

what is happening on the “hither” side of religious experience (i.e., its psychophysiological rootedness), it can tell us nothing of the “farther” side of such experiences (i.e., their ultimate connection to transcendent powers). Advances in psychological knowledge do not, in James's view, refute religion because most (though not all) religious traditions already recognize that the divine enters our lives *through* our created physical nature.

**Dreaming is a primal wellspring of religion.** No mention is made in A&N's article of the role of dreaming in religion. However, a sizable literature has developed in recent years regarding the central involvement of dreaming in religious belief, practice, and experience (Bulkeley 1994, 1995, 1999, 2001; Harris 1994; Irwin 1994; Jedrej & Shaw 1992; Kelsey 1991; Mageo 2003; Miller 1994; O'Flaherty 1984; Stephen 1995; Tedlock 1987; Young 1999). At the same time, another sizable literature has arisen on the scientific study of dreaming (Domhoff 1996, 2003; Flanagan 2000; Foulkes 1999; Hartmann 1998; Hobson 1988, 1999; Jouvett 1999; Kahan 2001; Solms 1997), and recently a special issue of *BBS* was devoted to sleep and dreaming (*BBS* 2000, Vol. 23, No. 6). For researchers interested in further developing the insights of A&N, combining these two bodies of scholarship offers intriguing potentials. E. O. Tylor may or may not have been right that dreams are the origin of religion – such propositions are impossible to prove – but the historical and cross-cultural evidence is very clear that dreams are at least *reinforcers* of religious dispositions, providing experiential verification of ideas about the soul, supernatural beings, alternate dimensions of reality, and life after death. Abundant evidence also shows that dreams are frequently the proximate cause of striking religious innovations, prompting the development of new rituals, new conceptions of the divine, and new forms of social relationship. This primal connection between religion and dreaming may now, thanks to the resources of cognitive science, be explored in greater depth than ever before.

## Different religions, different emotions

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**Abstract:** Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) correctly claim that religion reduces emotions related to existential concerns. Our response adds to their argument by focusing on religious differences in the importance of emotion, and on other emotions that may be involved in religion. We believe that the important differences among religions make it difficult to have one theory to account for all religions.

Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) rightly emphasize the human proclivity to assign agency to events, including supernatural agency to otherwise unexplainable events, and we wholeheartedly agree. However, we propose that religions vary in the extent to which the reduction of existential concerns is a salient part of religious dogma, and the ways in which they promote meaning. Religions also differ in the emotions that are involved. Such considerations complement the more pan-religious analysis of A&N.

**Religion, meaning, and awe.** There is good evidence that humans have difficulty understanding random processes as part of causative accounts. The assignment of agency is perhaps part of a bigger system, a narrative or meaning-making system, that continually ascribes meaning to different life events. We often ask, *Why me?* Agency provides meaning for myriad events, from cloud movements to sudden misfortunes (e.g., the action of sorcerers).

Meaning making, if not unique to humans, surely reaches its heights in this species. It is a natural setup for religion, especially for a species inclined to agentic accounts. Meaning making is emo-

tionally satisfying, and it is probably a general feature of religion. The prevalence and effectiveness of religious coping (Pargament 1997) attests to the power of religion to help make sense of negative life events.

Along with reducing negative emotions related to existential concerns, attributions of meaning might also promote other emotions, such as awe. Awe is intimately involved in religious experiences, evident in the conversion stories related by James (1902/1997), to the story of Arjuna in the Hindu sacred text, the *Bhagavad Gita*. Could the experience of awe in a religious context promote fitness? Keltner and Haidt (2003) proposed that awe prototypically involves experiencing vastness and cognitive accommodation. Vastness often involves realizing patterns of causation, design, and beneficence that transcend the human scale, and such cognitive broadening could have fitness implications.

Some emotions, including awe, could take various forms in the context of religion, and might even detract from fitness. The Hebrew Bible, as well as the Koran, stresses the importance of both loving and fearing God. The Hebrew term for awe (*yirah*) involves a component of fear, as well. Religion can be associated with increased fear of God or fear of transgressing religious requirements (Abramowitz et al. 2002). Such fears can impact health. In one study of medically ill older patients, those patients who exhibited what might be termed *religious struggle* had a significantly greater likelihood of dying over the two-year duration of the prospective study. Religious struggle included, for example, patients wondering whether God had abandoned them or was punishing them (Pargament et al. 2001).

