TWO LEVEL CREDIBILITY-LIMITED REVISIONS

MARCO GARAPA

Universidade da Madeira and CIMA-Centro de Investigação em Matemática e Aplicações

Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new kind of nonprioritized operator which we call *two level credibility-limited revision*. When revising through a two level credibility-limited revision there are two levels of credibility and one of incredibility. When revising by a sentence at the highest level of credibility, the operator behaves as a standard revision, if the sentence is at the second level of credibility, then the outcome of the revision process coincides with a standard contraction by the negation of that sentence. If the sentence is not credible, then the original belief set remains unchanged. In this article, we axiomatically characterize several classes of two level credibility-limited revision operators.

§1. Introduction. The central goal underlying the research area of *logic of theory change* is the study of the changes which can occur in the belief state of a rational agent when he/she receives new information. One of the main contributions to the study of belief change is the so-called AGM model for belief change—named after the initial of its authors: Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, & Makinson, 1985). In that framework, each *belief* of an agent is represented by a sentence and the *belief state* of an agent is represented by a logically closed set of (belief-representing) sentences. These sets are called *belief sets*. A change consists in adding or removing a specific sentence from a belief set to obtain a new belief set.

Although the AGM model has acquired the status of a standard model of belief change, several researchers (for an overview see Fermé & Hansson, 2011, 2018) have pointed out its inadequateness in several contexts and proposed several extensions and generalizations to that framework. One of the criticisms of the AGM model, that appears in the belief change literature, is related to the use of the *success* postulate to characterize both contractions and revisions. In AGM Belief Revision the new information is always accepted. "This feature appears, in general, to be unrealistic, since rational agents, when confronted with information that contradicts previous beliefs, often reject it altogether or accept only parts of it" (Fermé, Mikalef, & Taboada, 2003). This can happen for several reasons. For example, the new information may be unreliable or may contradict previous highly entrenched beliefs.

Models in which the belief change operators considered do not always satisfy the *success* postulate (contrary to what is the case regarding the AGM model) are referred to as *nonprioritized belief change operators*. The output of a nonprioritized revision may not contain the new belief that motivated the revision. On the other hand, the

Received: July 31, 2019.

²⁰²⁰ Mathematics Subject Classification: 03B42.

Key words and phrases: belief change, non-prioritized belief revision, two level credibility-limited revision functions, axiomatic characterizations.

[@] The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Association for Symbolic Logic 388 doi:10.1017/S1755020320000283

outcome of a nonprioritized contraction may still contain the sentence by which the contraction was made. In Fermé & Hansson (2001), a nonprioritized contraction operator, designated by *shielded contraction*, was proposed. These operators are defined by means of a basic AGM contraction and a set of sentences R satisfying certain properties, called *set of retractable sentences*, and are such that, the outcome of the shielded contraction. On the other hand, the shielded contraction by a sentence that belongs to the set R coincides with the outcome of the associated basic AGM contraction. On the other hand, the shielded contraction by a sentence that does not belong to the set R leaves the original belief set unchanged. In Fermé & Hansson (2001) several classes of shielded contraction were presented. In Fermé *et al.* (2003) and in Garapa, Fermé, & Reis (2018b) several classes of shielded contracterized.

In Hansson et al. (2001) a nonprioritized revision operator designated by credibility*limited revision* was proposed. These operators have the following behavior (that relies on the notion of *credibility* (of a sentence)): If a sentence α is credible, then the outcome of the credibility-limited revision coincides with the outcome of the revision by that sentence through the associated basic AGM revision operator, otherwise no change is made to the belief set. Hence, a credibility-limited revision operator is induced by a (standard) revision operator and a set containing the sentences that are considered to be credible-the set of credible sentences. In Hansson et al. (2001) axiomatic characterizations are presented for credibility-limited revision operators induced by basic AGM revisions and by several (different) kinds of sets of credible sentences. More precisely it presents some results exposing the relation between the postulates satisfied by the credibility-limited revision operator and the properties satisfied by the underlying set of credible sentences. The model of credibility-limited revision was extended to cover iterated revision in Booth et al. (2012). In Fermé et al. (2003) an operator of credibility-limited base revision induced by a partial meet revision operator and a set of credible sentences satisfying a certain set of properties was presented. In Garapa, Fermé, & Reis (2018a) axiomatic characterizations were presented for operators of credibility-limited base revision induced by other kinds of standard base revision functions.

In this paper we propose a nonprioritized operator that we designate by *two level credibility-limited revision*. In this model, contrary to credibility-limited revisions, there are considered two levels of credibility (and one of incredibility). When revising a belief set by a certain belief, first the degree of credibility of that sentence is analyzed. If that belief is not credible, then the original belief set remains unchanged. When revising by a belief that is considered to be at the first and highest level of credibility, the two level credibility-limited revision has the behavior of a standard revision. When revising by a belief that is considered to be at the second level of credibility, that sentence is not incorporated but all the beliefs that are inconsistent with it are removed. The intuition underlying this behavior is that, the belief is not credible enough to be incorporated in the agent's belief set, but creates in the agent some doubt making him/her remove all the beliefs that are inconsistent with it. In the present paper we define and study several classes of two level credibility-limited revisions and present axiomatic characterizations for those classes of operators.

This paper is organized as follows: In §2 we introduce the notations and recall the main background concepts and results that will be needed throughout this article. We recall the definition of credibility-limited revisions and some of the properties proposed to characterize the sets of credible sentences that induce it, as well as some of the postulates proposed to characterize these operators. In §3 we present the definition of

the two level credibility-limited revision operators and the axiomatic characterizations for several classes of such operators. In §4 we summarize the main contributions of the paper and briefly discuss their relevance. In the Appendix we provide proofs for all the original results presented.

§2. Background

2.1. Formal preliminaries. We will assume a propositional language \mathcal{L} that contains the usual truth functional connectives: \neg (negation), \land (conjunction), \lor (disjunction), \rightarrow (implication) and \leftrightarrow (equivalence). We shall make use of a consequence operation Cn that takes sets of sentences to sets of sentences and which satisfies the standard Tarskian properties, namely *inclusion*, *monotony* and *iteration*. Furthermore we will assume that Cn satisfies *supraclassicality*, *compactness* and *deduction*. We will sometimes use $Cn(\alpha)$ for $Cn(\{\alpha\})$, $A \vdash \alpha$ for $\alpha \in Cn(A)$, $\vdash \alpha$ for $\alpha \in Cn(\emptyset)$, $A \not\vdash \alpha$ for $\alpha \notin Cn(A)$, $\not\vdash \alpha$ for $\alpha \notin Cn(\emptyset)$. The letters $\alpha, \beta, ...$ (except for γ and σ) will be used to denote sentences of \mathcal{L} . Uppercase Latin letters such as A, B, ... shall denote sets of sentences of \mathcal{L} . **K** is reserved to represent a set of sentences that is closed under logical consequence (i.e. $\mathbf{K} = Cn(\mathbf{K})$) — such a set is called a *belief set* or *theory*. Given a belief set **K** we will denote $Cn(\mathbf{K} \cup \{\alpha\})$ by $\mathbf{K} + \alpha$.

2.2. AGM revisions. The operation of revision of a belief set consists of the incorporation of new beliefs in that set. In a revision process, some previous beliefs may be retracted in order to obtain, as output, a consistent belief set. The following six postulates, which were originally presented in Gärdenfors (1988), are commonly known as *basic AGM postulates for revision*¹:

(*1)	$\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = Cn(\mathbf{K} \star \alpha) \text{ (i.e. } \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \text{ is a belief set).}$	(Closure)
(*2)	$lpha \in \mathbf{K} \star lpha.$	(Success)
(*3)	$\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha.$	(Inclusion)
(*4)	If $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K}$, then $\mathbf{K} + \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$.	(Vacuity)
(*5)	If α is consistent, then K $\star \alpha$ is consistent.	(Consistency)
(*6)	If $\vdash \alpha \leftrightarrow \beta$, then $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \star \beta$.	(Extensionality)

The operators that satisfy postulates $(\star 1)$ to $(\star 6)$ are known as *basic AGM revisions*.

DEFINITION 2.1. An operator \star for a belief set **K** is a basic AGM revision if and only if it satisfies postulates (\star 1) to (\star 6).

Two other postulates were proposed to deal with the revision by disjunctions (Gärdenfors, 1978, 1982):

(Disjunctive Overlap) $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \star \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta).$ (Disjunctive Inclusion) If $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$, then $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star \alpha.$

DEFINITION 2.2. An operator \star for a belief set **K** is an AGM revision if and only if it satisfies postulates (\star 1) to (\star 6), disjunctive inclusion and disjunctive overlap.

The following postulate, proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson in Alchourrón *et al.* (1985), introduces a factoring condition on the revision by disjunctions.

¹ The postulates were already presented in Alchourrón *et al.* (1985) but with slightly different formulations.

