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A War Time Love Affair: *The Round Table* and *The New Republic*, c.1914–1919

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Abstract

Against the backdrop of the Great War a seemingly unlikely transatlantic romance blossomed between the deeply imperialist *Round Table* journal founded by “Milner’s Kindergarten,” a cadre of young former colonial administrators in Great Britain, and the American progressive standard-bearer *The New Republic*. The rhetoric of *The New Republic* in these years was deeply influenced by political Anglo-Saxon thought, as exemplified in *The Round Table*. Political Anglo-Saxonism was the belief that Anglo-Saxons were uniquely prepared for both self-governance and colonial governance. Adherents judged others’ capacity to self-govern against idealized Anglo norms. Both *The Round Table* (1910) and *The New Republic* (1914), from their inaugural issues on, sought national solutions for national problems utilizing a shared rhetoric of national efficiency. During the Great War this shared nationalist-progressivism drew the two groups together facilitating *The New Republic*’s founders’ early (1915) embrace of American intervention in the war. These connections are illuminated here through the interactions of *The New Republic* founders: Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, and Walter Weyl with key members of the British Round Table set, including Lionel Curtis, Philip Henry Kerr, Alfred Zimmern, and the prominent American “imperial school” historian George Louis Beer.

Keywords: interventionism; World War I; Anglo-Saxonism; nationalist-progressivism; national efficiency

Introduction: “A War time Love Affair”

The New Republic has long been at the center of scholarship on the nature of modern American liberalism and progressivism. While the exact nature of progressive thought has often been in dispute, the claim that *The New Republic* served as a key standard-bearer for mainstream American progressivism has not.¹ Indeed, Michael McGerr has written that “Progressive ideas found mature, eloquent expression in such tracts as *The Promise of American Life* [1909], by Herbert Croly, *Drift and Mastery* [1914], by Walter Lippmann, and *The New Democracy* [1912], by Walter Weyl.”² This article explores the confluence of progressive and imperial thought by examining connections between *The New Republic* and the British imperialist journal *The Round Table* during World War One. Both groups

(progressives and imperialists) sought to bring order out of chaos, whether in urban slums or far-flung colonies. Significantly, both arenas were often presented as populated by racial undesirables in desperate need of such guidance.³

This insight, that the domestic and the imperial were profoundly linked is exemplified by *The New Republic* co-founder Walter Lippmann's shifting thought on foreign affairs during World War One. In August 1915 he wrote to Graham Wallas, an Oxford-educated British Fabian socialist and co-founder of the London School of Economics (L.S.E.):

I feel now as if I had never before risen above the problems of a district nurse, a middle western political reformer, and an amiable civic enthusiast. ... I've come to see that international politics is not essentially different from "domestic" politics. ... They are phases and aspects of one another.⁴

This account of having stepped out of the shadow of the great social, political, and economic problems targeted by progressive reformers, only to discover the edifice casting that shadow was much larger than they had previously assumed, became characteristic of many American intellectuals' responses to the war. It led many such American progressives to embrace a degree of national mobilization, or collectivization, they previously saw as either undesirable or impossible. This insight should, perhaps, not be surprising given the crucial role of transnational exchange in the spread of progressive ideas and practical reforms to the United States, as described in Daniel Rodgers's seminal *Atlantic Crossings*.⁵ Specifically referring to Lippmann and the other founders of *The New Republic*, Maureen Flanagan describes this shift as toward a "new sense of civic nationalism that spoke about the national interest."⁶ Here I instead use the language of "national efficiency" as did many American and British authors of the period.

Against the backdrop of the Great War, *The New Republic* and *The Round Table* groups' underlying similarities—most notably their shared progressivism, Anglo exceptionalism, and interventionism—came into sharp relief. Both exhibited a profound opposition to the myopia they saw as isolating their people from the reality of national and international affairs. When launching their publications (in 1910 and 1914 respectively) both groups were attempting to create truly national platforms for discussion of matters of national and imperial import, thereby facilitating truly national responses to those problems. The Round Table group—like their American progressive contemporaries—often openly despaired of conventional party politics and the "insufficient constitutional machinery" left to them by history. Against the backdrop of World War One they critiqued laissez-faire economics as entirely insufficient in the face of the threat posed by Imperial Germany, and advocated for expert control over the state. However, despite these underlying similarities, one should stress that it was only the external stimuli of the war that caused these two groups to draw so tightly together for a time, driven in great part by the increased demand for their shared brand of nationalist-progressivism.

More broadly this piece demonstrates that elites based in London, Oxford, Washington, and New York saw Anglo-Saxon Britons and Americans as obliged to fulfill a special role as the guarantors and enforcers of a just world order. When the Great War broke out in the late summer of 1914 this necessity was only heightened.

As early as the summer of 1915 Round Table members had successfully convinced both Lippmann and Croly of the necessity of American intervention. Future discussions between the two groups focused primarily on preparing U.S. public opinion for American

entry into the war. This can be seen most clearly in the publication of articles authored by Round Table members (principally Alfred Zimmern and George Louis Beer) in *The New Republic*, private correspondence in particular with Zimmern, and the growing influence of Round Table thought on *New Republic* editorials between 1915 and early 1917. Together, these threads serve to shed new light on many progressives' embrace of the need for American entry in those crucial years. The above is in sharp contrast to much prior work on *The New Republic* and U.S. intervention in the Great War focused instead on the publication's relationship with President Wilson and his lieutenants, overlooking such direct links to Great Britain, and suggesting a much later shift toward advocacy for American entry.⁷

Origins: National Solutions for National Problems

After contributing significantly to the formation of the Union of South Africa, leading members of "Milner's Kindergarten," a cadre of young former colonial administrators educated at New College, Oxford, returned to Britain in 1909 and organized themselves and ideological fellow-travelers into what became the Round Table movement. Lord Alfred Milner was credited with the initial idea and became patron. Lionel Curtis, whose use of Milner's imperial patronage had created the group, positioned himself as the visionary "prophet" of the organization, and Philip Kerr (a future wartime ambassador to the United States, 1939–40) became secretary, taking on the greatest organizational burden.⁸ Collectively they would hold great influence in the British policy elite over the next decade or so, as demonstrated most clearly by Milner's elevation to the five-man War Cabinet during the Great War.⁹

While they were internally divided between models of "organic" unity and formal federation, all ascribed to a version of Anglo (including American) history in which "English freedoms" had been repeatedly undermined by political schism (characterized as "disunion"). In 1910 they established a quarterly journal, *The Round Table*. Its primary aim was to promote closer union between the self-governing white dominions of the empire and Britain. Kerr became founding editor. The publication's editorial line called not merely for imperial federation, but for an imperial executive, possibly empowered by a written constitution, capable of setting policy over the objections of any constituent part of the empire including the Home Islands.¹⁰ This concept of an overarching Federal Government on broadly American lines distinguished the movement from earlier advocates of Imperial Union such as Sir Charles Dilke and Joseph Chamberlain.

This position was in many ways strikingly similar to the "New Nationalism" then being promoted by Theodore Roosevelt in the run up to the 1912 presidential election.¹¹ Speaking in Osawatomie, Kansas, in August 1910, Roosevelt invoked a parallel vision of a shared American past riven by two great wars (Revolutionary and Civil). He then stated:

I do not ask for over centralization; but I do ask that we work in a spirit of broad and far-reaching nationalism when we work for what concerns our people as a whole. We are all Americans. Our common interests are as broad as the continent. I speak to you here in Kansas exactly as I would speak in New York or Georgia, for the most vital problems are those which affect us all alike. The National Government belongs to the whole American people, and where the whole American people are interested,

that interest can be guarded effectively only by the National Government. The betterment which we seek must be accomplished, I believe, mainly through the National Government.¹²

He continued:

The American people are right in demanding that New Nationalism, without which we cannot hope to deal with new problems. The New Nationalism puts the national need before sectional or personal advantage. It is impatient of the utter confusion that results from local legislatures attempting to treat national issues as local issues.¹³

This concern for the nation or empire as a whole, overcoming the myopic provincialism that he believed too often dominated Anglo politics, can be seen clearly in the opening pages of both *The Round Table* in November of 1910 and *The New Republic* in November of 1914.

