War II, and the post-Vietnam period are used as examples of congressional dynamism. This final example of assertiveness is questionable. The authors point to the War Powers Resolution as the best example of congressional assertiveness in this period: "If the resolution's provisions turned out to be ambiguous and proved in the end to be unenforceable, the intention of Congress was nonetheless unmistakable" (p. 41). But that intention is a matter of some debate in the literature; many see the resolution as a huge delegation of authority, giving the president the power to make short wars without congressional involvement. To support the congressional acquiescence pattern, the authors discuss the Louisiana Purchase, the acquisition of the Panama Canal site, the Lend-Lease Program, and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

The third and fourth patterns are less distinct and less satisfying. Bipartisanship is illustrated exclusively by early episodes after World War II (creation of the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and the Taiwan Relations Act) that were driven by concern about the Soviet threat. The division-of-labor pattern consists solely of the Persian Gulf War. These instances were unique and seem unlikely to be repeated or to help predict future congressional behavior. And in many respects the Persian Gulf episode as presented seems to exemplify congressional acquiescence to presidential leadership, not a new pattern. The authors claim that Congress "made a significant, and at times essential contribution" (p. 124) by providing legitimacy to Bush's actions, demanding that other nations and the United Nations share part of the burden, and insisting that the administration clarify its goal. But they also note that Bush did not consult with Congress before making decisive diplomatic and military moves, and "the impulse toward congressional assertiveness in foreign affairs was remarkably restrained, to the point most of the time of being altogether absent, throughout the Persian Gulf crisis" (p. 125).

The case studies are not summarized in a way that provides for a theory of when Congress will choose to follow any of the four patterns. When Congress will be assertive or will defer to the president is left unanswered. In the conclusion, the authors note that "the phenomenon of legislative dynamism in dealing with external policy questions is quite clearly associated with periods of weak presidential leadership in foreign relations," and "forceful legislative intrusions into the sphere of external policy are also associated with periods of what might be called public-opinion groundswells regarding America's international role" (p. 160). But information on these variables is never presented in any systematic way.

The chapter on interest groups and lobbyists provides valuable information about congressional decision making in the foreign policy arena, but it is not placed within the framework of the four patterns. The section seems tacked on and detracts from the main discussion.

Despite these problems, the book is not without merit. It gives good overviews of most of the case studies chosen. Chapters 1–3 and 6 (the conclusion) in particular are good reading for an advanced undergraduate class on congressional-presidential relations.

Congress at the Grassroots: Representational Change in the South, 1970–1998. By Richard F. Fenno, Jr. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 170p. $34.95 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Burdett A. Loomis, *University of Kansas*

Not long ago, Richard Fenno was at an American Political Science Association convention, wondering aloud whether anyone might want to publish a case study of a single congressional district over almost three decades. The University of North Carolina Press did, and congressional scholars and students of representation are indebted to the editors there. Just when we suspected that Fenno could not wring one more set of insights from his "soaking and poking" political anthropology, he produces a book that tells a profound tale of political change in the South (and in suburbia), gives us a grounded study of what it means to represent a constituency, and offers an understanding of both the Rayburn and Gingrich eras in the House of Representatives. In addition, students of Congress can enjoy this book in its nuanced referencing of *Home Style*, Fenno's still-relevant study of House members in their constituencies, published in 1978.

Congress at the Grassroots is about the ways in which two members of Congress (MCs), Democrat Jack Flynt and Republican Mac Collins, represented roughly the same Georgia congressional district from the 1950s through 1998. Flynt, who is easily recognizable as one of the congressmen in *Home Style*, practiced a folksy, person-to-person style as a conservative southern Democrat, first elected in 1954. Fenno traveled with him in the early and mid-1970s, after his district lines had been redrawn twice, following the "one-person, one-vote" rulings of the 1960s and then the 1970 Census.

