

become the new tenders of information gates. Ultimately, they warn, the extent to which the emerging media regime will enhance or limit democratic discourse is unclear.

Second, the authors avoid crude relativism. To say that all forms of media may contain politically relevant information is not to say that all information is politically relevant, nor that all political information is democratically helpful. Notably, they contend that politically *relevant* information can either enhance or inhibit the public's understanding of politics. (In fact, they suggest that conventional political news, with its focus on the inside game of politics and devotion to a narrow understanding of "objectivity," has arguably undermined the public's democratic capabilities.)

After Broadcast News is both exhilarating and, at times, a bit frustrating. A few key components of the argument beg for more development, including the authors' reading of the Realist movement that, they argue, profoundly shaped the American media regime of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. That the Realist movement is not more completely rendered here is unfortunate, because recalling the Realist influence is one of this book's main contributions to our received understandings of media history. The Realist impulse to apprehend reality through a variety of genres, as much as a postmodernist embrace of hyperreality and multiaxiality, animates the book. The authors, it seems, wish to create a realism for the postmodern age, in which, as in the original Realist era, "the public assume[s] that the new media capture reality in ways that other sorts of representation could not" (p. 34).

The book is also less than satisfying when dealing with the vexing problems of misinformation in contemporary politics. In the final chapter, the authors offer some thoughtful standards against which to measure the dem-

ocratic performance of media, including *transparency* (about the persons and interests that lie behind media messages), *pluralism* (of media outlets, content, and perspectives), and *verisimilitude*, which they define as a media product's ability to offer "the likelihood or probability of truth" (p. 303). They pointedly reject the broadcast era's faith in facts; indeed, a central argument of the book is that "determinations of what constitutes all but the most basic facts, what constitutes opinion, and for whom this is the case are almost always inherently contestable" (p. 297). In essence, instead of preserving a privileged place for facts, Williams and Delli Carpini contend that facts have rarely been as self-evident as the broadcast era model of journalism believed. But replacing facts with "verisimilitude" will undoubtedly leave some readers dissatisfied, for the book does not fully grapple with the implications of a marketplace of ideas in which half-truths and distortions become the most popular commodities.

For readers attached to traditional notions of media social responsibility or to received models of media influence such as top-down agenda setting, this book may be jarring. "The challenge in shaping this new regime," the authors argue for example, "is not to determine how to re-create the authoritative political-information hierarchy of the past—for better or worse, that battle has already been lost" (p. 133). For others who have already embraced the relaxed boundaries between news and entertainment and the hyper-real nature of contemporary media and politics, the book may feel less like a revelation and more like a long-overdue exhortation to everyone else to catch up. No matter which camp you belong to, this should be required reading. Personally, I am grateful for the reorientation.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. By Zoltan Barany. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012. 472p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592713000595

— Brian D. Taylor, *Syracuse University*

In case any of us needed reminding, the events of the Arab Spring have highlighted once again the crucial role that coercive state agencies in general, and the military in particular, often play in regime transitions. Those seeking a clear and well-grounded overview of the role of the military in periods of major political change and of the way in which the army is subjected to democratic civilian control after such episodes will find a valuable guide in Zoltan Barany's new book.

The Soldier and the Changing State is an extraordinary book in both senses of that word, simultaneously remarkable and rare. Most notably, the book is built around 27 country case studies that span the globe—it really does encompass Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, as the subtitle promises. Barany traveled to all of those continents to conduct interviews, although not surprisingly in a book of this scope, the major source for the case studies is the existing secondary literature. The case studies are grouped by three different "contexts": after war, after regime change, and after state transformation. Each of these contexts is further subdivided into types, or what the author calls "settings": Postwar contexts can be found after both external and internal war, post-regime change contexts can be either postpraetorian or postsocialist, and state transformation can be either after colonialism or after (re)unification. Further, some of his settings use multiple chapters to cover different regions, and so there are three chapters

on postpraetorianism (Europe, Latin America, and Asia) and two on postcolonialism (Asia and Africa). Each substantive chapter has two main case studies and one secondary case. Overall, his 27 cases are Germany (after World War II), Japan, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Lebanon, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Slovenia, Russia, Romania, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, Tanzania, Botswana, Germany again (after reunification), South Africa, and Yemen. This book is a one-man-edited volume.

