a monolithic relationship between democratization and protest. Instead, Moseley argues that "it is precisely the ineffectiveness of formal democratic institutions ... that reduces citizens' faith in formal vehicles for representation and pushes them to adopt more contentious, street-based tactics" (p. 9).

The book successfully combines quantitative and qualitative methods. Most of the quantitative findings rely on data provided by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) from 2008, 2010, and 2012. These are representative national surveys of individuals from 24 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (p. 54). The book also takes subnational variation seriously by presenting in-depth case studies about protest behavior in three Argentine provinces based on fieldwork conducted from March to June 2013. Chapter 3 presents detailed quantitative data showing the different trends of protest activity across the region, combining individual- and country-level characteristics to explain protest participation at the individual level. Moseley finds that "mass-level democratic engagement has outpaced the consolidation of high-quality formal institutions in many Latin American regimes, creating a gap in terms of citizens' demands for democratic representation and its supply" (p. 72). Chapter 4 examines questions of protest from the top, examining the political elite's use of these strategies. The author finds that those who are more inclined to be targeted for participation-buying are also more likely to turn out to street protests and roadblocks, but not labor strikes. This finding is an interesting one for those interested in studying contentious politics and institutional politics. Chapters 5–7 focus on protests in Argentina at the subnational level. Studying the cases of Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and San Luis provinces, Moseley demonstrates the unevenness of protest within one country: protests differ not only across nation-states but also within them. He claims that "where democratic institutions are only partially flawed—as is the case in numerous developing regimes across the region and in many provinces within Argentina—and political engagement thrives, peaceful street demonstrations become a powerful tool for individuals in pursuit of effective democratic representation" (p. 177).

Despite its many contributions, the book fails to examine three dimensions that seem critical in the construction of a protest state—exit and loyalty, state repression, and protest efficacy—focusing only on the use of voice through protest. Albert O. Hirschman's classic work (*Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, 1970) teaches us that voice is one of the tools available to citizens to express their dissatisfaction. *Protest State* examines masterfully different voice options, but does not address the possibilities of loyalty through partisanship, participation in organizations, and exit by migration. Incorporating Hirschman's complete framework of analysis would have made the author's argument even more convincing. Is voice the result of the combination of ineffective political institutions and high engagement, or is it the response to the absence of exit and loyalty? Are citizens who have the opportunity to leave to another country willing to spend time and energy in organizing a protest? Examining the availability of exit options would have strengthened the book's argument about weak institutions.

In addition, the author's treatment of state repression is disappointing. One could argue that not all groups, regardless of subnational variation, experience the same treatment from the state and that these differences have implications for how, if, and when they protest; the unevenness of state repression of particular groups of individuals may weaken their capacity to organize and make demands on the state. By the end of the book, the author seems to recognize the critical difference between the intensity and the majority of preferences (per Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, 1956). "Perhaps the gravest missing piece from this book is my inattention to how systematic differences in law enforcement responses to protestors might shape protest repertoires" (p. 196).

Finally, the theory of the book does not help readers understand the relationship between street-based protest efficacy and the use of this strategy. If a street-based protest is ineffective, should we expect a decline in its use in the future? Do states in which protest is effective normalize at the same rate as states in which protest is ineffective? Given the richness of the data, the author could have selected cases and used process-tracing to study the relationship between protest efficacy and its effects on the use of the strategy over time.

Despite these quibbles, *Protest State* is a terrific work that makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of the rise of contention in Latin America. The book is a must-read for scholars interested in the region, social movements, and contentious politics in the Global South.

Gambling with Violence: State Outsourcing of War in Pakistan and India. By Yelena Biberman. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 240p. $99.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.
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Outsourcing violence is a murky business. All sorts of states delegate violence to any number and type of agents. They are a motley crew. Along with citizens concerned about local security lapses and those coerced to join, tribal groups, former rebels, football fans, motorcycle gangs, religious zealots, ideologues, and criminals heed the call to arms. To see quite how bizarre and alarming delegation in this policy area becomes, watch Joshua Oppenheimer's award-winning film *The Act of Killing*, which documents the anticommunist mass murderers in Indonesia in the 1960s. But for all their peculiarities, nonstate

armed groups share some general characteristics, not least a penchant for a zoological *nom de guerre*. States let loose (night) wolves in the Crimea, cats of many colors in Sri Lanka, tigers in the Balkans and Andhra Pradesh, and seagulls in the Solomon Islands. With their implications for security, the welfare of citizens, and for our understanding of the state and its sovereign tasks, no wonder, as Yelena Biberman points out, there is a growing literature on these agents of violence and atrocity.