 $(\star V)$ **K** $\star (\alpha \lor \beta) =$ **K** $\star \alpha$ or **K** $\star (\alpha \lor \beta) =$ **K** $\star \beta$ or **K** $\star (\alpha \lor \beta) =$ **K** $\star \alpha \cap$ **K** $\star \beta$. (Disjunctive factoring)

The following proposition illustrates that in the presence of the six basic AGM postulates for revision, *disjunctive overlap* and *disjunctive inclusion* are equivalent to *disjunctive factoring*.

PROPOSITION 2.3 (Gärdenfors, 1988). Let **K** be a logically closed set and \star be an operation for **K** that satisfies the basic AGM postulates for revision. Then \star satisfies disjunctive factoring if and only if it satisfies both disjunctive overlap and disjunctive inclusion.

2.3. AGM contractions. A contraction of a belief set occurs when some beliefs are removed from it (and no new beliefs are added). The following postulates, which were presented in Alchourrón *et al.* (1985) (following Gärdenfors, 1978, 1982), are commonly known as *basic Gärdenfors postulates for contraction* or *basic AGM postulates for contraction*:

$(\div 1)$	$\mathbf{K} \div \alpha = Cn(\mathbf{K} \div \alpha)$ (i.e. $\mathbf{K} \div \alpha$ is a belief set).	(Closure)
$(\div 2)$	$\mathbf{K} \div \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K}.$	(Inclusion)
(÷3)	If $\alpha \notin \mathbf{K}$, then $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \div \alpha$.	(Vacuity)
(÷4)	If $\not\vdash \alpha$, then $\alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \div \alpha$.	(Success)
$(\div 5)$	$\mathbf{K} \subseteq (\mathbf{K} \div lpha) + lpha.$	(Recovery)
$(\div 6)$	If $\vdash \alpha \leftrightarrow \beta$, then $\mathbf{K} \div \alpha = \mathbf{K} \div \beta$.	(Extensionality)

The operators that satisfy postulates $(\div 1)$ to $(\div 6)$ are known as *basic AGM* contractions.

DEFINITION 2.4. An operator \div for a belief set **K** is a basic AGM contraction if and only *if it satisfies postulates* (\div 1) *to* (\div 6).

In addition to the six basic AGM postulates for contraction, Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson presented in Alchourrón *et al.* (1985) the following postulates for contraction by a conjunction:

 $\begin{array}{ll} (\div7) & (\mathbf{K} \div \alpha) \cap (\mathbf{K} \div \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \div (\alpha \land \beta). \\ (\div8) & \mathbf{K} \div (\alpha \land \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \div \alpha \text{ whenever } \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \div (\alpha \land \beta). \end{array}$ (Conjunctive inclusion)

These postulates are known as the supplementary AGM postulates for contraction. The operators that satisfy postulates $\div 1$ to $\div 8$ are known as AGM contractions.

DEFINITION 2.5. An operator \div for a belief set **K** is an AGM contraction if and only if it satisfies postulates $(\div 1)$ to $(\div 8)$.

2.4. Credibility-limited revision. In this subsection, we address the *credibility-limited revision* operators. These are the nonprioritized belief revision operators that are more closely connected to the *two level credibility-limited revisions* operators that we propose. The credibility-limited revision operators were proposed in Hansson *et al.* (2001). When revising a belief set by a sentence by means of a credibility-limited revision, we need first to analyse whether that sentence is credible or not. When revising by a credible sentence, the operator works as a basic AGM revision operator, otherwise it leaves the original belief set unchanged. Formally:

DEFINITION 2.6 Hansson *et al.* (2001). Let **K** be a belief set, \star be a basic AGM revision operator on **K** and C be a subset of \mathcal{L} (the set of credible sentences). Then \circledast is a credibility-limited revision operator induced by \star and C if and only if:

$$\mathbf{K} \circledast \alpha = \begin{cases} \mathbf{K} \star \alpha & \text{if } \alpha \in C \\ \mathbf{K} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

This construction can be further specified by adding constraints to the structure of C (the set of credible sentences). In Hansson *et al.* (2001), the following properties for C were proposed:

Credibility of Logical Equivalence: If $\vdash \alpha \leftrightarrow \beta$, then $\alpha \in C$ if and only if $\beta \in C$.² **Single Sentence Closure:** If $\alpha \in C$, then $Cn(\alpha) \subseteq C$. **Disjunctive Completeness:** If $\alpha \lor \beta \in C$, then either $\alpha \in C$ or $\beta \in C$. **Negation Completeness:** $\alpha \in C$ or $\neg \alpha \in C$. **Element Consistency:** If $\alpha \in C$, then $\alpha \not\vdash \bot$. **Expansive Credibility:** If $K \not\vdash \alpha$, then $\neg \alpha \in C$. **Revision Credibility:** If $\alpha \in C$, then $K \circledast \alpha \subseteq C$.

In Garapa *et al.* (2018a) the following property for C (the set of credible sentences) was proposed.

Credibility lower bounding: If **K** is consistent, then $\mathbf{K} \subseteq C$.

Note that it follows from credibility lower bounding that tautologies are credible sentences.

2.4.1. Postulates for credibility-limited revisions. When considering credibility-limited revisions (instead of standard revisions) the *success* postulate must be removed, and replaced by appropriate properties, capable of capturing the intuitions underlying credibility-limited revisions. The following postulates were proposed in Hansson *et al.* (2001).

(Relative Success) $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \circledast \alpha$ or $\mathbf{K} \circledast \alpha = \mathbf{K}$. (Strict Improvement) If $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \circledast \alpha$ and $\vdash \alpha \to \beta$, then $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \circledast \beta$. (Regularity) If $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \circledast \alpha$, then $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \circledast \beta$. (Disjunctive Distribution) If $\alpha \lor \beta \in \mathbf{K} \circledast (\alpha \lor \beta)$, then $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \circledast \alpha$ or $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \circledast \beta$.

The following postulate is related to consistency. It was one of the postulates used in the representation theorems for credibility-limited revisions presented in Hansson *et al.* (2001).

(Consistency Preservation) (Makinson, 1997) If **K** is consistent, then $\mathbf{K} \circledast \alpha$ is consistent.

§3. Two level credibility-limited revisions. The two level credibility-limited revisions are operators of nonprioritized revision. When revising a belief set by a sentence α , we first need to analyse the degree of credibility of that sentence. When revising by a sentence that is considered to be at the first and highest level of credibility, the operator works as a standard revision operator. If it is considered to be at the second level

² In Hansson *et al.* (2001) this property was designated by *closure under logical equivalence* and was formulated as follows: If $\vdash \alpha \leftrightarrow \beta$, and $\alpha \in C$, then $\beta \in C$.

393

of credibility, then that sentence is not incorporated in the revision process but its negation is removed from the original belief set. The intuition underlying this, is that the belief by which the belief set is revised is not credible enough to be incorporated but, creates in the agent sufficient doubt that forces him/her to remove the beliefs that are inconsistent with it. When revising by a noncredible sentence, the operator leaves the original belief set unchanged. The following definition formalizes this concept:

DEFINITION 3.7. Let **K** be a belief set, \star be a basic AGM revision operator on **K** and C_H and C_L be subsets of \mathcal{L} . Then \odot is a two level credibility-limited revision operator induced by \star , C_H and C_L if and only if:

$$\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \begin{cases} \mathbf{K} \star \alpha & \text{if } \alpha \in C_H \\ (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K} & \text{if } \alpha \in C_L \\ \mathbf{K} & \text{if } \alpha \notin (C_L \cup C_H). \end{cases}$$

In the previous definition $C_H \cup C_L$ represent the sentences that are considered to have some degree of credibility, C_H and C_L represent respectively the set of sentences that are considered to be at the first (highest) and at the second level of credibility. Note that if $\alpha \in C_L$, then $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K}$. According to the Harper identity³ $(\mathbf{K} \star \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K}$ coincides with the contraction of \mathbf{K} by $\neg \alpha$. Being \star a basic AGM revision (or an AGM revision) the operator obtained from it through the Harper identity is a basic AGM contraction (respectively, an AGM contraction) (Alchourrón *et al.*, 1985; Gärdenfors, 1978, 1982). Thus the second condition of the previous definition states that if α is at the second level of credibility, then the outcome of the two level credibility-limited revision by α coincides with the outcome of a standard contraction by its negation. The revision of the belief set by a noncredible sentence (i.e. by a sentences that is not in $C_H \cup C_L$) leaves the original belief set unchanged.

This construction can be further specified by adding constraints to the structure of the sets C_H , C_L and $C_H \cup C_L$. The properties that we will consider for such sets are the ones presented in §2.4 for the sets of credible sentences that induce credibility-limit revisions with a small modification on the revision credibility property (that we will present further ahead). Additionally we will consider a condition that relates the set of credible sentences C with the revision function \star that induce the same two credibility-limited operator. This condition will be designated by *condition* (C - \star) and states that if a sentence α is not credible, then any possible outcome of revising the belief set **K** through \star by a credible sentence contains $\neg \alpha$. The intuition underlying this property is that if α is not credible then its negation cannot be removed. Thus its negation should still be in the outcome of the revision by any credible sentence.

