Bridging Diverging Perspectives and Repairing Damaged Relationships in the Aftermath of Workplace Transgressions

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ABSTRACT: Workplace transgressions elicit a variety of opinions about their meaning and what is required to address them. This diversity in views makes it difficult for managers to identify a mutually satisfactory response and to enable repair of the relationships between the affected parties. We develop a conceptual model for understanding how to bridge these diverging perspectives and foster relationship repair. Specifically, we argue that effective relationship repair is dependent on the parties' reciprocal concern for others' viewpoints and collective engagement in the justice repair process. This approach enhances our understanding of the interdependency between justice and reconciliation/reintegration, while also providing theoretical insight into the processes underlying restorative conferencing, innovations that promise to help managers heal damaged organizational bonds.

KEY WORDS: workplace transgressions, justice repair, relationship repair, reintegration, reconciliation, restorative justice

W ORKPLACE TRANSGRESSIONS (i.e., actions that violate legal, ethical, or social boundaries) are a significant problem for organizations. There is ambiguity about the prevalence of workplace transgressions, partly depending on the construct (e.g., interpersonal deviance, harassment, incivility, aggression), its definition, and the measure used to capture its frequency; nonetheless, most studies report that the majority of all employees have experienced some form of victimization at work (e.g., 76–96 percent bullying behaviors, Djurkovic, McCormack, & Casminir, 2006; 75 percent harassment, Einarsen & Raknes, 1997; 86.2 percent incivility, Trudel & Reio, 2011). Even so, reported transgressions typically only capture the most extreme cases of employee bullying, harassment, and violence, just the tip of the iceberg; the vast majority of everyday transgressions are subtle and non-violent (Baron & Neuman, 1996), often passing without fanfare except in the eyes of their victims. But even relatively minor transgressions are often seen as offensive and necessitating some response (Bies, 1987) as they can have significant implications for the victim's physical and psychological well-being (e.g., Greenberg,

2006; Witvliet, Ludwig, & van der Laan, 2001). Ignoring workplace transgressions also has an impact beyond the victim, potentially shaping the ethical conduct of the offender and other potential offenders (see Nagin, 1998). Perhaps even more importantly, seemingly minor transgressions can easily escalate into more serious conflicts and violence among workers if not properly addressed (Aquino, Grover, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Bies & Tripp, 1996). It is thus in the organization's best interest to see that workplace transgressions are resolved in a way that prevents these outcomes.

For organizations, often one of the most critical outcomes following a workplace transgression is the damaged relationships that follow (Jehn, 1995). Transgressions violate the psychological contracts between organizational members (Rousseau, 1989), undermining the trust, respect, credibility, legitimacy, and reputations that are critical to working relationships. For example, disrespectful treatment can lead to organizational disengagement among their victims (e.g., Blader & Tyler, 2009), while also eliciting outrage and disengagement of uninvolved employees and undermining the organization's effectiveness (e.g., Okimoto, 2009; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004). For offenders, their actions threaten the trust of their victims and the broader organizational community (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009), inhibiting their inclusion as contributing group members. A manager's ability to help repair these relational bonds is often essential for ongoing cooperative work relations and the long-term benefit of the organization (Kidder, 2007; Goodstein & Butterfield, 2010). We conceptualize "relationship repair" (or "relationship restoration") as restoring feelings of benevolence and empathy to the relationship between parties, encompassing both reconciliation (i.e., relationship repair between individuals), as well as reintegration (i.e., an individual's regained support from and commitment to the organizational community). Adopting a three-party approach that considers the relationships between the victim, offender, and third-party members of the broader organization, there are three relationship repair goals of importance: interpersonal reconciliation between victim and offender, a victim's reintegration into the organizational community, and the offender's reintegration into the organizational community.

However, a focus on repairing organizational relationships alone is not sufficient without additional concern for justice repair. We conceptualize "justice repair" (or "justice restoration") as restoring subjective feelings of justice and fairness to the situation. Work on forgiveness and reconciliation after injustice argues that in order to encourage willingness to engage in relationship repair, individuals must feel that justice has been repaired (e.g., Exline, Worthington, Hill, & McCullough, 2003; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2007; Worthington, 2006). Therefore, a justice response that restores a perceived sense of justice for the victim, offender, and third-party observers is more likely to lead to relationship repair between those parties, facilitating ongoing cooperation and sustained work engagement. Of course, restoring subjective feelings of justice and fairness for individuals after a workplace transgression has value beyond fostering relationship repair. Feelings of justice are important both because of the moral or normative imperative for organizations (Cropanzano & Rupp, 2002), and because of the costly organizational consequences that can follow unresolved justice concerns. Most relevant to the current focus on relationship

outcomes, failure to address feelings of injustice risks organizational withdrawal (Blader & Tyler, 2009) and possible retaliation against the individual perpetrators (Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004) and/or the organization as a whole (Blader, Chang, & Tyler, 2001).

However, one of the challenges that remain largely unexplored in the current literature is the broad diversity in opinions about what an offense means to people and how it should be dealt with (Hume, 1951; Mikula & Wenzel, 2000). These differences are particularly prominent between different party perspectives; past research shows divergence between victims and offenders in their appraisals of the wrongdoing and perceptions of an appropriate response (e.g., Mikula, 1994; Mikula & Wenzel, 2000; Mummendey & Otten, 1989; Otten, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 1995; Weiner, 1985). As a consequence, it is difficult for managers to identify a justice response that can adequately address all divergent perspectives on justice repair (Shotter, 1989). For example, we know that sincere apologies are more acceptable than insincere apologies (e.g., Schlenker & Darby, 1981), and even what aspects of an apology contribute to sincerity judgments (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Forster, & Montada, 2004); but we know relatively little about why and when the same apology is acceptable to some people and not others (c.f. Fehr & Gelfand, 2010), or how to encourage all parties to see an apology as the correct course of action, including the reluctant offender (Okimoto, Wenzel, & Hedrick, 2013). This divergence in perspective makes it difficult for managers to respond in a way that is satisfying to all affected parties and facilitate relationship repair. *What can managers do to bridge the gap between divergent perspectives on justice and promote repair of important relational bonds in the aftermath of a workplace transgression?*

To bridge the diversity of views about a workplace transgression and repair the working relationships affected by it, we propose a *tripartite perspective on intragroup reconciliation* that considers a more comprehensive approach for responding to workplace transgressions. We suggest that the very subjectivity that makes justice so difficult to manage is also the key to its resolution. Specifically, justice concerns are flexible, multifaceted, and dependent on an individual's salient self-concept. This means that relationship repair can be fostered not only by identifying a justice response that attempts to speak to the concerns of all stakeholders, but also by actively shaping perceptions of the transgression, thus encouraging mutual appreciation and collective engagement in the repair of a broader variety of justice goals. In other words, managers can help to bridge diverging views and motivate relationship repair by encouraging the involved parties to see beyond their own perspectives to adopt the views and concerns of the other involved parties. We conclude by offering practical suggestions for how managers might reduce the discrepancy between different party perspectives in order to foster intragroup reconciliation.