Gambling with Violence contributes to this literature a welcome case approach with a wealth of interview and archival material of substantial theoretical interest to political scientists. The book is mostly about counterinsurgency in South Asia, but Biberman's field research takes her to Turkey and Russia as well. Complementing the quantitative literature, her work illustrates the value of layers of evidence on the sequence of events and the incentives at work. It is an intrepid political scientist who overcomes the obstacles and risks of field research in this challenging environment, and it is a safe bet that Biberman has tales to tell about her dissertation research and *Gambling with Violence*. Indeed, I would appreciate more on how she tackled the practical and ethical issues she encountered.

Existing research delineates both logistical and political incentives to outsource violence. States delegate to manage insurgencies, to coup-proof, and to eradicate or expel unwanted populations. They seek efficiency gains, to counterbalance unreliable regular forces, and to avoid the blame. Of the counterinsurgencies that Biberman examines, she writes, "When valued territory is at stake, states—be they democratic, semidemocratic, or authoritarian—take the gamble with violence by empowering nonstate actors to fight insurgency on their behalf" (p. 158). States bet on these agents as losses mount and when not making military headway. Political incentives for delegation and plausible deniability get least support in her analysis of counterinsurgency.

As for the agents, they have both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives. Pakistan's irregulars in 1971 included rural zealots with anti-Hindu beliefs and those wanting compensation and immunity for criminal acts. Biberman describes the principal-agent problem posed by the side switching and ill-disciplined Razakars in this conflict (p. 59), while noting the state's tolerance of violence and victim humiliation that also enriched or amused members of India's armed group, the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon, in Kashmir (p. 79) and Turkey's village guards in Kurdish regions (p. 138). In addition to her insights about the conditions under which agents contract with the state, the theoretical implications of this material are worth exploring. What she is observing is not simply the principal's problem of *can't control* (the principal-agent problem) but also the principal's temptation of *won't control*, where the state refuses to rein in selfish agents as long as their actions contribute some tactical or strategic advantage. Principals and agents have different interests, but not necessarily conflicting ones. If the violations are exposed, the state can blame bad apples: the familiar principal-agent problem. With the murkiness of the outsourcing relationship, ill-defined lines of control, and the convenient assumption of information asymmetry, delegating to armed non-state actors is a technique that served some state officials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, for example.

Of theoretical interest to Biberman are the timing of delegation to these groups and their effectiveness. Her "balance of interests" approach suggests that militias form when regular forces are in trouble. Pakistan in 1971 used militias when "it became clear that the rebels were reclaiming the province" (p. 38). In Chhattisgarh, India called on Salwa Judum to overcome a stalemate. The same goes for Turkey and Russia: "When the local balance of power was in their favor, they worked alone. They turned to proxies when the distribution of local power was roughly equal and when they were weak vis-à-vis the rebels" (p. 130). A "last resort" argument about delegation to these groups makes sense; think of the surge in Iraq and the United States enlisting Awakening militias in response to the insurgency. Interestingly, it is a pattern that is difficult to disentangle in the global quantitative data. But the wider claim that this approach "contributes to the burgeoning scholarship on militias by considering, for the first time, the interests of both the states and the nonstate actors" (p. 158), sits oddly with the existing principal-agent literature on this topic.

The timing issue, of course, complicates the measurement of effectiveness. If these groups only get going when the going gets rough, success rates likely suffer. For Biberman, the "jury is still out on whether nonstate counterinsurgents are actually useful" (p. 5). Yet in the case narratives, it is not clear that is where she ends up. These case studies describe useful strategic contributions from the Ikhwan in Kashmir, vigilantes in Dagestan, and the gantamirovtsy and kadyrovtsy in Chechnya. For Turkey, "Kurdish Hizbullah in the cities and the village guards in the countryside helped upend the local power balance in the state's favor. So successful were the Islamists that, by 1997, the state no longer needed them" (p. 143). Although the verdict on Salwa Judum is that they "stoked more chaos" (p. 126), the government, undeterred by a Supreme Court ruling outlawing the group for human rights violations, continued to use their fighters in other organizations. A measure of success in the principal-agent literature, at least, is contract renewal.

