

## Reviews

Michael Palmer, *Freud and Jung on Religion*. (London: Routledge, 1997.) Pp. x + 238. £45 hb, £13.99 pb.

This book fulfils the pressing need for a concise yet comprehensive analysis of the contrasting theories of religion offered by Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav Jung. The book divides into two parts, Palmer taking each thinker at a time, presenting their ideas before subjecting these to nuanced criticism. It would be hard to conceive how the exposition of Freud's theory could be bettered: Palmer introduces the reader to the main themes of each of the critical works on religion, illuminating key ideas by recourse to other of Freud's writings. Indeed, the great success of this presentation lies in Palmer's appeal to more neglected texts. Hence, it is not just (say) *Totem and Taboo* and *The Future of an Illusion* which are analysed: the case studies on Schreber and the Wolf Man receive significant attention, as does *Ritual: Psycho-Analytic Studies*, the little-known book by Freud's disciple, Theodor Reik. Palmer's criticisms of Freud are, in the main, familiar, highlighting, *inter alia*, the unsubstantiated nature of the primal horde hypothesis, the androcentricity of Freud's perspective, and Malinowski's demonstration that the Oedipus complex is not universal. But in addition to this well-trodden ground, Palmer illuminatingly applies Donald Winnicott's analysis of 'transitional objects', so as to redefine the concept of religious illusion. He also seeks to deny that Freud commits the genetic fallacy.

The clarity exhibited in the section on Freud is less apparent in the part on Jung (though this is less a criticism of Palmer than of Jung himself, whose thought seems to thrive on mystification). As before, the reader is guided through the central categories of Jung's psychology (archetypes, individuation, the collective unconscious), and Jung's central claim – that, far from being neurotic in character, religion is actually essential for good mental health – is fairly presented and well analysed. But Palmer is highly critical of Jung and the idea of archetypes. And it is indeed quite extraordinary that certain patterns in mythical and religious images should have led Jung to postulate the existence of a collective unconscious as the home and fountainhead of these ideas. Take, for example, the famous connection he draws between the paranoid schizophrenic's vision of the sun's phallus and a similar image occurring in a Mithraic liturgy. Considering the great diversity of religious imagery throughout history, it would be queer if a person's individual phantasy could *not* be related to a mythical idea. Moreover, many writers (including Bastian, Wittgenstein and – Palmer's favoured example

– Róheim) have little difficulty in explaining the pan-human repetition of ideas that so surprised Jung: ‘That the phases of the moon, the change of seasons, the phenomena of death, of birth and of sexual life, in short everything a man perceives year in, year out around him, connected together in any variety of ways – that all this should play a part in his thinking and his practices, is obvious’ (Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough*). As an alternative to this, the notion of the collective unconscious seems both evidentially lacking and strangely uneconomical. And quite apart from the matter of archetypes, Palmer produces other, more savage criticisms: Jung is guilty of ‘extreme subjectivity’, of ‘crude pragmatism’, and of psychologism (reducing God to a purely psychic reality), while consistently giving priority to theory over evidence.

The forcefulness of Palmer’s criticisms in this context stems in part from his desire to show that Jung is not the friend of religion he is so often made out to be. Though Jung does stress the great importance of believing in God, Palmer thinks such a psychologized God is no triumph for religious belief. Jung’s argument has, he says, ‘so radicalized the notion of God’s immanence as an exclusively psychic reality that it becomes...questionable whether anything has been left of God at all, and thus whether anything distinctive is meant when we speak of religion’ (p. 196). This remark is telling, and highlights what is perhaps a significant weakness of the book. It is true that Jung’s account may ultimately be incompatible with theism, but Palmer is wrong to assume that theism equals religion. There are many other religious traditions in which the notion of (an independently existent) God is not paramount. This is crucially the case for many new religious movements and for revivals of older traditions (such as Wicca and other neo-pagan religions). Jung’s influence on these has been so vital that it is almost certainly a shortcoming of this book that it pays no attention whatsoever to these important new developments in the religious life of human beings. Yet that would be my only major criticism of this book, which stands as a clear, substantial guide around the thought of two intellectual giants, and will be of great use to all students of religious studies.

