

which targeted strategic efforts have succeeded, it concludes that even this more modest form of opinion leadership is often more easily said than done. The conditions under which such efforts succeed and fail are clearly a fruitful ground for additional research.

Predicting the Presidency also breaks new theoretical and empirical ground. Chapter 7 examines presidents' success in shaping opinion among cross-pressured Americans. Recent cases offer some evidence that presidents can bring along members of their own party, even when their actions conflict with many copartisans' prior policy preferences. However, even here the data suggest the limits of opinion leadership. For example, President Obama succeeded in rallying many Democrats behind surveillance policies that most Democrats abhorred under President George W. Bush. However, Obama enjoyed little luck in rallying Democrats behind aid to Syrian rebels or strikes against the Assad regime.

Perhaps even more interesting is the case of cross-pressured opposition party members. Can presidents build support from the opposition by pursuing policies in line with their preferences? Edwards finds only modest evidence that they can. While Obama enjoyed considerable Republican support for military action against ISIS, in both the surveillance and Syrian airstrikes cases Edwards finds evidence of a significant backlash effect. Despite considerable Republican elite support for Obama's policies, he failed to secure substantial support from Republicans in the mass public.

Chapter 8 examines the critical question of whether the rise of social media has bolstered presidents' capacity to lead opinion and mobilize their supporters to influence the legislative process. Past scholarship has documented the decline of the golden age of presidential television, increasing competition between news and entertainment options, and the fragmentation and atomization of the media environment, all of which have conspired against presidents' ability to reach and appeal to a mass audience. Social media and other new forms of communication may offer presidents a way to counter these trends. Has the rise of social media been a game changer? After carefully tracing President Obama's many efforts to exploit various media to influence the public and mobilize his supporters, Edwards argues it has not. While social media paid significant electoral dividends for Obama, it did little to boost his legislative agenda. While future scholarship will undoubtedly paint a fuller picture, at first blush the same would seem to be true for President Trump.

Finally, having shown presidents' struggles to move public opinion, Edwards argues that they have little more success persuading members of Congress. Perhaps most tellingly, the partisan balance of power in Congress is more predictive of roll-call voting outcomes today than ever before. Interestingly, Edwards notes that perhaps President Obama's biggest legislative victory in his second term

dominated by divided government—enacting a tax increase on the wealthiest Americans (those earning more than \$450,000 a year)—was possible only because of the sunset provisions in the original Bush tax cuts. In this case, congressional inaction would have led to the expiration of all of the Bush tax cuts, congressional Republicans' least-preferred outcome. This reality, not presidential persuasion, enabled bipartisan compromise. To this, one might add that President Obama's greatest achievement of his first term—the passage of the Affordable Care Act—was made possible only because of Senate Democrats' filibuster-proof majority (which disappeared in the midst of the legislative battle itself, requiring a creative use of reconciliation). Similarly, President Trump's most important legislative victory to date—the massive corporate tax cut—was also possible solely because of the use of reconciliation to circumvent the need for Democratic votes in the Senate.

Is there anything presidents can do in the absence of such conditions or major opportunities in the political environment? In the conclusion, Edwards argues that presidents may best serve their interests by eschewing public appeals and “staying private” in the hopes of fostering an “accommodating spirit” among swayable members of Congress. To be sure, Edwards acknowledges that such an approach is far from a panacea. Nevertheless, he contends that such an approach “*is* likely to contribute to reducing gridlock, incivility, and public cynicism” (p. 213). Dialing back the public posturing could conceivably increase the grounds for compromise. However, the conditions under which such strategies can succeed in an increasingly polarized polity are plainly a question for further research.

The Politics of Millennials: Political Beliefs and Policy Preferences of America's Most Diverse Generation. By Stella M. Rouse and Ashley D. Ross. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018. 336p. \$80.00 cloth.
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— Deborah J. Schildkraut, *Tufts University*

This book offers an important, wide-ranging analysis that compares political attitudes and behaviors of Millennials to older Americans while also providing an essential analysis of the heterogeneity that exists among Millennials. It should be referenced by anyone writing in political science about this generation. After reading it, I am even more convinced than I was before that referring to “Millennials” as a group is often inadequate. Stella Rouse and Ashley Ross routinely show that race and ideology often complicate whether and how being a Millennial affects public opinion.

