CrossMark

The book includes a short guide to further reading, recommending some books with opposite conclusions, including books defending materialism. However, Swinburne does not treat idealism, panpsychism, or neutral monism. Happily, recent metaphysics is increasingly open to views more radically at odds with materialism than is substance dualism. In light of these, philosophers today might need as much argument for the existence of mind-independent material stuff as they do for the existence of immaterial souls. While Swinburne provides no argument for the existence of bodies, the question hardly threatens his main conclusion: that we are souls, not bodies.

Does Swinburne's argument work? He succeeds in showing deep problems with alternative theories of personal identity. He succeeds in showing that there is more to the Cartesian argument and less to the objections than most philosophers have thought. In my view, the case is powerful and thought-provoking. I have no original objections. Some objections have already been made against Swinburne's larger book on the subject, especially by Lynne Rudder Baker ('Swinburne on substance dualism', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 6.2 (2014), 5–15) and Eric Olson ('Swinburne's brain transplants', *Philosophia Christi*, 20.1 (2018), 21–29). Swinburne does not tell us if these objections were fair to begin with or signal whether the present formulations avoid them.

Whether or not the argument is persuasive, *Are We Bodies or Souls?* is excellent. It deepens the debate for professional philosophers, and carefully introduces a wide audience to a big question, a big answer, and a big argument. It is especially useful for courses in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. While the moral of the book is that we should look beyond material externalities, I must remark that the book is magnificently produced by Oxford University Press – the cover is the most beautiful I have seen on a philosophy book.

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David Bentley Hart *That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven, Hell, and Universal Salvation*. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2019). Pp. 232. £20.00 (Hbk). ISBN 9780300246223.

David Bentley Hart's *That All Shall Be Saved* challenges head-on a Christian doctrine commonly thought to be thoroughly biblical and traditional:

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an eternal hell. The book is relatively short and made to feel even shorter by Hart's prose and avoidance of technical jargon. Without a single footnote, his case is made not by appealing to various authorities, but by appealing to one's better angels – whom, he implies, are better guides to truth than the authorities have been. According to Hart, the view that all shall be saved – or universalism – is the only morally palatable or logically coherent eschatological view (see 12–13, 103, 167). Hart is not alone in his defence of universalism. The recent works of historian Ilaria L. E. Ramelli and philosopher Thomas Talbott, both of whom are mentioned by Hart, are examples of modern defences of universalism. Hart's work, however, is an easily digestible introduction to the debate, as he addresses the question of universal salvation from a number of perspectives.

Hart's 'chief ambition' is 'to try to think through certain questions about the "last things" ' in a way closer 'to the obscure origins of the Christian conception of reality' (2). He does this in three parts. The first is 'The Question of an Eternal Hell'', which consists of one chapter 'Framing the Question' (9) and another 'Doubting the Answers' (33). Although some subordinate questions are relevant, the 'always more significant question' is whether anything could 'truly permit us to love an omnipotent and omniscient God who has elected to create a reality in which everlasting torture is a possible final destiny for any of his creatures' (13). 'The Infernalists', or 'defenders of the idea of a real hell of eternal torment' (12–13), have offered a number of answers, including the Thomist account of freedom or the Calvinist doctrine of individual predestination (36, 49). Hart more than doubts the answers since he regards them as 'wholly illogical' (40) or a 'metaphysical absurdity' (49).

The second part of the book, *Apokatastasis*, includes four meditations which constitute Hart's argument for universalism. The first meditation, 'Who is God?', is on 'the moral meaning of *creatio ex nihilo*' (65). With careful attention to the fourth-century Cappadocian church father Gregory of Nyssa, he argues that the doctrine of 'creation out of nothing' is not only a metaphysical or moral claim but an eschatological one (68). If out of his goodness God creates the world, then to his goodness the world must return. He concludes that 'if God is the good creator of all, he must also be the savior of all' (91). The second meditation, 'What is Judgement?', is 'a reflection on biblical eschatology' (92). Hart offers over twenty biblical passages in support of universalism and alternative interpretations of passages often used to defend an eternal hell. Specifically, he cautions against building eschatological doctrines on images which are likely to be 'more poetic than precise' (115), such as those in Revelation (106–110) or those described by Jesus (110–119). He also argues that the Greek word *aionios*, often translated as 'eternal' to describe the length of final punishment, does not have 'the intrinsic meaning of "eternal" ' but a 'vaguer connotation' of a certain age or time (123). He concludes that the biblical data are clear that hell, insofar as it exists, is not eternal (129).

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The third meditation, 'What is a Person?', is 'a reflection on the divine image' (130). Hart returns to Gregory of Nyssa and pines for an alternative version of Christian history where the church hitched its theology to Gregory instead of Augustine (138). According to Hart, Gregory's understanding of the divine image attends to 'the whole of the [human] race, comprehended by God's "fore-sight" as "in a single body," which only in its totality truly reflects the divine likeness and the divine beauty' (140). Because of this, 'each person . . . is indispensable, for the humanity God eternally wills could never come to fruition in the absence of any member of that body' (144). If one person is saved, then all must be saved. The fourth and final meditation, 'What is Freedom?', is a 'reflection on the rational will' (160). Hart rejects a 'libertarian' understanding of freedom (172) in favour of an 'intellectualist' understanding (36) that is necessarily 'teleological in structure' (173). 'True freedom', he says, 'is contingent upon true knowledge and true sanity of mind. To the very degree that either of these is deficient, freedom is absent. And with freedom goes culpability' (177). Since humans are made with an orientation towards the Good, persons are only free insofar as they choose the Good – thus, an 'eternal free rejection of God' is 'a logically vacuous idea' (178).

