

in the United States for the political branches to revise or overturn judicial decisions. “Perhaps one can mount theoretical objections to weak-form review,” Tushnet writes, “but its practice seems good enough—in the nations where it occurs” (p. 120).

Although most of the authors seem to share reservations about the role of the modern Supreme Court, the two early essays by Zuckert and Goldstein provide an interpretation of the Framers’ intention (particularly James Madison’s) and the jurisprudence of the Marshall Court that supports a more expansive role for the Court than would be justified by Young’s “judicial traditionalism” (p. 175). Zuckert, for example, focuses on the failure of the Constitutional Convention to adopt two key provisions of the Virginia Plan ardently, if unsuccessfully, pushed by Madison in Philadelphia. One would have given the new national legislature the authority to veto state laws that violated federalism or individual rights. The other was a Council of Revision, composed of the new national executive and some number of federal judges, which would have a qualified veto over acts of the national legislature. Madison believed that both provisions were essential, and he viewed their defeat as perhaps fatal to the success of the Constitution. Zuckert notes, however, that when the delegates added restrictions on the states in Article I, Section 10, and other provisions on relations between the states in Article IV, they, “[w]ithout anybody quite planning it,” made the Supreme Court “the recipient of an impressive array of powers” (p. 69).

In his conclusion, Zuckert appears to argue that the Constitution effectively vested the Court with key powers that the Virginia Plan had placed in the national legislature and the Council of Revision: to veto (by ruling unconstitutional) state laws and statutes of the national legislature. So constituted, the Court can choose to reach decisions on a “narrow legal basis” by “applying a strictly originalist approach to cases,” or it can attempt “to fulfill the broader, political, trans-legal system needs thrown into its lap by the Constitution” (p. 77). It has, then, a “dual imperative”: “the explicit duty to be nothing but a legal institution” and “the implicit duty to be more than a legal institution.” “[T]he Court,” Zuckert concludes, “is constantly driven beyond the bounds of strict legality in order to do its political work” (p. 77).

As if to illustrate Zuckert’s point, Goldstein devotes one section of her essay to an analysis of “what was admirable” (p. 82) in the jurisprudence of John Marshall. She maintains that the lesson of such contract clause cases as *Fletcher v. Peck* (1810) and *Dartmouth College v. Woodward* (1819) is that Marshall saw “broader purposive principles within, or perhaps underneath, the clauses [of the Constitution] and explicated their broader reach, despite the limited wording of the clauses” (p. 83). This ability to find and explicate the deeper principles is “what makes Marshall’s jurisprudence the icon that it is” (p. 84).

Young’s defense of “judicial traditionalism” challenges these interpretations. First, Young notes early on that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention debated the Council of Revision four times, rejecting it again and again. Most delegates simply opposed having judges decide on the wisdom of legislation. The Council of Revision, he insists, was “repudiated . . . in favor of the traditional judicial role” (p. 179). Second, as *Marbury v. Madison* (1803) and *Gibbons v. Ogden* (1824) illustrate, the Marshall Court relied upon the “plain import” and the “obvious meaning” of the text of the Constitution. What mattered was how the words were understood by those who wrote them and those who ratified them. The Supreme Court’s “starting point was the text of the Constitution and its emphasis was on how that text was originally understood at the time of its framing. . . [I]t cannot be said that [the Court] operated as a Council of Revision” (p. 185).

As this brief sampling of themes and issues illustrates, the editors of and contributors to this excellent volume have certainly done justice to their “very broad, daunting topic.”

States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security. By

Elke Krahmman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 318p.

\$90.00 cloth, \$32.99 paper.

doi:10.1017/S1537592711000806

— Allison Stanger, *Middlebury College*

The past decade has been marked by an explosion in the government deployment of private security contractors both at home and abroad. In this timely and thought-provoking new book, Elke Krahmman endeavors to expand our understanding of this twenty-first-century phenomenon through two analytical innovations. First, she probes national differences in the deployment of privatized force in a comparison of U.S., UK, and German policies. Second, she endeavors to shed light on changes in the democratic control of the use of force with a philosophically informed framework that highlights the role of ideas in shaping political choices.

Krahmann focuses on two competing ideologies or ideal types, republicanism and liberalism, which, she argues, have shaped the debate to date. Republicanism “advocates the centralization of the provision of security within the state and national armed forces comprised of conscripted soldiers.” Liberalism “suggests the fragmentation and limitation of governmental powers and the political neutrality of professional armed forces” (p. 3). Each leads to differing models of civil–military relations: liberalism, which eschews conscription in Krahmann’s depiction, facilitating the privatization of security, and republicanism, which embraces conscription, impeding it. In turn, conscription enhances democratic control of foreign policy, while reliance on an all-volunteer force undermines it. Each model has its own shortcomings: “The Republican

ideal of centralized government has been criticized for overregulation, bureaucratization and cost-expansion. The Liberal model of fragmented and privatized governance has been faulted for unresponsiveness to national security needs and profiteering” (p. 83).