BRIAN R. CLACK  
St Clare’s, Oxford

Jacob Neusner and Bruce Chilton, *The Intellectual Foundations of Christian and Jewish Discourse: The Philosophy of Religious Argument*. (London, Routledge, 1997.) Pp. xvi + 184, £13.99.

The thesis of this interesting book is deceptively simple. The Jewish Bible and the sayings of Jesus consist of narratives but not arguments, and later

Rabbinic and Christian discourse consists of arguments rather than narratives. The Bible itself is (on the whole) taken to be mythical in character, in the sense that no difficulties arise out of the mutual assertion of contradictory propositions. Later texts are very much part of the Greek philosophical tradition in that they value argument and insist that such argument be validly constructed. There is no doubt that we should be wrong were we to see the Mishnah or the letters of St Paul as being textbooks about logical processes, but we should not be wrong if we appreciate that the structure of their prose contrasts radically with what preceded it and pays close attention to the ways in which conclusions follow from premises.

The structure of this book by Neusner and Chilton is rather curious, given the emphasis on dialectic. There are alternating chapters on the Rabbinic commentaries and on Christian thinkers, and although both sets of thinkers are shown to use dialectical reasoning, it is not at all clear what connection there is supposed to be between them. While the structure of what St Paul, Origen, Irenaeus and Augustine argue is in some ways similar to the rabbis, the differences strike one as more significant than the similarities. The basic distinction is that the Christian thinkers do not have legal issues predominantly in mind, as opposed to the Jews, and so their arguments are at once purer and less contaminated with the issues that arise in everyday life. The structure of the book has two chapters set against each other, so that we start with the Mishnah and St Paul on confronting conflict in texts, then go on to the Talmud and Origen on how to conduct dialectical argument, the use of natural history in the Mishnah and Irenaeus, and finally Jewish and Christian accounts of the notion of social history. One of the ways in which one would expect this structure to be used is dialectically, so that the Jewish and Christian approaches would react with each other, but this is not done. The reader is just supposed to read the individual chapters and draw the appropriate conclusions.

The basic argument is that a clear distinction can be drawn between Judaism and Christianity as sources of revelation, and as systems of argumentation which draw on later and predominantly Greek forms of analysis. How plausible is this thesis? Jesus asserts, while by comparison St Paul argues; the Old Testament is tolerant of contradictory propositions while the Mishnah is not. A stage was reached when religious thinkers felt it appropriate to investigate the nature of the arguments which can be used to understand the nature of their faith and the practical implications it has for its followers, and this marks a radical break with what preceded it. I wonder how plausible this idea is. Some readers of the Old Testament form the opinion that it consists of arguments, often with God (and not only in the Book of Job), and that there are plenty of examples of dialectical reasoning throughout the text. Some readers of the sayings of Jesus would also point to the arguments which he produced, and which others produced against his

arguments. Now, this is not the place to go into the text and bring out such arguments, but it might be enough to suggest that more goes on in the scriptures than just assertion and the defence of revelation as a source of authority. It is certainly the case that some of the rules of behaviour in the Old Testament come without their reasons, but others are given reasons, and individuals often question what God tells them to do. In both Jewish and Christian scriptures it is not the case that people just accept what is revealed to them, they require some evidence that revelation indeed comes from God and needs to be interpreted in a particular way.

This point does not invalidate what Neusner and Chilton produce in their account, since the main content consists of very perceptive descriptions of how particular arguments work and how their structure leads to a broader understanding of how to use argument and analysis itself in the discussion of the scriptures and their implications. No doubt over time there are shifts in the ways in which thinkers express themselves and organize their arguments. We all tend to orientate our thinking in line with current cultural conditions as we experience them. Yet many would doubt that the original scriptural text is so bereft of argument as is alleged here. It is certainly true that the scriptures consist of more than just arguments, but it does not follow that there are no arguments there. After all, revelation itself operates within a context of argument, in that it is taken to prove something, or at least to support some position or another. So the basic distinction between the mythical scriptures and the dialectical commentaries needs more support than Neusner and Chilton manage to provide.

