ideology but by material concerns. In contrast, parties that operate in urban areas cultivate electoral constituencies that care more about programmatic issues and are thus harder to co-opt.

The book's evidence includes an impressive array of interviews with leftist, Islamist, and pro-regime politicians, which provide granular detail on how co-optation works. Another notable empirical contribution is a dataset of 440 leftist politicians in Morocco who won office during the communal elections of 2003 and 2009 (p. 101). The author finds that leftist politicians in small communes with mostly illiterate and unemployed constituencies have a higher probability of switching to loyalist parties than those in larger and wealthier communes. Such patterns suggest that the regime tended to co-opt politicians in impoverished areas where clientelism is rampant. Although, as the author acknowledges, the data's coverage of politicians is severely limited due to restrictions imposed by the Moroccan Interior Ministry. Buehler's effort to collect such data in a difficult authoritarian context is laudable. The inclusion of Mauritania as a case study should also be applauded, because it brings attention to an understudied case among scholars of autocratic regimes and comparative politics.

Why Alliances Fail does not stop at explaining why co-optation succeeds in some cases and fails in others, but further seeks to understand why some opposition parties make themselves vulnerable to co-optation by seeking support in rural areas in the first place. To address this question, Buehler examines the period that followed decolonization in the Maghreb and argues that the ways that regimes consolidated power shortly after independence played a key role in structuring political competition. The Bourguiba regime in post-independence Tunisia built an urban support base, whereas regimes in Morocco and Mauritania built rural bases of support. Buehler argues that these early regime-building strategies in Morocco and Mauritania portended future weakness for opposition forces who ended up competing on the regime's turf in rural areas and became more liable to co-optation. In Tunisia by contrast, the Bourguiba regime had so alienated and politically weakened its rural regions that political parties had little to gain by moving to these areas. The opposition parties in Tunisia retained an urban base and thus were protected from co-optation later.

Although Buehler's argument that regime-consolidation strategies after independence shape opposition politics is intriguing, it could have been made more compelling by fleshing out the motivations of opposition parties and their reasons for acting. It remains unclear why leftists in Morocco and Islamists in Mauritania would choose to move to rural regions, given the fierce competition they were likely to expect in those places. The reader is left wondering why these parties did not choose to safely remain in urban areas where, according to the author's argument, they would be shielded from aggressive regime co-optation and why other parties (Islamists in Morocco and leftists in Mauritania) avoided making the same mistakes. The importance of historical precedents could have been more persuasively conveyed by laying out why opposition actors acted the way they did and how these early choices constrained later options.

Overall, this book is a strong addition to the literature on coalition politics and authoritarianism and will spark many debates. It illustrates the intricacies of co-optation under authoritarian regimes in ways that promise to enrich future studies on autocratic survival. This book also sheds new light on patterns of regime transitions during the Arab Spring, which is especially valuable to scholars of the Middle East and North Africa. The explanation for why the Moroccan regime survived the Arab Spring, for example, challenges existing arguments that emphasize elite cohesion and the inherent robustness of Arab monarchies. Instead, Buehler draws attention to how the previous co-optation of leftists made the opposition incapable of mounting a serious cross-ideological challenge to the regime in 2011. This work thus demonstrates the importance of autocratic strategies of co-optation in influencing whether opposition mobilization arises and succeeds.

Religion and Nationalism in Global Perspective. By J. Christopher Soper and Joel S. Fetzer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 280p. $105.00 cloth, $29.99 paper.
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The Easter church bombings in Sri Lanka, which themselves followed the mosque shootings in New Zealand, are tragic reminders of how raw and active religion is in national politics around the world today. These acts were not terrorism against a ruling elite or ethos, but were targeted at a small religious minority in the country. Given that the focus of scholarly attention has been trained on how states treat religious minorities through their regulation, it is important to consider both how these regimes are established in the first place and the degree of entanglement religion has with nations in the form of nationalism. From my own point of view, I took on this review in the hopes of understanding how the US case compares to other countries. Given the strident rise of Christian nationalism in the United States, abetted by Trump, I hoped to gain perspective on this process growing from what I thought was a relatively stable and pluralistic civil religion.

Christopher Soper and Joel Fetzer have been doing high-level comparative religion and politics work for many years now (this is their second book in the Cambridge Religion and Social Theory series), so it is

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not surprising that the ambition of this project is significant. They aimed to write the first comparative study of the origins and development of three models of religion and nationalism: religious nationalism, civil-religious nationalism, and secular nationalism. They have done that.