If
$$\alpha \notin C$$
 and $\beta \in C$, then $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \star \beta$. (C- \star)

We now present a slightly reformulated version of the *revision credibility* property mentioned in ^{2.4} for credibility-limited revisions. This property states that the sentences in the outcome of the basic AGM revision operator \star , that induces a given two credibility-limited revision, by a credible sentence are also credible.⁴

³ Harper identity: Harper (1976), $\mathbf{K} \div \alpha = (\mathbf{K} \star \neg \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K}$.

⁴ We note that, this version of revision credibility relates two structures (namely ★ and C) that are independent of each other, while, on the other hand, the previous version presents a relation between a credibility-limited revision [®] and its associated set of credible sentences. We note also that, more rigorously *revision credibility* should be named *revision credibility*

Revision Credibility: If $\alpha \in C$, then $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \subseteq C$.

We now present a proposition that relates some of the properties mentioned above for the set of credible sentences.

PROPOSITION 3.8. Let \star be a basic AGM revision on a consistent belief set **K** and C be a set of sentences.

- 1. If C satisfies element consistency and condition $(C \star)$ holds, then C satisfies single sentence closure.
- 2. If $Cn(\emptyset) \subseteq C$ and condition $(C \star)$ holds, then C satisfies expansive credibility.

In the next subsection, we propose a set of postulates to characterize the two level credibility-limited revision operators. At the end of that subsection, we will present explicit definitions for the sets C_H and C_L in terms of a two level credibility-limited revision \odot and investigate the properties that such sets satisfy whenever \odot satisfies some given postulates.

3.1. Two level credibility-limited revision postulates. In this subsection we present the postulates that we will use in the representation theorems for the *two level credibility-limited revisions* that we will present further ahead. The first set of postulates were already recalled in §2.2 and were proposed for AGM revisions.

(Closure) $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = Cn(\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha)$ (i.e. $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ is a belief set). (Inclusion) $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha$. (Vacuity) If $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K}$, then $\mathbf{K} + \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. (Extensionality) If $\vdash \alpha \leftrightarrow \beta$, then $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. (Disjunctive Overlap) $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$.

The second set of postulates were recalled in §2.4 and were proposed for credibilitylimited revisions:

(Consistency Preservation) If K is consistent, then $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ is consistent. (Strict Improvement) If $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\vdash \alpha \rightarrow \beta$, then $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. (Regularity) If $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$, then $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. (Disjunctive Distribution) If $\alpha \lor \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$, then $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ or $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$.

The next set of postulates are obtained by adapting the *recovery* postulate for contraction and three of the postulates proposed for shielded contractions⁵. These postulates deal with negations.

(N-Recovery) $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \neg \alpha$. (N-Relative Success) If $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$, then $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$. (N-Persistence) If $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$, then $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. (N-Success Propagation) If $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\vdash \beta \rightarrow \alpha$, then $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$.

with respect to **K** and \star since it relates the set of credible sentences with the outcomes of the revision of **K** by means of \star . However, we will use the shorter designation for it, since whenever this property is mentioned, it will become clear from the context which is the belief set and the revision operator being considered.

⁵ Relative success (Rott, 1992) $\mathbf{K} \sim \alpha = \mathbf{K}$ or $\mathbf{K} \sim \alpha \not\models \alpha$. Persistence (Fermé & Hansson, 2001) If $\mathbf{K} \sim \beta \vdash \beta$, then $\mathbf{K} \sim \alpha \vdash \beta$. Success propagation (Fermé & Hansson, 2001) If $\mathbf{K} \sim \beta \vdash \beta$ and $\vdash \beta \rightarrow \alpha$, then $\mathbf{K} \sim \alpha \vdash \alpha$.

N-Recovery states that if the result of revising a belief set by a certain sentence is (subsequently) expanded by the negation of that sentence then all the initial sentences are recovered. *N-Relative success* states that when revising by any given sentence either the negation of that sentence is effectively removed, or the belief set is left unchanged. *N-Persistence* intuitively states that if a negation of a sentence is kept when trying to revise a belief set **K** by that sentence, then it should also be kept when revising **K** by any other sentence. *N-Success propagation* informally states that if the negation of certain sentence is removed when revising a belief set by that sentence, then the same thing happens regarding every logical consequence of that sentence.

The following three postulates are weaker versions of the postulates of *relative success* (for credibility-limited revisions), *vacuity* and *disjunctive inclusion* (for revisions).

(Weak Relative Success) $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ or $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K}$.

(Weak Vacuity) If $\neg \alpha \notin K$, then $K \subseteq K \odot \alpha$.

(Weak Disjunctive Inclusion) If $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$, then $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) + (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$.

Weak relative success states that either α is incorporated when revising by it or nothing is added. In both cases, some sentences might be removed from the original belief set. *Weak vacuity* states that if the negation of a sentence is not an element of a given belief set **K**, then **K** is a subset of the revision of **K** by that sentence. Thus even if $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K}$ it may happen that $\alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. *Weak disjunctive inclusion* ensures that if $\neg \alpha$ does not belong to the revision of a belief set **K** by $\alpha \lor \beta$, then everything in the expansion of **K** $\odot \alpha$ by α .

We also propose the following postulate:

(Containment) If **K** is consistent, then $\mathbf{K} \cap ((\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.

Containment informally states that whenever **K** is consistent (at least) the sentences added to $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ as a result of an expansion by α are removed when intersecting the outcome of that expansion with **K**.

The following propositions relate some of the postulates presented above.

PROPOSITION 3.9. Let **K** be a consistent and logically closed set and \odot be an operator on **K** that satisfies N-Persistence and closure. Then \odot satisfies N-Success propagation.

PROPOSITION 3.10. Let **K** be a consistent and logically closed set and \odot be an operator on **K** that satisfies closure, consistency preservation, weak relative success and N-Recovery. Then \odot satisfies N-Relative success.

The following proposition states that if \odot is an operator, on a consistent belief set **K**, that satisfies *weak vacuity* and *inclusion*, then it also satisfies the following property that was introduced in Hansson (2017):

(Confirmation) If $\alpha \in \mathbf{K}$, then $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$.

PROPOSITION 3.11. Let **K** be a consistent and logically closed set and \odot be an operator on **K** that satisfies weak vacuity and inclusion. Then \odot also satisfies confirmation.

In the following proposition explicit definitions of C_H and C_L are given in terms of a two level credibility-limited revision \odot . If α is at the highest level of credibility, then it should be an element of the outcome of the revision of the belief set **K** by it. Therefore,

a natural way to define C_H is by $C_H = \{\alpha : \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha\}$. On the other hand the sentences at the second level of credibility, i.e. in C_L , although not being incorporated when revising a belief set by it, should be such that its negation is removed during the revision process. Thus a natural way to define C_L is by $C_L = \{\alpha : \neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha\} \setminus C_H$. The next proposition illustrates some properties that are satisfied by C_H , C_L and $C_H \cup C_L$ whenever \odot satisfies some of the postulates mentioned in this section.

PROPOSITION 3.12. Let **K** be a consistent belief set and \odot be an operator on **K**. Let $C_H = \{\alpha : \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha\}$ and $C_L = \{\alpha : \neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha\} \setminus C_H$. Then:

- If ⊙ satisfies consistency preservation, then it holds that if α ∈ C_H, then ¬α ∉ K ⊙ α.
- 2. $C_H \cap C_L = \emptyset$.
- 3. If \odot satisfies N-relative success and weak vacuity, then it holds that if $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$, then $\neg \alpha \in C_H$.⁶
- 4. If \odot satisfies consistency preservation, then C_H satisfy element consistency.
- 5. If \odot satisfies closure, then C_L satisfies element consistency and $Cn(\emptyset) \subseteq C_H$.
- 6. If \odot satisfies consistency preservation and closure, then $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfies element consistency.
- 7. If \odot satisfies closure and extensionality, then C_H , C_L and $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfy credibility of logical equivalents.
- 8. If \odot satisfies weak vacuity and inclusion, then C_H and $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfy credibility lower bounding.
- 9. If \odot satisfies vacuity, then C_H and $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfies expansive credibility.
- 10. If \odot satisfies N-success propagation, then it holds that if $\alpha \in C_L$ and $\beta \in Cn(\alpha)$, then $\beta \in C_H \cup C_L$.
- 11. If \odot satisfies strict improvement, then C_H satisfies single sentence closure.
- 12. If \odot satisfies strict improvement and N-success propagation, then $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfies single sentence closure.
- 13. If \odot satisfies disjunctive distribution, then C_H satisfies disjunctive completeness.
- 14. If \odot satisfies N-persistence, closure and consistency preservation, then $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfies disjunctive completeness.
- 15. If \odot satisfies N-persistence, closure and strict improvement, then C_L satisfies disjunctive completeness.