This was not mere coincidence, of course, Roosevelt's platform had in large part been inspired by (future editor of *The New Republic*) Herbert Croly's *The Promise of American Life* (1909), which sought to combine the "conservative" good governance of Hamilton with the "democratic" vision articulated by Thomas Jefferson.¹⁴ This transatlantic emphasis on political unity, is made all the more evident by the Kindergarten's earlier (1906–07) enthusiastic embrace of Alexander Hamilton and the Federal Constitution (1789) as a model for future British constitutional reform. This can be seen most clearly in their enthusiastic promotion of the Edinburgh-born F.S. Oliver's *Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union* (1906).¹⁵ As a result, one can reasonably describe both the Round Table set and *The New Republic* clique as "nationalist-progressives."¹⁶

Roosevelt's own growing obsession with "national efficiency" on his return to the political stage, following his overseas tour of 1909–10, is present throughout the remainder of his swing through the West and Midwest. For example, in St. Paul, Minnesota, on September 6, 1910 he opened a speech calling for corporate power to be restrained with a paean to efficiency:

Now, my friends, America's reputation for efficiency stands deservedly high throughout the world. ... There is great reason to be proud of our achievements; and yet no reason to believe that we cannot excel our past. ... Henceforth we must seek national efficiency by a new and better way, by the way of the orderly development and use, coupled with the preservation, of our national resources, by making the most of that we have for the benefit of all of us, instead of leaving the sources of material prosperity open to indiscriminate exploitation [emphasis added].¹⁷

This desire for scientific "national efficiency" mirrored developments in Britain, which had drawn Conservatives and Unionists, modernizing Liberals, and Fabian socialists together in unexpected and cooperative combinations.¹⁸ Indeed, Rodgers in *Atlantic Crossings* remarks on the arresting similarities between Roosevelt and the municipal socialist Birmingham mayor turned arch-imperialist, Joseph Chamberlain: "Theodore Roosevelt, [was] so like Chamberlain in his politics of national efficiency, his tribunate style, and his agenda of Tory social reform."¹⁹ Chamberlain had served as a key patron and inspiration to the Milnerite Round Table group early in their careers prior to his debilitating stroke of 1906.²⁰

Inaugural Issues: 1910 and 1914

The inaugural issues of *The Round Table* (1910) and *The New Republic* (1914) serve to demonstrate the underlying compatibility of the two publications' progressive assumptions and worldviews, if not always their domestic and international agendas.

On Kerr and Curtis's return to London following a joint tour of Canada, they began to piece together the first issue of *The Round Table* which was published on November 15, 1910. Although individual authors were not identified in the early years, it is widely assumed that Kerr took the lead in the introduction:²¹

It is a common complaint, both in Great Britain and in the Dominions, that it is well-nigh impossible to understand how things are going with the British Empire. *People feel that they belong to an organism which is greater than the particular portion of the King's dominions where they happen to reside, which is one of the greatest human fabrics, but which has no government, no Parliament, no press even, to explain to them where its interests lie, or what its policy should be* [emphasis added].²²

While acknowledging that there was no shortage of writing on the empire, Kerr contended that much of it was ill-informed and "coloured by some local party issue," resulting in a great deal of ignorance and "disputes ... which in most cases could be solved if the facts were known."²³ To remedy this defect the journal included contributors based in all corners of the white empire and also India.²⁴ To modern eyes there is a strange idealism in the pages of *The Round Table*, based on the distinctly progressive belief that sunlight was the best disinfectant, and that simply exposing abuses and "misinformation" would be sufficient to begin political reform:

Failing, therefore, a body which can speak for every part [of the Empire], we must contrive a makeshift, and the makeshift is THE ROUND TABLE. The aim of THE ROUND TABLE is to present a regular account of what is going on throughout the King's dominions, written with first-hand knowledge and entirely free from the bias of local political issues, and to provide a means by which the common problems which confront the Empire as a whole, can be discussed ... For that, in the opinion of the promoters, who reside in all parts of the Empire, is what is most needed at the present day.²⁵

In the following years several contacts were established between the Round Table set and the progressive movement in the United States. For example, in 1912 Kerr lunched with Theodore Roosevelt at Sagamore Hill during the latter's unsuccessful run to retake the White House from William H. Taft. During the same trip Kerr also met both Walter Lippmann and Herbert Croly (two future *New Republic* founders) at the "House of Truth," a Washington, D.C., club founded by Felix Frankfurter and other young progressives disillusioned with the comparative conservatism of the Taft administration.²⁶

In November of 1914, against the distant backdrop of the Great War then raging in Europe, the co-founders of *The New Republic* finalized their first issue. The enterprise was financially backed by The New School founder and progressive activist Dorothy Payne Whitney and her husband, the imperial adventurer and investment banker Willard D. Straight.²⁷ The latter's advocacy of government intervention, both at home and abroad, along with the views of the three founders: Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, and Walter Weyl, would together reshape the American liberal tradition.²⁸

Both Lippmann and Croly had been educated at Harvard, although only Lippmann graduated with an A.B. in 1910.²⁹ Weyl's background was the most academically impressive, having studied in Halle, Paris, and Berlin before receiving his Ph.D. in Economics from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. He was in some ways the most conventionally progressive, having spent some years at the University Settlement, a famous settlement house on the Lower East Side of Manhattan.³⁰ All three moved freely in the Ivy League alumni circles then central to contemporary politics and elite publishing, much like their Oxbridge counterparts in Great Britain.³¹ The inaugural issue of *The New Republic* opened:

The New Republic is frankly an experiment. It is an attempt to find national audience for a journal of interpretation and opinion. Many people believe that such a journal is out of place in America; that if a periodical is to be popular, it must first of all be entertaining, or that if it is to be serious, it must be detached and select. Yet when the plan of *The New Republic* was being discussed it received spontaneous welcome from people in all parts of the country [emphasis added]. They differed in theories and programmes; but they agreed that if *The New Republic* could bring sufficient enlightenment to the problems of the nation and sufficient sympathy to its complexities, it would serve all those who feel the challenge of our time.³²

As Harold Laski stated at the time, and as Marc Stears notes in his *Progressives, Pluralists, and the Problems of the State* (2002), *The New Republic* was not only “explicitly modeled on the English *Nation* and *New Statesman*” magazines, but it also sought to set the national political agenda in much the same way as those British publications.³³

For our purposes, the common rhetorical commitment with *The Round Table* to meeting the “challenge of our time” is striking, as is the emphasis on simply exposing the underlying problems of the empire or nation. Above all their shared concern for the nation or empire as a whole, overcoming the parochialism they saw as too often dominating Anglo politics, is a key strand linking *The New Republic* and *The Round Table* from the outset.

The issue continued by reviewing the political situation in the United States following the recent midterm elections, noting: “Progressivism of all kinds has fared badly. ... Popular interest ... is tired of Congresses which do not adjourn, of questions which are always being discussed and never being settled, of supposed settlements which fail to produce the promised results.”³⁴ Intriguingly, it also defended President Andrew Jackson as a retrospectively “Progressive” Democrat, representative of the nation as a whole, illustrating one of many differences between the “progressivism” of this era (in both the British Empire and the United States) and the present.³⁵ Further, in the same article *The New Republic* went on to effectively call for a parliamentary model of government, previously advocated by Woodrow Wilson in his *Congressional Government* of 1885:

there is a manifest need for the adjustment of political structure to the [national] representative function of the President. To discharge that function properly the President should have the right to introduce bills and bring them to vote. National interest should at least have as fair an opportunity of obtaining consideration as district interest.³⁶

In short, *The New Republic* in its opening issue demonstrated an unusual constitutional openness to the British model in pursuit of national efficiency, just as *The Round Table* had repeatedly called for an American-inspired federal government for the same reason.³⁷

Shared Foundations: Progressivism and Anglo-Saxonism

This mutual constitutional curiosity connecting *The New Republic* to British political elites may at first glance seem coincidental. However, stepping back and examining the underlying assumptions, outlooks, and backgrounds of both sets of college-educated men, one begins to discern crucial connecting tissue spanning the Atlantic.

Politically the majority of the Kindergarten can be most accurately described as “disappointed Liberals” who later drifted toward the Conservative or “Unionist” Party in Great Britain. Milner’s own political journey from Liberal, to Liberal Unionist (following the 1886 split over Irish Home Rule), to Conservative served as something of a blueprint for the group. So too did that of the aforementioned “municipal socialist” Joseph Chamberlain.