A focus on origins signals that this is a work of historical institutionalism, where they trace the forces at play at the time of the nation's founding and follow them to the present. Their central argument is that "patterns established at the time of state formation continue to be of crucial importance to contemporary understandings of religion and nationalism, and that those divisions are reflected in popular attitudes toward the state" (p. 74). As such, they pick cases that cover a 3 x 2 matrix: (origin) each of the three models on one axis, and (duration) stability versus instability on the other axis. That careful case selection helps them gain leverage on the forces that emerge in society to challenge nationalist ideas and arrangements.

This is a deeply researched volume, with an amount of country-level detail that belies the book's length. I learned a tremendous amount from each chapter (and not just because I am not a comparativist). Each chapter follows a similar scheme that first details the history of the founding and then the subsequent development. This often takes the path of following party debates and regime changes, as well as cataloging societal shifts and group relations. But the cases also take up modern data from multiple levels, such as the elite level in religious magazines and public opinion data that are widely available. This results in considerable evidence on which to back their claims and also a serious amount of nuance to process. These country cases invite prolonged consideration. Soper and Fetzer are to be commended for sinking so much effort into diverse cases from across the world.

It was, however, a bit frustrating that different aspects of the argument are all labeled "nationalism": for example, institutional arrangements are referred to as creating nationalism ("variant ideas among the delegates about the kind of nationalism they were creating," p. 194), but so is the ideology of groups about who belongs in the nation. In their argument, institutional arrangements are effectively in lockstep with the ideologies that govern society, so this labeling is consistent with that approach. However, it may invite a stronger association than if they had labeled the variables separately and let their data work to establish that connection.

The country cases engage Israel (unstable civil religion), Uruguay (stable secular), India (unstable secular), Greece (stable religious), and Malaysia (unstable religious), while the United States occupies their stable civil-religious nationalism cell. This line follows a long tradition of argument in the United States that its twin pillars of church–state separation have been able to incorporate all believers. Therefore, while embracing none in particular and extending rights gradually to all, the nation can gain widespread loyalty. That is not wrong, and loyalty to the United States is widespread among minorities, but the United States did not start out this way. Differing factions (think Madison compared to Washington) understood the link of religion to the state quite differently. Some states still had established churches for several decades. By the time the federal government had the capacity to enforce the First Amendment, the politics of backlash against an inclusive civil religious model had begun to grow. Soper and Fetzer admit to some of this as they introduce the cases (p. 26), but the US chapter goes to pains to reinforce its "stable" label, mostly by claiming that religious nationalist sentiments have not yet prevailed.

The more important problem with the argument is that assessing religious connections to nationalism does not stress-test the categorical claim. They summarize the US case by arguing that "it is hard to make a religious nationalist claim in the United States because the First Amendment guarantees religious free exercise rights for all" (p. 226). But Christian nationalist claims have been made for decades by elites and have gained traction in recent years, especially in the current administration. We know this because of a number of articles (not cited) that have documented the extent of Christian nationalist sentiment, its connection to the limits of citizenship, and even its deep roots in the party system, policy issue stances, and vote selections. Simply put, large portions of the electorate believe that America is a Christian nation and adopt political positions and back politicians to enact it (or prevent its further erosion).

That pattern is not only very difficult to square with a "stable civil religion" tag but it also raises the question about what "stability" and the models of religious nationalism actually mean. Does it mean the ideology does not change or that the institutions do not change? In the United States, Soper and Fetzer appear to hang their hat on the First Amendment (that institutions did not change means stability), whereas in the case of Israel they highlight the factions challenging their civil-religious model. The robustness of the categorization is arguably in doubt given how easy it is to substitute the United States for Israel in this statement: "instability in Israel's model arises from political pressures from different quarters toward either religious nationalism or secular nationalism" (p. 74).

That key measurement issue is not the only concern. There is very little discussion of how nationalism should be measured in opinion data, nor is there any discussion about how models of religious nationalism should be measured. Put another way, whether measures of religion correlate with support of the state or dislike of nearby rival states does not necessarily illuminate which model of religious nationalism they support. I saw no measures of ascriptive nationalism, which would seem necessary to

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complete the argument. These data are available in the United States, though I am not sure where else.