In the next proposition we will construct an operator \star in terms of another operator \odot . Being C_H and C_L the sets mentioned above, we will explore some of existing relations between these sets and \star whenever \odot satisfies some of the postulates proposed for two credibility-limited revisions.

PROPOSITION 3.13. Let **K** be a consistent belief set and \odot be an operator on **K**, $C_H = \{\alpha : \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha\}$ and $C_L = \{\alpha : \neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha\} \setminus C_H$. Let \star be the operator on **K** defined (for all α) by

- i. If $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$, then $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$;
- ii. If $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$, then $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = Cn(\alpha)$.

⁶ Hence $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfies negation completeness.

The following statements hold:

- 1. If \odot satisfies N-persistence and consistency preservation, then condition $(C_H \cup C_L \star)$ holds.⁷
- 2. If \odot satisfies regularity and consistent preservation, then C_H satisfies revision credibility.

3.2. *Representation theorems.* In this subsection we present representation theorems for several classes of two level credibility-limited revisions. More precisely we consider the classes of two level credibility-limited revisions induced by basic AGM and by AGM revision functions and by several alternative types of sets of credible sentences (i.e. considering different sets of properties associated to the related sets of credible sentences, C_H and C_L). In the following theorem we present an axiomatic characterization for a two level credibility-limited revision operator induced by a basic AGM revision and sets C_H and C_L satisfying some given properties.

THEOREM 3.14. Let **K** be a consistent and logically closed set and \odot be an operator on **K**. Then the following conditions are equivalent:

- 1. ⊙ satisfies weak relative success, closure, inclusion, consistency preservation, weak vacuity, extensionality, N-relative success and containment.
- 2. \odot is a two level credibility-limited revision operator induced by a basic AGM revision operator for **K** and sets C_H , $C_L \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ such that: $C_H \cap C_L = \emptyset$, C_H and C_L satisfy credibility of logical equivalents and element consistency.

The next theorem illustrates some one-to-one correspondence between additional two level credibility-limited postulates and additional properties of C_H and $C_H \cup C_L$.

THEOREM 3.15. Let **K** be a consistent and logically closed set and \odot be an operator on **K**. Then the following pairs of conditions are equivalent:

- 1. ⊙ satisfies weak relative success, closure, inclusion, consistency preservation, weak vacuity, extensionality, N-relative success, containment and
 - (a) Vacuity.
 - (b) *Disjunctive distribution*.
 - (c) *Strict improvement*.
 - (d) *N*-success propagation and strict improvement.
 - (e) *N*-persistence.
 - (f) *Regularity*.
- 2. \odot is a two level credibility-limited revision operator induced by a basic AGM revision operator \star for **K** and sets $C_H, C_L \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ such that: C_H and C_L satisfy credibility of logical equivalents and element consistency, $C_H \cap C_L = \emptyset$ and
 - (a) C_H satisfies expansive credibility.
 - (b) C_H satisfies credibility lower bounding and disjunctive completeness.

⁷ I.e. that the following condition holds:

If $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$ and $\beta \in C_H \cup C_L$, then $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \star \beta$.

- (c) C_H satisfies single sentence closure.
- (d) C_H and $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfy single sentence closure.
- (e) Condition $(C_H \cup C_L \star)$ holds.
- (f) C_H satisfies revision credibility.

In the following theorem we present an axiomatic characterization for a two level credibility-limited revision operator induced by an AGM revision (instead of by a basic AGM revision as in the previous theorems) and sets C_H and C_L satisfying some given properties.

THEOREM 3.16. Let **K** be a consistent and logically closed set and \odot be an operator on **K**. Then the following conditions are equivalent:

- 1. ⊙ satisfies weak relative success, closure, inclusion, consistency preservation, weak vacuity, extensionality, containment, strict improvement, N-persistence, N-recovery, disjunctive overlap and weak disjunctive inclusion.
- 2. \odot is a two level credibility-limited revision operator induced by an AGM revision operator \star for **K** and sets $C_H, C_L \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ such that: C_L satisfy credibility of logical equivalents and element consistency, $C_H \cap C_L = \emptyset$, C_H satisfies element consistency, credibility lower bounding and single sentence closure and condition $(C_H \cup C_L \star)$ holds.

It follows from Theorems 3.15 and 3.16 that if we also impose, in statement (2) of the Theorem 3.16, that C_H satisfies expansive credibility, then we have to replace *weak vacuity* by *vacuity* in statement (1) of that theorem. Furthermore, if we impose in statement (2) of the Theorem 3.16 that C_H satisfies revision credibility, then we must add *regularity* to the list of postulates presented in statement (1) of that theorem. Having in mind Proposition 3.12 and the constructions used in part (1) to (2) of the proof of Theorem 3.16 it is possible to include other properties of the credible set of sentences in statement (2) without adding any other postulates in the statement (1) (for example, that $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfies credibility lower bounding and that $Cn(\emptyset) \subseteq C_H$).

§4. Conclusion. AGM revision operators are always successful, i.e. a given belief is always incorporated when revising by it. However, this is not a realistic feature of belief revision, since an agent may be unwilling to incorporate certain potential beliefs into his/her belief set. In this paper we presented a nonprioritized revision operator that we call *two level credibility-limited revision*. The basic idea of two level credibility-limited revision. The first step consists of determining which beliefs are credible (and their degree of credibility) and which are not. Then the function should:

- behave as a standard revision when revising by a belief at the highest level of credibility (C_H) ;
- behave as a standard contraction by the negation of that belief, if that belief is at the second level of credibility (C_L) ;
- leave the set of beliefs unchanged when the belief to be revised is considered not credible (is not an element of $C_H \cup C_L$).

Two level credibility-limited revisions operators are closely related to credibility-limited revisions. In fact, they can be seen as a generalization of credibility-limited revisions. In the particular case where $C_L = \emptyset$ both types of operators coincide.

In this paper, we proposed several postulates to characterize two level credibilitylimited revisions operators and presented axiomatic characterizations for several classes of such operators. We presented some results exposing the relation between the postulates satisfied by two level credibility-limited revision operators and the properties satisfied by the underlying sets of credible sentences.

§A. Proofs.

LEMMA A.1. Let K be a belief set. Then:

- 1. $(\mathbf{K} + \alpha) \cap (\mathbf{K} + \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta$.
- 2. $\mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha$.
- *Proof.* 1. Let $\delta \in (\mathbf{K} + \alpha) \cap (\mathbf{K} + \beta)$. Hence $\delta \in \mathbf{K} + \alpha$ and $\delta \in \mathbf{K} + \beta$. By deduction it follows that $\alpha \to \delta \in \mathbf{K}$ and $\beta \to \delta \in \mathbf{K}$. On the other hand it holds that $\{\alpha \to \delta, \beta \to \delta\} \vdash (\alpha \lor \beta) \to \delta$. Thus $(\alpha \lor \beta) \to \delta \in \mathbf{K}$, from which it follows that $\delta \in \mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta$. Therefore $(\mathbf{K} + \alpha) \cap (\mathbf{K} + \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta$.
- 2. Let $\delta \in \mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta$. Hence by deduction $(\alpha \lor \beta) \to \delta \in \mathbf{K}$. It holds that $\{(\alpha \lor \beta) \to \delta\} \vdash \alpha \to \delta$. Thus $\alpha \to \delta \in \mathbf{K}$, from which it follows that $\delta \in \mathbf{K} + \alpha$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha$.

Proof. Proposition 3.8.

- Let α ∈ C and β ∈ Cn(α). Assume, by *reductio ad. absurdum* that β ∉ C. Hence by condition (C *) it follows that ¬β ∈ K * α. Thus ¬α ∈ K * α. It holds by * *success* that α ∈ K * α. Hence K * α is inconsistent. By * *consistency* it follows that α ⊢⊥. Contradiction, since C satisfies element consistency.
- Let β ∈ Cn(Ø) and ¬α ∉ C. From Cn(Ø) ⊆ C it follows that β ∈ C. By condition (C_H ∪ C_L ⋆) it follows that ¬¬α ∈ K ⋆ β. It holds that ⋆ is an AGM revision operator. By ⋆ *closure* it follows that α ∈ K ⋆ β. On the other hand, by hypothesis K is a consistent belief set. Thus β ∈ K and ¬β ∉ K. By ⋆ *vacuity* and *inclusion* it follows that K ⋆ β = K + β. Thus K ⋆ β = K, from which it follows that α ∈ K. □

Proof. Proposition 3.9. Let $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\vdash \beta \rightarrow \alpha$. Hence $\vdash \neg \alpha \rightarrow \neg \beta$. It follows by *N*-*Persistence* that $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \beta \vdash \neg \beta$. Therefore, by *closure*, it follows that $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$.