In their belief in the power of institutions to alter the character of both individuals and (to varying degrees) races the Kindergarten were, however, profoundly progressive in their outlook.³⁸ This is made most evident in their early commitment to the settlement house movement. Milner himself had helped to found the Toynbee Hall settlement house in Tower Hamlets, following the unexpected death of his friend Arnold Toynbee in 1883.³⁹ Lionel Curtis and his contemporary at Oxford, Richard Feetham, a generation later, were also drawn to serve at Toynbee Hall.⁴⁰ Curtis had previously worked for the Haileybury Guild for three years managing a boys’ club in London’s East End,⁴¹ and had spent two vacations “slumming” as a wandering vagrant in order to gain firsthand experience of the poor law.⁴² Patrick Duncan, another member of the Kindergarten, who later chose to remain in South Africa (ultimately becoming governor-general, 1937–1943), also worked at Toynbee Hall.⁴³ Alfred Zimmern likewise enjoyed a long association with this iconic settlement house in London’s East End.⁴⁴ For all of these men, the class-based ethos of (imperial) service was a constant presence during their education at Oxford. Many of their classmates and professors stated publicly that Oxbridge men must serve as “an exemplar of the imperial race” and of Anglo-Saxon masculinity.⁴⁵ Further, through Curtis’s use of Milner’s power of patronage as High Commissioner for South Africa, many of these young men had initially been appointed to positions in municipal government in South Africa specifically to stamp out corruption.⁴⁶

Existing alongside their progressivism was their political Anglo-Saxonism, which was wholly compatible with the thought of both conservative and progressive Atlanticists in the United States. This form of Anglo exceptionalism, adhered to by much of the American and British political class, was defined by judging other peoples’ capacity to self-govern against idealized Anglo models.⁴⁷ In practice this meant querying the “peoplehood” (the linguistic, racial, and cultural unity) of colonized peoples and their perceived capacity for establishing and maintaining “just rule”—meaning clean (incorruptible), *efficient*, and representative self-government. In sum, political Anglo-Saxonism was presented as the route to political modernity.

Works such as the Liberal MP, and later British ambassador to the United States (1907–13), James Bryce’s *The American Commonwealth* (1888) had been crucial in popularizing this worldview in both the British Empire and the United States.⁴⁸ Significant milestones within this white, English-speaking exceptionalist mythology include the Magna Carta (1215), the English Bill of Rights (1689) following the so-called Glorious Revolution, and the American Declaration of Independence (1776). As a result of the growing power of this ideology, Priscilla Roberts has written that long before the outbreak of the Great War, “Americans from the northeastern patrician elite subscribed almost unthinkingly to the same beliefs in Anglo-Saxon racial and political superiority and the

strategic desirability of Anglo-American cooperation as did their British counterparts.”⁴⁹ Before U.S. entry into World War One this was evident in much elite American writing on national efficiency.⁵⁰

In the industrializing, urbanizing, globalizing world they found themselves, both groups came to place more and more emphasis on questions of national efficiency. While occasionally featuring material critical of the excesses of political Anglo-Saxonism,⁵¹ *The New Republic* commonly embraced this rhetoric of Anglo exceptionalism: carrying numerous articles by progressive thinkers, including even the notably antiwar Randolph S. Bourne, which explicitly discussed the collective triumphs and notable shortcomings of “Anglo-Saxon civilization.”⁵²

As uncomfortable as it may now be to acknowledge, the former colonial administrators of *The Round Table* were undoubtedly progressive in their worldview. Just as uncomfortably: the American Northeastern educated elite and wider U.S. political class—from which Straight, Croly, Lippmann, and Weyl were drawn—welcomed political Anglo-Saxonist arguments and sentiment in these years, especially against the backdrop of the New Immigration of non-Protestant Southern and Eastern Europeans.⁵³ In the minds of elites based in London, Oxford, Washington, and New York, Anglo-Saxon Britons and Americans were obliged to fulfill a special role as the guarantors and enforcers of a just world order.

Alfred Eckhard Zimmern as Key Conduit

The extensive links between *The New Republic* and the wider Round Table movement are particularly evident in the papers of Sir Alfred Zimmern. He was a prominent British classicist and historian who was first a Tutor and then Fellow at New College, Oxford, and an active member of the Round Table set between 1912 and 1921.⁵⁴ Intriguingly, Lippmann, Weyl, Zimmern, and George Louis Beer—a regular contributor to both publications—all shared comfortable suburban German-Jewish backgrounds.⁵⁵ This makes their advocacy of Anglo exceptionalism all the more remarkable. Perhaps it was for this reason, Andrea Bosco argues, that Zimmern was consciously promoted as an “ambassador” to *The New Republic* by other members of the Round Table movement.⁵⁶ Zimmern was certainly an extremely able envoy to the American elite.⁵⁷

Zimmern, who is often credited with inventing the term “welfare state,” would later serve at Versailles and draft a major memo on a British proposal for a League of Nations, which Lord Robert Cecil took to the Paris Peace Conference.⁵⁸ He also co-founded the Royal Institute of International Affairs with Curtis and Kerr after the war. His international affiliations are further confirmed in his role as the inaugural Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth, 1919–1921, and his subsequent position as a visiting professor at Cornell in the early 1920s.⁵⁹

Zimmern’s later leftist politics, joining the Labour Party in 1924 and standing against Lloyd George in Caernarfon Boroughs, are often used to present him as a purely idealist or even “utopian” thinker in international relations. This is largely a result of E.H. Carr’s representation of Zimmern in *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* (1939)—reducing him to a convenient foil or strawman in opposition to Carr’s self-described realism.⁶⁰ However, such analysis overlooks the widespread collaboration then occurring in Great Britain between avowedly leftist organizations such as the Fabians and the Round Table movement, based on their shared conception of the national efficiency problem.⁶¹ These connections led such noted socialist figures as “Mrs. Sidney Webb”

(Beatrice Webb), to write to Zimmern in July 1916: “What excellent stuff appears in the Round Table.”⁶²

As Zimmern’s wartime writings indicate, characterizing him as an impractical idealist obscures the complexities and influence of his thought. It also overlooks his enduring, Round Table influenced, commitment to an Anglo-American core at the heart of any future world order, a conviction he clearly shared with Croly, Lippmann, and Weyl, not to mention *The New Republic*’s proprietor Willard Straight.

Zimmern is regularly credited with the term the “British Commonwealth” mirroring his earlier study of Classical Athens, *The Greek Commonwealth* (1911).⁶³ That said, there are other often cited contenders, notably Curtis (who was in part inspired by Zimmern’s historical treatment of Athens when forwarding his own ideal of a “British Commonwealth”) and James Bryce, the author of *The American Commonwealth* (1888).⁶⁴

Classical education had long served as an ideological pillar justifying British expansionism.⁶⁵ Kristofer Allerfeldt has argued that classical antiquity and Rome in particular likewise played a crucial role in the rhetoric of many American progressive imperialists, including Theodore Roosevelt.⁶⁶ The compatibility of American progressivism with contemporary British imperialism is therefore only further demonstrated through the influence of the Australian-born Glasgow, Oxford, and then Harvard-based liberal scholar, Gilbert Murray, with both *The Round Table* and Theodore Roosevelt and associates.⁶⁷ Roosevelt’s own speeches demonstrate his embrace of such classical justifications of empire. For example, while in London in 1910 he had praised Lord Cromer and the British administration in Egypt as “the best government it has had for at least 2,000 years—probably a better government than it has ever had before.”⁶⁸ He was lauded in return by leading British imperialists including Cromer, George Curzon, Herbert Kitchener, and Rudyard Kipling (two of whom were then married to American-born wives).⁶⁹ Murray would later meet with Croly and other members of *The New Republic* team during a 1916 visit to New York while pushing for expedited U.S. entry into the war.⁷⁰

Zimmern had himself spent seven months traveling in the United States in 1911–1912, during which time he—like Kerr and Murray—lunched with Theodore Roosevelt on Long Island. He also attended a New York demonstration in memory of the 146 garment workers killed in the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire (March 1911) and made a pilgrimage to the University of Wisconsin to meet with the Georgist economist and historian John Commons, who he subsequently described as a “sort of American Sidney Webb.”⁷¹

Resulting from his New College education and connections Zimmern enjoyed close friendships with Edward Grigg, Reginald Coupland, Philip Kerr, and Lionel Curtis among other fellow Round Table members.⁷² He also participated in a sustained correspondence with both Herbert Croly and Walter Lippmann at *The New Republic* throughout World War One.