In the end, Soper and Fetzer are right that there is no one model of religion and nationalism: how religion orients itself toward the state depends on a variety of considerations that together look like pluralism. None of the models is inherently stable; all of these more or less open democratic states face the prospect of changing electorates and new popular models of nationalism that do not mesh with their institutional arrangements. One productive way forward is to engage with religious regulation measures systematically gathered from the world's countries to see how states cope with changing constituencies and how that, in turn, affects commitment to models of nationalism in the country. Though this thoughtful book stands on its own, of course, it will also fuel any effort to expand inquiry to other cases.

Borderland Battles: Violence, Crime, and Governance at the Edges of Colombia's War. By Annette Idler. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 496p. $99.00 cloth, $34.95 paper.
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Borders divide people, states, institutions, and traditions. In her nuanced book, Annette Idler focuses instead on what borders connect: communities, illicit markets, and violent organizations.

We might expect the numerous violent nonstate groups along Colombia's borders with Venezuela and Ecuador to be competitors—for ideological reasons in the case of Colombian insurgent groups and counterinsurgents, or for economic ones in the case of lucrative illicit markets. But Idler provides a conceptual framework for the numerous ways these groups cooperate, narrowly or broadly. She then draws out implications of these arrangements for civilians' security in the borderlands of Colombia/Venezuela and Colombia/Ecuador. In this way, the book speaks to the literatures on armed group alliances, criminal conflict, and rebel governance.

Idler develops multifaceted theories to answer three questions: What are violent nonstate actors' relationships and what explains them? What impact do these relationships have on citizen security? And what is the effect of the border on these violent nonstate groups' relationships and civilians? Chapter 2 classifies violent nonstate actors' relationships into three "clusters:" enmity, rivalry, and friendship. Within each cluster are more specific arrangements, such as combat and armed disputes in enmity, spot sales and tactical alliances in rivalry, and supply chain relationships and pacific coexistence in friendship (p. 40). Idler associates the clusters with distrust-reducing mechanisms that allow groups to work together, such as personal connections, mutual interests, and shared values. After providing an overview of the borderland settings in chapter 3, readers curious about the fieldwork and the research design should detour to the epilogue and appendix A before moving on to the chapters that provide more in-depth overviews of the three clusters.

Chapters 4–6 describe each cluster and civilians' experiences living under each. Each of the clusters has implications for what Idler calls "citizen security," which encompasses several dimensions, such as social fabric and a reciprocal relationship with the provider of governance and the citizen. Security is both "objective" and "subjective," with the latter going beyond measures of observable violent events to include psychological effects of violence such as fear and coping.

Chapter 4 focuses on the enmity cluster and how the interactions that comprise it—combat and armed disputes—affect the citizens who live in the contested areas. Citizens can remain safe if they avoid armed disputes in cities or combat sites in the rural areas. Chapter 5 considers how the different arrangements under rivalry affect citizens. Surprisingly, in this mode in which armed groups cooperate, albeit guardedly, citizen security is worse than when enmity or friendship prevails. Here, uncertainty pervades communities, and selective violence can affect people who are unclear about who is in charge. Chapter 6 looks at areas of "friendship," where civilians have the best chance at something resembling security, even if it is provided by violent nonstate groups. Here, under strategic alliances, pacific coexistence, and preponderance, these violent groups can develop governance relationships with civilians living in the affected areas. Idler characterizes this as shadow governance and shadow citizenship.

In Chapter 7, Idler considers the effect of the border on these relationships among nonstate groups and civilians. She identifies four ways in which the border functions: as facilitator, deterrent, magnet, and disguise (p. 252). The first two relate to the border per se and its transnational character, and the second two relate to the distance to the center. Borders facilitate illicit trade and deter interventions from the state. They also serve as a magnet for illicit groups and disguise the behavior of these groups from the central political authorities. Chapter 8 raises areas for new research after covering some examples of borderlands in other regions. Idler suggests considering whether the nature of borders matters, as well as the type of organized crime present, exploring how nonstate order and citizen security move beyond the war and peace binary, and further examining how nonstate actors, civilians, and the state interact.

Key contributions of the book are that it draws attention to the relationships among violent nonstate groups and provides detailed accounts of borderland residents' lives. The civil war literature has conceived of relationships between states and nonstate groups, and between armed actors and civilians. Comparatively little

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