Drawing upon (and often quoting) 25-year-old notes, Fenno delineates Flynt's *"issueless"* (p. 37, emphasis in original) representational style. This portrait takes us back to the heyday of conservative southern Democrats, who prospered in a setting of no serious Republican opposition. Even in the face of a significant environmental controversy, Flynt depended on his highly personal representational routines. All that would change in the 1970s, and Fenno's descriptions produce a clear baseline for comparing the following pair of sketches: Jack Flynt struggling in a new district in a changing South, and Mac Collins developing a conservative style notable for its absence of personal connection. Based on an examination of this one district, both author and reader must address the terms of representation, which every two years, in 435 seats, can be renegotiated.

Flynt inherited a new, more suburban district in 1972, and Fenno's conversations with him in 1972 and 1976, his final reelection campaign, are the most riveting narratives in the book. The congressman understands the general political challenge presented by his new district and yet will not, or cannot, change his behavior to increase his chances of winning. After exploring the new territory in the Atlanta suburbs with Flynt, Fenno writes: "It was the first time I had ever seen the congressman without any idea of where to go or what to do" (p. 57). Following an easy Flynt victory in 1972 and a very narrow win in 1974 over Newt Gingrich, Fenno returned to travel with the congressman during the 1976 campaign. Drawing extensively on his contemporaneous notes, Fenno expertly lays out a legislator's behavior in the terminal stage of his career. Fenno has characterized electoral careers as first "expansionist" and then "protectionist." With Flynt, he finds an MC in the final stages of protectionism—hanging on for one more term, in part because he might gain a bit more power in Washington. Fenno quotes from his notes: "It's a little like watching the last train run through town" (p. 74).

Returning to the district in the 1990s, Fenno finds a completely different representational style being practiced by Mac Collins, first elected in 1992, but a spiritual brother to the Class of 1974 Republican "revolutionaries." Much as Flynt could not change his person-to-person style, Collins frames most contacts in terms of policies. Fenno argues that

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401332021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

changes in context and communications have made it easier to develop a policy-oriented representational style that does not depend on personal linkages. Rather, the message is the message, expressed repeatedly in sophisticated ways. Whereas Jack Flynt reflected the old South's Democratic past, Mac Collins reflects the new South's conservative Republicanism. In itself, such an observation is scarcely earth shattering, but it gains weight from Fenno's unique perspective of thirty years' work in the district.

Congress at the Grassroots is a valuable addition to the literature because of the continuing quality of Fenno's observations, especially as they are tied to a clear-headed view of an extremely complex process. The book adds to our understanding of Congress by looking through the prism of constituency relations and the evolution of districts, but its greatest value is to allow a shrewd scholar to take one more look at the subject that has fascinated him for so long. Fenno was there to watch country stores become convenience outlets, power brokers become supernumeraries, and conservatives register as Republicans, not Democrats.

At first glance, this might seem a slight book on a slight subject. The district is merely one of 435, and the MCs, while competent and successful, are obscure. Yet, as always, Fenno has the wit to understand the broader significance of this extended case. In the end, he touches such important and well-researched subjects as role of party, the change in campaign styles, the coming of ideological partisanship (especially from the Right), and the complexities of representation. All in all, that is not bad for a slender volume and a set of old notebooks.

Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America. By Paul Frymer. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. 214p. $16.95 paper.

Howard L. Reiter, *University of Connecticut*

The multiracial extravaganza staged at the 2000 Republican convention reminds us of the centrality of race in our national politics. In a work that effectively challenges cherished notions of how the political system functions, Paul Frymer argues that through most of U.S. history the major parties have lacked incentives to promote the interests of African Americans.