This empirical ambition is coupled with a disarming theoretical modesty. At one point, Barany declares (p. 300; emphasis in original), “the generalization we *can* make is that it is extremely difficult to make useful generalizations,” and his “skepticism regarding grand theories” (p. 345) is evident throughout. This skepticism is not about theory per se; rather, it is rooted in a largely implicit historical institutionalism that emphasizes the importance of context, timing, and leadership. Some readers may find this “it depends” stance frustrating, but this reviewer thought it was both refreshing and largely warranted. Barany is also explicit about his normative bias in favor of democracy and his interest in providing useful advice to policymakers seeking to construct democratic civil–military relations.

The book is organized in the conventional fashion for comparative, qualitative case study research. The nine case study chapters are sandwiched between an introduction and theory chapter and a conclusion that summarizes the major arguments and provides policy advice. The theory chapter has a brief overview of the classic civil–military relations literature, starting with Plato and running through Machiavelli and Clausewitz before arriving at the founders of the contemporary social science work on the topic, such as Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Samuel Finer. Barany sets out his standard for good democratic civil–military relations in terms of the “triangular nexus between state, society, and the armed forces” (p. 11), which he then employs in the cases to assess the amount of progress toward this ideal. This theoretical setup will be particularly useful for general scholars of democratization and comparative politics who are less familiar with the civil–military relations literature.

Barany’s theoretical restraint does not mean that there are no general claims—indeed, his belief in the importance of context and starting points is one of his principal arguments. For example, in analyzing the radically different trajectories for civil–military relations in Pakistan and India, he stresses the circumstances of the 1947 partition and the differing bureaucratic capacities of the new states.

The most important general argument is that “democracy cannot be consolidated without military elites committed to democratic rule” (p. 3). Relatedly, the author also asserts that “building democratic civil–military rela-

tions may be the most fundamental prerequisite of the transition to and the consolidation of democracy” (pp. 10–11). If he is right, then he has located another necessary condition or prerequisite of democracy, along with a state (Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 1996, 17–19).

It is thus somewhat disappointing that Barany does not more explicitly measure military views of democracy in the case studies. Although he asserts in the conclusion (p. 340) that “it was easy to discern that the armed forces were not committed to democratic values” in the cases with authoritarian outcomes, the reasons for his confidence are not clear. To prove his case, he needs some way to assess officer-corps beliefs independent of the outcome that these values are supposed to explain—a democratic, authoritarian, or hybrid regime. For example, J. Samuel Fitch (*The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, 1998) used interviews with retired and active-duty officers to classify the “role beliefs” of Argentine and Ecuadorian officers into five distinct categories. Obviously, such a method was not available to Barany given the scope of his project, but more explicit attention to his coding of military “commitment to democracy”—either yes, no, probable, or unclear, according to the summary tables—would have helped. Without more detailed treatment of military elite beliefs, it is hard to know whether a commitment to democracy is a cause or consequence of democratic consolidation, or indeed whether some form of apolitical professionalism, indifferent to regime type, is also compatible with stable democracy.

Another significant general argument, although Barany features it less prominently, concerns the importance of “institutionally balanced civilian control of the armed forces” (p. 239). Indeed, in my view this is his most notable and best-supported claim, especially since it goes against one of Huntington’s arguments in *The Soldier and the State* (1957), the urtext of contemporary civil–military relations from which Barany takes his title. Huntington contended that the institutional design of American civil–military relations as set out in the Constitution was seriously flawed because it divided power over the armed forces between the legislature and the executive, thus provoking a struggle for control that tended to draw the military into politics. He even suggested that the situation in Imperial Germany, in which the Kaiser had unquestioned dominance of the military and the parliament was toothless, was far preferable. Barany, in contrast, demonstrates throughout the book that an empowered parliament that is actively involved in defense and security policy is a key ingredient of democratic civil–military relations. The same could be said for societal actors, such as nongovernmental organizations and the media. Moreover, another type of civil–military balance is also important. An extreme form of civilian control, in which the military has no real voice in the policy process, such as in Germany, India, and Japan

and more recently in Argentina, is also a problem, leading to ineffective defense policy.