The author maintains that countries favor either republicanism or liberalism at different points in their history. In the United Kingdom, a liberal orientation prevailed until World War I intervened. In the United States, “a mixture of Liberal and Republican ideological principles” characterized the period between 1788 and World War I (p. 54). In Germany, “democratic control over the use of armed force,” otherwise known as the triumph of Republican principles, did not prevail until the mid-twentieth century. All three countries expanded democratic control of their militaries in the Cold War years. In the post–Cold War era, the liberal model has reasserted itself, albeit to varying degrees. In the UK, “the rise of Neoliberalism has played an important role in legitimizing the growing contribution of private military contractors to UK security” (p. 117). In the United States, the growing use of private security contractors can be explained by “the changing ideological preferences of US governments from Republicanism to Neoliberalism” (p. 154). In Germany, the privatization of security has not been as extensive, because of an enduring commitment to republican ideals; “it is impossible to fully understand the transformation and privatization of the Bundeswehr and its implications without reference to the persistent German commitment to the Republican models of the state, the citizen and the soldier” (p. 192). The book thus maps the variance in approaches across both time and space, using competing philosophical orientations to illuminate empirical outcomes.

The question that naturally arises, given this mapping of the empirical landscape, is a causal one: How are we to account for the variance? Krahmman’s approach establishes the link between philosophical or ideological orientation and policy outcomes, aiming “to illustrate the importance of Republicanism and Liberalism for the explanation and evaluation of the privatization of military force in Western democracies” (p. 4). It does not tackle the interesting causal question of precisely why preferences change. The final chapter of the book, for example, refers to “changing internal and external circumstances,” which have been “inextricably linked” as the cause of preference transformation (p. 241), but it neither presents nor evaluates competing explanations of the sources of preference change, something the case studies might arguably have given one the requisite leverage to do.

Instead, Krahmman deploys republicanism and liberalism to both explain and prescribe. The penultimate chapter considers the future of democratic security, framing the choice as one between “contractorization or cosmopolitanism.” She argues that the preceding chapters have shown how “the theoretical models presented by Repub-

licanism and Neoliberalism have become corrupted in the process of their adaptation to the contemporary political environment and the political praxis” (p. 241). The implication is that liberalism has morphed into neoliberalism as the animating rival to republicanism, but the solution is not a return to liberalism but instead a choice between what Krahmman calls “contractorization” (representing a continuation of the status quo) or cosmopolitan republicanism, which takes republicanism to the global level and might be seen to be embodied in the European Union’s external orientation. The concluding chapter ruminates on these competing alternatives (contractorization becomes neoliberalism along the way), and the last sentence of the book concludes that the “answer to Kant’s vision of the abolition of standing national armies might, thus, be found neither in their replacement with private military contractors nor in the rise of cosmopolitan militaries, but the civilianization of international conflict resolution” (p. 285).

The ambitious nature of the overall undertaking is both the work’s principal strength and weakness. While the attempt to marry political philosophy and empirical work is admirable and worthwhile, the inherent demands of applying a complex tool kit of philosophical concepts across both time and space often threatens to overwhelm the coherence of the overarching argument. For example, clear lines are drawn early on between republicanism and liberalism, but the distinction between neoliberalism and liberalism is never sufficiently distinguished. Neoliberalism as a concept first appears on page 11 without definition and then reappears on pages 34 to 36, where it is effectively equated with the ideas of Milton Friedman. But since liberalism also has an intimate relationship with the celebration of free markets, many questions linger on the differences between the two. When Krahmman deploys neoliberalism to elucidate where the United States and the UK are today, the blurry edges of key concepts can make the argument difficult to follow; the book, in places, cries out for better editing. Moreover, the basic association of Friedman’s thought with the privatization of national security may well be misplaced. While he was indeed a leading advocate of minimal government, Friedman also saw the defense of the country against foreign enemies to be an inherently governmental function.

Krahmann is to be applauded for giving us an extensive first-cut mapping of the ways in which the public–private relationship in the civil–military area has varied over time and in three different countries. The empirical contribution of the book is therefore significant, in that it explores the privatization of security and changing norms of democratic control in three countries over time. Chapter 7, a comparative exploration of the ways in which the UK, United States, and Germany have used contractors in deployed operations, primarily in Iraq, breaks new ground by extending the analysis beyond the perspective of a single country. Since much of the study of private security

contracting has focused exclusively on the United States or United Kingdom, this is significant.

