

Ci's purpose of being persuasive to Xi Jinping's successors would not be fair to Ci and his project.

Ci imagines that post-Xi polity. There will be no authoritative leader to follow Xi as Deng followed Mao. Instead there will be an attempt to share power among diverse factions. But meanwhile the Leninist dictatorship will be confronted by a democratic society of people who want "good jobs" and an "enjoyable life" (p. 108). A feudal notion of red family heritage will not legitimate the ruling caste. Yet Ci does not call for citizens to rise up.

Instead his appeal is to ruling groups and their desire to hold on to power. He builds on the Xi era demonization of the prior two decades of leadership by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The Jiang era, in this perspective, brought "ten years of moral and reckless self-aggrandizement." The Hu era made the CCP "rotten to the core" (p. 84). Ci then asks, "What was this rot, as evidenced in the shocking malfeasance of these powerful members of the party [Zhou Yongkang, General Guo Boxiong, General Xi Caihou and Liang Jihua] but the moral and behavioral manifestation of a near-terminal legitimation crisis" (p. 85).

Writing for CCP leaders who may be loyal to this Xi vision, Ci cannot remind us that Jiang tried to constrain military hawks and that Hu, in order to seek reconciliation with Japan on maritime territorial issues, had to try to marginalize Han racists who demonized Japan. In contrast, Xi's ruling group incorporates the hawks and the racists. Their foreign policy assertiveness challenges the sovereignty of neighbours and leads them to seek ways to maintain their independence which upset the new right populist chauvinist legitimations of the CCP. Future peace and tranquillity are not givens.

In short, in singularly addressing CCP ruling groups, Ci is forced to omit factors which may impact future Chinese stability and legitimacy. Ci's prudential arguments therefore cannot be fully persuasive, something that Ci, of course, is well aware of. Therefore, he concludes by imagining alternative futures. What happens, he asks, if the future brings "China's further rise and democracy's future decline." In that case, Ci bravely concedes, "all bets are off" (p. 380). That is, Ci's penetrating analysis would not be applicable in that very different reality.

But in our age of rapid change and radical uncertainty, none of us can know the future. Projecting from key tendencies, albeit incomplete, Jiwei Ci's book is a heroic attempt at a contribution to help bring about a better future for the people of China and of the world.

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Creating the Intellectual: Chinese Communism and the Rise of a Classification

EDDY U

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Intellectuals have suffered a great deal at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Who were these unfortunate souls, how were they defined, identified, employed and then dismissed, with many persecuted, and how

did their tortured relationship with the Party affect the trajectory of Chinese Communism? These are the key issues treated in Eddy U's illuminating book. The author, a sociologist, argues that the intellectuals were created by the CCP as "a classification of people" based on Marxian thought, replacing the term *zhishijieji* (intellectual class), which had been used in the early decades of the Republican period, with the term *zhishifenzi* (educated persons). The Party placed the intellectuals in a new category compared with the "capitalists," "landlords," "rich peasants," "poor peasants," "workers" and others. Diverse and dispersed, they were turned into subjects, then objectified and treated by the Party as "usable but unreliable" individuals: usable because their knowledge and skills were badly needed for socialist construction; unreliable because owing to their "bourgeois" or "petty-bourgeois" backgrounds, their consecration to Chinese Communism and loyalty to the Party were not always assured. Their expertise, combined with Party distrust, underscored "the mutual constitution of the intellectual and Chinese Communism" (p. 17), with each having a profound impact on the other politically and in many other ways.

