

high Soviet culture was tacitly encouraged. Fidel Castro was given rock star treatment during a 40-day visit to the USSR. It helped that top Soviet officials, right up to Nikita Khrushchev, associated Cuba with the revolutionary excitement of their own youth.

Latin America reinforced socialist internationalism, an element of official ideology that became central to Soviet identity after Stalin's death. Rupprecht treats the socialist internationalism of the late 1950s and 1960s (the chronological center of the book) as an amalgam of Soviet internationalist traditions of the 1920s and the newer opening to the outside world during Khrushchev's Thaw. Rupprecht finds that socialist internationalism was not imposed on Soviet artists, cultural figures, and academics, but rather enthusiastically embraced by them through at least 1968. Latin America experts, including the professionalized younger generation, invariably viewed the region through the internationalist ideological lens. More controversially, as this argument runs counter to prevailing assumptions about the decay of socialist ideology in the late Soviet period, Rupprecht suggests that socialist internationalism was accepted uncritically by the wider Soviet public of the period.

Rupprecht devotes two chapters to Latin American travelers' and exchange students' views of the Soviet Union. No less than Soviet travelers to Latin America, these visitors found their preconceptions reinforced rather than challenged by their visits—and their preconceptions were, up to the 1970s, overwhelmingly positive. As Rupprecht comments several times, such basic amenities as running water were much more impressive to visitors from the global South than to westerners, who were often turned off by trips to the USSR. Latin American leftists found the Soviet message of “non-capitalist development” compelling (in-line with what we know about Soviet foreign policy in this period, Rupprecht shows that communism and revolution were downplayed in favor of state-led modernization in Soviet propaganda in the Third World). Although some committed Latin American leftists gradually became disillusioned with the USSR for some of the same reasons as the west European and American left, the Soviets continued to win favor from indigenous writers from the poorer Latin American countries. More surprisingly, prominent Latin American conservatives and Catholics occasionally found common ground with the Soviet regime for its apparent social conservatism and success in keeping pornography, rock ‘n’ roll, and other contaminants from the American-inspired global popular culture at bay. Here, as elsewhere, Rupprecht's arguments are tight, nuanced, and interesting.

Overall, this outstanding book deserves a wide audience among Soviet historians and cultural historians of the Cold War. It rests on deep and wide-ranging primary source research (Russian archives, Russian and Spanish-language publications, and a handful of interviews), as well as a thorough command of recent scholarship in English, German, Russian, and Spanish, yet it is well written and engaging. I would encourage Cambridge University Press to make it available in an affordable paperback edition so that it may be used in the advanced undergraduate and graduate classroom.

JULIE HESSLER
University of Oregon

Nation, Ethnicity, and Race on Russian Television: Mediating Post-Soviet Difference. By Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz. London: Routledge, 2015. xvi, 284 pp.

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In a 2015 article for the *New York Times*, Gary Shteyngart spent a week in a luxury hotel and watched Russian television. Noting that the vast majority of Russians receive

their news from TV and that most stations are state-owned, Shteyngart wanted to determine if a week's worth of it was hazardous to his health. He survived, drank too much, and concluded that a generation from now we would find Russian state television from 2015 as ridiculous as Soviet television.

Shteyngart's article illustrates the prevailing perceptions of Russian news in the Putin era: a fantasy assortment of doctored stories and vapid entertainment that might require visits from the therapist after too much exposure. In this important, detailed, and exhaustive study, Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz did not need therapeutic assistance, but they did watch television across a vital two-year period (September 2010 to September 2012). They also conducted interviews with 16 prominent television journalists (including the notorious Dmitrii Kiselev), and sorted through the various ways that television programs dealt with thorny issues such as nationalism, ethnic differences, race, and religion in post-Soviet Russia. Their work is certainly not a breezy read like Shteyngart's, but the conclusions are all the more sobering.

Treating Russian television news as a consensus-management tool and a media form that attempts to shape nationhood, Hutchings and Tolz argue that dismissing it as simply "state-controlled" misses much of the point of how TV functions in Russia today. As they write, television reflects the broader struggles within Russia to stabilize, unify, and formulate policies. Television has also played decisive parts in creating "media events" and in "generating different, and often conflicting, modes of combining national unity and ethno-cultural diversity (16)." Television, in short, provides an important window into the ongoing conflicts over ethnic versus civic forms of nationhood and identities in contemporary Russia.

Hutchings and Tolz waded into the scholarly arguments about Russian nationhood before detailing how reporting on interethnic relations has proven to be difficult terrain, at best, for the media to traverse. As they argue, the Kremlin's attempts to promote an image of harmony, one frequently expressed on TV, has produced a media landscape "replete with contradictions which manifested themselves in the approach taken to ethnicity-related questions" (67). Television reports mostly presented ethnic diversity as one of Russia's unique qualities while simultaneously reporting issues such as migration and violence as problems associated with particular ethnic groups. Combined with a tendency to cover the Russian Orthodox Church as "an unchallenged pillar of Russianness which transcends national and religious identities" (68), Russian television both mirrors and shapes the contradictions, xenophobia, and hatreds growing within Russian society at large.