The third and final part consists only of final remarks, which are largely summative in nature. He especially underscores, however, his conviction that the doctrine of an eternal hell, majority view though it may be, is 'morally repugnant' (199). He revisits the 'always more significant question' (13) from the beginning of the book: whether a God who would allow even a single soul to endure an eternal hell would be worthy of love or worship. His answer is 'an unqualified and unyielding no' (208). If Christianity requires a belief in hell, then it would be, for him, 'proof that Christianity should be dismissed as a self-evidently morally obtuse and logically incoherent faith' (208).

A full evaluation of Hart's book is well beyond the scope of this review, but I offer a few commendations and a few questions that remain. In this book, Hart traverses biblical, moral, philosophical, theological, and historical ground with an impressive familiarity with each. A particularly strong moment was the lucid defence of analogical predication with respect to language about God. He argues that, even if God's transcendence guards against univocal predication, our language about God cannot be wholly equivocal lest faith become 'nothing but mindless submission to a collection of intrinsically unintelligible oracles arriving from an entirely hidden source' (55). He insists, then, that for infernalists, and especially Calvinists, words like 'love', 'justice', and 'goodness' lose their meaning entirely (53–61, 81, 88). He challenges his readers to cling to the goodness and love of God, and implores them to consider what these words really mean. Another strong moment was the critique of the popular 'libertarian' account of freedom, which pervades much of Western culture. To be 'fully free', he argues, one must not merely choose but choose well (173).

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A few questions remain, however. The first is how Hart himself defines words like love, justice, goodness, and even hell. His insistence on 'childish imagery' (53) perhaps invites us to evoke plain or obvious meanings of these words, but his own use of them is at times unclear. For instance, while it is a virtue to address different versions of hell, it is not always clear which version is being critiqued and whether the critique is applicable to other versions. Additionally, while he considers a proper understanding of love to be incompatible with an eternal hell, his detractors might find a proper understanding of love to be incompatible with universalism. For Hart, persons are only free by choosing the good and thus 'God frees souls by dragging them to himself' (179). This conjures an image of mosquitos mindlessly and inevitably drawn by their animal nature to a blue light. The Christian tradition, however, has often argued that humans are endowed with a God-given rationality which, though it allows them to choose evil, also allows them to choose God. God's transcendence, after all, is always balanced in the tradition by his personality; God is the source of all, but also a person who, himself intrinsically relational, invites the rational human soul into the fullness of that relationship. It is difficult, using 'childish imagery' at least, to make sense of a truly 'loving' relationship that includes one person 'dragging' the other, against one's will, to himself.

Another question which remains is whether Hart's eschatological conclusions have any relevance *in the present* for the existence of evil. Given the nature of God, Hart says that 'God . . . is wholly capable of determining the result of all secondary causes, including free will, while not acting as yet another discrete cause among them' (184). This means that God could arrange the contingencies of life 'until evil has vanished altogether' and still would 'not trespass upon the sanctity of the autonomous will' (186). However, this presents a dilemma for God's present actions in a world where evil exists. Either God is determining the results of all secondary causes without violating free will *or* he is not doing so even though he could. The first horn appears to make God the author of evil, but the second horn makes one wonder why God has not eradicated evil if he could do so without violating free will. On this point, a younger David Bentley Hart apparently thinks differently:

> To say that God elects to fashion rational creatures in his image, and so grants them the freedom to bind themselves and the greater physical order to another master . . . is not to say that God's ultimate design for his creatures can be thwarted. It is to say, however, that his will can be resisted by a real and (by his grace) autonomous force of defiance. (*The Doors of the Sea* (2005), 63)

If the younger and older Hart can be synthesized, one might say that the 'real and autonomous force of defiance' granted to the soul by God is only temporary. If this is so, one wonders why God would allow this force to exist at all.

These questions remain, however, only as an invitation to further conversation about whether all shall be saved. Hart's book on its own is sure to inspire such

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conversation, and those interested in Christian eschatology will especially find it helpful in engaging the topic.

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Peter Harrison & Jon H. Roberts (eds) *Science without God? Rethinking the History of Scientific Naturalism*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). Pp. xv + 263. £65.00 (Hbk). ISBN 9780198834588.

Scientific naturalism, broadly seen as the displacement of supernatural explanation by a strict focus on laws of nature, is the dominant perspective in modern science and popular culture. In light of the remarkable success of the naturalistic explanations of modern science, theological or metaphysical concerns are often discounted as superfluous both in philosophical value and in historical significance. Yet this version of scientific history fails to account for the striking extent to which the natural world has throughout history been understood to rest on theological or metaphysical assumptions that defy naturalistic categories. With this collection of essays by leading historians of science, religion, and philosophy, Peter Harrison and Jon H. Roberts provide a highly compelling alternative history of the sciences and their relation to naturalism that will be of direct relevance to contemporary philosophical arguments about the nature of scientific explanation and the enduring importance of religious belief.

The collection offers valuable ways of rethinking both philosophical and historical aspects of the relationship between science and naturalism. In terms of philosophical considerations, there are a number of essays in which the supposed dichotomy between natural and supernatural – a distinction often unthinkingly assumed in modern discussions – instead gives way to a more complex sense of interrelation. With an expansive account of ancient Greek philosophers who invoked divinities to explain the regularity and complexity of nature, Daryn Lehoux demonstrates that the line between natural and supernatural – and, indeed, the line from naturalism to science – is nowhere near as uncomplicated as conventionally imagined. In a similar vein, Michael Shank argues that the confluence of Aristotelian thought with mediaeval Christian theology resulted in a form of naturalistic explanation based on divine providence, with miraculous

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