Reconstruction, and the New Deal. As Tulis and Mellow note and concur, any student of US politics would agree that the winners in these three transformational moments —the Federalists, the Radical Republicans, and FDR and congressional Democrats, respectively—enacted policy initiatives that fundamentally altered the course and nature of US politics and government. Indeed, it would be impossible to deny the significance of these winners' achievements. Where Tulis and Mellow chart new scholarly territory, however, is by flipping the script and focusing on the losers in these three transformational conflicts. According to the authors, each of the losers in these three instances—the Anti-Federalists, Andrew Johnson, and Barry Goldwater, respectively—consciously acted in such a way as to enable the raw material for their ideas and intellectual heirs to achieve down the line what they could not in their own time—to win where they once lost. Each transformational "moment" has its reciprocal "antimoment" that ultimately shapes US politics and government just as fundamentally as the political victory that made it a loser in the first place. The use of the word "consciously" is important here. The idea of agency on the part of the losers is critical to the argument Tulis and Mellow are making. In their analysis, each of the losers they examine makes conscious decisions and takes deliberate actions that go against success in the present with the aim of increasing the likelihood of political success at some future point in time. In the words of Tulis and Mellow, these are episodes of "self-transforming failure" (p. 11).

With the necessary groundwork laid, Tulis and Mellow move to individual chapter analysis of each of their three examples, beginning with the founding era. Based on a detailed and insightful examination of the Federalist Papers and assorted Anti-Federalist writings, readers are presented with a series of ratification arguments advanced by the two sides. Tulis and Mellow skillfully demonstrate how the arguments of the Anti-Federalists forced Publius to change their rhetoric on fundamentally important matters such as states' rights and the separation of powers. Although the Federalists' shift in rhetoric undoubtedly helped them reach their goal of constitutional ratification, Tulis and Mellow convincingly show how these rhetorical shifts also paved the way for the victory of Anti-Federalist constitutional interpretations down the road. It is worth quoting the text at length on this point (p. 59):

> On every contested topic, *The Federalist's* rhetorical strategy is to follow an initial denial of the logic of the Anti-Federalist position with a second or third iteration in which the normative conclusion of the Anti-Federalist is contested but the Anti-Federal picture of the logic of American political development is elaborated and endorsed. This rhetorical strategy helped Federalists succeed in the ratification debate, yet it provided the tools and authority by which their constitutional intentions and aspirations could, to this day, be challenged.

Not only does this quote explain the long-term significance of the losing Anti-Federalists but it also hints at the crucial role they played in enabling the ultimate success of the other two political losers identified here. In addition to Anti-Federalist rhetoric being adopted by Federalists to ensure the ratification of the Constitution, the Anti-Federalist–fueled defenses of the Constitution put out by the Federalists provided the intellectual heft and basis for Andrew Johnson to champion states' rights in the aftermath of the Civil War and for Barry Goldwater to do the same and attack the overall scope of the national government in the 1960s. Tulis and Mellow make clear that the Anti-Federalist episode of loser-turning-winner is critical to the similar transformations of the visions of both Johnson and Goldwater; they also show clearly that Johnson's experience shaped Goldwater's. This is crucial to understanding the authors' claim that, rather than the multiple governing regimes that some scholars see as present in US political history, there really is only one—molded and transformed by the conflicts described here but still at the same time fundamentally of a piece. It is here that Tulis and Mellow engage Rogers Smith's seminal theory of multiple traditions in US political development ("Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America," *American Political Science Review* 87 [3], 1993) and offer perhaps the study's most valuable insight as to how both liberalism and Smith's "ascriptive" traditions can coexist in the story of US political development: "Rather than a narrative of liberal constitutional progress, we offer an interpretation of a braided developmental process in which liberal constitutional moments are entwined with constitutional antimoments that sustain and ingrain illiberalisms or ascriptive hierarchies" (p. 6).

Legacies of Losing is an impressive work that all scholars of US political development and of US partisan change will need to engage. Some may argue with how much agency was actually exhibited by the political losers in question here, and others may point to other individuals and forces beyond Andrew Johnson that served to sink the liberal experiment of Reconstruction. It is also certainly the case that the key concept of "political logic" is left somewhat unclear throughout the text. So be it. *Legacies of Losing in American Politics* is a significant scholarly work that will shape the intellectual debate for years to come.