Krahmann's comparison assembles a wealth of interesting and important data in one place, thereby forcing the reader to think about the issue of privatization in new ways. Those with an interest in the comparative dimensions of the privatization of security should find much to be gained from grappling with his challenging contribution.

The Prospect of Internet Democracy. By Michael Margolis and Gerson Moreno-Riaño. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009. 200p. \$99.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592711000818

— Jay G. Blumler, *University of Leeds*

If you want to inform yourself fully about the reasons why the coming of the Internet has not yet initiated a radically different and utopian system of political democracy and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future, then this is the book for you. *The Prospect of Internet Democracy?* Forget it, the authors say—at least if “democracy” is conceived in any bottom-up sense. The title of their second chapter, “Impossible Dreams,” hits off their thesis as well as their basic line of argument. They repeatedly juxtapose visions of an Internet-launched new democratic order against prevailing, powerful and obdurate constraints, rooted in hierarchically controlled political and economic institutions. It's sort of Rousseau versus Machiavelli, with the latter holding most of the cards most of the time.

The authors' commitment to this intellectual strategy is evidenced by the way they dramatically frame the issues under consideration: Will the Internet “transform” democratic politics? Will it “revolutionize” democratic politics? Will it achieve a “radical renewal” of American democracy? Are notions of direct democracy realizable? Will the Internet “revolutionize” policy making? Will the dynamic nature of the Internet facilitate not just rapid change but revolutionary change throughout society? Will it introduce an electronic commonwealth? Can it give ordinary people control over the political agenda? Can formerly ignored citizens be empowered at last? Will the Internet be used for civic purposes that enhance democratic values like equity and fairness?

Unsurprisingly perhaps, the authors' answers to all of these questions are resoundingly in the negative. And indeed, if these are the questions that we should be asking about the place of the Internet in democratic politics nowadays, then their argument stands up; their answers, which are developed thoroughly, do appear convincing.

They argue that the prospects for democratic transformation and renewal are obstructed by powerful obstacles: elite domination and behavior, resulting for example in a colonization of most important Internet sites; the “commodification of everything” in a capitalist society, tending to marginalize politics on the Internet and encouraging many people to think of themselves more as consumers

than as citizens when using the Internet; the tendency of leaders and officials to put many more resources into e-government than into e-democracy; and the role of “human nature in politics,” ensuring that most people devote far more energy and thought to a host of everyday pursuits and pastimes than to civic affairs (as long maintained of course by such theorists of elite democracy as Graham Wallas, Walter Lippmann, and Joseph Schumpeter among others; against this last factor it can be counterargued, however, that public involvement in politics is more of a variable than a constant, differing across societies, demographic subgroups, current issues and events, and even institutional arrangements).

In my view, two of the more interesting chapters of this book are less reliant on the stark contrast of political idealism versus political realism that shapes the rest of the analysis. Chapter 4 on “Democracy, Tolerance and the Internet” offers a refreshing and nuanced discussion of how Internet-based discourse can foster both intolerance of the views of others and tolerance of them. And Chapter 6 on “The Internet and Democratic Education” considers how increasing uses of new media in universities and colleges are lowering educational standards and short-changing the preparation of students to become critically informed citizens. The picture here is unremittingly grim—of a dystopia in the making, as it were.

But one is bound to wonder whether the central argument of this book hasn't reached its sell-by date by now. How many times must the dreams of classical democrats be punctured before turning to other issues? Can anything significant really be added to a critique that has already become so familiar? Are Margolis and Moreno-Riaño in danger of flogging, if not a dead horse, then one that is ripe for retirement?

In any case, their master conceptualization is itself open to criticism on at least three grounds. First, it is normatively unhelpful. Thinking about democracy in either/or terms (either classical or elite systems of democracy) leaves no room for attempted betterment, which, though short of the wholesale change that they rule out, might well be worth achieving in its own right. In theory and practice, progressive democrats can and do work meaningfully on a more-or-less basis—more or less participation, consultation, involvement, deliberation, public understanding, popular control, etc. Second, the conceptualization is arguably simplistic—in the sense that by bundling up all political communications into two contrasted models, it tends to overlook the many different, complex, and sometimes conflicting ways in which the Internet, especially, is, and is becoming, involved in democratic politics (so many actors, so many roles, so many relationships, so many types of political and communication efforts, so many directions of message traffic, so many consequences, etc.). The implications of these several elements for citizenship and democracy, whether positive or negative, will only be adequately understood by to some extent