Writing to Zimmern in June 1915, Lippmann described himself as a great fan of *The War and Democracy* (1915), a collection of articles Zimmern had co-authored with other leading British intellectuals.⁷³ Lippmann, a defining figure in contemporary American progressive thought, also crucially described himself as a convert to the Round Table worldview:

It is indeed the very best book on the war published so far. A sweet tempered and generous book, such as one almost despairs of securing from a nation in the midst of war. I wish I could believe without any further doubt that your crowd represented enlightened England. It would disperse the last doubts I have about the fairness of the essential issues in this war. ... Your opening chapter and your chapter on Germany

and Seton-Watson's chapter on Austria-Hungary are I think the best things in the book. *They have won me as almost nothing else that has come from England since last August. And with the general philosophy that lies behind them I think I agree too. I have been studying the Round Table literature and feel essentially converted* [emphasis added].⁷⁴

On July 6, 1915 Lippmann urged Zimmern to visit the United States to allow the two to talk in person.⁷⁵ This offer was repeated enthusiastically by Croly first just two days later and again in August, the second time with the added incentive of a permanent position as writer for *The New Republic*.⁷⁶ In this second letter Croly, while disagreeing with Zimmern on the need for immediate American entry into the war, couched his reasoning in the need to prepare American public opinion before "any such heroic step is taken." He then urged Zimmern to reconsider his offer, emphasizing the potential importance of Zimmern's writings in preparing the way for future American entry.⁷⁷ This discussion, focused on the best means and moment for American entry, echoes earlier higher-level transatlantic correspondence between, for example, Theodore Roosevelt and Rudyard Kipling, including this sent by Roosevelt in November 1914 (just three days before *The New Republic* launched):

If I should advocate all that I myself believe, I would do no good among our people, because they would not follow me. Our people are short-sighted, and they do not understand international matters. Your people have been short-sighted, but they are not as short-sighted as ours in these matters. The difference, I think, is to be found in the comparative widths of the Channel and the Atlantic Ocean.⁷⁸

Wider Embrace: 1915–1917

Leading members of the Round Table movement such as Curtis and Kerr also enjoyed significant American connections, including with *The New Republic* co-founders. For instance, on December 8, 1915, Lionel Curtis wrote to Lady Selborne, wife of the former First Lord of the Admiralty and High Commissioner to South Africa William Waldegrave Palmer, enclosing a copy of *The New Republic*. Maud Palmer, the Countess of Selborne, had played something of a "mother hen" role for members of Milner's Kindergarten while in South Africa, introducing them to the small circle of elite Anglo women then living in the country. In his letter of December 1915 Curtis highlighted an article by the noted American historian George Louis Beer, who had recently become a regular contributor as American correspondent to *The Round Table*, and would go on to serve as a key adviser to President Wilson at Versailles:⁷⁹

I am sending you a copy of the "New Republic" containing an article by my friend Beer, one of the leading American historians whom I brought into touch with Croly, the editor of the "New Republic", who is also the man who formulated the policies Roosevelt adopted [Progressive Party, 1912]. Croly's article, page 56, on Beer's paper, is [sic] significant as hitherto he and the "New Republic" have represented pure Monroeism.⁸⁰

While Curtis's boast about his influence over Croly was almost certainly hyperbolic, his distaste for the publication's past "Monroeism" (isolationism) was very real. The article in

question is Beer's "America's Part Among Nations," which was published on November 20, 1915. In this the latter argued, on distinctly Anglo-Saxonist lines, that:

we of the United States are, in the same sense as England and possibly even to a greater degree, responsible for the existing chaos. By our policy of self-centered aloofness ... we have deliberately ignored the obligations that every state owes to mankind. ... In that the United States deliberately refused to become involved in any European matters, we must bear some measure of responsibility for the existing world-war.⁸¹

Echoing the views of *The Round Table*, Beer further argued that the "fundamental aim of German world politics" was to "oust the English-speaking peoples from the prominent position they are occupying in all the continents."⁸² He concluded by calling for a permanent military alliance with Great Britain:

Such an alliance, made for no aggressive purpose and seeking merely to preserve peace, order and justice in the world, would naturally attract to it nations of like mind, and might be the foundation stone of that federation of the world which alone can reconcile "the freedom of individuals and of individual states with the accomplishment of a common aim for mankind as a whole."⁸³

The closing quote was drawn from the German philosopher Immanuel Kant's *The Idea of a Universal History* (1784) but could equally have described Curtis's vision of a cooperative (Anglo-dominated) international order based on imperial federation, which he set out fully in his *The Commonwealth of Nations* the next year (1916).⁸⁴

Not everyone in the Kindergarten itself was entirely convinced by Curtis's vision; earlier in 1915 an increasingly disillusioned Philip Kerr wrote to the American-born Nancy Astor: "Lionel's God is the British empire and he worships and serves it day and night."⁸⁵ However, Curtis's ideal of a reformed Anglo-led world was one that Beer was eager to advocate for. This embrace was undoubtedly built on his reputation as a leading scholar of the "Imperial School" of early American history, which emphasized the economic development and efficient administration of pre-Revolutionary North America under British rule.⁸⁶ Indeed, Beer had (in)famously concluded his 1907 *British Colonial Policy, 1754–1765*:

It is easily conceivable, and not at all improbable that the political evolution of the next centuries may take such a course that the American Revolution will lose the great significance that is now attached to it, and will appear merely as the temporary separation of two kindred people's whose inherent similarity was obscured by superficial differences.⁸⁷

Given Lippmann's own embrace of the idea of an initial world state as a "federation of Western powers" before blooming into a "Federation of Mankind," this is another indication of the close parallels in thinking between the Round Table and *The New Republic* sets.⁸⁸

Herbert Croly in his editorial that accompanied Beer's November 1915 article, while stopping short of advocating an immediate formal alliance (or for the "reunification" of Curtis and Beer's dreams), held that a British-American military understanding on some terms was necessary for the creation of what he termed a "League of Peace."⁸⁹ In truth the

Milner set had likely been pushing at an open door as, according to Lippmann, since early 1915 the editorial board of *The New Republic* had “decided ... to devote the paper to the creation of an Anglo-American understanding.”⁹⁰

Philip Kerr had throughout 1915 courted the American ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines Page, a North Carolinian and former editor of *The Atlantic Monthly*, who was profoundly convinced of the “Mahanist thesis, that American security depended upon British sea power.”⁹¹ Kerr’s relationship with Page blossomed drawing him into the orbit of the Round Table group.⁹² Page wrote to his son in mid-July 1915 that *The Round Table* is “the best review, I dare say, in the world” adding that the wider New College set were “perhaps the best group of men here for the real study and free discussion of large political subjects.”⁹³

Priscilla Roberts has detailed a number of significant meetings between *New Republic* and *Round Table* representatives that occurred during the war: the most important of these being Lippmann’s meeting with Geoffrey Dawson (then editor of *The Times*) in London in 1914, and several meetings between proprietor Straight and the wider Round Table group at the Astors’s Cliveden mansion in the Chiltern Hills northwest of London.⁹⁴

By April 1916, Lippmann wrote enthusiastically to Graham Wallas that the war’s outcome must be “a union of liberal peoples pledged to cooperate in the settlement of all outstanding questions, sworn to turn against the aggressor, determined to erect a larger and more modern system of international law upon a federation of the world.”⁹⁵ Such discussions occurred alongside the continued growth of William Howard Taft’s League to Enforce Peace (LEP) in the United States, and James Bryce’s League of Nations Society (LNS) in Great Britain, both founded in 1915, as well as intensifying correspondence between Taft and Bryce.⁹⁶

The only direct meeting between the two groups that appears to have proven difficult was the unpredictable Curtis’s 1916 visit to *The New Republic*’s New York offices, which resulted in him writing to Kerr that perhaps he would be “wiser to drop” any further cooperative ventures.⁹⁷ In contrast to Curtis’s somewhat predictable fireworks, the stalwart Zimmern would publish in *The New Republic* (in addition to *The Round Table*) throughout the war. However, the affiliation was never as close as Croly, Lippmann, or co-founder Walter Weyl would have liked. This is demonstrated by their lavish praise for his intermittent articles throughout 1916. For instance, both Weyl and Croly wrote to Zimmern praising his “The Meaning of Nationality,” which appeared in the January 1, 1916, edition of *The New Republic*. Croly writing on October 15, 1916, commented, shortly before the article was reprinted, that “Both Lippmann and I highly approve of your article on Nationality and we are going to use it as part of a series of articles which we are planning, dealing with the reaction of the war upon various American domestic problems.”⁹⁸

Likewise, a deflated Croly later wrote to Zimmern in January 1917:

It is a great disappointment to me that you have been obliged to abandon the idea of contributing regularly to The New Republic. There is nobody in England who I would rather have as a regular contributor than yourself. ... Even though you cannot contribute regularly I hope that you will do so occasionally.⁹⁹

Coming as this did less than four months prior to Wilson’s urging of the United States to war in his address to Congress of April 2, 1917, it is safe to say that Zimmern’s role influencing the thought of *The New Republic* (and through it the wider progressive movement) on U.S. entry has previously been unduly overlooked.

