contemporary thinking about radicalized identity and legal rights" (p. 93). The counterpoint to *Plessy* was *Brown*. Golub is not the first to recognize the limits of *Brown*. However, Golub contrasts "celebratory" *Brown* and "aspirational" *Brown*. The former "indulges a fantasy of completion or accomplishment" while the latter "marks an appeal to law to make good on its promises" (p. 96).

The author focuses on three elements that are potential impediments to equality and change: context, redemption, and white supremacy. Context explains how Clarence Thomas and Thurgood Marshall could both espouse a belief in a color-blind constitution and yet mean two diametrically opposed things by it. Both quote Harlan, but "it is difficult to imagine two views less similar than those held by Justices Thomas and Marshall regarding the constitutional meaning of racial equality" (p. 31). When Marshall argued for a color-blind constitution, he was referring to a society in which separate but equal segregation was legally protected. Thomas writes in another time when the most visible pillars of segregation had apparently been felled.

Golub's notion of "redemption" has a long-standing racial connection. Abraham Lincoln spoke of the Civil War as redemptive in resetting American democracy without the stain of slavery. And the ending of legal segregation was thought to have a similar redemptive quality. The problem is that redemption becomes a self-congratulatory phase that supposedly signals the end of discrimination and the launching of the color-blind perspective. It is a "triumphal narrative that celebrates how far we've come on matters of race" (most prominently displayed in the voting rights cases; p. 23). The problem is that redemption does not cleanse the effects or leave the resulting racial relations in any proximity to equality.

The author also identifies the role of white supremacy (in lower case, rather than as a movement). This is manifested in a number of ways: group consciousness versus individualism, white victimization, and the irony of color blindness. African Americans, as a group, have felt inequality, but conservatives focus on individualism. And so it follows that the costs of an affirmative action program will be borne by individual whites who were not direct parties to past discrimination, even though they may benefit from its systemic consequences. They transformed the issue into a zero sum game where, ironically, the commitment to racial equality can be portrayed as a violation of the rights of whites. In addition, Golub points to two seemingly inconsistent trends. First, conservatives have cast whites into an aggrieved group (all while decrying group identity). Second, while extolling the virtue of color blindness, that doctrine as interpreted by conservatives actually has the ironic effect of making race more prominent.

This is a sobering book. It provides an excellent analysis of how we got here. Golub argues that the Constitution might indeed be antithetical to racial equality. There are two constitutions in his mind. There is the document itself, and there is the Constitution as defined and interpreted by the Supreme Court. Golub declines to say that the Court is irredeemably lost, but its current composition suggests that it will be at least a generation before there is not a majority in support of a policy of "color blindness" that is actually inimical to the interests of racial minorities in terms of its consequences. More telling, he argues (p. 164) that "racial equality . . . *may in fact be unachievable* [author's emphasis] within the current American constitutional order." Indeed, he argues that the relevant provisions of the Constitution actively work against equality and actually elevate entrenched hierarchy over equality. You do not need to agree with his assessment to concur that the situation is dire.

This is also a timely book, written during the Obama administration but released during the Trump presidency, when racial tensions are even more prominent, and when racially charged code words and dog whistles have given way to overt racially based appeals. And if one wants to find some ray of hope among the current conditions, maybe the overt and open racial overtones will ultimately shift the discussion on race. Maybe the presumed redemptive aspects of dealing with race will finally become genuine. But clearly, as Golub shows us, we have not come as far as some think.

Politics Over Process: Partisan Conflict and Post-Passage Processes in the U.S. Congress. By Hong Min Park, Steven S. Smith, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017. 204p. $70.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

On Parliamentary War: Partisan Conflict and Procedural Change in the U.S. Senate. By James I. Wallner. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017. 264p. $75,00 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592719000057

— C. Lawrence Evans, *College of William and Mary*

The congressional lawmaking process is remarkably changed from "Schoolhouse Rock" days, when that cloying cartoon and its singing/dancing bill caricatured the movement of legislation from committee to the floor of the House, action in the Senate, and then onto the president's desk for a signature or veto. Beginning in the 1980s, as the Congress became more polarized along partisan lines and increasingly permeable to outside forces, committee autonomy substantially declined, party leadership activism grew at all stages of the legislative process, and in the Senate, especially, rampant obstructionism became the norm. Authored by distinguished scholars of American national politics, these two first-rate books contribute significantly to our knowledge of the newer and more idiosyncratic pathways that now characterize lawmaking on Capitol Hill, and along the way shed

considerable light on what ails the contemporary Congress.