DIVERGENT VIEWS ABOUT JUSTICE REPAIR

In this section, we define the problem of divergent perspectives. Opposing parties will often differ in their (typically self-serving) attributions about the offense (Mikula,

1994; Weiner, 1985), and those diverging perceptions of blameworthiness, serious-ness, and intent can weigh heavily in determinations about the appropriate type and severity of a response (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Gromet & Darley, 2006). But even when all involved parties agree that a transgression has occurred, how serious the offense is, and who is to blame, they may yet diverge in their *symbolic interpretations* of the transgression (i.e., its symbolic meaning and/or consequence), and thus what constitutes an appropriate response. Indeed, our review of the literature below suggests that what people want following a transgression, and more fundamentally the subjective belief about what the offense symbolizes and what is required to address it, varies between party perspectives. Thus, the same offense can have different meanings depending on whose perspective is taken in the situation. See Table 1 for a broad overview of this framework. Herein lies the difficulty of justice repair: the subjectivity of injustice, indeed the psychological meaning of the transgression itself, can vary widely between the involved parties. This divergence limits a manager's ability to apply a broadly acceptable justice response that can facilitate reconciliation and reintegration.

Table 1: Divergent views on justice repair

	Victim Perspective	**Offender Perspective**	**Third-Party Perspective**
Perceived threat (internal):	Threat to victim's control and autonomy	Threat to offender's integrity and identity	Threat to shared group norms/values
Perceived threat (external):	Threat to victim's interpersonal status and respect	Threat to offender's interpersonal status and respect	Threat to broader group/organizational status and respect
Salient Justice Goal	Victim Empowerment	Offender Moral Repair	Social Order/Value Consensus

Party Perspective and Salient Justice Concern

Victim Power/Control

By intentionally violating shared rules and norms, offenders symbolically place themselves above others (and the victim in particular), resulting in an imbalance of power, status, and control (Heider, 1958). The offender's actions degrade and diminish the victim (Murphy & Hampton, 1988), threatening inferiority (Foster & Rusbult, 1999), powerlessness (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Bies & Tripp, 1996; Miller, 2001), dishonor (Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1993, Scheff, 1994), lack of regard/respect (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Smith, 1998), and in some cases diminished self-worth (Koper, Van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993; Scobie & Scobie, 1998). Shnabel and Nadler (2008) emphasize the centrality of power motives for victims of transgressions (versus offenders) and sug-gest that victim empowerment is a precondition for their willingness to reconcile.

In a laboratory paradigm, enhanced victim empowerment increased victims' willingness to reconcile, but did not affect offenders' willingness to reconcile. Wenzel and colleagues (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008) similarly argue that when a transgression upsets victims' power and status, people see justice as requiring elevation of the victim and/or degradation of the offender. Participants who interpret an offense as upsetting their sense of power are more likely to seek responses that reassert the relative status of the victim (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2010). Notably, desire for renewed power/control may be driven both by *internal* desires for personal control (i.e., self-determination and autonomy; Deci & Ryan, 2000), and/or *external* desires for recognition of social power and status within the larger group (i.e., symbolic power or status within the organization; Okimoto, 2008; Smith, Olson, Agronick, & Tyler, 2009). This idea echoes classic work linking justice judgments to internal desires for control (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) as well as external desires for recognition (i.e., status, respect, and belongingness; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992).

Offender Moral Integrity

Transgressions, particularly those that violate prescribed principles of dignity and respect (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Folger, 1998; Skitka, 2003), can also undermine feelings of moral integrity—an intact and uncorrupted moral self. This is particularly true among offenders; transgressions have clear implications for offender integrity and standing in the broader organizational community (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Integrity is a core motive explicated in a number of psychological theories (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000; Festinger, 1957; Lecky, 1945; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988; Swann, 1983) and has critical importance for judgments of self-worth (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008). As such, offenders often require any attempts at restoration to afford them the opportunity for pardon and forgiveness. Put differently, the repair of moral integrity is a core need of offenders who recognize their responsibility for the transgression (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Again this concern may be driven by *internally* focused feelings of moral integrity (i.e., keeping one's moral/values intact and uncorrupted) or *externally* focused anxiety over social acceptance (i.e., being seen as a person of integrity). Aquino and Reed (2002) refer to this distinction as internalization (e.g., prosocial behavior, moral reasoning) versus symbolization (e.g., self-presentation, religiosity). Interestingly, this concern for moral integrity also underlies the tendency for offenders to justify or excuse their own moral failings rather than accept responsibility (Okimoto et al., 2013); when their social belonging is threatened , offenders tend to respond defensively, deflect responsibility, and report less shame and remorse (Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013), effectively avoiding the self-relevant moral implications of the transgression. In contrast, offenders who acknowledge responsibility for a transgression are more likely to suffer from feelings of guilt (Baumeister et al., 1994), shame (Exline & Baumeister, 2000), and moral inferiority (Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). Thus, a repentant offender typically seeks forgiveness and renewed moral inclusion in the group (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008).

Community Consensus and Order

Any given group, organization, or society will have a number of rules and norms (both formal and informal) that its members expect to share. These rules/norms help to exemplify an organization's values and define its distinctive identity, binding its members together as a cohesive unit (Haslam, McGarty, & Turner, 1996; Hogg, 1993). However, when these rules/norms are violated, it suggests a lack of consensus over those supposedly shared values, potentially undermining their validity (Durkheim, 1964; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Vidmar, 2000). It is for this reason that intentional transgressions are seen as more severe than accidental transgressions (Darley & Pittman, 2003); only intentional transgressions threaten the social order (Heider, 1958; Miller & Vidmar, 1981). As a result of the implied social threat, even uninvolved third-parties are often psychologically affected by the offense, can exhibit quite consequential reactions in response to the unjust treatment of others (for a review see Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004), and often seek responses that help to reaffirm the organizational values violated by the offense (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2010; Wenzel et al., 2008). Although not yet specified in the literature, we can again make the distinction between internal and external sources of concern. People may care about organizational consensus because of their *internal* concerns over the clarity of organizational values and authenticity of the organizational identity (McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993), or because of the implications those shared values might have for intergroup regard within the broader social context, *external* concerns over the status of the organization in the eyes of the public (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). Although we focus this brief discussion on organizational peers, this analysis may also extend to other stakeholders (e.g., managers, investors, customers) who, by definition, have a stake in the organization's reputation and performance.