A Key Editorial: March 1917

Lippmann's embrace of a British-influenced national efficiency rhetoric, in part resulting from these transatlantic exchanges, is evident in several of his editorials in *The New Republic* in 1917. None more so than that of March 3, 1917 (just one month before U.S. entry) which laments the insufficient and "decadent political machinery" of the American government as currently organized.¹⁰⁰ Remarkably, it begins with a quote from F.S. Oliver's *Alexander Hamilton*—published eleven years earlier in 1906—a touchstone text for the Round Table movement, often described by political allies such as the Conservative MP Leo Amery as "their Bible."¹⁰¹ The quote in question read: "The spirit of the nation is a great force, but it is one which cannot be always on the alert, and, while it sleeps, the part of noble institutions is to keep watch."¹⁰² Lippman's editorial read:

As compared with the other great states of the world, the United States to-day is in point of organization one of the most backward and intellectually the most timid. Whatever else the war has done, it has at least taught England and Germany and Canada and France that large-scale operations can be planned and executed, that modern nations must think in very large sums of money, that the scruples and dogmas of legalism and laissez-faire are old men's bogeys. ... *In their severest trials the progressive nations have discovered that the old unorganized, competitive profiteering is unsound and wasteful* [emphasis added] ... But the United States trundles along without nationalized railroads or shipping, its mineral resources unsocialized, its water power exploited, its fundamental industries whipped into competition, its food distribution a muddle, its educational system starved, its labor half organized, badly organized, and unrecognized in the structure of society.¹⁰³

The piece concluded by advocating for "a war against that Congressional system which makes good administration impossible ... Congress will not reform itself. It will be reformed only from the outside by a President speaking for the nation."¹⁰⁴ Daniel Rodgers in his *Atlantic Crossings* commented that, inspired by *The New Republic*, Wilson:

did not offer American progressives simply an idealistic set of war aims in 1917. He offered them, after years of frustrating political labor, an experiment in the possibilities of the war-collectivized state. ... This sense of momentous change was essential to the progressives' understanding of the war. [For them] The war represented a historical passage; none of the industrial nations would revert to their prewar individualism when the crisis had passed.¹⁰⁵

Marc Stears has similarly written that "Croly, Lippmann, and Weyl were struck with the practical opportunities for radical reform the war [had] presented in Britain. As the war intensified ... the British public was increasingly becoming aware of the 'need for and benefit of organization' of the sort the Fabians and their allies offered."¹⁰⁶ *The New Republic* sought to mobilize the American public in support of the same goal of national efficiency.

Advertising to a Shared Audience

Following U.S. entry into the war *The Round Table* went on a circulation drive throughout the United States culminating in adverts placed in *The New Republic* that fall and winter.¹⁰⁷ The first advert featured in *The New Republic* of November 17, 1917, and

was authored by Kindergarten member Robert Henry Brand, then working in D.C. as deputy chairman of the British Commission. It set out two goals on which “the future peace of the world will depend”:

1. The maintenance and development as a world-wide self-governing democracy of the unity of the British Commonwealth of nations, which now contains within its borders more than a quarter of the world’s population.
2. The furtherance of close and friendly relations between that Commonwealth and the United States.¹⁰⁸

This recasting of the British “Commonwealth” as a proto-League of Nations was common from at least early 1916 onward.¹⁰⁹ This new cooperative framing of Britain’s imperial domain was designed in part to attract to a progressive American audience.¹¹⁰ The full-page advert continued:

For the attainment of these ends, and the achievement of their common ideals of peace, justice and liberty in the life of the world, it is vital that the people of the British and American Commonwealths should have more intimate knowledge of each other’s political life and way of thinking.¹¹¹

This need to create a public square for a transatlantic Anglo-polity closely echoes the earlier calls for national platforms (i.e., *The Round Table* and *The New Republic*) for public debate and policy discussion, to allow either nation to address the most pressing issues then facing their societies.

Demonstrating the breadth of views then associated with the imperialist *Round Table* among the blurbs recommending the publication was one provided by the Irish socialist playwright George Bernard Shaw (another leading Fabian).¹¹² At the bottom of the page was a slip, which once torn off and returned to the Macmillan Company on Fifth Avenue (with a check for \$2.50) would trigger a one-year subscription.¹¹³ The very fact that the *Round Table* group saw *The New Republic’s* readership as uniquely fertile ground for expansion proves their growing ideological kinship.

A repeat advert in the December 22, 1917, issue of *The New Republic* highlighted the support of “General Smuts, the noted Boer leader and statesman, who fifteen years ago was fighting the British Empire in South Africa, and who is now a member of the British War Cabinet.” *The Round Table* set would less than two years later, when discussing the Treaty of Versailles and in an obituary of Smuts’ close political ally Louis Botha, present him as Alexander Hamilton reborn (to Botha’s Washington).¹¹⁴ This shared willingness of *The Round Table* to draw on U.S. history (rehabilitating, to British eyes, “colonial rebels” in the process), while *The New Republic* likewise used British models to discuss future constitutional change, is remarkable.¹¹⁵

Significantly, this second advert ran directly under *The New Republic’s* own readership drive for 1918. This indicated, to even the most casual reader, the growing closeness of the two publications and their worldviews. While one should add that permanent U.S. circulation of *The Round Table* only doubled from around 100 to 200 copies, Kerr and others were wont to boast that those 200 were the American policy elite of the day.¹¹⁶ In truth the *Round Table* set’s real influence in the United States lay not in the circulation of their own journal, but in their ability to influence the editorial line of established American publications such as *The New Republic*.

With the Armistice of November 1918, and the Treaty of Versailles signed the following June, the stimuli that had brought the two groups together ceased. Thereafter, exchanges between the two slowed. Despite this, following Versailles where many of the players discussed above had notable roles, they helped to construct policy institutions that continue to shape American and British foreign relations to this day. Just as Walter Lippmann, Walter Weyl, and George Louis Beer all served in Wilson's Inquiry to prepare materials for the peace negotiations, leading Round Table men such as Philip Kerr served in key positions in the British delegation to Versailles.¹¹⁷ Following the failure of an attempt to set up an (Anglo-American) Institute of International Affairs, due to growing American isolationism, Lippmann became a prominent member of the *Council on Foreign Relations* (CFR) founded in the United States in 1921. Similarly, top figures in the Round Table movement—most notably Kerr, Curtis, and Zimmern—all served as founder members of the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA), commonly known as “Chatham House” (1920).¹¹⁸

Conclusion

While many of those discussed here would later prove influential during the negotiation of the Versailles settlement that is not the focus of this piece. Rather, it has sought to demonstrate that the shared nationalist-progressivism of *The New Republic* and *The Round Table* combined during World War One to feed a mutual infatuation driven by the heightened wartime need for “national efficiency.”

Indeed, it is evident that by the summer of 1915 Round Table members had convinced both Lippmann and Croly of the necessity of American intervention. Future discussions between the two groups focused primarily on preparing U.S. public opinion for American entry into the war. Combining Lippmann's own statements on “studying the Round Table literature” and “feel[ing] essentially converted” in June of 1915, with his explicit use of the Round Table's “Bible”—F.S. Oliver's *Alexander Hamilton* (1906)—in framing the crucial *New Republic* editorial of March 3, 1917, one must conclude that the influence of *The Round Table* on *The New Republic* and Lippmann in particular was substantial. Furthermore, Croly's (rejected) offer to Zimmern to take up a position as a resident *New Republic* writer, Zimmern's later articles published in *The New Republic* (c.1915–1917), and Croly's editorial of November 1915 (accompanying George Louis Beer's call to arms) confirms this timeline.¹¹⁹

Together, the above threads prove how early *The New Republic* set embraced U.S. intervention, and the Round Table group's influence in that shift. As Priscilla Roberts has previously argued in relation to Philip Kerr, the wider Round Table movement's conscious courting of *The New Republic* was part of a coordinated British campaign pushing for American intervention.¹²⁰ It is clear that this pull was significant in drawing sometimes reluctant progressives into supporting American entry. While this cannot be divorced from (or replace) established milestones such as the sinking of the *Lusitania* off the Irish coast (May 1915), the Zimmerman Telegram (January 1917), and the German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare (February 1917), it serves to shed a new light on many progressives' conversion to American intervention. It also demonstrates the underlying compatibility of the thought of key progressive figures in the United States with, select, Conservatives and Unionists in Great Britain.

