The second level exhibiting pressure on international actors is the condition of future expectations. States and leaders are aware of future costs and expectations relevant to an international conflict. If they feel they will lose the upper hand in the future, then it will be better to escalate the conflict now than in the future when their military position will be weaker. Colaresi calls this theory the dynamic two-level pressure theory and it works exceedingly well throughout the book. The push and pull of domestic conditions as well as the international situation conflate to either push states to continue a rivalry or pull them to terminate a conflict. This interaction is continuous and thus dynamic.

To test the dynamic two-level pressure theory, Colaresi uses a multimethod approach. Examining the Somali-Ethiopian, Egyptian-Israeli, and Sino-American rivalries with the structured, focused case study method, he is able to construct a variable oriented narrative that illustrates his theory at work. After the case studies, he "zooms out" and uses large-n statistical techniques to test his hypotheses with daily events data. Once again, he finds strong support for his theory where the variables of rivalry outbidding and increased future expectations are observed. He also finds support for de-escalation predictions if the rival dyad has a common external enemy. Issues under contention of a salient nature (usually territory) are also of importance for escalation and de-escalation (if the issue is settled). His statistical tests are impressive for incorporating relevant controls and dealing with a potential selection-effects problem by testing for its existence.

Colaresi's case studies are equally impressive and also timely (particularly the Ethiopia-Somalia rivalry case). His writing style is clear and concise. Some researchers may overlook the historical discussion contained in the case studies in the rush to judge the statistical models, but these case discussions are important for theory construction and subsequent testing. Furthermore, the case studies are important for readers who may be unconvinced by statistics. The author is also able to incorporate strong statistical measures into his case studies with the use of daily events data that show the ebb and flow of the rivalry throughout time.

The book contains a few flaws. First of all, Colaresi has to deal with the problem that data is not available to test his true theory. Therefore, the operationalizations he uses for rivalry outbidding and future expectations may not get at the true meaning of the terms. He does well enough to contort available data into close approximations of his theoretical concepts, yet there is a divergence between what the case studies would consider a negative future expectation of conflict and what is tested in the statistical model. Furthermore, Colaresi, and all researchers for that matter, should present predicted probabilities so that unfamiliar researchers and students may be better able to grasp the importance of the categorical data outputs.

Another potential problem is with the dyadic propositions in the theory. It is unclear if there is truly a dyadic process at work here. For instance, in the Somalia-Ethiopia case, the rivalry outbidding that resulted in escalation seemed to be confined to one side (geographic maps might also have been helpful for the reader unfamiliar with some regions covered). Are dual interactions important, or will the theory work just as well if only one side experiences outbidding and high future costs? Timing issues are typically ignored in international relations research, yet they are critical to the understanding and testing of theoretical propositions. Do these processes work at the same time? Is there more likely to be rivalry escalation if an autocracy escalates first? These are all important questions, yet they cannot be covered since the theory and the data do not currently account for the timing of events. In addition, I would have liked to see a greater emphasis on the importance of issues under contention in the statistical tests (they are clearly important for the case studies). Might the issue variables more correctly account for the variance at work?

Colaresi's work is important in that scholars and the public at large know very little of the process of escalation and de-escalation in the context of long-standing rivals. The work is also critical in that researchers must now begin to focus on how the de-escalation process works in real-time situations. It is clear that scholars should start to incorporate the domestic level into their international relations theories. Without a theory of domestic political pressures, a theory of rivalry escalation and termination would be empty. Second of all, it is important that scholars begin to tackle the question of how the diametrically opposing processes of peace and escalation originate. In the context of rivalry, there are many important questions and answers to be developed. Colaresi has made a good start, and it is hoped that in combination with other efforts, there might be progress toward an accumulation of knowledge in uncovering the rivalry dynamics and processes at work in these important conflictual pairs of states.