Proof. Proposition 3.10. Let $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. By *consistency preservation* it follows that $\alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. By *weak relative success* it follows that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K}$. Let $\delta \in \mathbf{K}$. By *N*-*Recovery* it follows that $\delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \neg \alpha$. From $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ it follows, by *closure*, that $\delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$.

Proof. Proposition 3.11. Assume that $\alpha \in \mathbf{K}$. **K** is consistent, thus $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K}$. It follows from *weak vacuity* that $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. On the other hand by inclusion $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha$. It follows from $\alpha \in \mathbf{K}$ that $\mathbf{K} + \alpha = \mathbf{K}$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K}$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$. \Box

Proof. Proposition 3.12.

- 1. Let $\alpha \in C_H$. Hence $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. By \odot consistency preservation it follows that $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.
- 2. Follows trivially by definition of C_H and C_L .

- 3. Assume that $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$. Hence it holds that $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Thus, from \odot *N*-relative success, it follows that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$. It holds that \mathbf{K} is consistent, hence $\neg \neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K}$. It follows, from \odot weak vacuity that $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \neg \alpha$. Thus $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \neg \alpha$. Therefore $\neg \alpha \in C_H$.
- 4. Assume that $\alpha \vdash \perp$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \vdash \neg \alpha$. By \odot consistency preservation it follows that $\alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Thus $\alpha \notin C_H$.
- 5. Assume that $\alpha \vdash \perp$. Thus, from \odot *closure*, it follows that $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Therefore, $\alpha \notin C_L$. Hence C_L satisfies element consistency. Let $\alpha \in Cn(\emptyset)$. By \odot *closure* it follows that $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Thus $\alpha \in C_H$. Therefore $Cn(\emptyset) \subseteq C_H$.
- 6. Assume that $\alpha \vdash \perp$. By (4) and (5) it holds that $\alpha \notin C_H$ and $\alpha \notin C_L$. Thus $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$.
- Assume that ⊢ α ↔ β. We will start by showing that C_H satisfies credibility of logical equivalents. Let α ∈ C_H. Hence α ∈ K ⊙ α. It follows from ⊢ α ↔ β and ⊙ *closure* that β ∈ K ⊙ α. On the other hand, it follows from ⊙ *extensionality* that K ⊙ α = K ⊙ β. Thus β ∈ K ⊙ β, from which it follows that β ∈ C_H. By symmetry of the case it holds that if β ∈ C_H, then α ∈ C_H. Therefore it holds that α ∈ C_H if and only if β ∈ C_H.

We will now show that C_L satisfies credibility of logical equivalents. Let $\alpha \in C_L$. Then $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\alpha \notin C_H$. It follows from $\vdash \neg \alpha \leftrightarrow \neg \beta$ that $\neg \beta \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. On the other hand, it follows from \odot *extensionality* that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. Thus $\neg \beta \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. On the other hand, C_H satisfies credibility of logical equivalents thus $\beta \notin C_H$. Therefore $\beta \in C_L$.

We will now show that $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfies credibility of logical equivalents. Let $\alpha \in C_H \cup C_L$. Thus $\alpha \in C_H$ or $\alpha \in C_L$. Both sets, C_H and C_L , satisfy credibility of logical equivalents. Thus $\beta \in C_H$ or $\beta \in C_L$. In both cases it holds that $\beta \in C_H \cup C_L$.

- 8. Let $\alpha \in \mathbf{K}$. By Proposition 3.11 it follows that $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Hence $\alpha \in C_H \subseteq C_H \cup C_L$. Thus C_H and $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfy *credibility lower bounding*.
- 9. Assume that $\mathbf{K} \not\vdash \alpha$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \not\vdash \neg \neg \alpha$. It follows from \odot vacuity that $\mathbf{K} + \neg \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \neg \alpha$. Thus $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \neg \alpha$. Therefore $\neg \alpha \in C_H$. Consequently it also holds that $\neg \alpha \in C_H \cup C_L$.
- 10. Let $\alpha \in C_L$ and $\beta \in Cn(\alpha)$. Then $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\vdash \alpha \to \beta$. It follows from \odot *N*-success propagation that $\neg \beta \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. There are two cases to consider. If $\beta \in C_H$, then $\beta \in C_H \cup C_L$. If $\beta \notin C_H$, then $\beta \in C_L$. Consequently $\beta \in C_H \cup C_L$.
- 11. Let $\alpha \in C_H$ and $\beta \in Cn(\alpha)$. Hence $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. On the other hand, it follows by \odot strict improvement that $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. Hence $\beta \in C_H$.
- 12. Let $\alpha \in C_H \cup C_L$ and $\beta \in Cn(\alpha)$. Hence $\alpha \in C_H$ or $\alpha \in C_L$. In the first case it holds by (11) that $\beta \in C_H$. Thus $\beta \in C_H \cup C_L$. In the second case by (10) it holds that $\beta \in C_H \cup C_L$. Therefore, in both cases it holds that $\beta \in C_H \cup C_L$.
- 13. Assume the $\alpha \notin C_H$ and $\beta \notin C_H$. Hence $\alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\beta \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. It follows from \odot *disjunctive distribution* that $\alpha \lor \beta \notin \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Therefore $\alpha \lor \beta \notin C_H$.
- 14. Assume that α ∉ C_H ∪ C_L and β ∉ C_H ∪ C_L. Hence ¬α ∈ K ⊙ α and ¬β ∈ K ⊙
 β. Thus, by ⊙ *N*-persistence, it holds that ¬α ∈ K ⊙ (α ∨ β) and ¬β ∈ K ⊙ (α ∨ β). Hence, by ⊙ closure, ¬(α ∨ β) ∈ K ⊙ (α ∨ β). Hence α ∨ β ∉ C_L. On the other hand, by ⊙ consistency preservation it holds that α ∨ β ∉ K ⊙ (α ∨ β). Therefore α ∨ β ∉ C_H. Thus α ∨ β ∉ C_H ∪ C_L.
- 15. Assume that $\alpha \notin C_L$ and $\beta \notin C_L$. We will consider two cases: $Case(1).\alpha \in C_H \text{ or } \beta \in C_H$. By (11) it follows that $\alpha \lor \beta \in C_H$. Thus $\alpha \lor \beta \notin C_L$.

Case (2). $\alpha \notin C_H$ and $\beta \notin C_H$. Hence $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. Thus, by \odot *N-persistence*, it holds that $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$ and $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Hence, by \odot *closure*, $\neg (\alpha \lor \beta) \in \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Hence $\alpha \lor \beta \notin C_L$.

Proof. Proposition 3.13.

- Assume that α ∉ C_H ∪ C_L and β ∈ C_H ∪ C_L. Hence β ∈ C_H or β ∈ C_L. If β ∈ C_H, then β ∈ K ⊙ β. By ⊙ *consistency preservation* it follows that ¬β ∉ K ⊙ β. Assume now that β ∉ C_H. Then β ∈ C_L. By definition of C_L it follows that ¬β ∉ K ⊙ β. Thus in both cases it holds that ¬β ∉ K ⊙ β. Hence it holds that ¬α ∈ K ⊙ α and ¬β ∉ K ⊙ β. By ⊙ *N*-persistence it follows that ¬α ∈ K ⊙ β. By definition of * it holds that K * β = K ⊙ β + β. Hence it holds that ¬α ∈ K * β.
- 2. Let $\alpha \in C_H$ and $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. It holds that $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Thus, by \odot consistency preservation, it follows that $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Hence $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. By \odot regularity it follows that $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. Thus $\beta \in C_H$.

Proof. Theorem 3.14. (1) to (2): Let \star be the operation such that:

i. If $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$, then $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$;

ii. If $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$, then $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = Cn(\alpha)$.

Furthermore let $C_H = \{ \alpha : \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \}$ and $C_L = \{ \alpha : \neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \} \setminus C_H$.

We start this proof by noticing that by \odot *consistency preservation* it follows from $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ that $\alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.

We must show that:

(A) $C_H \cap C_L = \emptyset$, C_H and C_L satisfy credibility of logical equivalents and element consistency;

(B) \star is a basic AGM revision operator;

(C) \odot is a two level credibility-limited revision operator induced by \star and the sets C_H and C_L .

(A) Follows trivially by Proposition 3.12.

(B) We must show that \star satisfies the six basic AGM postulates for revision.

It follows trivially by the definition that of \star that it satisfies success and closure.

Inclusion: It follows by the definition of \star and \odot *inclusion* that \star satisfies *inclusion*.

Vacuity: Assume that $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K}$. We intend to prove that $\mathbf{K} + \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Assume by *reductio ad absurdum* that $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. It follows by \odot inclusion that $\mathbf{K} + \alpha \vdash \bot$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \vdash \neg \alpha$. **K** is a belief set, thus $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K}$. Contradiction. Therefore $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Hence it holds that $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$. It follows by \odot *weak vacuity* that $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Thus (by monotony) $\mathbf{K} + \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$.