Politics without Stories: The Liberal Predicament. By David Ricci. Cambridge University Press, 2016. 268p. $103.95 cloth, $24.99 paper.
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David Ricci's *Politics without Stories: The Liberal Predicament* claims that, in the United States, liberals campaign at a chronic philosophical disadvantage. By

Ricci's account, liberals campaign by "string[ing] together one policy proposal after another" (p. 40) without recourse to an underlying philosophical perspective. Their philosophical scarcity is made particularly apparent by conservatives' practice of campaigning with "stories," specifically, *alpha stories*: those sweeping political claims that serve to organize conservative politics and policy. Ricci sets out first to explain this difference, describe its likely electoral consequences, and finally propose how liberals might address this disadvantage. He concludes that this imbalance has left liberals strategically impaired: voters can readily recount conservatives' programs, whereas liberal candidates are perceived as adopting ad hoc proposals in response to events.

Ricci's lively and meticulous monograph accounts for these ideological differences by describing different intellectual styles among those who produce liberal and conservative philosophies. He adopts an openly polemical approach, claiming the left's electoral success as a key ambition. Although his analysis is compelling, he forgoes potentially fruitful opportunities to engage in the empirical literature in US politics. This literature might propose that Ricci's philosophical differences are caused by compositional differences in the major political parties, or psychological differences in American partisans, or even the intrinsic political appeal of each party's policy agenda.

Ricci's argument turns on a tripartite categorization of political stories. At the highest level are "Uber Stories," which are so fundamental as to define the very nature of political membership. Because these stories are fundamental and have such consensus support, they play no part in political competition. At the next level, "Alpha Stories," is where Ricci finds ideological differences. Finally, there is a more ephemeral class of stories, typically referred to as "news," which comprise the press's attempts to sate the public's appetite for novelty: sporting events, natural disasters, wars abroad, and the like. These stories are replaced by one another as quickly as they are introduced. Accordingly, they cannot convey political meaning and identity and are therefore not useful in political competition.

Among conservatives, Ricci notes three alpha stories: the Judeo-Christian tradition as a source of political values, the notion of free markets as natural and just, and the reign of tradition. He argues that these stories provide conservatives a durable set of policy recommendations. No comparably unifying vision can be found among liberals, Ricci claims, because liberal philosophers neglect to consider underlying philosophical rules. Instead, liberals are said to "typically and continually complain about an endless variety of difficulties and dangers in modern life" (p. 39). Put another way, conservative laments about modern life can all be traced to a single set of problems—an insufficient adherence to conservative principles. Liberals, conversely, find unrelated causes underpinning each social problem. Ricci recounts recent books by liberal philosophers, publicists, and office seekers to show that they describe an ever-changing collection of exigent problems, a situation he describes as a "list syndrome." This results in liberal office seekers communicating novel solutions to unwanted pregnancies, racial inequality, pollution, and childhood obesity and so on, while conservatives provide succinct axioms, recurring across decades, which are internally consistent.

Ricci provides a number of reasons why liberals have been left philosophically disarmed. Liberalism is needlessly mired in jargon, as academic philosophers write for shrinking, technical audiences. Academic incentives require liberal philosophers to build a separate intellectual niche and then defend their turf from others. They are therefore more motivated by attempts to distinguish their contributions and to emphasize intellectual difference, rather than contributing to a common intellectual position. Liberals also venerate empirical induction, faithfully following arguments and evidence wherever they lead, whereas conservative philosophers are inclined to deduce new justifications for their existing preferences. Finally, liberal philosophers are disinclined to concede the necessity of political compromise.

Ricci highlights liberals' predicament by ascribing to it great electoral consequence. An obvious test of this proposition would be to measure the ideological consensus on symbolic questions, thereby determining whether conservative survey respondents have achieved greater consensus in response to the philosophical imbalance. Symbolic attitudes were in fact measured on the 1996 and 2014 General Social Survey, as was the standard deviation of agreement within each ideological cohort (see Tom W. Smith, Michael Davern, Jeremy Freese, and Stephen Morgan, *General Social Surveys*, 1972–2018). On 80% of the issues, liberals have higher standard deviations on symbolic questions than do conservatives, vindicating Ricci. However, a more complicated picture emerges when inspecting the pattern on individual items. For instance, among these items, a very narrow range of symbols enjoy differing ideological consensus: specifically, general impressions of American superiority, values of US citizenship, and veneration for the English language. More specific items measuring national pride—the United States' history of equitable treatment, its economic achievements, its scientific leadership, and its global political influence—see no ideological difference. Finally, the temporal instability in the estimates of ideological consensus challenges Ricci's story. The putative strength of conservatives' philosophical consistency is in its rhetorical stability: while liberals campaign on a fluctuating list of proposals, conservatives consistently advocate for the same ideas, imparting a widespread understanding of which conservative ideas go with which. However, some symbols

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subject to overwhelming conservative consensus in 2014 (the importance of speaking English, the value of US citizenship, having lived in the United States for life) saw no ideological differences in 1996. This pattern is consistent with the notion that, for the American public, the symbolic resonance of specific stories is a reflection of the most recent election, not the long-term accumulation of philosophical messaging.