Restoring Justice through Satisfaction of Salient Concerns

In order to restore a subjective sense of justice for individuals, theories of injustice repair suggest that it is important to restore the salient material and psychological concerns of the perceiver that follow from an injustice. In an attempt to integrate the findings from the emerging literature on the efficacy of different injustice responses, Wenzel and Okimoto proposed a justice restoration theory (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008; Wenzel et al., 2008) suggesting that the perception of a satisfactory justice response depends on the individual perceiver's salient concerns following the transgression. Thus, recognizing an individual's salient justice concerns and associated justice goals can facilitate the administration of a justice response (or set of responses) that best addresses them. A similar approach has been suggested by Reb, Goldman, Kray, and Cropanzano (2006) who argued that, in order to maximize justice satisfaction, a justice response must address the psychological needs elicited by the transgression. These frameworks echo other needs-based models of justice that focus on the psychological experience and consequence of a transgression (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001; Skitka, 2003; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2008) rather than the specific contextual features that triggered that experience.

In all of these needs-based models, the "fit" between the individual's salient justice repair goals and those addressed by the response is argued to predict justice satisfaction more accurately than features of the response alone. An excellent example of this "fit" approach is provided by Fehr and Gelfand (2010) who showed that individuals respond positively to apologies that fit their self-construal. Similarly, Wenzel, Okimoto, and Cameron (2012) showed that when respondents were focused on the power and status implications of the offense, they preferred an approach that disempowered the offender (e.g., punishment); but when respondents were focused on the value implications of the offense, they preferred an approach that helped to revalidate group values (e.g., dialogue). Of course, there are numerous routes to these same justice outcomes, and various features of an intervention are likely to affect its perceived consequence; however, it is not the goal of the current discussion to outline the specific means through which each different intervention is able to achieve a sense of justice, only to highlight the idea that justice is achieved by addressing salient justice goals.

An important caveat is that research on justice repair has rarely considered more than one perspective (i.e., victim, offender, *or* third-party). Although we have identified trends, there is limited research examining multiple perspectives in tandem. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the forgiveness and reconciliation literatures, which typically conceptualize forgiveness as an exclusively victim-based sentiment that is tied to the victim's willingness to reconcile with the offender (Palanski, 2012). Moreover, even if we assume that managers can accurately identify an individual's justice concerns and understand how to formulate an adequate response that speaks to those concerns, the effectiveness of that response is still undermined by the divergent perspectives on justice and reconciliation. For example, a given response might be perfectly suited to address the victim's concerns, but may be seen as unfair by the offender and/or third-party observers. Thus, managers may struggle to find a justice response that is satisfying to all affected parties.

RELATIONSHIP REPAIR

Within organizations in particular, there is also an important imperative for managers to *repair the relationships* between those parties; as noted earlier, effective functioning in organizational groups after a transgression requires both individual engagement as well as cooperative working relationships between individuals (Kidder, 2007). Thus, to maintain effective cooperation and collaboration between employees, managers should also attend to relationship repair after a workplace transgression. This includes repair of the relationship between the victim and offender of a workplace transgression, typically regarded in the literature as *interpersonal reconciliation*. However, relationships also exist between these individuals and the broader organizational community. And to the extent that the transgression threatens those relational bonds, repair of their acceptance and inclusion within the broader organization (i.e., reintegration) is also important. Such reintegration is typically understood as repair of the relationship between the offender and the organizational community (i.e., *offender reintegration*). However, the salience of three perspectives

highlights a third relationship between the transgression victim and the organizational community (i.e., *victim reintegration*), a relational bond that is often overlooked as a focus of concern in the restoration process.

In this section we discuss the relationship between justice repair and relationship repair, focusing on the bonds between victims, offenders, and their broader workplace community. Past research and theory has argued that restoring a sense of justice for the individuals affected by a workplace transgression is critical because justice is typically required for individuals' willingness to forgive and engage in relationship repair activities. Research shows that the satisfaction of salient justice concerns is often a precondition for forgiveness (Exline et al., 2003; Tripp et al., 2007; Worthington, 2006), a transformation of motives and attitudes toward the offender from negative to positive, indicative of reduced retributive motives, reduced avoidance, and increased benevolence (McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006; McCullough, Rachal, Sandage, Worthington, Brown, & Hight, 1998). Under this definition, true forgiveness is typified by a *willingness to reconcile* with the offender, letting go of the negative emotions and moving forward with relationship repair. Thus, justice repair is often seen as a necessary step to achieving relationship repair (Tripp et al., 2007).

Importantly, however, justice may not always be sufficient for forgiveness and relationship repair. Recent research shows that only those justice interventions that facilitate a renewed trust and understanding between parties lead to forgiveness/reconciliation (Wenzel & Okimoto, 2014). Although punitive approaches can effectively restore a sense of justice in victims, justice achieved through punishment does *not* lead to forgiveness. In contrast, justice repaired through a consensus generating process (e.g., apology or bilateral dialogue) can lead to forgiveness and good-will toward the offender (Wenzel & Okimoto, 2014). Thus, justice can but does not necessarily promote relationship repair. Fortunately, as evidenced by this special issue of *Business Ethics Quarterly*, there is a surge of recent interest on "constructive" justice responses to transgressions that have been shown to encourage relationship repair, including apologies (see Bobocel & Zdaniuk, 2005; Fehr & Gelfand, 2010), restorative conferencing (e.g., Goodstein & Aquino, 2010; Goodstein & Butterfield, 2010; Kidder, 2007; Okimoto, Wenzel, & Platow, 2010) and forgiveness (e.g., Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Fehr & Gelfand, 2012).

Further pushing the boundaries of work in this domain, we argue for an alternative theoretical position that upsets the justice and forgiveness literature's assumed priority of justice repair as a means to achieve relationship repair. Specifically, we review research suggesting that attempts to manage relational bonds after a transgression can help to facilitate consensus about what justice repair entails, bridging diverse perspectives on justice. Building on these insights, we propose a new imperative for promoting both justice and relationship repair that involves encouraging parties to look beyond their self-interested perspectives and move toward collective engagement in the pursuit of a more multifaceted restoration goal. Within this framework, we outline each form of relationship repair, discuss its importance, and delineate how it can be fostered through mutual concern and reciprocated goal satisfaction.