The impact of polarization has been particularly pronounced in the Senate, where strong incentives now exist for minority parties to routinely exploit the obstructionist potential in chamber rules and practice. In *On Parliamentary War*, James Wallner attempts to explain the persistence of dilatory practices in that chamber by integrating the two dominant theories of Senate obstructionism—the majoritarian perspective of Gregory Wawro and Eric Schickler and the path-dependence approach most closely associated with scholars like Sarah Binder and Steven Smith. According to the former, Senate operations are remotely majoritarian, and obstructionist opportunities like the filibuster exist because they serve the interests of most senators some of the time. Members of the minority party, for their part, recognize that if they push their procedural leverage too far, the partisan majority may simply clamp down, perhaps even "go nuclear" and significantly restrict use of the filibuster and related tactics. The path-dependence argument, in contrast, highlights the supermajority required by Senate rules to reform Rule 22, which in turn is what enables 60 members to bring debate to a close in the contemporary chamber. Moreover, a wide range of informal norms and practices within the Senate have evolved over time in response to the potential for extended debate. Scrapping the filibuster would require that the Senate revamp its operating procedures more generally. For these reasons, although significantly circumscribing the filibuster may be technically feasible for a Senate majority, it seldom will be politically attainable because of the costs that these path dependencies entail.

Drawing on insights from international relations scholars as diverse as von Clausewitz and Schelling, Wallner advances a bargaining synthesis to the aforementioned theories. Critical to his account are the considerable opportunities that minority party members have for retaliating against majorities attempting to centralize agenda control. Advocates of the majoritarian perspective, of course, fully recognize that minorities have the ability to make life difficult within the chamber if the partisan majority clamps down excessively on minority rights. Similarly, the "path dependence" studies all allow for significant procedural change within the body if the benefits from such reforms are large enough to countervail the costs. Still, Wallner's book provides the most systematic and detailed delineation of such benefits and costs that we have, and thus can serve as a valuable foundation for the development of more rigorous models of procedural bargaining.

What really sets this book apart, however, is the richness of the treatment of procedural strategy. The author is a scholar, but he also is a practitioner who has held senior staff positions within the Senate, and it shows. Chapter 3 is a superb introduction to the Senate's internal procedural architecture that would be a valuable addition to most courses about the Congress. Wallner's careful case studies of the aborted attempt to end filibusters on district and appellate court nominations in 2005, and the successful effort to end such obstructionist potential on lower court and administrative nominees in 2013, are more nuanced than are existing narratives in the literature. Although the book appeared before the 2017 action by Senate Republicans to end filibusters on Supreme Court nominations, Wallner's presentation of the costs and benefits of such restrictions can inform our understanding of that change as well.

The substantive focus of *Politics Over Process* may be more arcane than the bells and whistles of filibuster reform, but it is no less important if we are to understand how legislation is crafted within a polarized Congress. Here, the subject is postpassage politics—how the chambers resolve differences in the content of House- and Senate- passed legislation. Perhaps no other stage in the lawmaking process has been more transformed by the recent rise of partisan polarization and activist party leadership on Capitol Hill. Previously, bicameral accommodations on major legislation typically occurred via conference committees, where each chamber appointed delegates (called conferees) to meet and forge compromise language capable of passing in identical form on the House and Senate floors. Earlier scholarship by Steiner, Van Beek, Longley, Oleszek, and others described the internal operations of such panels and the nature of the bargaining process within them (e.g., which chamber tends to win and why). Many additional articles have used the incidence and makeup of conference panels to adjudicate scholarly disputes about the foundations of committee power and the relative importance of distributive and partisan imperatives for explaining congressional organization. But, as Hong Min Park, Steven Smith, and Ryan Vander Wielen document, this established and highly researched feature of the congressional legislative process has all but evaporated.

The change, they point out, has come in two waves. The first occurred from the 1970s to the mid 1990s, and reflected broader alterations in the standing committee and budget processes. The majority Democratic caucuses of that era were often large, but also deeply factionalized by region, seniority, member ideology, and so on. One result was significant reforms to the House and Senate committee systems that also served to broaden member participation during the conference stage, which in turn produced larger conferences on somewhat fewer measures. Even more consequential were the new legislative vehicles established by the 1974 Budget Act, especially budget resolutions and reconciliation bills. The wide scope of these omnibus measures produced large and unwieldy conferences, to be sure, and also helped reduce somewhat their overall incidence.