Consistency: Assume that α is consistent. We intend to prove that $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha$ is consistent. If $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$, then $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$. By \odot *closure* it follows that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \not\vdash \neg \alpha$.

From which it follows that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha \not\vdash \perp$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha$ is consistent. If $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$, then it follows by the definition of \star that $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha$ is consistent.

Extensionality: Let $\vdash \alpha \leftrightarrow \beta$. By \odot *extensionality* it holds that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. We will consider two cases:

Case (1). $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Then $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$. It holds that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \beta + \beta$. On the other hand, it follows by \odot *closure* and *extensionality* that $\neg \beta \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \star \beta = \mathbf{K} \odot \beta + \beta$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \star \beta$.

Case (2). $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Hence it holds, by \odot *closure* and *extensionality* that $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = Cn(\alpha) = Cn(\beta) = \mathbf{K} \star \beta$.

(C) We will now prove that \odot is a two level credibility-limited revision operator induced by \star and the sets C_H and C_L . There are three cases to consider:

If $\alpha \in C_H$, then $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. On the other hand, it follows by \odot consistency preservation that $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Thus, by definition of \star , it holds that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$.

Assume now that $\alpha \in C_L$. Hence by \odot weak relative success it holds that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K}$. On the other hand $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} \cap \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$.

It holds, by the definition of \star , that $\mathbf{K} \cap \mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \cap (\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha)$. On the other hand, from \odot *containment* it holds that $\mathbf{K} \cap (\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \cap \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \cap \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$.

Consider now that $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$. Hence $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. It follows from \odot *N*-relative success that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$.

(2) to (1): Let K be a consistent belief set and \star be a basic AGM revision operator for K. Let $C_H, C_L \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ be such that: $C_H \cap C_L = \emptyset$, C_H and C_L satisfy credibility of logical equivalents and element consistency. Let \odot be the two level credibility-limited revision operator induced by \star and the sets C_H and C_L . Thus

$$\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \begin{cases} \mathbf{K} \star \alpha & \text{if } \alpha \in C_H \\ (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K} & \text{if } \alpha \in C_L \\ \mathbf{K} & \text{if } \alpha \notin C_L \cup C_L. \end{cases}$$

We intend to prove that \odot satisfies *weak relative success, closure, inclusion, consistency* preservation, weak vacuity, extensionality, N-relative success and containment. We start by noticing that it follows from $C_H \cap C_L = \emptyset$ that if $\alpha \notin C_H$, then either $\alpha \in C_L$ or $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$.

Weak relative success: If $\alpha \in C_H$, then by \star success it follows that $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. If $\alpha \notin C_H$, then either $\alpha \in C_L$ or $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$. In both cases it follows by definition of \odot that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K}$.

Closure: Logical closure is preserved under intersection. **K** is a belief set. Thus it follows trivially from the definition of \odot and \star *closure* that \odot satisfies *closure*.

Inclusion: It follows trivially from the definition of \odot and \star *inclusion* that \odot satisfies *inclusion*.

Consistency preservation: Assume that $\alpha \in C_H$. C_H satisfies element consistency. Thus it holds that $\alpha \not\models \perp$. From \star *consistency* it follows that $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha$ is consistent. Thus by definition of \odot it follows that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ is also consistent. Assume now that $\alpha \notin C_H$. It holds that either $\alpha \in C_L$ or $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$. In both cases it follows from the definition of \odot that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K}$. On the other hand, by hypothesis, \mathbf{K} is consistent, thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ is also consistent.

Weak vacuity: Assume that $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K}$. We intend to prove that $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. It follows trivially if $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$. Assume now that $\alpha \in C_H \cup C_L$. It holds, by \star vacuity and *inclusion*, that $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} + \alpha$. We will consider two cases:

Case (1). $\alpha \in C_H$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. *Case* (2). $\alpha \in C_L$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K} = (\mathbf{K} + \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K} = \mathbf{K}$. **Extensionality:** Let $\vdash \alpha \leftrightarrow \beta$. It holds that C_H and C_L satisfy credibility of logical equivalents. Thus $\alpha \in C_H$ if and only if $\beta \in C_H$ and $\alpha \in C_L$ if and only if $\beta \in C_L$. We will consider three cases:

Case (1). $\alpha \in C_H$. Thus $\beta \in C_H$.

Case (2). $\alpha \in C_L$. Then $\beta \in C_L$.

Case (3). $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$. Thus $\beta \notin C_H \cup C_L$.

In each case it follows, from the definition of \odot and \star *extensionality* (in the first two cases) that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$.

N-relative success: Assume that $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. We intend to prove that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$.

Assume by *reductio ad absurdum* that $\alpha \in C_H \cup C_L$. Hence, either $\alpha \in C_L$ or $\alpha \in C_H$. In both cases it holds, from the definition of \odot , that $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Thus, by \star *success* it follows that $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha$ is not consistent. By \star *consistency* it follows that $\alpha \vdash \bot$. Contradiction, since either $\alpha \in C_L$ or $\alpha \in C_H$ and it holds that C_H and C_L satisfy element consistency. Hence $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$. Thus, it follows trivially by \odot definition that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$.

Containment: Above we showed that \odot satisfies *closure*, *weak vacuity* and *N-relative success*. We will prove by cases:

Case (1). $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K}$. Hence by \odot weak vacuity it holds that $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \cap ((\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.

Case (2). $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Thus by \odot *N-relative success* it follows that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$, thus $\mathbf{K} \cap ((\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.

Case (3). $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K}$ and $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. We intend to prove that $((\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.

It must be the case that $\alpha \in C_H \cup C_L$, otherwise it would follow that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$, which contradicts the hypothesis that $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K}$ and $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. We will consider two cases:

Case (3.1). $\alpha \in C_H$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. By \star success it follows that $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Hence $(\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \cap ((\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.

Case (3.2). $\alpha \in C_L$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K}$. Let $\beta \in ((\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K}$. Hence $\beta \in (\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha$ and $\beta \in \mathbf{K}$. From the former it holds by \odot *closure* (and deduction) that $\alpha \to \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Hence $\alpha \to \beta \in (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K}$. Thus $\alpha \to \beta \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. It follows by \star success and closure that $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Thus $\beta \in (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha) \cap \mathbf{K} = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \cap ((\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.

Proof. Theorem 3.15. (1) to (2): We will use the same constructions as in the corresponding part of Theorem 3.14. Then we need to prove only that C_H , C_L and/or $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfy the properties listed in the corresponding paragraph of item 2. This follows trivially by Propositions 3.12 and 3.13.

(2) to (1): Let \odot be a two level credibility-limited revision operator induced by a basic AGM revision operator \star for **K** and sets C_H , $C_L \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ such that: $C_H \cap C_L = \emptyset$, C_H and C_L satisfy credibility of logical equivalents and C_L satisfies element consistency. It follows from Theorem 3.14 that \odot satisfies *weak relative success, closure, inclusion, consistency preservation, weak vacuity, extensionality, N-relative success* and *containment*. It remains to prove that if C_H , C_L and/or $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfy also the property listed in a given paragraph of item 2, then \odot satisfies the postulates listed in the corresponding paragraph of item 1.

(a) Assume that C_H expansive credibility. We must prove that \odot satisfies vacuity. Assume that $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K}$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \nvDash \neg \alpha$. It follows from C_H expansive credibility that $\neg \neg \alpha \in C_H$. It holds that C_H satisfies credibility of logical equivalents thus $\alpha \in C_H$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. It follows from \star vacuity that $\mathbf{K} + \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Thus $\mathbf{K} + \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.

- (b) Assume that C_H satisfies credibility lower bounding and disjunctive completeness. We must prove that ⊙ satisfies *disjunctive distribution*. Assume that α ∉ K ⊙ α and β ∉ K ⊙ β. Hence α ∉ C_H and β ∉ C_H (otherwise it would follow from ★ *success* and ⊙ definition that α ∈ K ⊙ α and β ∈ K ⊙ β). C_H satisfies disjunctive completeness. Thus α ∨ β ∉ C_H. It holds that C_H satisfies credibility lower bounding, thus α ∨ β ∉ K. On the other hand, by definition of ⊙ it follows that α ∨ β ∉ K ⊙ (α ∨ β).
- (c) Assume that C_H satisfies single sentence closure. We intend to prove that \odot satisfies *strict improvement*.

Let $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\beta \in Cn(\alpha)$. We will prove by cases:

Case (1). $\alpha \in C_H$, then $\beta \in C_H$ (since C_H satisfies single sentence closure). Thus by definition of \odot and \star *success* it follows that $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$.

