(3) Cases in which fear of punishment is manifested.
(4) Melancholics with symptoms of fear resulting in complicated psychoses.
(5) Cases in which conceptions producing fear are undoubtedly the predominating symptoms.
(6) Cases in which conceptions producing fear are accompanied by hallucinations.
(7) Cases with motor symptoms which can eventually be traced to psycho-motor aphraxia.
(8) Cases in which symtomatological fear is most prominent.
(9) Cases of organic psychoses with fear.
(10) A reflex condition of fear.
(11) Neurasthenia with emotional fear.

At the end of each group a *resumé* of the cases precedes the author's observations on the whole, and in the last chapter of the book his conclusions are set forth.

He is of opinion that fear, or the symptoms which result in fear, cannot of themselves be classified as a mental disease. The conceptions which give rise to fear are of the greatest possible variety, and although they form a common symptom of several mental diseases, it would be impracticable to classify these on such a basis.

It is, however, useful to distinguish between "fear and melancholia" and the true melancholia of Wernicke. After a study of this book, it is easy to comprehend the mental process of the evolution from fear to agitation. The moderate form of fear remains within a prescribed circle of conceptions, and may be described as anxiety (Sorge). The exaggerated form of fear breaks through this circle and manifests itself in agitation.

HAMILTON C. MARR.

Mental Mechanisms. By WILLIAM A. WHITE. New York. 1911. Pp. 151 + vii. Price $ 2.

This book, the most recent issue of the *Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series*, is a presentation of certain modern standpoints in normal and abnormal psychology, for the most part those developed in the writings of Freud and Jung.

It "does not pretend to an exhaustive setting forth of all the principles underlying psychopathology, but only to an explanation and emphasis of certain fundamentals which appear absolutely essential to an understanding of the problems of present-day psychiatry." The plan upon which the book is written is, indeed, somewhat unsystematic, and the connection between its constituent parts is not made very clear to the reader. This is no doubt ascribable, however, to the method of approach employed, and the book should nevertheless fulfil a very useful purpose in introducing English readers to conceptions which are acquiring a rapidly increasing recognition in modern psychology.

As a minor criticism it may be mentioned that the account of Freud's views on p. 80, though true of his earlier work, is certainly an incorrect statement of his present-day standpoint. He no longer ascribes the

psycho-neuroses to psychic traumata experienced in infancy, but to a failure in the normal inter-developments of the primitive instincts. The conception of psychic trauma has been replaced by the far more fertile one of "mental conflict."

There is a chapter on "The Psychological Approach to the Problem of Art" which is interesting and suggestive, and the book concludes with a general discussion of the part which psychology and psychopathology should play in the field of preventive medicine.

BERNARD HART.

Part III.—Epitome of Current Literature.

1. Physiological Psychology.

The Problem of Affective Memory [*La Question de la "Mémoire Affective"*]. (*Arch. de Psych. Feb.*, 1911.) *Claparède.*

Can the emotions and feelings become objects of memory? This question has been hotly debated since it was first raised by James, who answered it in the negative. When we think of an old emotion, said James, it is not the *memory* of the emotion that arises in consciousness, it is the *actual* emotion, accompanied by its characteristic organic irradiations. Titchener, Höffding, and others have followed James. On the other hand Ribot has repeatedly and vigorously maintained that there cannot be a shadow of a doubt about the reality of "affective memory," and he has been followed by Pillon, Dugas, Paulhan, Baldwin, and others, all arguing that there can be affective images just as there are visual images. Now Professor Claparède takes up the question in a searching and penetrative manner, not so much to disprove the existence of a memory of this kind, as to show that the problem is really much more complex than has usually been supposed, and that it has not always been clearly grasped by those who have discussed it. The problem itself is really unprofitable to discuss, but the misunderstandings raised by its discussion are important.

The chief error of Ribot and others, in Claparède's opinion, is the failure to realise that when there are actual physical feelings of emotion we cannot be concerned with the mere *representation* of an emotion; we have its actual *presence*. There has been a failure to establish a precise criterion of memory, and there has been a failure to understand James's theory of the emotions. These two points are discussed in detail, and Claparède concludes that the complexity of the question lies in the fact that the revival of an emotion involves two distinct processes—the revival of the cardio-vascular organic phenomena and the consciousness of these organic modifications. Until the relationships of these two processes are understood the question of the "affective memory" can only he discussed in an atmosphere of confusion.

HAVELOCK ELLIS.