Central to Frymer's analysis is the concept of capture. A group is captive when it is so small and politically homogeneous that one party can afford to take it for granted and the other can afford to write it off. This is normally the case for black Americans, who were overwhelmingly Republican from the Civil War until the New Deal and then became almost monolithically Democratic in the 1960s. In three chapters that trace this history, Frymer argues that the modern party system was created in the 1830s precisely in order to remove slavery from the agenda; after that goal failed in the late 1840s and 1850s, African Americans entered their first period of party captivity. From 1865 to the 1930s, Republicans enjoyed their allegiance and perceived that there was little they had to do to keep it. The Democrats were the party of white supremacy, and Republicans, who hoped to build a base among white southerners and feared to antagonize racially prejudiced northern whites, downplayed their own racial progressivism.

After the 1940s and 1950s, when the black vote seemed to hold the balance of power, the parties switched roles. Since the 1960s, the Democrats have been the beneficiaries of black voters. Taking that vote for granted and hoping to woo white backlash voters, Democrats in a variety of ways have tried to deemphasize their dependence on African Americans. These efforts have included ending "welfare as we know it" and symbolic gestures, such as the Sister Souljah incident. Meanwhile, Republicans have gone, in Barry Goldwater's words, "hunting where the ducks are," in ponds where there are few black faces.

After reviewing this history and placing it in the context of his capture theory, Frymer discusses several other aspects of the political system. He argues that in mobilization drives Democrats focus more on perceived swing groups than on blacks, who are therefore deprived of the efficacy-enhancing effects of being courted. He maintains that it is particularly ironic that African-American Democrats in Congress owe their clout to such nondemocratic norms as seniority and constituency service rather than to party responsibility. Finally, Frymer prudently draws parallels and differences between blacks and other potentially captured groups, mainly gays and lesbians and the religious Right.

The importance of this book is its major theoretical contributions. Frymer's chief targets are big ones: Anthony Downs, V. O. Key, Jr., E. E. Schattschneider, and other proponents of the responsible parties model, and pluralists. In *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), Downs presented a model of partisan behavior based on rational choice assumptions, including the argument that parties are promiscuous pursuers of voters. Frymer points out that some voting blocs may be undesirable, as they would drive away other parts of the coalition. Therefore, even if one accepts Downs's assumption of single-minded electoral incentives, some groups will continue to be pariahs. Key argued in *Southern Politics* (1950) that the lack of two-party competition kept southern blacks down, and such competition would motivate both parties to woo them, but Frymer maintains that two-party competition may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratization. Key did not foresee that the post-Goldwater GOP would simply write off southern blacks in its pursuit of white voters. Frymer's portrait of the Congressional Black Caucus contradicts what the responsible parties advocates have argued: It is not plebiscitary processes that best promote the interests of African Americans but the contramajoritarian procedures of Congress, which have enabled blacks to secure beachheads on Capitol Hill. Finally, Frymer's depiction of "a long-term, white-based majority interest in the United States" (p. 20) belies the pluralist promise of shifting coalitions.

The book is not flawless. There are more factual errors than a volume this short should boast. Senator Thomas Hendricks was not a Republican (p. 58); farm workers were not "a majority of the population in the United States until the 1920s" (p. 184); George Wallace did not run for the Senate in 1958 (p. 98); the McGovern-Fraser Commission did not mandate primaries (p. 106); Ronald Reagan did not win in 1980 by a "close" margin (p. 108); Kay Bailey Hutchison was never governor (p. 195); and at least seven names are misspelled. Although Frymer rightly faults the Kennedy administration for its dilatory record on civil rights (p. 97), John Kennedy should be given credit for running on the issue in 1960. Fortunately, these errors and omissions do not undermine the main arguments of the book.

Along with such works as Michael Goldfield's *The Color of Politics* (1997), Robert C. Lieberman's *Shifting the Color Line* (1998), and Michael Omi and Howard Winant's *Racial Formation in the United States* (1986, 1994), Frymer shows the centrality of race in the American political process. In addition, he makes a strong theoretical contribution to our analysis of the functioning of political parties in democratic regimes. *Uneasy Alliances* will be a valuable resource for

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