But for Biberman the victories are "ephemeral and incomplete," producing "territorial control but not legitimacy or peace" (p. 164). She writes, "Nonstate allies gave states, at best, a tactical advantage, not outright victory.. . . East Pakistan/Bangladesh shows that nonstate allies do not necessarily help states win. Cases in which militias served

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as the necessary condition for military victory—in Kashmir, Chhattisgarh, Chechnya, and Turkish Kurdistan—are hardly poster children of peace" (p. 163). Defining policy success is surely a thorny problem. Yet given the selection issue and the principal's military goal of defeating insurgents, four out of five wins seems pretty good odds in a gamble with violence. Biberman's definition of success or victory, complete with peace and legitimacy, would be a high bar for conventional forces. The success of outsourcing is evaluated by the goals of the principal, but what Biberman's work intimates is that may not be good enough for the rest of us. Armed nonstate actors, as their names suggest, are likely predators. How do we weigh, or better control, the human costs of this dark menagerie?

Transitional Justice and the Former Soviet Union: Reviewing the Past, Looking toward the Future. Edited by Cynthia M. Horne and Lavinia Stan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 438p. $125.00 cloth, $41.99 paper.
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For scholars steeped in the comparative method, the successor states to the Soviet Union offer an ideal setting for uncovering the determinants of transitional justice (TJ). All but four constituent former republics experienced Soviet occupation, along with famine resulting from forced collectivization and Stalinist purges. All made great and irrecoverable sacrifices during World War II. Then, in 1990–91, all became independent, albeit with various degrees of enthusiasm as the Soviet Empire collapsed. Yet their TJ trajectories varied considerably. Rarely does the real world provide such a controlled environment to trace causal mechanisms at work.

Despite this attraction, the Former Soviet Union (FSU) is considered a difficult case to analyze because, thanks to the politics of *Glasnost* ("transparency" in Russian) initiated by Gorbachev, the former republics got a head start in "righting the wrongs" of the communist past. Glasnost, which bore a strong resemblance to transitional justice, was announced and well underway five years before the democratic transitions started in earnest. Both of these facts invite the reader to sit down with a book that promises to answer this question: Why did some countries start reckoning with the communist past while others did not? Despite this ideal setup for any scholar of comparative politics, for several reasons the volume under review falls short of providing a systematic analysis of the determinants of transitional justice.

First, the editors start with a very strong attachment to the idea that the FSU's grappling with the past is going to be a "non-case." Indeed, the book begins and ends with discussions of "FSU's handicap relative to Central and Eastern Europe." Even in the case of Russia, this is not strictly speaking true, as I explain later. Second, nowhere in the volume do we find a definition of what actually constitutes TJ. We find examples of mechanisms—lustration, opening archives, appointing historical commissions, writing history textbooks, and setting up museums and memorial dates—but no actual definition.

Another reason the book falls short of its goals is associated with its format: an edited volume succeeds only when editors can ensure that specific country chapters share a similar structure. But the chapters in this volume do not even seem to be applying the same definitions of TJ or its constitutive mechanisms. For instance, according to standard definitions (Jon Elster, *Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective*, 2004; Marek Kaminski, Monika Nalepa, and Barry O'Neill, "Normative and Strategic Aspects of Transitional Justice," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(3), 2006), TJ comprises policies aimed at dealing with the past that are implemented in the aftermath of a transition to democracy. In light of this, policies implemented by an authoritarian regime do not actually constitute TJ.

The lack of a uniform structure imposed on the contributors makes the task of the concluding chapter, which provides a synthesis of what we learned, excruciatingly difficult. Presented with this gargantuan charge, Alexandra Vacroux can do little more than conclude, "The three Caucasian countries and the five Central Asian states have done much less [than the Baltics], though Georgia has recently become interested in such [transitional justice] measures and Kazakhstan stands out as having tried more than its neighbors. Ukraine and Moldova have had bursts of transitional justice measures, while Russia and Belarus have not" (p. 348).

What is desperately needed instead is discussion of the different mechanisms that different former republics favored, along with an explanation why they were chosen. Yet, the only disaggregation over time that Vacroux offers is in figure 16.1 (p. 351), which merely separates every TJ mechanism into state and nonstate sponsored. The conclusion offers no synthesis of what we learned beyond the following sentence, which contains a logical fallacy: "Given . . . the fact that some of the Central European countries that implemented transitional justice have experienced backsliding in the democratic process, the assumption that transitional justice is an essential precondition of building a sustainable, democratic political order requires more rigorous testing" (p. 357). This sentence would have been correct if anyone argued that TJ is a sufficient condition to prevent democratic backsliding, but nobody in the TJ research field makes that claim.

A reader may also wonder what key guided the selection of cases for particular chapters, because alongside discussions of the 15 republics, there is a chapter devoted to Serbia and half of a chapter to Poland. Not