Case (2). $\beta \in C_H$. Thus by definition of \odot and \star success it follows that $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. *Case* (3). $\alpha \notin C_H$ and $\beta \notin C_H$. From $\alpha \notin C_H$ it follows from the definition of \odot that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K}$. Hence $\alpha \in \mathbf{K}$. It follows from $\beta \in Cn(\alpha)$ that $\beta \in \mathbf{K}$. Therefore it follows by the definition of \odot and \star success that $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$.

- (d) Assume that C_H and C_H ∪ C_L satisfy single sentence closure. By (c) ⊙ satisfies strict improvement. It remains to show that ⊙ satisfies N-success propagation. Let ¬α ∈ K ⊙ α and ⊢ β → α. It holds that ⊢ ¬α → ¬β. We will prove by cases: Case (1).⊢ ¬α. Hence ⊢ ¬β. Therefore by ⊙ closure it follows that ¬β ∈ K ⊙ β. Case (2).∀ ¬α. By ★ success it holds that α ∈ K ★ α. Hence by ★ consistency ¬α ∉ K ★ α. Thus from the definition of ⊙ it follows that α ∉ C_H ∪ C_L. By C_H ∪ C_L single sentence closure it follows that β ∉ C_H ∪ C_L. Thus K ⊙ α = K = K ⊙ β. Therefore, ¬α ∈ K ⊙ β = K. K is a belief set, thus ¬β ∈ K = K ⊙ β.
- (e) Assume that condition $(C_H \cup C_L \star)$ holds. We intend to prove that \odot satisfies *N*-persistence.

Let $\alpha \in \mathcal{L}$ and assume that $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. We will consider two cases:

Case (1). $\vdash \neg \beta$. Hence by \odot *closure* $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.

Case (2). $\forall \neg \beta$. If $\beta \in C_H \cup C_L$, then it holds, by definition of \odot that $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \star \beta$. On the other hand, by \star success it follows that $\mathbf{K} \star \beta \vdash \bot$, which contradicts \star consistency. Hence $\beta \notin C_H \cup C_L$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \beta = \mathbf{K}$, from which it follows that $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K}$. We will consider two subcases:

2.1: $\alpha \in C_H \cup C_L$. Condition $(C_H \cup C_L - \star)$ holds. Hence $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Therefore, by the definition of \odot , it holds that $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.

2.2: $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$. Therefore $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$.

(f) Let $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. We will consider two cases: *Case* (1). $\alpha \in C_H$. Then $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Hence $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Revision credibility holds, thus $\beta \in C_H$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \odot \beta = \mathbf{K} \star \beta$. By \star success it follows that $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$.

Case (2). $\alpha \notin C_H$. Hence $\beta \in \mathbf{K}$. By Proposition 3.11 it holds that $\mathbf{K} \odot \beta = \mathbf{K}$. Thus $\beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$.

Proof. Theorem 3.16. (2) to (1): Let \odot be a two level credibility-limited revision operator induced by an AGM revision operator \star for **K** and sets C_H , $C_L \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ such that: C_L satisfies credibility of logical equivalents and element consistency, $C_H \cap C_L = \emptyset$,

405

 C_H satisfies element consistency, credibility lower bounding and single sentence closure and condition $(C_H \cup C_L - \star)$ holds.

We note that since C_H satisfies single sentence closure then C_H also satisfies credibility of logical equivalents. We note also that since C_H and C_L satisfy element consistency then $C_H \cup C_L$ also satisfies element consistency. Thus, according to Proposition 3.8, $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfies single sentence closure.

It follows from Theorems 3.14 and 3.15 that \odot satisfies *weak relative success, closure, inclusion, consistency preservation, weak vacuity, extensionality, N-relative success, containment, strict improvement* and *N-persistence*. It remains to prove that \odot satisfies *N-recovery, disjunctive overlap* and *disjunctive inclusion*.

N-recovery: We will consider three cases:

Case (1). $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \neg \alpha$.

Case (2). $\alpha \in C_H$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Then by \star success it follows that $\alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \neg \alpha = \mathcal{L}$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \neg \alpha$.

Case (3). $\alpha \in C_L$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \cap \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. It holds that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \neg \alpha = (\mathbf{K} \cap \mathbf{K} \star \alpha) + \neg \alpha$.

 $\delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \neg \alpha \text{ iff } \delta \in (\mathbf{K} \cap \mathbf{K} \star \alpha) + \neg \alpha \text{ iff } \neg \alpha \to \delta \in (\mathbf{K} \cap \mathbf{K} \star \alpha) \text{ iff } \neg \alpha \to \delta \in \mathbf{K}$ and $\neg \alpha \to \delta \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \text{ iff } \delta \in \mathbf{K} + \neg \alpha$ and $\delta \in (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha) + \neg \alpha \text{ iff } \delta \in \mathbf{K} + \neg \alpha$ and $\delta \in \mathcal{L}$ iff $\delta \in \mathbf{K} + \neg \alpha$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \neg \alpha = \mathbf{K} + \neg \alpha$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \neg \alpha$.

Disjunctive overlap: We will prove by cases:

Case (1). $\alpha \in C_H \cup C_L$ and $\beta \notin C_H \cup C_L$. It holds, by definition of \odot , that $\mathbf{K} \odot \beta = \mathbf{K}$ On the other hand $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfies single sentence closure, thus $\alpha \lor \beta \in C_H \cup C_L$. By \star *disjunctive factoring* (Proposition 2.3) it holds that either: (i) $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$, (ii) $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star \beta$ or (iii) $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \star \beta$.

(i) $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \cap \mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$.

(ii) Condition $(C_H \cup C_L \cdot \star)$ holds. Hence it follows from $\beta \notin C_H \cup C_L$ and $\alpha \lor \beta \in C_H \cup C_L$ that $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Therefore $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \star \beta$. It holds by \star success that $\mathbf{K} \star \beta = \mathcal{L}$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathcal{L}$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \cap \mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$.

(iii) As in case (ii), it follows by condition $(C_H \cup C_L - \star)$ that $\mathbf{K} \star \beta = \mathcal{L}$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \cap \mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$.

Case (2). $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$ and $\beta \in C_H \cup C_L$. This case is symmetric with case 1.

Case (3). $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$ and $\beta \notin C_H \cup C_L$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \beta = \mathbf{K}$. We will consider two subcases:

3.1: $\alpha \lor \beta \notin C_H \cup C_L$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K}$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$.

3.2: $\alpha \lor \beta \in C_H \cup C_L$. Condition $(C_H \cup C_L - \star)$ holds. Thus it follows by \star *closure* that $(\neg \alpha \land \neg \beta) \in \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Thus, by \star *closure*, $\neg (\alpha \lor \beta) \in \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. By \star *success* it follows that $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathcal{L}$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta = \mathbf{K} = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \cap \mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$.

Case (4). $\alpha \in C_H \cup C_L$ and $\beta \in C_H \cup C_L$. $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfies single sentence closure. Thus $\alpha \lor \beta \in C_H \cup C_L$. We will consider four subcases:

4.1: $\alpha \in C_H$ and $\beta \in C_H$. C_H satisfies single sentence closure. Thus $\alpha \lor \beta \in C_H$. Thus by definition of \odot it holds that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \star \beta$ and $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Hence by \star *disjunctive overlap* it follows that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. 4.2: $\alpha \in C_H$ and $\beta \in C_L$. C_H satisfies single sentence closure. Thus $\alpha \vee \beta \in C_H$. By definition of \odot it holds that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap (\mathbf{K} \star \beta \cap \mathbf{K})$. It follows, by \star *disjunctive overlap*, that $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap (\mathbf{K} \star \beta \cap \mathbf{K}) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \vee \beta) \cap \mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \vee \beta)$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \vee \beta)$.

4.3: $\alpha \in C_L$ and $\beta \in C_H$. This case is symmetric with the previous one.

4.4: $\alpha \in C_L$ and $\beta \in C_L$. By definition of \odot it holds that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta = (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K}) \cap (\mathbf{K} \star \beta \cap \mathbf{K})$. It follows by \star *disjunctive overlap* that $(\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K}) \cap (\mathbf{K} \star \beta \cap \mathbf{K}) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \cap \mathbf{K}$. It holds that $\alpha \lor \beta \in C_H \cup C_L$. It follows by definition of \odot that $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \cap \mathbf{K} \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$.

Weak Disjunctive inclusion: We start by noticing that, according to Lemma A.1, it holds that $(\mathbf{K} + \alpha) \cap (\mathbf{K} + \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta$ and $\mathbf{K}' + \alpha \lor \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K}' + \alpha$, for any belief set \mathbf{K}' .

Assume that $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. We will prove by cases:

Case (1). $\alpha \in C_H$. It holds that C_H satisfies single sentence closure. Thus $\alpha \lor \beta \in C_H$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$ and $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. It holds that $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. From which it follows by \star *disjunctive inclusion* that $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) + \alpha \lor \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha \lor \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$.

