing out that the "North-South theatre" with its "empty performances" constitutes a real political obstacle to enabling interventions to halt mass atrocities, alongside a serious lack of military capability beyond that of the United States, and a shocking reluctance to coordinate among the many UN agencies that could help protect the people. But even Weiss notes that the Libya example "suggests that it is not quixotic to utter 'never again' and occasionally to mean it" (p. 235).

In their conclusion, Lupel and Verdeja consider the crucial question of how to "create" political will to respond to potential or ongoing genocides. Firstly, there should be further development and diffusion of norms against the use of violence on civilians and favouring international cooperation to prevent or halt such violence. Secondly, awareness needs to be cultivated that halting mass atrocities is in the common interest of all states. Thirdly, in any particular situation of potential or actual

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violence, strategies need to be devised that are appropriate to the context. Finally, strong leadership, especially by democratic states, is needed to enable effective genocide prevention (pp. 251–3).

Responding to Genocide identifies the major stumbling block to preventing and halting genocide – differences among states and other actors. Governments need to know that there is a risk and agree to take concerted action to address it. They need to be willing and able to impose coercive measures as a last resort, if structural prevention and softer direct prevention measures have failed. Debates about semantics – whether a "genocide" is the issue or not – should not foil the primary objective of preventing massive human rights violations. This volume highlights how difficult (but not impossible) it is to overcome that stumbling block. It points to some improvements that could strengthen the capacity of various international actors to prevent genocide, but does not cover others (such as the use of sanctions or measures such as monitoring missions). It would also have been illuminating to broaden the discussion to include obstacles to action, such as the cost (in money and in lives) of preventive measures, the ways bureaucracies can inhibit early warning, and the perennial problem that crisis-response crowds out prevention (in terms of resources, and the attention and time of politicians and officials). Reducing such obstacles could improve the ability of governments and international organisations to prevent genocide. While that does not necessarily improve the will to respond, such measures could improve the capacity of those actors that are willing to do so.

Diversionary War: Domestic Unrest and International Conflict. By Amy Oakes. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012. 280p. $95.00 cloth, $25.95 paper.
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— David Brulé, *Purdue University*

For the uninitiated, diversionary wars are those in which leaders are thought to seek to distract attention from domestic problems by directing military action against a foreign target. In *Diversionary War*, Amy Oakes, like other scholars, argues that diversion is not an optimal policy response to domestic problems. Indeed, domestic policy choices that directly address problems at home are likely to be better than diversion. Also like other scholars, she draws an important distinction among countries and governments according to their ability to employ various policies. Rather than argue that democracies are the only ones that face obstacles to policy choices in response to domestic unrest (i.e., repression), or that focus on institutional impediments to implementing domestic policy, Oakes suggests that a set of policy alternatives are constrained by the extent to which a country is able to garner the necessary resources to address domestic discontent. Consequently, leaders may be required to substitute one policy for another. For instance, if a repression is unavailable as a viable policy choice in response to domestic unrest, leaders may substitute diversion for repression. On the other hand, if a leader lacks the resources to launch a military adventure abroad, he or she may have little choice than to employ domestic alternatives.

Unfortunately, the literature on diversion is large and ever more difficult to advance. Perhaps because of this, Oakes—mistakenly, in my view—characterizes her argument as if it is a novel contribution to the literature, suggesting that research on the diversionary use of force has paid only scant attention to the concepts of policy substitutability, institutional constraints, and resource availability. But her claims are drawn directly from the large literature on the topic. For instance, Bruce Russett, T. Clifton Morgan, and Kenneth Bickers, Christopher Gelpi, and Ross Miller have made very similar arguments since 1990. More recently, Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet Kisangani, among others, have extended these arguments and devised increasingly sophisticated tests of the theory. Although she references much of this work, Oakes appears to oversell her theoretical contribution in light of this large literature.

Be that as it may, Oakes makes an important contribution to the literature by turning her attention to the question of whether diversion actually is a beneficial policy choice relative to other alternatives. Here, she carefully considers previous work on the topic (e.g., Pickering and Kisangani) and logically connects the effects of a number of policy responses—diversion, repression, political and economic reform—on domestic unrest. She approaches the question initially from an agnostic point of view, suggesting that relationships could be either positive or negative. But when situated within her own argument concerning policy resources, she makes precise predictions, which are borne out in the analyses.

Perhaps the chief strengths of the book are found in the author's methodological solution to the question concerning the fruits of diversion, as well as in her combination of case studies (discussed later) with large-n statistical analyses. She examines the relative effects of policy responses on domestic unrest. Rather than simply assume that diversion is a binary phenomenon, Oakes disaggregates military action into low-level spectacles—uses of force short of war—and war. She also explicitly models the effects of repression and reform on domestic unrest. Her results are intriguing: low-level spectacles increase unrest, while repression is effective in reducing it.

Although the disaggregation of military action into three categories is useful in examining the effects of diversion on unrest, it is problematic when considered as an outcome variable. Oakes suggests that leaders may choose among the military options in a decision-making framework in which implications of a low-level spectacle