Relationships Help to Bridge Divergent Justice Concerns

Although typically seen as a consequence of justice repair, we suggest that managing relational concern between parties can serve as a conduit to facilitate consensus in otherwise divergent views about justice. In other words, an individual's salient concern for the other parties and the relationships between them can foster greater agreement between parties about the symbolic implications of the transgression and thus what constitutes an appropriate and effective justice response.

First, it is important to recognize that, while trends may be apparent, the symbolic interpretation of a transgression (as reviewed above) is *not only determined by the party role* they have in the transgression (victim, offender, or third-party). Rather, an individual's perspective on a transgression depends on how they subjectively define or position themselves relative to these three party perspectives. The formal/objective role of an actor or observer in the transgression event does not necessarily determine that individual's perspective, which is the *subjective* viewpoint that each individual adopts. An individual might act as an agent or representative in the interests of an aggrieved victim, persecuted offender, or concerned organizational stakeholder, taking their perspective in the transgression. Indeed, people can identify themselves as an individual different from other individuals (e.g., as a victim or offender), or as a member of a social relationship, group, or organization (e.g., Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Haslam, 2004; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). It is this salient self-definition that partly determines whether or not self-interested concerns are strictly role-based, or if they include other-serving and collective goals (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Thus, irrespective of one's party role, an individual's level of concern for others can influence his/her perspective, including the interpretation of a transgression and subsequent justice repair goals. For example, a third-party who strongly identifies as an organizational member is likely to care most about how a transgression affects the outcomes of the organization as a whole (Haslam, 2004). In contrast, a third-party who shares a close friendship with the victim of a transgression but does not strongly identify with the organization is likely to care more about how the transgression affects the victim, not about its broader meaning for the organization. Stated simply, the quality of a perceiver's relationship with or concern for the parties involved is likely to affect their symbolic interpretation of a transgression (Okimoto, Wenzel, & Platow, 2010; Wenzel et al., 2008).

Second, it is important to recognize that one's perspective is not mutually exclusive with other perspectives; people can adopt *multiple simultaneous viewpoints* (e.g., Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Haslam, 2004; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Turner et al., 1987). For example, third-parties (such as a compassionate manager) will likely place their loyalties with the organization as a whole, but as benevolent actors also responsible for the well-being of their employees, they may also show concern for the individual needs of the victim and the offender. Theoretically speaking, any individual may simultaneously understand and appreciate the perspectives of the victim, offender, and the group. However, it is important to note that despite the ability to empathize with multiple perspectives, individuals may be naturally inclined to focus on or

prioritize their own, role-based perspective following a transgression, as threats to personal self-interest tend to motivate a more insular justice viewpoint (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Haslam, 2004).

Third, an individual's perspective is *not static*. Rather, one's view on the transgression may be a flexible and dynamic outcome that varies in response to changes in social reality (Turner et al., 1994). This means that an individual's perspective can be influenced by agents—authorities, leaders, management—who can shape individual goals, norms, and values through directives, leading by example, or defining organizational culture (see Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005). For example, in contexts where the organization's policy is clear about its support for victims of workplace bullying, decision-makers may be more likely to consider the importance of empowering a victim when such behavior does occur. In this case, organizational values facilitate concern for victims and, through this, consideration of the victim's perspective. Indeed, recent research evidence shows that even subtle manipulations of an individual's loyalties, identity, or beliefs about organizational cohesion can motivate people to seek more constructive justice repair responses that promote relationship repair (Wenzel et al., 2008, 2010). Okimoto and Wenzel (2009, Study 3) accomplished this by simply asking people to consider the perspective of the offender when making a managerial decision about how to respond to an injustice. Those participants who were explicitly reminded that it is important that the offender learn from his punishment (i.e., moral repair) were more likely to see inclusive punishments as more appropriate, responses that offered the offender the opportunity to repair his image by helping coworkers. Similarly, in two studies, Wenzel and Okimoto (2012) examined victim reactions to a transgression involving close versus distant offenders. When victims felt close to the offender, their feelings of justice were predicted by perceived moral agreement; but when victims did not feel close to the offender, justice was predicted by perceived power and respect. These findings echo other research showing that chronic or trait-based concern for others (e.g., interdependent self-construal) predicts a preference for justice responses that transcend self-interested concern (e.g., Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2012). This body of work is important because it suggests that management interventions aimed at shaping an individual's concern for the involved parties can consequently alter their perspective on a transgression event.

Together these ideas suggest that relational concern is not only a potential consequence of justice repair, but can also serve as a catalyst for bridging divergent perspectives on justice. If an individual's perspective on a transgression is subjective (rather than fixed to party role), can accommodate multiple simultaneous perspectives, and is sensitive to external influence, this means that managers can actively direct the justice sense-making process. By encouraging the involved parties to transcend their self-interested perspectives, managers may be able to guide the involved parties in a direction that is most amenable to the relationship repair goals that are critical to ongoing organizational functioning.

Promoting Collective Engagement in the Resolution Process

Importantly, while it may be possible to encourage individuals to adopt the perspective of the other parties in a transgression in order to bridge divergent justice repair goals, concern for others (as a within-person sentiment) may still not be sufficient to achieve the goals of reconciliation and reintegration. Although valuing another party and his/her viewpoint on justice may foster a more complex and multifaceted understanding of justice, that understanding and concern is more effective for promoting reintegrative outcomes if it is communicated to the other party to develop a *shared* understanding of the transgression event (Braithwaite, 1999). This might be effectively conveyed through open dialogue, but is more likely to engender the trust that is necessary for relationship repair if the other party is seen to be engaging in the active pursuit of another party's justice goals. As Lewicki and Bunker (1996) suggest, the repair of close working relationships requires that both parties in the relationship value that ongoing relationship and be *willing to engage* in the relationship repair process. The other party's sincere and active engagement in repair of non-self-interested justice goals should encourage the other party's willingness to expose vulnerabilities (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), trust that underpins relationship repair.

First, achieving reconciliation and reintegration require the parties to reach a consensus about the transgression and what is needed to address it. To this end, it may *not* be sufficient to foster rudimentary concern for the working relationship (i.e., just getting along because we have to). Such basic tolerance may enhance concern for others' justice satisfaction (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009), but would be insufficient to repair the trust and respect issues elicited by relational violations (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Robinson, 1996), particularly when the pre-transgression relationship comprised affective or identification-based trust (i.e., trust indicative of mutual understanding and concern for the other; Kramer, 1993; McAllister, 1995). Similarly, it may *not* be sufficient for the involved parties to engage in simple cognitive perspective-taking alone (i.e., an understanding of another person's individual and situational circumstances); recognition of the legitimacy of alternative perspectives does not necessarily implicate their importance. For example, a third-party may understand how a coworker might act disrespectfully because of his/her own personal circumstance, and that this understanding may partly excuse the transgression; but that recognition alone, we argue, does not motivate reintegrative action or make salient the importance of satisfying the post-transgression concerns of that offender. Rather, genuine relationship repair may require individuals to amend their current understanding of "justice" to include the concerns of the other affected parties.