The book covers these themes through a series of case studies: the mostly unsuccessful attempts to commemorate the new "Day of National Unity" holiday (which turned into reports on blood donation campaigns); coverage of the December 2010 Moscow riots that began after the murder of a Spartak Moscow fan (where blame was shifted not just to the attackers but to the North Caucasus and its residents as a whole); the popularity of reality television shows such as *Shkola* (where xenophobic attitudes are frequently expressed); the initially subdued coverage of the 2011 protests and 2012 elections and how state media injected ethnicity into their reports; and the coverage of the Pussy Riot scandal as one that turned Christ the Savior Cathedral into a "supremely sacred space" (206) on the small screen, all serve as the focal points for Hutchings and Tolz to argue persuasively that Russian television again and again reified ethnic nationalism as the basis for Russian belonging today.

Many of the conclusions Hutchings and Tolz reach will be not too surprising to readers of this review, but they are backed by exhaustive research, detailed data, and an ongoing engagement with relevant theoretical literature. Russian television has both reflected and shaped the increasing authoritarianism of the Putin system after

2012, even if the coverage of events differs slightly across different channels. Russian journalists do not usually receive specific instructions on what to say and how to say it, but have to possess the ability to report the broad strategies of the Kremlin. Over the course of their two-year study, Hutching and Tolz conclude that Russian TV reports have increasingly grown more hostile toward ethnic, national, and religious minorities in Russia. In the end, their conclusion that official discourse has proven to be “neither coherent nor univocal” but has nevertheless contributed mightily to the “public sense of victimhood” (250) that in turn fosters an increasingly strong ethnic nationalism should make us all worry.

STEPHEN M. NORRIS
Miami University (Ohio)

Russian Writers and the Fin de Siècle: The Twilight of Realism. Ed. Katherine Bowers and Ani Kokobobo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. xii, 304 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. Figures. \$99.99, hard bound.
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This volume consists of fourteen fairly brief chapters examining the “fin-de-siècle” themes in Russian realist literature of the nineteenth century. Additionally, the editors, Ani Kokobobo and Katherine Bowers, provide an introduction; Caryl Emerson an afterword. The team of authors includes both “emerging and established scholars,” to quote the book’s jacket.

The collection is divided into four parts: Part One, titled “The Anxieties of Disintegration,” comprises Kate Holland’s chapter on the theme of degeneration in Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin’s *The Golovlev Family*; Yuri Corrigan on the concepts of selfhood in Fedor Dostoevskii’s *Adolescent*; Robin Feuer Miller on the literary genealogy and contexts of Fedor Dostoevskii’s “A Boy at Christ’s Christmas Party;” and Alexander Burry and S. Ceilidh Orr on “apocalyptic anxieties” in *Anna Karenina*.

Part Two, “Destabilizing Gender and Sexuality,” consists of Emma Lieber’s chapter on Ivan Turgenev’s short stories, especially “The First Love,” as well as Connor Doak’s chapter on “masculine degeneration in Dostoevskii’s *Demons*,” and Jenny Kaminer’s examination of the female characters in Anton Chekhov’s *Seagull*.

Part Three, titled “Generic Experiments and Hybridity,” features Katherine Bowers’s contribution on the depictions of family decline in Sergei Aksakov, Saltykov-Shchedrin and Ivan Bunin; Ani Kokobobo’s chapter on the grotesque in Lev Tolstoi and Mikhail Artsybashev; Muireann Maguire on Nikolai Gogol’ and Sigizmund Krzhizhanovsky; and Jane Costlow on Vladimir Korolenko and the genre of *ocherk*.

Part Four, “Facing Death and Decay,” has three essays: Thomas Newlin on “Decadent ecosystems” in Chekhov’s *Uncle Vanya*; Edith Clowes on Leonid Andreev’s “abject realism”; and Ilya Vinitsky’s on Ivan Turgenev’s “drama of dying” as a literary theme.

The editors trace the idea behind this collection to annual Slavic studies conferences, and indeed reading this book through feels (or, at least, has felt to this reviewer) like sitting through four or five ASEES literary panels in a row: the presentations (in this case, the chapters) are competent and frequently insightful, yet many are either narrowly textual or comparing just two or three canonical works. In addition, while focusing on disparate primary texts, they mainly arrive at strikingly similar conclusions, exposing the fin-de-siècle (or decadent, and/or degeneration) motifs in Russian realist literature starting with Saltykov-Shchedrin and Turgenev all the way to Dostoevskii, Tolstoi and especially (if predictably) Chekhov.