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Notes

- 1 See, e.g., David W. Noble, "The New Republic and the Idea of Progress, 1914–1920," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 38:3 (Dec. 1951): 387–402; and James A. Nuechterlein, "The Dream of Scientific Liberalism: The 'New Republic' and American Progressive Thought, 1914–1920," *The Review of Politics* 42:2 (Apr. 1980): 167–90.
- 2 The three authors, collectively, founded *The New Republic* in 1914 through the patronage of Willard Straight and Dorothy Whitney. Michael McGerr, *A Fierce Discontentment: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870–1920* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 280.
- 3 Duncan Bell's recent work on the ways in which liberalism and empire were intertwined in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is of great relevance here. See, e.g., Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 9, 90, 115. See also Duncan Bell, "What is Liberalism?," *Political Theory* 42:6 (Dec. 2014): 682–715.
- 4 Lippmann to Graham Wallas, Aug. 5, 1915 in John Morton Blum (ed.), *Public Philosopher: Selected Letters of Walter Lippmann* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1985), xxi. Wallas and Lippmann's interactions dated back to Wallas's lectures as a visiting lecturer at Harvard while Lippmann was a student journalist at the *Harvard Crimson*.
- 5 On the international nature of contemporary progressive reform, see Daniel Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). Indeed, it is worth noting that Rodgers's transnational approach to progressivism arguably laid the foundations for the established literature of the last twenty years on imperial exchanges between the United States and other powers.
- 6 Maureen Flanagan, *America Reformed: Progressives and Progressivisms, 1890–1920s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 215.
- 7 See, e.g., Edward A. Stettner, *Shaping Modern Liberalism: Herbert Croly and Progressive Thought* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), esp. Chapter 7 "Liberalism and War": 122–43. See also Noble, "The New Republic and the Idea of Progress," 396.
- 8 Walter Nimocks, *Milner's Young Men: The Kindergarten in Edwardian Imperial Affairs* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1968), 146–49.
- 9 Indeed, the Round Table set remained influential well beyond Milner's death in 1924, and many members were crucial to the later Cliveden set of leading appeasers during the interwar period.
- 10 Nimocks, *Milner's Young Men*, 156.
- 11 It also stood in stark contrast to eventual Democratic-nominee Woodrow Wilson's continued advocacy of states' rights. "The New Nationalism," Encyclopaedia Britannica www.britannica.com/topic/New-Nationalism (accessed Mar. 25, 2020); Gary Murphy, "'Mr. Roosevelt Is Guilty': Theodore Roosevelt and the Crusade for Constitutionalism, 1910–1912," *Journal of American Studies* 36:3 (2002): 441–42; and Robert Eden, "Opinion Leadership and the Problem of Executive Power: Woodrow Wilson's Original Position," *The Review of Politics* 57:3 (1995): 483–503.
- 12 Theodore Roosevelt, "The New Nationalism" (Osawatomie, Kansas, Aug. 31, 1910) Theodore Roosevelt Papers: Series 5: Speeches and Executive Orders, -1918; 1907, Apr. 15, 1910, Sept 6. Manuscript/Mixed Material. www.loc.gov/item/mss382990693 (accessed Mar. 25, 2020).
- 13 Roosevelt, "The New Nationalism".
- 14 Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (New York: Macmillan, 1909).
- 15 This is arguably most evident in their role in the creation of the Union of South Africa (1910). For more on the Kindergarten's explicit use of Alexander Hamilton and the U.S. Constitution to argue in favor of British "Imperial Federation," see Patrick M. Kirkwood, "Alexander Hamilton and the Early Republic in Edwardian Imperial Thought," *Britain and the World* 12:1 (Mar. 2019): 28–50. See also Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life*, 29: "I shall not disguise the fact that on the whole my own preferences are on the side of Hamilton rather than Jefferson"; and F.S. Oliver's *Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union* (New York: Macmillan, 1906), which inspired the Kindergarten's embrace of Hamilton's Federalism first for the South African colonies.
- 16 For a more detailed discussion of this label, see Marc Stears, *Progressives, Pluralists, and the Problems of the State: Ideologies of Reform in the United States and Britain, 1909–1926* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 55–57. See also David Levy's discussion of national progressivism in *Herbert Croly of the New Republic: The Life and Thought of an American Progressive* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014)

[original 1985] and Charles Forcey's presentation of Herbert Croly as a "Nationalist Liberal" in Chapter 1 of his *The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann, and the Progressive Era, 1900–1925* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 3–51.

17 Theodore Roosevelt, "Speech at St. Paul" (St. Paul, MN., Sept. 6, 1910), Theodore Roosevelt Papers: Series 5: Speeches and Executive Orders, -1918; 1907, Apr. 15, 1910, Sept. 6. Manuscript/Mixed Material. www.loc.gov/item/mss382990693 (accessed Mar. 25, 2020).

18 James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 205–206, 265.

19 Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*, 247. For more on "national efficiency" as a technocratic and militaristic Edwardian ideology, see G.R. Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study of British Politics and Political Thought, 1899–1914* (London: The Ashfield Press, 1990).

20 Nimocks, *Milner's Young Men*, 5, 7, 11, 18.

21 Nimocks, *Milner's Young Men*, 184; and J.R.M. Butler, *Lord Lothian, Philip Kerr, 1882–1940* (London: Macmillan, 1960), 323.

22 "Introductory: The Round Table" in *The Round Table: A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the British Empire* 1:1 (Nov. 15, 1910): 1.

23 "Introductory: The Round Table," 1.

24 A typical issue would have a section on wider Imperial or Foreign Affairs, Political Events in Britain, South Africa, and less regularly Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and India.

25 "Introductory: The Round Table," 2. For progressive belief in the power of exposing "misinformation," see Flanagan, *America Reformed*, 141–42.

26 Priscilla Roberts, "World War I and Anglo-American Relations: The Role of Philip Kerr and *The Round Table*," *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 95:383 (2006): 120; and Brad Snyder, *The House of Truth: A Washington Political Salon and the Founding of American Liberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 13, 37. See also James Srodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World* (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint, 2012), esp. Chapter 1 "Dinner at the House of Truth."

27 Straight himself was undoubtedly a convinced advocate of modernizing empire and Anglo exceptionalism, as demonstrated by his education at Cornell under the direction of H. Morse Stephens, a future president of the American Historical Association and a former trainer of Indian Civil Service recruits at Cambridge. Straight had also been a member of Stephens's popular Kipling Club in Ithaca. Louis Graves, *Willard Straight in the Orient: With Illustrations from His Sketch-books* (New York: Asia Publishing Company, 1922), 1.

28 Charles Forcey, *The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann and the Progressive Era, 1900–1925* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). For a more modern rendition of the same claim, see David Seideman, *The New Republic: A Voice of American Liberalism* (New York: Praeger, 1986), 1–59. Priscilla Roberts has convincingly claimed that Straight's internationalism "arose primarily from an indiscriminating psychological need to have his country play a great but poorly defined role on the world stage." Priscilla Roberts, "Willard Straight, The First World War, and 'Internationalism of all Sorts': The Inconsistencies of An American Liberal Interventionist," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 44:4 (1998): 493, 499.

29 Stears, *Progressives, Pluralists, and the Problems of the State*, 6, 9–10.

30 Allen Freeman Davis, *Spearheads for Reform: The Social Settlements and the Progressive Movement, 1890–1914* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984), 90.

31 Interestingly both Weyl and Lippmann's earlier flirtations with the Socialist Party of America did not disqualify them from such elite company.

32 "The New Republic," *The New Republic: A Journal of Opinion* 1:1 (Nov. 7, 1914): 1.

33 Stears, *Progressives, Pluralists, and the Problems of the States*, 6.

34 "The New Republic," *The New Republic*, 1.

35 Just as the racism of many American progressives in the South (and beyond) in this era did not disqualify them from the progressive big tent, nor should the spread of racial views expressed by the British "Kindergarten" during and after their time in South Africa.

36 "When President Jackson ..." *The New Republic* 1:1 (Nov. 7, 1914): 5. See also Frank Prochaska, *Eminent Victorians on American Democracy: The View From Albion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 70–71, 110, 125; and Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics* 1913 Reprint (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1913), 204–205.