Second, relationship repair may also require constructive actions by the other parties that exhibit their sincerity and commitment to the relationship and the other party's justice needs (e.g., Goodwin & Ross, 1992; Okimoto, 2008). We define such justice repair actions as "*collective engagement*" in the restoration process—reciprocated justice goal pursuit where one party strives to satisfy the goals of the other parties. Such collective engagement repairs justice while also fostering consensus and trust, forming a basis for relationship repair. As an illustration of this idea, consider the relationship between an offender and a third-party member of the

organization; the relevant relationship repair goal here is offender reintegration. Based on our earlier arguments, mutually satisfactory justice repair would require revalidation of shared organizational values as well as the opportunity for offender moral repair, and such repair may be necessary to facilitate offender reintegration. However, reintegration may also require communication of sincere concern for the other party, which can be achieved through collective engagement in the justice restoration process as mutual need satisfaction fosters relationship growth (Crocker & Canevello, 2012). In this case, the third-party might act with openness and support to facilitate offender moral repair, while the offender takes steps to revalidate the legitimacy of the values violated by the transgression. This argument is also exemplified in Shnabel and Nadler's (2008) observation that reconciliation between the victim and offender follows justice need satisfaction conferred by the other party: the offender satisfies the victim's empowerment needs through a sincere apology, and the victim satisfies the offender's moral integrity needs through forgiveness (see also Goodstein & Butterfield, 2010). The victim may feel justice satisfaction following any empowering intervention (e.g., punishment), but such interventions would not translate into a greater willingness to reconcile with the offender unless that offender expresses sincere concern for the victim's suffering (e.g., a sincere apology; Wenzel & Okimoto, 2014). The argument that collective engagement is critical to relationship repair goes beyond existing research and theory in justice. Past work has recognized the value of addressing the diverse justice concerns of the individual parties but not the potential dyadic (or triadic) interaction and mutual interdependence between them.

In essence, these two antecedents (i.e., adoption of alternative perspectives and engagement in those alterative justice repair goals) should be effective because together they illustrate the veracity of the individual's commitment to the relationship. This involves both internal allegiances to other perspectives, as well as external expression of that allegiance through prosocial action. Such a response from the affected parties would also aid in multifaceted justice repair that is more likely to be acceptable to all parties, particularly in cases where such repair comes at the expense of one of those parties (often the offender). However, collective engagement in those diverse justice goals goes further to express a shared commitment to the relational bonds threatened by the offense. If all parties recognize that the other involved parties sincerely care about their justice needs, they will be more likely to make the concessions and proffer the vulnerability required for reconciliation and reintegration. One parallel to this idea comes from the tradition of research on social value orientation (see Van Lange, 1999). Work in this domain touts the benefits of having (and expressing) concern for both self and other as a way to foster mutually acceptable outcomes and ongoing cooperative relationships.

Of course, the glaring caveat of this argument is that in many cases such selfless adoption and expression of concern for other parties, particularly for offenders, may be difficult for managers to achieve themselves, let alone inspiring others to do the same. However, the difficulty of such an aspiration should not negate goal pursuit. Although difficult, encouraging principled commitment to enhancing shared understanding and concern may constitute an important first step on the road to

relationship repair. It is also important to remember that relationship repair is not an easy goal to aspire to, often requiring an ongoing process that builds toward trusting bonds over time. Indeed, victims and offenders may require some distance from the transgression event before they are willing to actively engage in its repair (McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003). Moreover, as we will discuss in more depth later, encouraging the use of restorative *processes* as a matter of course may help to foster such commitment.

A Tripartite Approach

Applied to a three-party (i.e., tripartite) context, these propositions suggest that in order to best foster repair of the affected organizational relationships between them (i.e., intragroup reconciliation), each party (victim, offender, and third-party) must transcend their own perspective to value and engage in the justice goals of the others. An absence of engagement by any one of these parties risks incomplete justice repair and a failure to engender reconciliation and reintegration. Figure 1 illustrates the concept of an individual's multiple overlapping concerns within the current tripartite approach. Each of the concentric circles represents an individual's sphere of salient concern for each of the three major perspectives following a transgression: victim (typified by concern over empowerment), offender (typified by concern over integrity), and organizational (typified by concern over social order). In the figure,

Figure 1: The tripartite perspective on intragroup reconciliation

a perceiver may fall anywhere within (or even outside) this conceptual space, and an individual's specific combination of perspective-based concerns has implications for their salient justice repair and relationship repair goals following the transgression. For managers who wish to pursue relationship repair, the imperative is to encourage the parties to adopt concern for all three perspectives, recognizing the injustice as it affects all three parties (in the overlapping areas) and moving toward shared goal pursuit.

Interpersonal Reconciliation

Concern for the perspectives of both the victim and offender encourages interpersonal reconciliation. Such reconciliation is cultivated when *both* victim and offender transcend their own perspective to adopt the other's; the victim must embrace the perspective of the offender, and the offender must embrace the perspective of the victim. In terms of justice goals, an effective response requires addressing salient empowerment and integrity justice goals (i.e., redistributing power from the offender to the victim and offering an opportunity for the offender to repair his/her moral integrity) in order to facilitate reconciliation. However, to reach reconciliation, justice is best achieved by one party acting to satisfy the justice goals associated with the other party. As discussed earlier, these ideas are echoed in past research emphasizing the importance of constructive exchange between the victim and offender when seeking reconciliation (e.g., Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Wenzel & Okimoto, 2014). Importantly, however, an exclusive focus on interpersonal reconciliation as a relationship repair goal fails to show concern for the broader interests of the organization and the social values or principles violated by the offense. Consider the case of two colleagues who share a close work relationship, but the relationship was jeopardized by some interpersonal offense. Given their pre-existing relationship, each of them may be concerned with the needs of the other as well as their ongoing relationship when trying to resolve their conflict; but perhaps neither is particularly concerned with what that offense means to the organization as a whole, and thus they might ignore the broader organizational implications of the transgression and their engagement in that organization when attempting to resolve the conflict between them. It is thus the manager's job to encourage them to consider the broader implications for the organization and move them toward actions that also help to repair social order and encourage the broader organizational community to reintegrate the potentially marginalized actors.

