

observation that “the Western world is destined to be filled with a mixed race” (p. 183), both to dismantle assumptions about racial mixture lurking behind some arguments for multiculturalism and to examine the relationship between racial solidarity and political agency in the African diaspora in the twenty-first century.

Hanchard pays especially careful attention to the relationship between micro- and macro-politics. His aim, he explains, is to develop a “middle range” theory that inquires when and how black citizens’ responses to injustice have political salience, even when they do not constitute a political movement. A chapter coauthored with Michael Dawson, for example, sheds light on the ways that political ideologies circulate in black communities in the United States. It exposes and explores “the upward diffusion of ideological forms,” as middle-class African Americans adopt ideas and behaviors from the working-class (p. 85). One of the most important theoretical contributions, furthermore, is Hanchard’s account of an “ethics of aversion” as a strategic choice through which subordinated subjects aim to minimize their encounters with members of the dominant group. Demonstrating how black resistance to assimilation operates selectively, and undermining the assumption that it is “racism in reverse,” he enriches conventional political and moral vocabularies, which have proved inadequate for interpreting the actions of black subjects.

The book also addresses the temporal dimensions of black political life. Building on his earlier work on Afro-modernity, Hanchard offers a view of the modern “West” that foregrounds the slave trade, slavery, colonial conquest, and apartheid. Not only does this account bring a distinctive voice and constellation of concerns to the burgeoning conversation about comparative political theory, but it also presses against prevailing understandings of the predicament of the present. At a moment when European and Anglo-American democratic theorists decry the undemocratic character of late modern existence and mourn the loss of now-discredited emancipatory narratives, the author redirects our attention to another set of losses and utopian alternatives. Attending to the fragmentation of the transnational solidarity that undergirded the anticolonial and antiapartheid movements and the gap between emancipation and freedom in much of the black world, he offers an alternative diagnosis of the present and a font from which to draw insight about what more democratic forms of life would require.

It is not possible to introduce so rich an array of theoretical questions and concepts and to dwell on all of them in depth. My only quibble with the book, then, is that it contains the germ of several books, all of which might be profitably developed further. For example, the first three chapters, which lay out Hanchard’s theory of “quotidian politics,” could easily constitute a substantial volume on their own. Such a book would allow Hanchard to flesh out in more detail how “coagulation” works in actual polit-

ical practice and clarify the political stakes in differentiating his conception of everyday black political activity from the idea of infrapolitics in the work of James Scott and Robin D. G. Kelley. Similarly, Hanchard’s capacity to range across so many spatial dimensions of black political thought sometimes comes at the cost of specifying how these dimensions are related to one another. The book opens with a fascinating meditation on the dual meaning of “party”—as festivity and discipline—in the context of Afro-Brazilian politics; and it could do more to trace the ways that that notion of political party, as well as other political ideas and cultural practices, circulates within the African diaspora. Finally, a follow-up volume would allow Hanchard to develop the conception of “political community” upon which much of the argument depends.

To say that *Party/Politics* leaves questions unanswered is not, however, to diminish its achievement. Perhaps the book’s most significant contribution resides in the demand that political theorists—and, indeed, all students of politics—learn to ask more adequate questions about the character of black political experience, as well as in the guidance Hanchard provides in indicating what some of those questions should be. Attending to “the sources of political imagination” among people of African descent across the globe, the book lays out a necessary and ambitious research agenda. It offers an eloquent counter-argument against entrenched conceptual frames and habits of thought that push slavery, colonialism, and their legacies to the margins. And it testifies powerfully that theorists who are serious about the constitution of more democratic futures need to look to the horizons of black political thought and practice today.

**Punishment, Prisons, and Patriarchy: Liberty and Power in the Early American Republic.** By Mark E. Kann. New York: New York University Press, 2005. 348p. \$50.00. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071666

— M. A. Bortner, *Arizona State University*

Mark Kann’s book is an astute, lucid, and valuable contribution to the critical analysis of the history of imprisonment and, most importantly, the relationships between liberty and punishment, the persistent gulf between those classified as deserving or undeserving, and the ideological assumptions and cultural practices regarding gender, race, and class that sustain those distinctions.

Kann’s primary thesis—that since the earliest days of this nation, the valorization *and* denial of liberty have been inseparable—provides a framework for understanding historical continuity and current conditions. His task is to examine “how first-generation penal reformers, prison officials, and politicians legitimized the denial of liberty and perpetuation of patriarchal political power in liberal society” (p. 4). He presents a compelling account of the

apparent contradiction and conundrum: How can a nation dedicated to freedom systematically deny it to so many?