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The second wave of change followed the 1994 midterm elections and the emergance of GOP majorities in the House and Senate. Since then, partisan polarization has stepped up significantly, and majority control in both chambers regularly has been up for grabs. To facilitate centralized control by majority party leaders over bicameral bargaining and—this is key—to avoid the kinds of obstructionist tactics described by Wallner, formal conference committees mostly went by the wayside, and the resolution of cross-chamber legislative differences increasingly was accomplished via other, more informal mechanisms. Now, either party leaders meet privately (assisted by leaders of the committees of jurisdiction) and cut the necessary deals, one chamber simply acquiesces, or the House and Senate consider revised versions via a sequential process commonly called "ping pong." If the same party controls both houses, members of the minority party are largely shut out of the interchamber bargaining process.

In their sophisticated, systematic, and comprehensive study of postpassage legislating, Park, Smith, and Vander Wielen synthesize and extend existing scholarship in important ways. Among other topics, they explore in great detail the presence of ideological bias within conference delegations (when they occur) and how such biases vary by chamber, delegation size, and the bargaining scope of the conference. Chapter 4 is an excellent description of the changes that have taken place in postpassage bargaining by legislative context, focusing on appropriations bills, tax legislation, budgets, farm bills, and defense. The authors conclude by considering the normative consequences of their findings. Among other results, the decline of conference procedures means reduced reliance on the subject-matter expertise available from standing-committee members (who typically dominate conference panels) and less transparency and openness in the legislative process. Such changes, needless to say, are unlikely to increase public trust in Congress or the quality of legislation it produces.

Given its rigor and depth, *Politics Over Process* should be the standard scholarly treatment of postpassage politics in Congress for years to come. Many readers will wish that the authors had allocated more attention to the relationships that may exist between postpassage procedures and the nature of the bargaining between parties and chambers. Conference committees, one chamber acquiescence, the exchange of amendments, and related approaches to bicameral accommodation are associated with structurally different bargaining sequences. How does such variation affect which chamber or party tends to win and by how much, the ideological content of legislation, and the role played by the president? Clearly, the structure of the interchamber bargaining game may affect legislative outcomes, but how and why? Such questions are largely left to future research, but scholarly attempts to explore them will necessarily start with this fine book.

In short, both *On Parliamentary War* and *Politics Over Process* add a great deal to scholarship about lawmaking and bargaining in the highly polarized congresses of the 2010s. Both books should be required reading for specialists in legislative studies, and they would each be constructive additions to reading lists for advanced undergraduate- and graduate-level courses about the Congress. Assuming any doubts remain, the dancing bill of Schoolhouse Rock days needs to be retired, and these remarkable new books help explain precisely why.

From Inclusion to Influence: Latino Representation in Congress and Latino Political Incorporation in America. By Walter Clark Wilson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017. 296p. $75.00 cloth.
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— Peverill Squire, *University of Missouri*

The first Latino to win election to a seat in the U.S. Congress was Romualdo Pacheco, a Republican elected as a representative from California in 1877. (Several Latinos had previously served as territorial delegates, the earliest in 1822.) Latino members have been a constant presence in Congress since 1931, and in the House continually since 1943. Yet congressional scholars have given them and their impact on the institution scant attention.

In *From Inclusion to Influence*, Walter Clark Wilson seeks to remedy that omission. He provides a broad-gauged study of the role Latino members have played in Congress, particularly since the 1970s. Focusing on House members, because the number of Latino senators has been too few to allow for rigorous analysis, Wilson examines both the extent to which Latinos have been incorporated into the American political system and how successful they have been in having their interests represented in Congress. He overcomes two significant obstacles in this pursuit. First, even when looking only at House members, the number of Latinos serving in each session is relatively small, limiting analytical options. Second, much of the legislative process is opaque. Wilson is sensitive to both points; consequently he employs a range of research approaches, collecting data where possible and analyzing it with appropriate econometrics, and relying on interviews, case studies, and anecdotal evidence where useful quantitative data are not available.

The picture Wilson paints on the question of Latino political incorporation is fairly bleak, but still hopeful. He documents that the number of Latinos elected to Congress has increased slowly over time and that in recent years, they have started to gain positions of power, notably committee and subcommittee chairs. At the same time, consistent with the conventional wisdom, he shows that Latinos are still only elected from districts that contain substantial numbers of Latinos, that they are still mostly elected as Democrats, and that Latinos vote at lower rates than do members of other major racial and