Offender Reintegration

Concern for the perspectives of the offender and the organization encourages offender reintegration. Such offender reintegration is cultivated when both the offender and important third-party stakeholders look beyond their own perspective to adopt the other: the offender embraces the perspective of the organization, and third-party observers embrace the perspective of the offender. In terms of justice goals, an effective response requires the revalidation of salient integrity and social order justice goals in order to facilitate offender reintegration. Satisfaction of these goals can lead to offender reintegration and consensus when the offender promotes

social order and cohesion by acknowledging and revalidating organizational values, while organizational representatives reinstate the offender as a moral organizational citizen through some act of acceptance or absolution. Consistent with this view, restorative justice scholars often describe successful offender reintegration as re-inclusion of the offender within the broader work community, but contingent on his/her acknowledgement that the transgression was wrong and reinforcing social order and consensus (Bazemore, 1998; Goodstein & Aquino, 2010). Research also shows that among observers in the organization, explicit concern for the needs of both the organization and the offender after a workplace transgression leads to a preference for inclusive sanctions that publically communicate the organization's value position on the offense, as well as offer the offender an opportunity to give back to the community and recover his/her moral credentials (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009). This particular set of restoration goals (i.e., social order, moral repair, and offender reintegration) focus on the problems that are perhaps most salient for the organization: preventing future harm (through both rehabilitation and deterrence), re-inforcing organizational rules and values, and assuring that the offender can continue to effectively function in the organization. These concerns also epitomize the full range of restoration goals following "victimless" violations of a non-interpersonal nature where the offense targets the organization itself and/or the burden is shared communally (e.g., workplace theft).

Victim Reintegration

However, when there is a victim involved, victim reintegration should be a particularly salient relationship repair goal. Victim reintegration is encouraged by shared concern for the perspectives of the victim, the perspective of the organization as a whole, and the relationship between the victim and the organization. Specifically, the victim perspective is particularly important to consider because interpersonal transgressions are likely to undermine a victim's feelings of belongingness and inclusion in the broader organizational community (i.e., "respect"; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). The experience of injustice raises questions about one's importance and value in the organization (De Cremer, & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2001), increasing the importance of and vigilance for disambiguating information that clarifies the individual's place in the group (De Cremer, 2002; De Cremer & Blader, 2006; van Prooijen, van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002, 2005). Failure to reaffirm the victim's value to the organization risks organizational disengagement (e.g., Blader & Tyler, 2009; Simon & Stürmer, 2003, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2001). In fact, if the victim fails to aid the group in facilitating intragroup reconciliation, victims may themselves become marginalized by the organizational community (Gromet & Okimoto, 2014). But despite significant concerns regarding victim engagement and inclusion following workplace transgressions, research and theory often overlook the victim perspective when discussing the appropriate ways of responding to transgressions. Concern for the organizational consequences that follow transgressions, and concern for addressing the cause of that transgression itself (i.e., the offender), may overshadow concern for the organization's commitment to the party most directly affected by the event: the victim. Lack of concern for the

victim-organization relationship may stem from an assumption that repair of this relationship is not necessary because it is not under "threat." But to the contrary, the justice literature is replete with examples of how victimization damages ties with the organization in which the transgression occurred (e.g., Tyler & Lind, 1992).

To address the salient need to promote victim engagement as an outcome in both research and practice, the tripartite approach proposes that victim reintegration is best facilitated through collective engagement by victim and organizational representatives. This means that victim desires for empowerment are acknowledged and satisfied by the organization, and the organization's desires for cohesion and regard for its values are acknowledged by the victim's (possibly through some expression of trust in the organization). If the organization did everything to empower the victim but the victim maintains the view that the organization cannot be relied on or has lost its integrity, the organization is unlikely to engage in open acceptance of and respect for the victim. Similarly, if the victim helps to bolster the validity of organizational values but the organization does not similarly acknowledge the victim as an important organizational member, the victim may also withdraw from the organization. Despite a lack of research and theory on victim reintegration, it is likely to be a salient focus following more severe workplace transgressions. Relatively speaking, individuals are likely to have much less difficulty empathizing with the victim's perspective compared to the offender's perspective. Thus, victim reintegration may come more naturally to managers. Nonetheless, organizational theory and explicit recommendations for best practice should incorporate victim reintegration as a critical restoration goal in the wake of workplace transgressions. Practically speaking, for managers this means restoring the victim's feelings of autonomy and control by empowering them, while also acknowledging the value and importance of the victim's contributions to the organization, revalidating their social status (see Okimoto, 2008; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2011). Such organizational engagement in responding to the concerns of the victim may also help to reinforce the organization's commitment to their employees, repairing any potential threat to valued bonds with the organization.

Intragroup Reconciliation

Finally, concern for all three perspectives can facilitate *intragroup reconciliation*, the nexus of relationship repair indicative of the restoration of all affected relational bonds (including interpersonal reconciliation, offender reintegration, and victim reintegration). Our arguments suggest that intragroup reconciliation is best cultivated when all parties recognize and value the concerns of the others, and salient justice goals are addressed through mutual reciprocal action: the offender and the organization take steps to empower the victim, the organization and the victim provide the offender with the opportunity for moral repair and inclusion, and both victim and offender acknowledge and act to revalidate the superordinate organizational values undermined by the transgression. Together, concern for the needs of all three parties and the repair of the relationships between them constitutes a shared interest in restoring the collective bonds between those affected by the transgression. According to the model, this should be the normative goal for managers striving to repair the

relational bonds in the organization that were affected by the transgression. However, given the difficulty of adequately meeting this diversity of goals, intragroup reconciliation is likely to be a particularly difficult restorative aspiration. But even if not fully achieved, marginal improvements in the intragroup dynamic that both bolster trusting relationships while also closing the gaps between divergent justice goals are likely to improve the long-term prospect of intragroup reconciliation.