The explanation is in the specificity: The revered liberty was from a particular form of patriarchy, that is, the domination of one group of privileged white men—American colonial leaders—by another group of privileged white men—British rulers. This liberty, gained through a brutal war, was never envisioned as universal liberty. The list of those deemed incapable and unworthy of full liberty and equal civil standing, “marginals” in Kann’s narrative, was considerable and encompassing.

The author provides a poignant analysis of the ostensible impetus for exclusion: fear, writ large, that *others* would “abuse liberty by practicing vice, fomenting disorder, and defying law” (p. 2). His analysis is particularly compelling when he details the ways in which the right to liberty and, consequently, the likelihood and experience of imprisonment were gendered and raced. This is prominent not only in the original formation of prisons and punishment but also in the first and second generations of “reformers.”

Clearly, the subtext of Kann’s exploration of “liberty and power in the early American republic” is the remarkable confluence between the historical and current distribution of liberty and imprisonment. This is extremely important for the excavation of the persistence of policies of mass imprisonment, despite all evidence of their resounding failure to achieve espoused goals. This trenchant work instructs us to look not only at the political currency associated with the rhetoric of law and order and this latest expression of a deeply carceral society but also at the assumptions of inequality at the very heart of the culture and the institutional and ideological structures that perpetuate them.

Kann provides a trenchant exposition of the mechanisms through which rehabilitative rhetoric—sustained by concealment of prison horrors—minimized critique, legitimized the deserving/undeserving divide, and preserved imprisonment as a perverse “adjunct to liberty” (p. 17). Further explication of the alternatives to prison would be welcome, but it is telling when he suggests that alternative responses to perceived abuses of liberty, alternatives such as voluntary associations employing persuasion and example, though seemingly more consonant with professed American ideals, are deemed unreliable and insufficient, and do not prevail.

The developments chronicled by Kann preclude the possibility that widespread liberty, uncoerced cooperation, and democratic efforts might replace patriarchy as the main source of public order. The coveted rhetoric of liberty runs headlong into unruliness. In the hands of the many, the proper liberty of the powerful becomes a messy liberty, too enlivened, too embodied, indulgent, and undisciplined: “[L]eading citizens and civic leaders expressed deep doubts that marginal people could be trusted to practice liberty without licentiousness” (p. 267). Disordered

freedom is impermissible and punishable. One nation, indivisible, indeed! In *Punishment, Prison, and Patriarchy*, Mark Kann has given us an incisive analysis with far-reaching implications.

**Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good.** By Mary M. Keys. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 270p. \$70.00.

DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071678

— Todd Breyfogle, *University of Denver*

In her book, Mary M. Keys makes significant contributions to our understanding of Aquinas, Aristotle, and theories of the common good. Keys makes two fundamental, persuasive arguments: 1) Aquinas’s account of the will’s natural inclination to virtue (and consequent sociability) and his development of a theory of natural law are deliberate philosophical attempts to correct weaknesses in Aristotle’s account of the common good; and 2) in correcting and improving upon Aristotle, Aquinas “is consciously laying new, deeper, and broader foundations for ethics and political science” (p. 111), foundations which are—or should be—of considerable value to contemporary secular (as well as Christian) political thought. Specifically, she argues that Aquinas’s new foundations address a persistent difficulty with traditional common good theory: “how to elaborate a ‘unitary but complex’ account of the human good that does justice to the many worthwhile ways of life and the multiple genuine goods that people seek by nature and by choice” (p. 14).

Nine chapters divided into four parts tightly and intricately organize Keys’s dazzlingly broad discussion and slightly sprawling prose. Part I makes the case for considering Aquinas as a significant and distinctive contributor to even (indeed, especially) secular contemporary political theory, and situates Aquinas’s concerns amidst the work of John Rawls, Michael Sandel, and William Galston. (In subsequent chapters, Alasdair MacIntyre, Henry Jaffa, and Robert George become equally substantial contemporary participants in Keys’s exploration.) Part II examines Aquinas’s treatment of Aristotle’s three political-philosophical foundations: the social nature of human beings (*Politics* I), the centrality of regimes in forming virtuous citizens and human beings (*Politics* III), and the problematic (for Aquinas and Keys) account of the universal, best regime (*Politics* VII–VIII). Aquinas’s extension—in the natural goodness of the will and natural law theory—of Aristotle’s first two foundations represents, Keys persuasively argues, a fuller and more coherent account of human action, which resolves the Aristotelian tension between the civic and cardinal virtues. In Part III, Aquinas’s treatment of magnanimity and legal justice (in his *Commentary on Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics”*) reveals the ways in which the theological virtues and natural law improve upon Aristotle’s treatment of the tension between