**Other religions, other emotions.** Although we agree that emotion is an important element of religion, it is interesting to us that emotion plays such a key role in A&N's discussion. Religion and emotion have not always been seen as inexorably linked. With the Renaissance came a vastly increased scientific understanding of the material world. Perhaps faced with a losing battle in understanding the physical universe, theologians began to confine their purview into the realm of subjective experiences. Emotional experiences became the primary criterion for the evaluation of the truth of religion. Certain religions, such as American Protestantism, have been powerfully affected by the turn to emotions (Cohen & Rozin 2001; Cohen et al. 2003; 2005; Lindbeck 1984; MacIntyre 1988; Milbank 1993; Morris 1996; Taylor 1989).

However, some religions have handed down social and ritual sensibilities since long before the Renaissance. Although emotions are also importantly involved in other religions such as Judaism and Hinduism, they may not have the same central role that they do in Protestantism. Rather, social connections and ethnic ties may be seen as of key importance, and different emotions may be involved (Cohen et al. 2005; Morris 1996; 1997). The social elements of such religions are relevant to an evolutionary analysis. Other theorists have proposed that religion is adaptive because of its promotion of social cohesion or conformity (e.g., Wilson 2002).

The social and/or emotional focus of religions suggests that agency itself has many forms, and attributions for emotional states vary (e.g., Liu et al. 1992; Smith & Ellsworth 1985). There are the most common agents in social explanation – other individuals, groups, the self. There are other agents, as well – natural forces like the weather and disease, and broad social and economic forces. Cultures prioritize different kinds of agents in their everyday social explanation (Miller 1984; Morris & Peng 1994). And this is evident in the form agents take in specific religions. For example, for Protestants, religious and moral behavior is expected to follow from altruistic and emotional motivations, such as keen awareness of God (Allport & Ross 1967), compassion, or sympathy. However, for members of certain other religions (such as Judaism, Catholicism, and Hinduism), social and duty-based motivations may be more acceptable (Cohen et al. 2005; Miller & Bersoff 1992, 1994; Miller & Luthar 1989; Miller et al. 1990).

In the same vein, the reduction of existential concerns may be more central, for example, in Christianity and Islam than it is in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Judaism. In the context of Judaism, for

example, there are only limited references in the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) to an afterlife. Many Jews believe that Judaism focuses more on the here and now, rather than on life after death (Klenow & Bolin 1989–1990; Zedek 1998) – despite the fact that certain Jewish authorities, such as Maimonides, considered belief in life after death to be a critical part of Jewish faith (Lamm 2000).

It is also possible that the practice of different religions involves different emotions. There are many other emotions that may be involved in religion, and that could provide fitness benefits. We will briefly discuss disgust as one possibility, and speculate about the evolutionary relevance of disgust in religion.

The substance of blood has special meaning in many religions. We note that purity concerns, some centered on blood, are common in many religions. For example, in Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism, menstruation imparts ritual impurity. Such taboos might reduce the spread of diseases that are blood-borne. Furthermore, from an evolutionary point of view, menstrual taboos might impact fertility (Gardin 1988). As Morris (1996; 1997) has pointed out, there are two types of religions. In religions of assent (Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism, among the major world religions), participation in a religion is accomplished by accepting a set of beliefs. In religions of descent (Hinduism and Judaism, among the major world religions), participation is accomplished by a blood tie to ancestral members of the religion. In religions of descent, purity and blood are major considerations, and the emotion of disgust plays a special role in guarding against material contamination and its moral consequences. Such moral disgust can be approached as a pre-adaptation in cultural evolution (Rozin et al. 1999).

**General remarks.** Religion is a human quasi-universal. Although there may be dimensions of religion that have explanatory value cross-culturally (e.g., Jensen 1998), religion takes vastly different forms. Consider the difficulty in generating a definition of religion that covers both Buddhism and Evangelical Christianity – let alone the religious practices of traditional societies. The field of psychology of religion has for most of its history tried to define religion in ways that would apply in all religions, but has recently come to appreciate that this might not be possible. Many theorists in psychology of religion have recently argued for a more contextually grounded, or particularistic, approach. Some have argued that religions can be compared to each other only in limited ways because of their fundamental differences (e.g., Hill & Pargament 2003; Moberg 2003; Shuman & Meador 2003). Similarly, we propose that the emotions involved in religion vary in important ways among religions.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writing of this commentary was supported by a grant from the Spiritual Transformation Scientific Research Program, sponsored by the Metanexus Institute on Religion and Science, with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation.