RELATIONSHIP REPAIR IN RESTORATIVE CONFERENCING

When managers are also concerned about repairing the relationships damaged by workplace transgressions (and we argue they should be), any individual intervention in isolation (e.g., apology, compensation, punishment) is likely to be inadequate because each lacks the collective justice effort that we have argued is critical for complete relationship repair. However, there is one approach (or perhaps more accurately, a justice repair "process"), that may be particularly suited for engendering intragroup reconciliation as defined in the tripartite approach: *restorative justice conferencing*. Restorative justice is defined as "a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future" (Braithwaite, 1999: 5). Although initially conceptualized in criminology and legal philosophy, management scholars have recently begun to consider the value of the restorative justice approach (e.g., Goodstein & Aquino, 2010; Goodstein & Butterfield, 2010; Kidder, 2007; Okimoto, Wenzel, & Platow, 2010). While management scholars have yet to provide empirical evidence of its effectiveness as a response to workplace transgressions, correlational research in criminology suggests high satisfaction with restorative conferencing and low rates of recidivism (Braithwaite, 2002; Latimer, Dowden, & Muise, 2005; Strang, 2002; Strang et al., 2006). Recent work in psychology has also promoted the use of restorative conferencing, but has focused on restorative justice as a goal or outcome of renewed consensus over the transgression and its repair (Wenzel et al., 2008), typically ignoring equally important relationship repair outcomes (Roche, 2003). In the current discussion, we treat restorative justice as a process, while the current tripartite approach explicates the specific justice and relationship repair goals that it should target. We argue that the restorative justice approach is uniquely suited to facilitate both justice and relationship repair, particularly when considering the needs of multiple parties. More specifically, restorative processes can promote the two key features that we have argued are critical to reconciliation and reintegration: consideration and consensualization of views surrounding the transgression and what is required to achieve justice, as well as collective engagement in the repair process itself.

First, restorative conferencing processes involve the significant dialogue between parties that is necessary to bridge divergence in views about the transgression and its repair. Central to restorative justice is the involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the justice restoration process, including the victim, offender, and members of the affected community (Bazemore, 1998; Christie, 1977). The implicit (and sometimes explicit) goal of restorative justice conferencing processes is to bring

together these parties to consider and attempt to reconcile their views (Wenzel et al., 2008). But even beyond reaching a shared understanding of the transgression and its repair, the dialogical process inherent to restorative conferencing may itself aid in the development or maintenance of a shared identity (Braithwaite, 2002). Contact and discussion between parties can help to reduce the hostility and negative attitudes felt toward other parties and promote a more inclusive social identity (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). As discussed earlier, that shared identity may help to shape individuals' understanding of justice, shifting their cognitive and motivational reactions toward adoption of more complex and multifaceted viewpoints (Okimoto, Wenzel, & Platow, 2010; Wenzel et al., 2008).

Second, restorative conferencing processes encourage collective engagement in justice repair. Goodstein and Butterfield (2010) specify that restorative justice conferencing processes in organizations may involve three interdependent processes: (1) offering offenders the opportunity to make amends and earn forgiveness and redemption; (2) offering victims the opportunity to communicate their suffering, acknowledge amends, and express forgiveness; (3) offer the workplace community the opportunity to support the victim and offender and facilitate reintegration. We note that all of these critical steps involve the process of collective engagement as we have defined it: offenders make amends to address the victim's concerns and the revalidation of community norms, victims proffer moral re-inclusion to offenders by their forgiveness, and third-parties act in aid of both the victim and offender's needs. According to our arguments, these tripartite actions facilitate restoration because they emphasize acting in repair of other parties' interests, helping to achieve consensus over what is required to restore justice while also communicating the relational concern and trust that helps to promote reconciliation and reintegration. Although the Goodstein and Butterfield (2010) model places less emphasis on achieving organizational outcomes through the restorative process, and in particular the role of the victim in promoting those outcomes, the current tripartite approach suggests that these goals are also critically important for encouraging organizational members to actively engage in reintegration. Indeed, Gromet and Okimoto (2014, this issue) show evidence that third party observers of a workplace transgression penalize both offenders and victims who refuse to engage in the justice and relationship repair process. Thus, intragroup reconciliation is best fostered through the collective engagement of all involved parties.

Importantly, this discussion adds to our understanding of how restorative justice achieves successful reintegration and reconciliation outcomes. Research typically defines success in restorative conferencing as reaching an agreement, expressing satisfaction, or reducing reoffending (e.g., Strang et al., 2006), but without providing evidence for *why* those outcomes are critical (other than ideological value) or specifying the features of the restorative process that are responsible for achieving those outcomes. The current model proposes that when reconciliation and reintegration are valued, restorative dialogue would be most effective when focused on recognizing and valuing the legitimacy of all parties' salient justice goals (i.e., consensus over the meaning of justice) as well as active engagement in its repair (i.e., collective engagement). In other words, rather than merely recognizing the diverging needs of the

involved parties and negotiating over a solution that best addresses those needs, the key to intragroup reconciliation is to: (1) bridge the gaps between divergent understandings of justice, and (2) encourage collective engagement in the resolution process. If supported by further research, this analysis reveals why and when restorative justice processes can achieve intragroup reconciliation; as such, an explicit focus on these key features may further increase the efficacy of restorative conferencing.

CONTRIBUTIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

In summary, through this tripartite approach we offer four significant contributions, each of which has both theoretical and practical importance. First, drawing on recent work investigating the symbolic concerns that follow from transgressions, we outline an integrative framework for understanding individual party-based reactions to workplace transgressions. The justice field does not yet have a parsimonious framework for understanding diverging responses to transgressions, and we offer a broad and inclusive start to filling this theoretical gap. For managers in particular, this integrative framework is revelatory in its implications for how to restore a sense of justice after a workplace transgression. It highlights the importance of the more symbolic implications of a transgression, consequences that are critically important for people but are often overlooked or downplayed in comparison to material outcomes. The current framework also suggests a probative focus on the motivations underlying a desired transgression response, rather than on the desired response itself. For example, if asking a victim of abusive supervision what he/she wants done about the transgression, that victim may demand dismissal of the offending supervisor. However, upon further probing of *why* this course of action is important, the underlying concerns of the individual may be revealed (e.g., fear of repeat victimization, feelings of respect, petty revenge), a deeper understanding that can aid in identifying a response that is more congruent with the organization's prerogative, and/or that meets the needs of the other involved parties.

Second, the current tripartite approach is novel in its regard for the relevance of all three parties following workplace transgressions, and their associated justice and relationship outcomes. Given the typical "one-shot," cross-sectional approach used in the majority of organizational justice research, the importance of both justice and relationship repair is often overlooked by justice researchers despite the fact that both are critical to organizational functioning after a workplace transgression. But beyond the mere recognition of relationship repair as an integral outcome, the current tripartite approach reveals the importance of three different relationships among the involved parties that require three relationship repair foci: victim-offender reconciliation, offender reintegration, and victim reintegration. We argue that within the organizational context, all three relational goals are critical to ongoing work relationships. Thus, managers would do well to avoid treating workplace transgressions as exceptional events that must be quarantined so the organization as a whole is protected. Rather, such events should trigger extraordinary efforts to revalidate the trusting relationships among coworkers.