Theories of the American party system also provide competing explanations for Ricci's pattern of messaging. Matt Grossman and David A. Hopkins ("Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats," *Perspectives on Politics*, 13 (1), 2015) argue that it is a mistake to regard the two major political parties as organizational mirror images or, most commonly, as two coalitions of politically motivated elites. Instead, they argue that the Republican Party is (for largely sociological and demographic reasons) motivated by advancing ideological purity, disciplined by purists in think tanks and conservative media. The Democratic Party, in contrast, comprises an ad hoc alliance between distinct social groups—racial minorities, labor unions, climate change activists, and so on. According to this account, Democratic elites might be incapable of adopting Ricci's prescription, because they lack the institutional resources to achieve ideological discipline.

Theories of public opinion also complicate the Ricci account. Christopher Ellis and James A. Stimson (*Ideology in America*, 2012) find a fundamental ideological asymmetry among the US public. When Americans are asked to appraise a specific policy proposal, there is a persistent appetite for expanded government intervention and liberal policy answers. When asked an abstract question about the proper scope of government, without recourse to a specific policy, conservative symbols are favored. This aggregate paradox—that the US public prefers specific liberal policies and general conservative principles—is also apparent on an individual level (almost one-third of the US public has this bundle of preferences). This finding might reframe Ricci's paradox as a rational response by elites to the strategic contours of US politics: liberals emphasize specific policies, and conservatives abstract symbols, because those are the strongest cards they have. Similarly, others find psychological differences along the ideological spectrum: conservatives are more inclined to symbolic enchantment, whereas liberals are more equipped for rationalism (J. Eric Oliver and Thomas Julian Wood, *Enchanted America: How Intuition and Reason Divide Our Politics*, 2018), or that incompatible values among liberals and conservatives preclude interchangeable political appeals (Mark Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler, *Prius or Pickup? How the Answers to Four Simple Questions Explain America's Great Divide*, 2018).

Finally, a voluminous literature has abstracted away the details of specific political campaigns and instead posited that US presidential elections respond powerfully to prevailing economic circumstance. To the extent that Ricci intends to resolve the liberal predicament to improve their political prospects, this literature would suggest that styles of ideological appeal operate on the electoral margins, yielding only a modest difference on voters after the powerful effect of economics has been felt.

Ricci's carefully researched and elegantly argued book provides a valuable contribution to students of US politics and to those interested in the electoral implications of philosophical debates. In an area dominated by those who use quantitative methods on survey data, Ricci's focus on the intellectual style of competing philosophical schools is a vital and distinct contribution. It will surely prove an influential claim among those seeking to understand the sources of ideological differences in the US public.

The Politics of Losing: Trump, the Klan, and the Mainstreaming of Resentment. By Rory McVeigh and Kevin Estep. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019. 320p. $32.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.
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As the outlines of President Trump's reelection campaign become clearer, it seems likely that stoking racial division will again be a central feature. According to *The Politics of Losing: Trump, the Klan, and the Mainstreaming of Resentment* by Rory McVeigh and Kevin Estep, this should come as no surprise. Drawing parallels to periods of heightened Ku Klux Klan activity throughout American history, the authors show how Trump succeeded in 2016 by appealing to white nationalist sentiment.

McVeigh and Estep contribute to an expanding literature on contemporary backlash politics. From Kathy Cramer's (2016) *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness and the Rise of Scott Walker* to Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan Hajnal's (2015) *White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics* and Ashley Jardina's (2019) *White Identity Politics*, a raft of recent scholarship documents the ways in which white Americans' fears and resentments have been nurtured, consolidated, and channeled to the political benefit of right-wing politicians and the Republican Party. Along with a broader scholarship on the persistence and political activation of racism, work in this area often makes arguments using experimental or fieldwork research and behavioral and opinion data. McVeigh and Estep's innovation is to use a historical case study approach, comparing episodes of heightened KKK activity in the 1860s, 1920s, and 1950–60s to Trump's 2016 strategies and bases of electoral support. The authors argue that Trump, like earlier KKK leaders, has taken opportunistic advantage of white Americans' sense of loss, focusing their resentment on others perceived as unfairly benefiting at their expense. The result is episodic white