- 37 One could argue that the recent “radical” demands for a national popular vote, and a more population-based and less territorially defined Senate fall within this same broad tradition.
- 38 See, e.g., McGerr, *A Fierce Discontentment*, xv: “progressives were radical in their conviction that other social classes must be transformed and in their boldness in going about the business of that transformation. ... Progressivism demanded a social transformation that remains at once profoundly impressive and profoundly disturbing a century later.” See also Daniel Gorman on the progressive thought of Lionel Curtis, John Buchan, and other members of the Round Table set. Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2006), 25–27.
- 39 Toynbee Hall would later inspire Jane Addams of Chicago’s Hull House and much of the wider settlement house movement in the United States. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*, 64.
- 40 Tony Honoré, “Feetham, Richard (1874–1965), Judge in South Africa,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, www.oxforddnb.com/ (accessed Mar. 25, 2020).
- 41 The young Clement Attlee (future prime minister of the 1945–51 Labour Govt.) would later inherit Curtis’s role as head of the Haileybury Guild when his initial successor moved on in 1907. Deborah Lavin, *From Empire to Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 16.
- 42 Alex May, “Curtis, Lionel George (1872–1955), writer and public servant,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, www.oxforddnb.com/ (accessed Mar. 25, 2020); and Lavin, *From Empire to Commonwealth*, 12.
- 43 Deborah Lavin, “Duncan, Sir Patrick (1870–1943), Politician in South Africa and Governor-General of the Union of South Africa,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, www.oxforddnb.com/ (accessed Mar. 25, 2020).
- 44 Asa Briggs and Anne Macartney, *Toynbee Hall: The First Hundred Years* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 78, 137.
- 45 Paul R. Deslandes, *Oxbridge Men: British Masculinity and the Undergraduate Experience, 1850–1920* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 38–39. See also Richard Symonds, *Oxford and Empire: The Last Lost Cause?* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1986).
- 46 See, e.g., Lionel Curtis to Wm. Lionel Hitchens, Nov. 28, 1901, Papers of William Lionel Hitchens, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Western Manuscripts and Special Collections, MSEng.hist.c.1037, folders 29–31; and Richard Davenport-Hines, “Hitchens, (William) Lionel [Nel] (1874–1940), Public Servant and Industrialist,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, www.oxforddnb.com/ (accessed Mar. 25, 2020).
- 47 For a wider discussion of the influence of Anglo exceptionalism in both the British Empire and the contemporary United States, see Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the Challenge of Racial Equality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Paul Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
- 48 See James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (London: Macmillan, 1888).
- 49 Roberts, “World War I and Anglo-American Relations,” 116.
- 50 See, e.g., the work of the former president of Harvard (1869–1909) Charles W. Eliot, “National Efficiency Best Developed Under Free Governments,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (Apr. 1915): 433–41. In this piece the avowedly anti-imperialist Eliot demonstrates a good dose of Anglo exceptionalism as proven by his long discussion of British and American inventions as the “legitimate fruits of liberty.” This was in turn contrasted against Germanic efficiency, which was essentially autocratic, servile, and mechanical. In short, German national efficiency, Eliot argued, was hindered by a Prussian lack of liberty.
- 51 See, e.g., Philonous’s critique “Intellectual Leadership in America,” *The New Republic* 1:2 (Nov. 14, 1914): 16. “Philonous” was the pen name of the Minsk-born, Jewish-American philosopher Morris Raphael Cohen, who often attacked American philosophy, political, and legal thought and public discourse more broadly as being too rooted in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and therefore overlooking the accomplishments of Continental Europe.
- 52 See, e.g., Randolph S. Bourne, “Theodore Dreiser,” *The New Republic* 2:2 (Apr. 17, 1915): 8; e.g. “Anglo-Saxon civilization seems to have been slowly starved of some of the emotional values which Europe has conserved, to both its woe and glory.” See also Forcey, *The Crossroads of Liberalism*, 231–34.
- 53 See, e.g., the writings of the progressive president of Harvard (1909–1933), Abbott Lawrence Lowell: “The Anglo-Saxon race was prepared for it [self-government] by centuries of discipline under the supremacy of law, and men will always take generations to acquire it, unless they are immersed in, and assimilated by a mass

of others already accustomed to it. ... these conditions are not true in our new possessions [Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, The Philippines etc.]” Lowell, “The Colonial Expansion of the United States,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (Feb. 1899): 152.

54 Paul Rich “Alfred Zimmern’s Cautious Idealism: The League of Nations, International Education, and the Commonwealth,” *Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed*, eds. David Long and Peter Wilson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 79–80.

55 However, Zimmern was raised Christian and was later active in the World Council of Churches. See Daniel Gorman, “Ecumenical Internationalism: Willoughby Dickinson, the League of Nations, and the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches,” *The Journal of Contemporary History* 45:1 (Jan. 2010): 51–73; and D.J. Markwell, “Zimmern, Sir Alfred Eckhard (1879–1957), Internationalist,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, www.oxforddnb.com (accessed Mar. 25, 2020): Christian denomination not specified. See also: Alfred E. Zimmern, “The Ethical Presuppositions of a World Order” in *The Universal Church and the World of Nations*, ed. Philip Henry Kerr (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Co., 1938).

56 Andrea Bosco, *The Round Table Movement and the Fall of the “Second” British Empire, 1909–1919* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 274.

57 For example, his substantial links with Louis Brandeis have previously been discussed at length in Philippa Strum’s *Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism* (1992). Philippa Strum, *Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 102–106.

58 David Edgerton, *Welfare State Britain, 1920–1970* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 59. On Britain and the League of Nations, see Peter Yearwood, “‘On the Safe and Right Lines’: The Lloyd George Government and the Origins of the League of Nations, 1916–1918,” *The Historical Journal* 32:1 (Mar. 1989): 131–55.

59 Markwell, “Zimmern, Sir Alfred Eckhard (1879–1957), internationalist”; and “Alfred Zimmern,” UNESCO Archives, <https://atom.archives.unesco.org/zimmern-alfred-2> (accessed Mar. 25, 2020). See also Joanne Morefield, *Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 59–60.

60 Michael Cox, “Introduction” in *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, ed. E.H. Carr (New York: Palgrave, 2001), xciii; and Rich, “Alfred Zimmern’s Cautious Idealism,” 79–80.

61 See Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency* (1990).

62 Mrs. Sidney Webb to Alfred Zimmern, July 7, 1916, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Western Manuscripts and Special Collections, Papers of Sir Alfred Zimmern (hereafter Zimmern Papers), MS. Zimmern 14: General Correspondence, 1913–15, folder 196.

63 Alfred Eckhard Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth: Politics and Economics in Fifth Century Athens* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911).

64 See e.g., J.D.B. Miller, “The Commonwealth and World Order: The Zimmern Vision and After,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 8:1 (1979): 162. Duncan Bell has already written on the influence of Zimmern’s treatment of Ancient Athens on Curtis’s promotion of a British Commonwealth at the core of the international order. See Duncan Bell, “From Ancient to Modern in Victorian Imperial Thought,” *The Historical Journal* 49:3 (2006): 735–59.

65 C.A. Hagerman, *Britain’s Imperial Muse: The Classics, Imperialism, and the Indian Empire, 1784–1914* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 4–5.

66 Kristofer Allerfeldt, “Rome, Race, and the Republic: Progressive America and the Fall of the Roman Empire, 1890–1920,” *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 7:3 (July 2008): 297–323. Allerfeldt’s article also discussed the influence of such classical comparisons on anti-imperialists.

67 See, e.g., Roosevelt’s invitation sent to Murray and wife to visit him at Sagamore Hill in July 1916, Theodore Roosevelt to Gilbert Murray, July 12, 1916, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Western Manuscripts and Special Collections, Papers of Gilbert Murray (hereafter Murray Papers), MS. Murray 31: Letters to Murray, July–Sept. 1916, folder 24: “Could you and of course Mrs. Murray come out here (Oyster Bay, Long Island) to lunch any day from Wednesday 26th to Sunday July 30th.” See also Gilbert Murray, *The League of Nations and the Democratic Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1918).

68 “Mr. Roosevelt in The City,” *The Times*, June 1, 1910, 9.