Fostering Fundamentalism: Terrorism, Democracy and American Engagement in Central Asia. By Matthew Crosston. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006. 186p. $89.95 cloth.
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— Roger D. Kangas, *The George C. Marshall Center*

In his book, Matthew Crosston lays out an interesting and worthwhile argument: that by focusing on short-term security assistance and long-term democracy building in authoritarian regimes, the United States is unwittingly creating conditions for extremism and anti-American sentiments throughout the world. His case study is the region of Central Asia—one that had largely been ignored by policymakers until the need for non-OPEC energy that increased in the 1990s and the military actions

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in Afghanistan that began in October 2001. According to Crosston, given the newfound strategic importance of Central Asia in its "global war on terrorism," the U.S. government has all but abandoned the notion of advocating democracy in the region. He emphatically states, "There has been no real oversight to gauge whether vibrant democracies are being established [in Central Asia]. And there has certainly not been a process where regimes have been singled out and denounced for the fact that they have consistently denied their citizens the right to chose their leaders and engage their governments in peaceful opposition and open debate" (p. 18). This particular theme runs throughout the book under the moniker "Wonka Vision of Democracy"—a reference to the children's tale of *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory*—which suggests that U.S. policymakers ignore the "reality of democracy" while professing "admiration for the fantasy democracy supposedly emerging." Crosston quotes excerpts from various public statements of U.S. government officials in a variety of settings to show that this is a "bipartisan effort" to avoid the difficult challenges raised by providing assistance to authoritarian regimes.

After an initial chapter outlining the threat of terrorism and emerging extremism in Central Asia, the author examines what he sees as the fundamental contradiction in U.S. policy: "how foreign policy is professed philosophically and how foreign policy is implemented financially" (p. 14). His case study is the region of the Ferghana Valley, which, he notes, is an ideal test case as it presents itself as a highly contentious piece of territory. Moreover, it is a region that has repeatedly been considered a hotbed of Islamic extremism. This is a concern raised by the respective national governments of the Ferghana Valley, as well as analysts and officials from outside of the region. Three subsequent chapters focus on the countries that possess part of the valley—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In each of these, Crosston highlights examples where he believes that the United States has purposefully, or unknowingly, overlooked the lack of democratization efforts by the governments in an effort to curry favor and remain engaged in Central Asia. He follows this set of studies with a brief chapter on Hizb ut-Tahrir and concluding remarks on how shortsighted U.S. policies in the region exude a sense of "double-standards" that will only make the populations in the respective countries skeptical of U.S. intentions.

In short, this book makes no apologies for its harsh criticism of U.S. policy toward Central Asia, and the author states that he hopes to have brought "light to the manner in which the United States provided aid to the region and how such manners compromise our security in the more important long term. While the local regimes increased their repression we looked duplicitous and self-serving" (p. 163). Legislation exists (for example, Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) that should limit such partnering with authoritarian regimes, but in actuality, policymakers prefer to overlook these principled measures for short-term gains. This theme is repeated throughout the book, indicating that the author had a clear conclusion drawn at the beginning of the text. Not surprisingly, discussions throughout the ensuing chapters serve to support this claim, giving the book more of a feel that it is ultimately polemical in nature, rather than a social science exercise. Part of this can be explained by the fact that Crosston attempts to examine a range of issues in very little space, and so one has to accept the fact that this is not a thorough historical examination of the forces at play in the region.

The style and focus of the book highlight other methodological concerns. First of all, there is an odd absence of interviews with U.S. government officials or others who might be engaged in security assistance, democracy assistance, U.S. policy in Central Asia, or even nongovernmental organizations that are recipients of U.S. assistance. Without question, the speeches and official documents quoted in the chapters are worth noting, but it would have been a more powerful argument had the "official position" been given a chance to explain, defend, or even refute some of these earlier statements. Not surprisingly, as in any organization, there are a variety of views within the U.S. government, including those who question the extent to which one should associate with authoritarian regimes. Authors such as Thomas Carothers have shown that the internal process of foreign assistance is complex and does reflect a competition of views *within* the policy community.

This brings up a second important methodological question: What are the perspectives of people *from the region*? Are the programs and propaganda of groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir or Al Qaeda resonating in Central Asia? In the Ferghana Valley, in particular? Before absolutist comments can be made, is there an effort to see the range of views in the region and the perceptions of U.S. programming? This can be done, as Zeyno Baran proved in her 2004 study of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia. Ultimately, such data challenges any work that tries to create direct causal relationships between policies and regional outcomes.

Finally, an examination of the endnotes suggests that the majority of the citations were from Internet sources, with a small group being the core citations. Not that searching for electronic sources is inherently wrong or unscholarly itself, but it ought to be complemented with other source materials and some element of fieldwork to at least verify or refute the secondary sources used. There has been quite a prolific body of literature on 1) Central Asian politics, 2) terrorism in Central Asia, and 3) U.S. assistance programs toward the region, including security assistance. It is a shame that the author overlooked these critical and important works that attempt to wrestle with similar themes. A 2006 study by the RAND Corporation entitled *Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform?: U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes* is a case

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in point—and a work that employed painstaking efforts in interviewing official and nongovernmental actors in the assistance arena.