The authors begin by describing Millennials and the social, economic, and political contexts in which they came of age. They review literature on political

generations and develop what they call the “Millennial persona.” Although they also call it an identity, it is not an identity as the concept is commonly understood by political psychologists. The authors do not employ measures of shared identification, sense of commonality, or connection to the group *as a group*. In popular culture, Millennials are constantly being told that they are Millennials. According to social identity theory (Henri Tajfel, “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 33, 1982), that should have an impact. At a minimum, it might lead Millennials to think of themselves as Millennials. Do they? We do not know because no one has asked them. Scholars doing original survey research always wish they could go back in time and change their instrument; I wish Rouse and Ross could do that and add questions about Millennial identification. What the authors instead propose is that Millennials generally possess a shared outlook that stems from a unique set of common experiences. Those experiences sometimes make this group distinctive in its political outlook when compared to older generations, even if Millennials themselves might not feel a sense of common cause with one another.

So what is this persona? And is the term *Millennial*, or any generational label, useful? Critics decry such labels as marketing ploys or unscientific gimmicks. Yet we know that the politically formative years can have a lasting impact on one’s political outlook (Duane F. Alwin and Jon A. Krosnick, “Aging, Cohorts, and the Stability of Sociopolitical Orientations Over the Life Span,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 97(1), 1991; Yair Ghitza and Andrew Gelman, “The Great Society, Reagan’s Revolution, and Generations of Presidential Voting” [working paper]; Donald R. Kinder, “Politics and the Life Cycle” *Science*, 312(5782), 2006), making public opinion analysis by cohort valuable. That is what Rouse and Ross provide. They note that while the years that denote generational boundaries may seem arbitrary, a general consensus often forms around politically meaningful generations. The key events and trends the authors identify as shaping Millennials are illustrated on page 29. They include the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the resulting War on Terror, the Great Recession, increasing racial and ethnic diversity, and the rise of digital communications.

After discussing the value of examining Americans born between 1981 and 1997 as a distinct group, and after describing the Millennial persona, the authors use the remainder of the book to provide information about the issues on which Millennials appear to be distinct from older Americans and the issues on which we find important heterogeneity among them. They rely on three original surveys conducted in 2015 and 2016; they also analyze transcripts from focus groups conducted with Millennials in four U.S. cities. Chapters proceed thematically: The Great Recession, education, foreign policy,

immigration, climate change, contemporary social issues (gun control, marijuana legalization, abortion), and political engagement.

Each chapter starts with considerable background on its theme. Subsequently, the authors provide descriptive data comparing Millennials and non-Millennials, which they follow with multivariate analyses. One notable finding is that Millennials are more cautious in their economic policy preferences than older Americans. When given an option for a “middle of the road” approach, they are wont to take it, whereas older Americans are more attracted to extremes. Another notable and consistent finding is the degree to which race conditions the effect of being a Millennial, and not just on issues related to diversity. For example, on economic policy, the authors find that younger and older whites differ more in their preferences than do younger and older nonwhites. On many issues, such as government spending, gun control, immigration, and marijuana legalization, one’s racial or ethnic background mattered more than (or enhanced the effect of) being a Millennial. For instance, Millennials overall were more likely than non-Millennials to favor marijuana legalization, but this was particularly true for nonwhites. Additionally, Millennials varied substantially in their attitudes on immigration, with Latinos and self-identified liberals expressing the most welcoming views.

I was surprised that being a Millennial was not, on its own, a consistent factor shaping attitudes about climate change. One of the only significant variables affecting whether Millennials feel that there is solid evidence of climate change was ethnicity, with Latino Millennials more likely than Latino non-Millennials to feel this way. Other subgroup differences were suggestive but not statistically significant. Climate change is one area where Millennials are often touted as being different from older Americans; Rouse and Ross pour some cold water on that conventional wisdom (though they do find that Millennials of many backgrounds are more likely than non-Millennials to think that global warming is caused by human activity). Even more sobering was that Millennials were less likely than non-Millennials to support policies aimed at curbing climate change, such as pursuing alternative energy and taxing pollution. Here, the focus groups were particularly illuminating. They revealed that Millennials are more focused on individual behaviors (such as taking public transportation or shunning plastic bags) than on government action.

Another policy where the authors puncture conventional wisdom is gun control: Millennials were less likely than older Americans to think background checks and waiting periods should be required before one can purchase a gun. And on abortion, generation was not significant. These results are interesting in and of themselves, but they have important implications for how we think of nascent partisan attachments among

Millennials. Put simply, people who expect Millennials to become reliably Democratic need to temper that expectation.

