Christian Democracy and the Fall of Communism. Ed Michael Gehler, Piotr H. Kosicki, and Helmut Wohnout. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2019. 357 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $79.50, hard bound.
doi: 10.1017/slr.2021.108

On the face of it, one might have expected the Christian Democratic (CD) parties of Europe to benefit mightily from the collapse of communist governments in the eastern half of the continent. After all, the 1989 revolutions reflected their peoples' desire to escape state socialism, join western Europe and embrace the classical liberal freedoms, including freedom of worship—exactly what Christian Democrats preached. In fact, however, they did not come out of it especially well. The aim of this volume is to explain that disappointing result.

Some CD politicians and activists had been in touch with their dissident colleagues behind the Iron Curtain for years before 1989. In particular, leading members of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), such as Alois Mock and Erhard Busek, had made personal contacts with human rights movements in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The European Democratic Union, a network of contacts with a distinctive CD orientation, seemed to promise the close cooperation of CD parties after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. In reality, only József Antall, as post-communist premier of Hungary, fulfilled the promise, and he died prematurely in 1993. The promise remained unfulfilled.

One problem in most of the ex-communist countries was that after 1989 political movements were numerous, protean, and unformed. They did not have the degree of organization that would enable stable relations to be established with them, let alone secure financial ties. German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who was very anxious to find CD colleagues in the emerging democracies, had great difficulty, even in predominantly Catholic Poland, in identifying a reliable partner, likely to survive and attract a significant number of voters. In Czechoslovakia the Catholic Church was relatively weak, especially in the Czech lands, and the civic movements which rose to the fore after 1989 were mainly secular in their orientation and highly suspicious of the authoritarian tendencies of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. Catholics had to be content with a modest position within Czech civil society.

Another reason for the overall disappointment is that the first successful anti-communist movement in a Warsaw Pact country, Solidarność (Solidarity), did not fit easily into the CD political spectrum: although many of its members were practicing Catholics, its declared political aims were focused on establishing the rights of labor as well as on human rights in general. They were closer therefore to the Social Democrats than the CDs of western Europe. Tadeusz Masowiecki, the first non-communist Warsaw Pact premier and a lifelong Catholic, turned out to be half-way to socialism in his political theory and practice, an apostle of the "third way" adumbrated in Pope Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. As a co-founder of Solidarność, he was on the side of the poor and disadvantaged, whereas most European CDs were part of the "establishment," and had in practice become opposed not only to communism but also to socialism in general. When Kohl offered him support, Mazowiecki responded standoffishly "I am a Christian and a democrat, but not a Christian Democrat" (215).

The Italian CDs were especially nervous about the changes further east: would they enhance the popularity of the Italian Communist Party? Or would they unleash a geopolitical upheaval that would threaten the CDs as the status quo party? In any case, the CDs were already falling apart into factions fueled by corruption and would finally cease to be the dominant party in Italy a little later.

The new post-communist governments were resolutely national in their orientation, determined to assert their independence from outside forces. West

European CD parties, however, were transnational in their beliefs and were in the process of merging much of their separate identity in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which made the European Community into the European Union.

Besides, Western CDs were by now moving into the grip of a neo-liberal ideology which stressed the supreme importance of international markets. Some central European politicians, notably Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland and Václav Klaus in the Czech Republic, believed that opening their nations to free markets abroad while selling off obsolete factories cheaply was the best way to overcome the economic lag caused by Soviet socialism. This concept fitted ill with the Catholic social teaching embraced by most central and east European CDs, which still valued the workers now being impoverished.

As result, many former CD voters eventually gravitated towards the nationalist and illiberal movements of Jaroslaw Kaczyński and Viktor Orbán, who promised to defend their populations against the depredations of international finance. As Piotr Kosicki argues in his concluding article, western CDs tended to adopt towards their central European colleagues a neo-liberal attitude of superiority which smacked of Orientalism.

Geoffrey Hosking
School of Slavonic & East European Studies
University College London

Amoral Communities: Collective Crimes in Time of War. By Mila Dragojević. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019. xxii, 197 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Maps. Photographs. $45.00, hard bound.
doi: 10.1017/slr.2021.109

Fascinating, intriguing and informative empirical snippets of experiences of war, drawn from research in Croatia, make this book a valuable addition to wealth of literature on the South Slav, or western Balkan, or once Yugoslav, lands and their trials. It offers a telling fabric which shows that all was not some form of inter-communal paradise, but that there was co-existence, often in parallel lives. Those parallel lives were not necessarily even noticed by those living them, even—as one of Mila Dragojević's interviewees is quoted, "we didn't notice how certain people would socialize together, or how some people would approve of some things" (98). The same respondent continues by saying "we never thought of that before," referring to the way in which people mainly of one ethnicity would meet together in particular bars, for example—and concluding that "we only started to notice" right before the start of the war (and then, perhaps, because older people began to point out who gathered in which locales). This is an example of an uncomfortable truth that many commenting on the Yugoslav war in the 1990s have been loathe to accept.

This is not a justification for war, to be clear. It is merely to indicate that Mila Dragojević's unique research has uncovered something not really done in decades of work on war, society and change, or politics across the Yugoslav lands. It is sobering material that we all need to read. It is research that points to the taboos of Second World War era topics that were never mentioned, about which grandparents never spoke—at least until social unrest, ethnic tensions, and armed conflict returned in the 1990s. And, yet, while also revealing this social fabric, Dragojević and her informants also find, importantly, that the conflict of the 1990s may well have left heavier marks that will be harder to remove, making the "prospect of reconciliation. . .more challenging after the 1990s" because an earlier form of "solidarity" in communities had been lost (103). That is a dismal, though strong, finding that cannot be pushed aside. It is also