## The embodied bases of supernatural concepts

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**Abstract:** According to embodied cognition theory, our physical embodiment influences how we conceptualize entities, whether natural or supernatural. In serving central explanatory roles, supernatural entities (e.g., God) are represented implicitly as having extraordinary properties that nevertheless do not violate our sensorimotor interactions with the physical world. We conjecture that other supernatural entities are similarly represented in explanatory contexts.

Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) assert that conceptual processes underlying knowledge and reasoning about the natural world also

support these functions when applied to the supernatural worlds central to religious beliefs (cf. Barrett & Nyhof 2001 and Boyer 2001). We endorse this claim, but from a theoretical perspective different from the one adopted by A&N. They describe conceptual processes as hardwired (i.e., shaped predominantly by phylogenetic factors) and modularized (i.e., divided into independent knowledge domains). In contrast, conceptual processes are highly dynamical and grounded in the principles of embodied cognition. By this view, perceptual simulations – partial reenactments of sensory and motor states derived fundamentally by our sensorimotor interactions with the physical world – underlie human conceptual knowledge and reasoning (Barsalou 1999). Two main corollaries follow from the embodiment view: (1) knowledge is highly constrained by the physical structure of the body and environment, and (2) object concepts remain linked to particular situations within which these objects have been perceived and acted upon, thus affording a rich array of contextual information that licenses situation-based inferences about the concept. The embodiment view has important implications for the cognitive science of religion.

Empirical evidence for embodied cognition is diverse and accumulating. Here we present representative findings (for reviews, see Barsalou 2003; Barsalou et al. 2003a; 2003b). Tucker and Ellis (1998) demonstrated that viewing an object automatically potentiates motor representations for actions that are functionally consistent with the object's physical affordances. Similarly, when conceptualizing nonpresent objects, subjects exhibit physical actions reflecting real-world interactions with the concepts' referents. For example, subjects tend to look up when generating properties of the concept BIRD and tend to look down when generating properties of the concept WORM (Barsalou et al., in preparation). A similar effect is reported by Bargh et al. (1996), who showed that subjects walk more slowly after being primed with words related to stereotypes of elderly adults than when these stereotypes are not primed. In short, embodied accounts of knowledge representation provide a unifying explanatory framework within which these findings can be biologically grounded.

Supernatural concepts also appear to be influenced by physical embodiment. Barrett and colleagues (Barrett 2000; Barrett & Keil 1996) present evidence that people do not adhere to a "theologically correct" conception of God (i.e., omnipresent, omnipotent) when reasoning about divine intervention. Instead, experimental subjects conceive of God much like a natural agent, describing His interventions in the world as being constrained both spatially (i.e., being in one place at a time) and temporally (i.e., helping individuals one at a time). The embodiment view offers an account of the cognitive mechanisms underlying Barrett and Keil's findings. The concepts of God that enter into these cognitive processes reflect the constraints of physical embodiment. Although God is represented implicitly as "able to hear things from long distances" and "able to move rapidly from one place to another," He is not represented as truly omniscient and omnipresent (Barrett & Keil 1996). Those properties that are represented implicitly are no doubt unordinary, but they do not fit A&N's definition of *counterintuitive*. It may be the case that in using a supernatural concept such as God for purposes of explanation and understanding, its counterintuitive aspects manifest themselves as bizarre, unordinary properties that nevertheless do not violate our embodied experiences. Thus, our physical embodiment constrains our conceptual abilities.

This analysis can be extended to other supernatural concepts. To illustrate, consider the concepts of GHOST and ZOMBIE, both of which are counterintuitive ideas that fit the putative recipe for mnemonic and cultural success (Atran 2002a; Boyer 2001). Both concepts activate the ontological category of PERSON. Whereas ghosts lack physical substance and therefore violate our intuitive physical knowledge of PERSON, zombies lack a mind and therefore violate our intuitive psychological knowledge of PERSON. It is not clear, however, that counterintuitive properties of these concepts are implicitly represented, just as counter-