I was pleased that the authors complemented their surveys with focus groups. I wish they had made more use of them and offered a clear statement of what we learn from the focus groups that we would not have learned if they had only relied on surveys. I also wish they had conducted focus groups with older Americans. A key virtue of their surveys is the comparisons they allow between younger and older respondents; such comparisons are not possible with the focus groups.

The book will serve as a useful resource for anyone interested in the politics of younger Americans. It will also be valuable to scholars interested in the chapter themes. There are a lot of statistical details to wade through in each chapter; I would like to have had a clean summary table at the end of each thematic chapter summarizing where Millennials differ from non-Millennials, where they do not, and where Millennials differ from one another. The narrative summary of findings in Chapter 10 is helpful, but visual summaries would have been even better.

Like any good book, this one leaves readers with many questions and an eagerness to see what kind of scholarship comes next. For example, to what extent does the Millennial persona shape attitudes on gender, sexuality, and race relations? The authors show us how powerfully race, ethnicity, and ideology can shape whether and how being a Millennial matters, but what about gender and region, or whether people live in urban or rural areas? What questions should we be asking as Generation Z begins to enter the electorate? For anyone deciding to take these questions on, *The Politics of Millennials* provides an excellent model for how to proceed.

Politics at Work: How Companies Turn Their Workers into Lobbyists. By Alexander Hertel-Fernandez. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 360p. \$29.95 cloth.
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— Anthony J. Nownes, *University of Tennessee, Knoxville*

At all levels of government, businesses dominate interest-group representation in the United States. This does not mean that business interests always get what they want from government, but it does mean that wherever and whenever government decisions are made, businesses almost always have a proverbial “seat at the table.” The primary reason that businesses are so politically ubiquitous is that they have a lot more money than others to spend on political activity. This is a bit of an oversimplification, of course, but sometimes things are exactly as they seem.

The corpus of scholarship on business political activity (often referred to as corporate political activity, or CPA) has grown substantially, and we now know considerably

more about the phenomenon than we did even a few short years ago. In his new book *Politics at Work*, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez contributes to this scholarship in an impressive, unique, and necessary way. Hertel-Fernandez examines what he calls *employer mobilization of workers*, which entails “the top managers of a company” attempting “to change the political behaviors and attitudes of their employees as a matter of company policy” (p. 4). The author is correct that this phenomenon has received too little media and scholarly attention.

In Chapter 2, Hertel-Fernandez briefly describes how he set out to study employer mobilization: through original surveys of workers and employers and congressional staffers, as well as a close reading of investigative journalism and the media record (p. 40). At the center of the book are several original surveys. First, in Chapter 3, Hertel-Fernandez describes the results of a survey of more than 500 corporate executives (and a follow-up survey with nearly 400 of these respondents). He reports that “46 percent of managers” surveyed “reported that their company attempted some form” of employer mobilization (p. 44). Among this 46%, “29 percent reported providing exclusively information about registering or turning out to vote,” while the “remaining 71 percent gave their workers more explicitly political information about candidates and policy issues” (p. 45). When asked what their goals were in contacting their employees, managers cited educating workers first (over half of those who reported mobilizing workers said they did so with this goal in mind), while 41% cited changing public policy. Finally, when queried, top managers cited employee mobilization as more effective than any influence strategy other than hiring lobbyists (pp. 48–49).

In Chapter 4, the author reports the results of a survey of 1,032 non-self-employed American workers. He finds that “about one in four American employees . . . reported ever experiencing some form of political contact with the top managers at their main job” (p. 71). The most common types of messages from managers to employees concerned policy issues (36% of contacted workers reported receiving this type of message), turning out to vote (31%), and registering to vote (22%). Employees reported receiving messages on a variety of issues, including health care, education and training, taxes, and regulation. Conservative messages outnumbered moderate and liberal messages. A disturbingly high number of employees (20% of those who reported contact from managers) reported receiving warnings of job loss or plant closure or decreases in wages or hours with their employers’ messages (pp. 77–81). Finally, a large number—47% of contacted employees—reported that employer messages altered at least one of their political attitudes or practices (p. 84). In short, employer mobilization *worked*.

Chapters 3 and 4 are largely descriptive, and this is for the best. To understand and explain a phenomenon we