The Soldier and the Changing State will probably be most widely read among specialists of civil–military relations, who will learn a great deal from the case studies in particular. But it should also find a considerable audience among democratization scholars. The book neither offers up a new theory of regime change nor tests existing theories, but there is no better general historical treatment of the ways in which civil–military relations influence the transition process in countries around the world.

Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery. By Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012. 304p. \$75.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

Creative Reconstructions: Multilateralism and European Varieties of Capitalism after 1950. By Orfeo Fioretos. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011. 264p. \$49.95.

Making Markets in the Welfare State: The Politics of Varying Market Reforms. By Jane R. Gingrich. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 288p. \$94.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592713000601

— Stefan Svallfors, *Umeå University, Stockholm University, and Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm*

The three books under review cover, in rich historical detail, the political construction of markets. They range from the constitution and varying effects of markets for welfare state services (by Jane Gingrich), to the domestic and multilateral determinants of industrial reconstruction (by Orfeo Fioretos), and the transitional market building in Eastern Europe (by Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits). Although they differ in case selection and theoretical starting points, they share a conviction that markets are at their core social and political constructions, and that the way in which markets are set up affects distributional outcomes, growth, and power differentials among social actors.

In *Making Markets in the Welfare State*, Gingrich sets out to correct the misconception that marketization of welfare state services means one and the same thing across contexts. By comparing marketization in health care, education, and elder care in Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden, she shows that the rules of the new markets differ widely from one context to the other. She discerns two basic dimensions in which welfare markets differ: One is the allocation dimension (how is access to services organized?); the other is the production dimension (who has effective control over the supply?). By cross-cutting these two dimensions, Gingrich arrives at no less than six different types of welfare markets, which vary in their setup, driving forces, and distributional effects.

Why have different markets emerged in different policy contexts? Gingrich argues that this depends on two factors. One is the preexisting access rules of welfare services:

Are they organized as uniform systems or as more fragmented and stratified ones? The other is the preferences of political actors when they try to further their constituencies’ interests. The author shows that left versus right politics has a great impact, even in marketization processes. The designs of these markets are, to a large extent, an effect of the way in which political actors on the left and the right have been able to mold them according to their constituencies’ interests. But they always do this in a policy context where preexisting access rules differ, which means that variations across policy domains within the same polity are just as large as the ones found between different polities. Political actors are often forced to choose “second-best” options as they maneuver the institutional terrain. The conceptualization of welfare regimes is of little help in trying to understand these processes. Gingrich maintains. Instead, she finds a much more complex interaction between policy contexts and political actors.

Although I am largely convinced by Gingrich’s arguments and impressed by her meticulous groundwork, I do not think she actually shows the reader how and if these different markets differ in their distributional effects. Access rules are one thing, but the ability to make productive use of such rules differs widely across social strata. What the actual outcomes are, and how they differ from nonmarket allocation, is something that is extremely hard to judge. The author is to be excused for not making any real attempt to do so. But the end result is perhaps a too-benign view of what marketization of welfare services entails. Markets—no matter how they are designed—tend to produce inequality alongside growth and flexibility. I do not believe that the Left will ever be able to design markets that do not produce inequality, although I am convinced after reading Gingrich’s book that the extent of such inequality must surely be affected by the construction of particular markets.

Fioretos’s *Creative Reconstructions* takes on industrial reconstruction in post-war Europe, focusing on the three largest economies: Britain, France, and Germany. There are two key respects in which his analysis differs from previous scholarship on the issues. The first is that he takes his starting point in behavioral economics, rather than in rational choice or historical institutionalism. Fioretos argues that while analyses grounded in rational choice theories tend to exaggerate the malleability of institutional configurations, historical institutionalism tends to underestimate it. Behavioral institutionalism constitutes a middle ground, in which institutions are seen as highly malleable, but under conditions inherited from the past. Not least are actors’ understandings of the present highly influenced by the institutional histories in question.

The second way in which Fioretos’s analysis breaks new ground is his consistent focus on the multilateral aspects of institutional change. He argues that the interplay between domestic and international factors has most often