Overall, this is an interesting exercise in polemics that crafts an argument worth presenting. The author should be commended for his desire to take such a principled and philosophically logical position. However, the work itself would have been enhanced with greater rigor in approaching the subject and an appreciation for the domestic situation within each of the noted countries, as well as the realities of U.S. policymaking. Obviously, such a work would require more extensive depth and regional knowledge—a worthy topic for a political scientist interested in the impact of policy programs on foreign states.

Democracy as Human Rights: Freedom and Equality in the Age of Globalization. By Michael Goodhart. New York: Routledge, 2005. 256p. $95.00 cloth, $26.95 paper.
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— Jerry Pubantz, *University of North Carolina at Greensboro*

Globalization, which had its modern origins in the capitalist expansion of the nineteenth century, has reached a level of development that challenges the sovereign independence, power, and authority of the nation-state, the primary actor in international politics for the last three hundred years. In so doing, it undermines popular sovereignty as traditionally understood in contemporary democracies. In his book, Michael Goodhart provides a tightly reasoned analysis of globalization's challenge to sovereignty and democratic theory, and puts forward a provocative redefinition of democracy that, he argues, can withstand globalization, even flourish in a globalized world.

Goodhart reminds us that state sovereignty is a period piece that arose out of the shambles of collapsing medieval political thought. Its origins reflected the new realities of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as the church's hierarchical and functional system of rule in Europe gave way to secular territorial states governed mostly by monarchies. The Westphalian system provided order internally, with the state mediating the relationship between the individual and the world. State sovereignty provided the moral justification first for the monarch to rule within established borders, and then, following the American and French Revolutions, for the people to rule. Goodhart advises his readers that modern political thought succeeded because the older worldview did not match reality any longer (p. 39). Theories of state sovereignty and subsequent democratic theories provided better explanations of new institutions and relationships.

The author argues that globalization, by striking at state sovereignty, threatens popular rule within democracies, and in so doing uncovers the weaknesses of modern democratic theory in a growingly borderless world. He writes: "Modern political theorists have long taken for granted that the sovereign state is the site of politics. . . . [T]his assumption extends to most thinking about democracy as well" (p. 20). The author reasons that despite its claim to universal application, the social contract theory assumes a finite citizenry within specified borders, with no authority for popular rule beyond the state's territory.

Goodhart ably describes the two general responses of those seeking to save democratic theory from the threat of globalization: the communitarian or nationalist rejection of globalization, attempting to keep global forces at bay, and the cosmopolitan project to democratize politics at the transnational level. The first approach he labels impractical. The second he finds in error theoretically, whether it comes in the form of enlarging the idea of popular sovereignty by somehow democratizing existing global institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, or alternatively promoting emergent global civil society as the new global democracy.

In their place the author argues for reconceptualizing democracy, emphasizing its human rights tradition specifically as "a political commitment to universal emancipation through securing the equal enjoyment of fundamental human rights for everyone" (p. 5). Citing the long struggle to end subjection—from the Levellers and Thomas Paine to Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Frederick Douglass—Goodhart suggests that at the heart of democratic theory is the demand for equality and freedom. He contends that these values have resonance in a world with disappearing borders and should constitute the core of democracy in the era of globalization. He proposes setting aside some traditional elements of what we think of as democratic life, arguing that we must give up "on the ideas of citizenship and popular rule as we know them" (p. 91) and judge generally accepted democratic institutions (legislatures, local governments, etc.) and procedures (pluralist politics) on the basis of their efficacy in securing rights. The "fundamental" rights that Goodhart believes must be secured are legion, including not only civil and political rights but also the social, cultural, and economic rights so often asserted by peoples in the developing world, as well as a spectrum of rights that include "equal access to public benefits and services . . . affordable access to health care, a living wage, a decent education [and] the right to choose one's own lifestyle" (pp. 143–46).

The author makes a forceful statement on the need to promote emancipation through expanded human rights as part of any democratic theory. He asserts that democracy as human rights (DHR) "is concerned with an end, not with any particular institutional method or procedure for ensuring it" (p. 150). Goodhart admits that achieving DHR will require "nothing less than the transformation of political culture" (p. 156). But therein lies the problem. For this reader, his diagnosis of the problem is flawless, his attention to sovereignty's growing inutility in the post-state era is well worth serious reflection, and his clarion

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