- 69 Serge Ricard, "A Hero's Welcome: Theodore Roosevelt's Triumphal Tour of Europe in 1910" in *America's Transatlantic Turn: Theodore Roosevelt and the "Discovery" of Europe*, eds. Hans Krabbendam and John M. Thompson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 152–53.
- 70 Herbert Croly to Gilbert Murray, July 14, 1916, Murray Papers, MS. 31: Letters to Murray, July–Sept. 1916, folder 39.
- 71 Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*, 71.
- 72 Peter J. Yearwood, *Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Policy, 1914–1925* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 65.
- 73 See R.W. Seton-Watson, J. Dover Wilson, Alfred E. Zimmern, and Arthur Greenwood (eds.), *The War and Democracy* (London: Macmillan, 1915).
- 74 Walter Lippmann to Alfred Zimmern, June 7, 1915, Zimmern Papers, MS. Zimmern 14: General Correspondence, 1913–15, folder 180. N.B.—Robert W. Seton-Watson, the Skye-born Scots historian mentioned by Lippmann, was yet another product of New College.
- 75 Walter Lippmann to Alfred Zimmern, July 6, 1915, Zimmern Papers, MS. Zimmern 14: General Correspondence, 1913–15, folder 194.
- 76 Herbert Croly to Alfred Zimmern, July 8, 1915, Zimmern Papers, MS. Zimmern 14: General Correspondence, 1913–15, folders 198–99; and Herbert Croly to Alfred Zimmern, Aug. 6, 1915, Zimmern Papers, MS. Zimmern 14: General Correspondence, 1913–15, folders 205–206.
- 77 Croly to Zimmern, Aug. 6, 1915, Zimmern Papers, MS. Zimmern 14, folders 205–206.
- 78 See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt to Rudyard Kipling, Nov. 4, 1914, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Western Manuscripts and Special Collections, Papers of Alfred Milner, MS. Milner 349: Correspondence, Dec. 1913–1914, folder 267.
- 79 Yearwood, *Guarantee of Peace*, 41. Beer's official title was Chief of the Colonial Division of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.
- 80 Lionel Curtis to Lady Selborne, Dec. 8, 1915, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Western Manuscripts and Special Collections, Papers of Lionel Curtis and the Round Table, MS. Curtis 2: Correspondence, 1910–1919, folder 202.
- 81 George Louis Beer, "America's Part Among Nations," *The New Republic* 5:55 (Nov. 20, 1915): 62.
- 82 See, e.g., "Germany and the Prussian Spirit," *The Round Table* 1:16 (Sept. 1914): 616–58; Beer, "America's Part Among Nations," 62.
- 83 Beer, "America's Part Among Nations," 63.
- 84 See Lionel Curtis, *The Commonwealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature of Citizenship in the British Empire, and into the Mutual Relations of the Several Communities Thereof* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1916).
- 85 Kerr to N. Astor, Apr. 13, 1915 in Deborah Lavin, *From Empire to Commonwealth*, 128. Nancy Astor is now best remembered as the first female MP to take up her seat in the House of Commons in 1919, and for her role in the "Cliveden Set" of interwar appeasers, which later grew out of the Round Table movement.
- 86 A.S. Eisenstadt, *Carnegie's Model Republic: Triumphant Democracy and the British-American Relationship* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 127.
- 87 Beer, *British Colonial Policy, 1754–1765* in Anthony Brundage and Richard A. Cosgrove, *The Great Tradition: Constitutional History and National Identity in Britain and the United States, 1870–1960* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 140.
- 88 Blum (ed.), *Public Philosopher*, xxiii.
- 89 Editorial (Herbert Croly), "An Alliance with Great Britain," *The New Republic* 5:55 (Nov. 20, 1915): 56–57. This call occurred against the backdrop of the independent foundations of James Bryce's *League of Nations Society*, and William Howard Taft's *League to Enforce Peace*.
- 90 Walter Lippmann to Graham Wallas, Apr. 21, 1916, in Blum (ed.), *Public Philosopher*, 46.
- 91 Roberts, "World War One and American Intervention," 123.
- 92 This marked similarity between the thought of Walter Hines Page and Walter Lippmann surely helped the Round Table set to make their pitch on the necessity of an enduring Anglo-American alliance. For Lippmann on the importance of sea power, see his *Stakes of Diplomacy* (1915) and also his *The Political Scene: An Essay on the Victory of 1918* (1919). Blum (ed.), *Public Philosopher*, xxii.
- 93 Walter Hines Page to Arthur W. Page, July 25, 1915, in Butler, *Lord Lothian*, 59.
- 94 Roberts, "Willard Straight, The First World War, and 'Internationalism of all Sorts,'" 506.
- 95 Lippmann to Graham Wallas, Apr. 21, 1916, in Roberts, "World War One and American Intervention," 127.

- 96 Mark W. Janis, *America and the Law of Nations, 1776-1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 201; and Lassa Oppenheimer, *International Law: A Treatise* 3d ed. (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2004), 264. See also Stephen Wertheim, "The League That Wasn't: American Designs for a Legalist-Sanctionist League of Nations and the Intellectual Origins of International Organization, 1914-1920," *Diplomatic History* 35:5 (Nov. 2011): 797-836. For Taft-Bryce correspondence, see William H. Taft to James Bryce, Oct. 21, 1916, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Western Manuscripts and Special Collections, James Bryce Papers U.S.A. (hereafter Bryce Papers U.S.A.), MS. Bryce U.S.A. 10: Letters, William Taft etc. ... to Bryce, folder 183; and William H. Taft to James Bryce, Feb. 6, 1917, Bryce Papers U.S.A.
- 97 Roberts, "World War One and American Intervention," 126.
- 98 Walter Weyl to Alfred Zimmern, Feb. 17, 1916, Zimmern Papers, MS. Zimmern 15: General Correspondence, 1916-18, folder 30; and Herbert Croly to Zimmern, Oct. 15, 1916, Zimmern Papers, MS. Zimmern 15, folder 34 [above quote]. The piece had already been published in *The New Republic* 5:61 (Jan. 1, 1916): 215-17.
- 99 Herbert Croly to Alfred Zimmern, Jan. 13, 1917, Zimmern Papers, MS. Zimmern 15: General Correspondence, 1916-18, folder 53.
- 100 Walter Lippmann (Editorial), "In the Next Four Years," *The New Republic* 10:122 (Mar. 3, 1917): 123.
- 101 See Kirkwood, "Alexander Hamilton and the Early Republic in American Thought," 35-37. See also John E. Kendle, *The Round Table Movement and Imperial Federation* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1975), 129.
- 102 Oliver, *Alexander Hamilton*, 435.
- 103 Lipmann, "In the Next Four Years," 123-24.
- 104 Lipmann, "In the Next Four Years," 124.
- 105 Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*, 279.
- 106 Stears, *Progressives, Pluralists, and the Problems of the State*, 130.
- 107 Stears, *Progressives, Pluralists, and the Problems of the State*, 126.
- 108 "A Statement from the Founders of The Round Table," *The New Republic* 13:159 (Nov. 17, 1917): vi.
- 109 See, e.g., Alfred Zimmern, "The Meaning of Nationality," *The New Republic* 5: 61 (Jan. 1, 1916): 215-17.
- 110 See, e.g., Noble, "The New Republic and the Idea of Progress," 190; and Nuechterlein, "The Dream of Scientific Liberalism," 172.
- 111 "A Statement from the Founders of The Round Table," vi.
- 112 "A Statement from the Founders of The Round Table," vi.
- 113 "A Statement from the Founders of The Round Table," vi.
- 114 "The Round Table Advert," *The New Republic* 13:164 (Dec. 22, 1917): advertising annex. Smuts would later prove to be perhaps the single most important "British" player at the Versailles Peace Conference other than Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Kerr, by then serving as Prime Minister David Lloyd George's personal secretary, had earlier in 1917 asked Smuts to reach out personally to President Wilson to convince him of the necessity of British Dominions like South Africa retaining former German colonies such as German Southwest Africa (modern Namibia). See "General Botha—an Appreciation," *The Round Table* 10 (1919): 98.
- 115 See, e.g., "When President Jackson ..." *The New Republic* 1:1 (Nov. 7, 1914): 5.
- 116 Roberts, "World War One and American Intervention," 126, 129.
- 117 For more on Philip Henry Kerr's role as David Lloyd George's "gatekeeper" at Versailles, see Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002).
- 118 For a wider discussion on how many of the individuals (and ideas) discussed above came to influence the post-World War One period through the clash of self-determination and empire at Versailles and in the League of Nations, see Susan Pedersen's excellent *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), especially relevant here is Chapter 1: "Of Covenants and Carve-Ups." For further relevant background, see also Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations: Review Essay," *American Historical Review* 112:4 (Oct. 2007): 1091-1117.
- 119 Lippmann to Zimmern, June 7, 1915. Lippmann "In the Next Four Years," 123-24. Herbert Croly to Alfred Zimmern, Aug. 6, 1915. See, e.g., Zimmern, "The Meaning of Nationality," 215-17. George Louis Beer, "America's Part Among Nations," 62; and "An Alliance with Great Britain," 56-57.
- 120 Roberts, "World War One and American Intervention," 118.

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