According to U, the origins of the term *zhishifenzi* date back to the early 1920s when the early CCP elites engaged in a robust debate about the alleged lack of political courage and moral integrity of members of the intellectual class. But it was not until the Yan'an period that intellectuals were identified in earnest as a new category of people, when educated men and women were recruited from the cities to this rural town to participate in the Communist revolution. After 1949, identification of this new classification gained fresh momentum. Individuals with varying degrees of education and training at primary, secondary or tertiary levels became intellectuals, including professors, school principals and teachers, editors, writers, journalists, accountants, engineers, artists and others. The identification was not fixed but varied spatially and from time to time, depending on the circumstances and needs of the Party. Thus, intellectuals were found in the countryside, too, contrary to the traditional view that they were naturally urban. Intellectuals were re-educated and thought reformed, with many becoming Party cadres, management staff, school principals and teachers, among others. There was no guarantee, however, that their new classification and status could not be altered. In fact, it was so changeable that some readers might find it confusing at times. It is unclear, for instance, when exactly the Party cadres and management staff in the school system were intellectuals like the teachers or just socialist revolutionaries. Perhaps it was sometimes negotiable. In any event, the intellectual individuals did not feel secure in their jobs and daily lives, knowing that they were usable but not trusted subjects.

Adopting an institutional-constructivist approach and drawing on a wide range of source materials, U examines a host of related issues, including registration of the subjects, workplace arrangements, organizations and associations, film and theatre productions, intra- and extra-Party struggles and mass surveillance. The drive to register the intellectuals and to determine their eligibility met with differing reactions from those concerned. In the end, a new pool of intellectuals was created serving the purposes of socialist construction. Many of those identified were often "unemployable" due to a lack of professional training. Yet they were capable of wreaking havoc on socialist development as the Party feared, a situation U describes as "a self-fulfilling prophecy" (p. 80).

The book covers the period from the May Fourth/New Culture Movement through Yan'an communism to socialist construction in the 1950s and up to 1964. For the early period of Communist rule, U focuses on thought reform, the Rectification Campaign and the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Disaffected intellectuals who criticized the Party leadership demanded re-definition of their classification and new roles in

the political system and socialist development. The pushback from Mao sparked anti-intellectual sentiments, with “ugly intellectuals everywhere” (p. 135). This paved the ground for the Cultural Revolution, which is unfortunately omitted from U’s analysis, despite references to it. Instead, he takes a brief look at the fate of intellectuals in the post-Mao reform era and in more recent years under Xi Jinping’s leadership. He concludes that it has been a struggle to define China’s intellectuals. Today they remain defined in a way markedly different from those in Western Europe and the United States. Controlled and utilized by the Party, they are still treated as useful but unreliable.

This well-researched and well-argued book makes a significant contribution to scholarship and will appeal to a wide audience in the China field, including graduate students of history, politics, sociology and comparative communist studies.

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Negative Exposures: Knowing What Not to Know in Contemporary China

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On 7 February of this year, within hours of the second and final reported death of Dr Li Wenliang, Weibo was awash with public expressions of grief, indignation and sorrow at the whistleblower’s passing from the disease for which he had attempted to sound the alarm. Notwithstanding the assiduous efforts of an army of official censors to stem the rising tide of unauthorized commemorations, tens of thousands of spontaneous eulogies surged through Chinese cyberspace, many accompanied by starkly repurposed images of Dr Li in his hospital bed, rendered in black and white, some beside eternally flickering digital candles. Artists who had never met Dr Li posted portraits drawn freehand from the photos he had posted of himself online shortly before his untimely death. The most haunting of these was created by the Australia-based political cartoonist, Badiucao, whose portrait of Dr Li faithfully reproduced his likeness, complete with a surgical mask over which the artist drew an open mouth, eerily frozen in a soundless scream, silenced now in perpetuity.

Margaret Hillenbrand’s incisive and beautifully composed monograph takes precisely these sorts of “photo-forms” – repurposed historical photographs – and their circulation as the point of departure for her fascinating excursus of public secrecy in contemporary China. While recognizing the CCP regime as fundamentally cryptocratic, Hillenbrand is not chiefly focused on documenting the finely-honed techniques of censorship in China today, arguing that “such a top-down view is missing a dimension,” insofar as “the disavowal of history in China has many stakeholders, whether willing or otherwise, affiliated with the state or not”; instead, she emphasizes that “the hushing of history is a densely collective endeavor in China. The silences of the present are conspiratorial” (p. 2). Public secrecy persists in part because it serves deep unmet needs; participation in the hidden economy of shared secrets itself generates ways of belonging, a collective sense of “knowing what not to know” that is both reinforced by consensual silences and incited in the selective repurposing of iconic images.