Third, the current theoretical arguments bring to the surface a number of problematic issues that are common in the justice repair literature. For one, there is a critical need for empirically examining multiple perspectives in tandem; despite the trends reviewed in this paper, few empirical examples actually compare different party reactions to the same event. Furthermore, the research and theory that does exist on party perspectives often fails to account for the dynamic nature and potential malleability of those views. Finally, there is an assumption in the literature that reconciliation and reintegration necessarily follow justice repair. To the contrary, we review evidence showing that consensus over the meaning of justice is partly determined by relational concern. Therefore, we argue for a synergistic relationship between justice and relationship repair such that the simultaneous pursuit of both may best facilitate satisfaction of desired restoration goals.

Leveraging these insights, we suggest two key factors that have important implications for the ability to achieve reconciliation and reintegration after a workplace transgression: consideration of alternative perspectives and diverse justice goals, and collective engagement in the achievement of those goals. Together these processes encourage reconciliation and reintegration beyond justice repair alone, while also helping to foster greater consensus about the nature of the transgression itself, its consequence, and what is required to achieve a renewed sense of justice.

These innovations also advance the understanding of restorative justice conferencing. Rather than conceptualizing a successful conference as an agreement, mutual satisfaction with the process, or some subjective sense of "justice," our tripartite approach suggests that restorative success can be assessed in terms of its ability to repair the salient concerns of the three involved parties, while also repairing the trilogy of relationships that are central to intragroup reconciliation. This is a definitive move to conceptualize restorative conferencing as not just a model of justice repair (Wenzel et al., 2008), but also as a model of relationship repair after injustice (Goodstein & Butterfield, 2010; Roche, 2003), placing weight on the satisfaction of both justice and relational goals. Furthermore, our arguments suggest that restorative conferencing is effective precisely because it bridges divergence in views on justice, while also encouraging collective engagement in its repair. Preliminary work already suggests that restorative conferencing is ineffective in promoting a subjective sense of justice if not seen as establishing a consensus between parties (Gromet, Okimoto, Wenzel, & Darley, 2012; Wenzel et al., 2010, Study 1). However, future research should more systematically test the empirical validity of the current arguments when examining both justice and relational outcomes.

These theoretical developments are also practically important for managers as they highlight the attributes of the restorative conferencing process that are most likely to yield positive reconciliation and reintegration outcomes. First, we suggest the importance of having the parties reaffirm their commitment to ongoing work relationships. This echoes our supposition that relational goals should be explicit in the restorative process, and that with the help of strong facilitation, such relational goals may be promoted in the restorative process independently from (or en route to) justice repair. Making relational goals explicit for the parties is important for inhibiting justice repair actions that sacrifice these relationships (e.g., revenge,

stigmatizing punishment; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009), while also serving as an as-piration point for the dialogue. In other words, the restorative dialogue is not about feeling better; it is about mending relationships for the future. Clearly defining this goal makes reconciliation and reintegration the focus of the meeting, rather than the simple pursuit of self-interested justice goals.

Next, we suggest promoting the importance of both cognitive perspective-taking and affective empathy. Through constructive dialogue between the affected parties, managers can aid individuals in recognizing the potential validity of and sympathy for alternative views on a transgression. This may require strong leadership from the facilitating manager who can provide a psychologically safe context for the expression of personal views, without risk of critique or backlash (Edmondson, 1999). In the meeting, parties are encouraged to recount the events from their view-point, while also discussing their opinions on the consequences and meaning of the transgression. So, the dialogue process is not a negotiation over the "true" account of the event, but rather a discussion that acknowledges the legitimacy and value of alternative views (Daly, 2002). This process may help naturally shift individuals toward a more complex justice viewpoint by reducing hostility and fostering a sense of interdependence and shared identity. However, managers might also explicitly encourage the involved parties to engage in other-focused cognitions; simply en-couraging empathetic perspective-taking has been shown to foster a perceived interdependence between two conflicting parties (e.g., Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Maner, Luce, Neuberg, Cialdini, Brown, & Sagarin, 2002). Of course, this is not necessarily an easy task—even the facilitating managers themselves are likely to hold preconceived beliefs about what outcomes are important, biases that they should try to recognize and inhibit. This would necessitate focusing on the superordinate goal of relationship repair, recognizing that such repair may be best achieved through openness, understanding, and satisfaction of the concerns of all parties. Generally speaking, facilitating managers must act as coaches (see Schein, 1999) as well as "entrepreneurs of identity" (see Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005), motivating their employees to transcend their self-interested views to adopt a shared viewpoint that is inclusive of all involved parties.

Finally, the model emphasizes the importance of individual engagement in collec-tive repair, noting that the communication and exhibition of concern for the needs of other parties is critical. In ideal practice, this involves the offender making amends and the victim expressing forgiveness (see Goodstein & Butterfield, 2010), while also providing validation and support for those parties, and encouraging them to engage in repair of normative organizational practice. In reality, such collaborative pursuit of justice would likely require the initial achievement of the other attributes (i.e., multifaceted views on justice and commitment to ongoing organizational rela-tionships). If the parties refuse to engage in this process, it is likely that they do not value that ongoing relationship and/or are not yet open to alternative justice views, in which case they are not yet prepared to fully engage in the collective repair process. Alternatively, the involved parties may only be willing to participate superficially in the restorative script, but without sincerity or conviction (e.g., empty apologies, contingent forgiveness). This may only make marginal progress towards relationship

repair; but nonetheless, relative to outright refusal, even routinized engagement in justice repair may be partially effective in engendering trust and progressing toward the repair of damaged organizational bonds.

Clearly, the road to intragroup reconciliation is difficult and would require more resources (i.e., effort and time) compared to, for example, censoring the transgression, punishing the offender, and/or compensating the victim. This lofty set of justice and relationship repair goals requires commitment and openness from all parties, particularly the manager who is attempting to resolve the conflict. As such, complete intragroup reconciliation may not always be desirable or even feasible. Nonetheless, to the extent that managers do actually care about ongoing work relationships, we argue that intragroup reconciliation should be the idealized outcome. The current approach can be instrumental for achieving this, helping managers to understand the diverse concerns following workplace transgressions, what is required to achieve reconciliation and reintegration, and how they might facilitate that process. Given the consequences associated with the inability of organizations to adequately recover ongoing working relationships following a workplace transgression, this is crucial knowledge for managers. Their ability to appropriately respond to the psychological needs of and relational bonds between the involved parties is critical for both the sustainability of organizations and the general well-being of their employees.

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