Case (2). $\alpha \notin C_H$. It holds that $C_H \cap C_L = \emptyset$. We will consider two subcases:

2.1: $\alpha \in C_L$. It follows by \odot definition that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K}$. It holds that $C_H \cup C_L$ satisfies single sentence closure. Thus $\alpha \lor \beta \in C_H \cup C_L$. We will consider two subcases:

2.1.1: $\alpha \lor \beta \in C_H$. It holds that $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Thus $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. It follows by \star *disjunctive inclusion* that $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. On the other hand it holds, by

* *inclusion*, that $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha$.

We will now show that $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \subseteq (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K}) + \alpha$. Let $\delta \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Hence $\delta \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$ and $\delta \in \mathbf{K} + \alpha$. It follows by \star *closure* that $\alpha \to \delta \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. It also holds that $\alpha \to \delta \in \mathbf{K}$. Hence $\alpha \to \delta \in \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K}$. Thus $\delta \in (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K}) + \alpha$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \subseteq (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K}) + \alpha$.

Hence it holds that $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K}) + \alpha$. On the other hand it holds, by \star success, that $\alpha \lor \beta \in \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) + \alpha \lor \beta = \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq (\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K}) + \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$.

2.1.2: $\alpha \lor \beta \in C_L$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \cap \mathbf{K}$. We will divide this case in two other subcases:

2.1.2.1: $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K}$. It follows from $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$ that $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Therefore by \star *disjunctive inclusion* $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) + (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$.

2.1.2.2: $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K}$. By \star vacuity and inclusion it holds that $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} + \alpha$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$. From which it follows that $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha = \mathbf{K} + \alpha$. It holds by definition of \odot that $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K}$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) + \alpha \lor \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$.

2.2: $\alpha \notin C_L$. Thus $\alpha \notin C_H \cup C_L$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha = \mathbf{K}$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha = \mathbf{K} + \alpha$. On the other hand, by \odot *inclusion*, it holds that $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) + (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$.

(1) to (2): We will use the same constructions as in the corresponding parts of Theorems 3.14 and 3.15. According to Theorems 3.14 and 3.15 it remains to prove that \star satisfies *disjunctive overlap* and *disjunctive inclusion*.

Disjunctive overlap: We start by noticing that according to Observation 1.17 of Hansson (1999) it holds that $Cn(\alpha \lor \beta) = Cn(\alpha) \cap Cn(\beta)$. We will prove by cases:

Case (1). $\neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \notin \mathbf{K}$. By \star *vacuity* and *inclusion* it follows that $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} + (\alpha \lor \beta)$.

By \star inclusion it holds that $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha$ and $\mathbf{K} \star \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \beta$. On the other hand it holds, by Lemma A.1, that $(\mathbf{K} + \alpha) \cap (\mathbf{K} + \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \star \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \alpha \lor \beta = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$.

Case (2). $\neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \in \mathbf{K}$. Hence $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K}$ and $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K}$. We will consider two subcases. 2.1: $\neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \in \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Thus, by \odot *N-persistence*, $\neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. By \odot *closure* it follows that $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. By symmetry of the case it also holds that $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \star \beta = Cn(\alpha) \cap Cn(\beta) = Cn(\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star \alpha \lor \beta$.

2.2: $\neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \notin \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Thus $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) + \alpha \lor \beta$. If $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$, then it would follow, by \odot *N*-persistence, that $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$ and $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$ and, consequently, by \odot closure that $\neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \in \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Contradiction. Hence, it holds that either $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ or $\neg \beta \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. We will subdivide this case:

2.2.1: $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\neg \beta \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \star \beta = (\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha \cap (\mathbf{K} \odot \beta) + \beta$. Let $\delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \odot \beta + \beta$. Thus $\delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$ and $\delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta + \beta$. Therefore $\alpha \to \delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\beta \to \delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. On the other hand by \odot *N*-recovery it holds that $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \neg \alpha$. Thus, by \odot closure, it holds that $\neg \alpha \to \neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Hence, by \odot closure, it holds that $\beta \to \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. By symmetry of the case it also holds that $\alpha \to \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. It holds that $\{\alpha \to \delta, \beta \to \alpha\} \vdash (\alpha \lor \beta) \to \delta$. Thus by \odot closure it holds that $(\alpha \lor \beta) \to \delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. By symmetry of the case it also holds that $(\alpha \lor \beta) \to \delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. By symmetry of the case it also holds that $(\alpha \lor \beta) \to \delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. By symmetry of the case it also holds that $(\alpha \lor \beta) \to \delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. Hence it follows by \odot disjunctive overlap that $(\alpha \lor \beta) \to \delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha \lor \beta$. Thus $\delta \in \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) + \alpha \lor \beta$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \star \beta = (\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha \cap (\mathbf{K} \odot \beta) + \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) + (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$.

2.2.2: $\neg \alpha \in \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\neg \beta \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \star \beta = Cn(\alpha) \cap (\mathbf{K} \odot \beta) + \beta \subseteq (\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha \cap (\mathbf{K} \odot \beta) + \beta$. As showed in the previous case it holds that $(\mathbf{K} \odot \alpha) + \alpha \cap (\mathbf{K} \odot \beta) + \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) + (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha \cap \mathbf{K} \star \beta \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$.

2.2.3: $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$ and $\neg \beta \in \mathbf{K} \odot \beta$. This case is symmetric to the previous one. **Disjunctive inclusion:** Assume that $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta)$. We will consider two cases:

Case (1). $\neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \notin \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) = \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta) + \alpha \lor \beta$. Thus $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. It follows by \odot *N*-persistence that $\neg \alpha \notin \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha$. Therefore $\mathbf{K} \star \alpha = \mathbf{K} \odot \alpha + \alpha$. It follows by \odot weak disjunctive inclusion that $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$.

Case (2). $\neg(\alpha \lor \beta) \in \mathbf{K} \odot (\alpha \lor \beta)$. Hence $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) = Cn(\alpha \lor \beta)$. Thus, it holds that $\mathbf{K} \star (\alpha \lor \beta) \subseteq Cn(\alpha) \subseteq \mathbf{K} \star \alpha$.

Acknowledgments. The author would like to thank Sean Walsh (the Associated Editor handling this paper) and the anonymous referee for the pertinent comments on the previous version of this paper that led its improvement. This work has been partially supported by Center for Research in Mathematics and Applications (CIMA) through the grant UIDB/04674/2020 of FCT-Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal and by the bilateral cooperation project FCT/DAAD (Germany) entitled "Advanced belief change operations based on comparisons and conditionals: Towards a general framework."

MARCO GARAPA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alchourrón, C., Gärdenfors, P., & Makinson, D. (1985). On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 50, 510–530.
- Booth, R., Fermé, E., Konieczny, S., & Pino Pérez, R. (2012). Credibility-limited revision operators in propositional logic. *Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on the Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, KR* 2012, pp. 116–125.
- Fermé, E., & Hansson, S. O. (2001). Shielded contraction. In Rott, H., & Williams, M.-A., editors. *Frontiers in Belief Revision*. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 85–107.
- . (2011). AGM 25 years: Twenty-five years of research in belief change. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, **40**, 295–331.
- . (2018). Belief Change: Introduction and Overview. Springer Briefs in Computer Science Series. New York: Springer.
- Fermé, E., Mikalef, J., & Taboada, J. (2003). Credibility-limited functions for belief bases. *Journal of Logic and Computation*, **13**(1), 99–110.
- Garapa, M., Fermé, E., & Reis, M. (2018a). Studies in credibility-limited base revision. *Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR* 2018), pp. 240–247.
- Garapa, M., Fermé, E., & Reis, M. D. (2018b). Shielded base contraction. *Artificial Intelligence*, **259**, 186 216.
- Gärdenfors, P. (1978). Conditionals and changes of belief. *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, **30**, 381–404.

. (1982). Rules for rational changes of belief. In Pauli, T., editor. *Philosophical Essays dedicated to Lennart Aqvist on his fiftieth birthday*, Vol. 34. New York: Springer, pp. 88–101.

——. (1988). Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

- Hansson, S. O. (1999). A Textbook of Belief Dynamics. Theory Change and Database Updating Applied Logic Series. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
 - ——. (2017). Descriptor Revision. New York: Springer International Publishing.
- Hansson, S. O., Fermé, E., Cantwell, J., & Falappa, M. (2001). Credibility-limited revision. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, **66**(4), 1581–1596.
- Harper, W. L. (1976). Rational conceptual change. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1976, pp. 462–494.
- Makinson, D. (1997). Screened revision. Theoria, 63, 14-23.
- Rott, H. (1992). Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment. *Journal of Logic, Language and Information*, **1**, 45–78.

FACULDADE DE CIÊNCIAS EXACTAS E DA ENGENHARIA UNIVERSIDADE DA MADEIRA CAMPUS UNIVERSITÁRIO DA PENTEADA 9020-105 FUNCHAL, PORTUGAL

E-mail: marco@uma.pt