Despite the problems which exist with the book's agenda, the specific discussion of the dialectical processes in both Christian and Jewish thought is very well done, and readers will be impressed by the clear and profound levels of analysis provided by both authors.

OLIVER LEAMAN

Liverpool John Moores University

Gerth, André A., *Theologie im Angesicht der Religionen. Gavin D'Costas Kritik an der pluralistischen Religionstheologie John Hicks* (= Beiträge zur ökumenischen Theologie 27), Paderborn, Schöningh 1997, 264 pp., DM 58.--

Studying living authors is a risky business. They tend to change their minds, which may render accounts of their work obsolete, at times even before they are published. In some respects this is unfortunately precisely what happened to the book presently under review. Gerth compares John Hick's pluralistic approach to a theology of religion with Gavin D'Costa's critical 'inclusivist' response, which depends largely on the great Karl Rahner's famous seminal

concept of the 'anonymous Christian.' What Gerth does not seem to have noticed at the time of publication (he has not considered any of D'Costa's contributions posterior to 1994) is that D'Costa himself seems to have turned 'exclusivist' in recent years, which cuts quite a number of edges off his earlier controversial exchanges with Hick. But despite this potentially fatal verdict Gerth's study can be recommended, and there is even more than one reason for that.

First, the book does serve as a most useful summary of the discussions between Hick and D'Costa from the early 80s to the mid-90s. Gerth has consulted a host of literature, primary as well as secondary, and transformed it into an exciting, though sometimes highly demanding narrative. Secondly, Gerth's argument, focussing on the consistence, coherence, and, above all, plausibility of inclusivism as held by D'Costa, is thoroughgoing, careful, and, most of all, intelligent. In sum, this is certainly more than can be said about many a comparable contribution to this field in recent years, which is all the more remarkable as Gerth decidedly abstains from claiming any degree of ground-moving originality for his thesis. In fact, his study was 'only' awarded a 'Lizentiat' or masters degree at the Katholisch-theologische Fakultät of the Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität, Munich. At a time when disputably lesser achievements are sometimes awarded higher degrees, such modesty should not go unnoticed. For there is originality in Gerth's thesis, albeit disguised in the modesty of expression as displayed throughout the narrative. The latter unfolds in three stages or chapters, (1) D'Costa's inclusivism, (2) D'Costa's critique of Hick's pluralism, (3) Conclusions and open questions. Gerth abstains from sweeping statements about the possibility of developing either, a coherent and a consistent and plausible model of inclusivist or exclusivist theology of religion. He prefers to check D'Costa's and Hick's models likewise as representatives or special cases of each of the two types and detect possible weaknesses in both. He certainly sees a lot of consistency in D'Costa's inclusivism, something which D'Costa himself might find useful to consider from the point of view of his newly acquired exclusivist position.

According to Gerth, the strength of inclusivism lies in its consistency. This is achieved through the belief that, while salvation in the fullest sense is possible for all, Christians and non-Christians, it is only possible through (granted the existence of) Christianity. This second point implies that, from the inclusivist point of view, salvation is less likely for non-Christians than for Christians. Thus what inclusivism gains in terms of consistency, it loses again in terms of coherence and plausibility. Nevertheless, after much grinding reflection Gerth comes to the conclusion that despite this lack of coherence and plausibility inclusivism remains a serious alternative to pluralism ('eine ernstzunehmende Alternative') precisely because of its consistency. Gerth then goes on to analyse D'Costa's critical review of Hick's pluralism, especially his claim that pluralism is inconsistent and therefore self-contradictory.

For, as the early D'Costa held, pluralism cannot claim normativity. It is relativist. If it is not, it must contain a hidden inclusivist agenda. D'Costa tried to prove that by showing that Hick in fact submits all religions and theologies to the pluralist agenda as a kind of super-paradigm. Criticising D'Costa, however, Gerth rightly observes that Hick (and many other pluralists of his vein) never meant the concept of pluralism to function in such a way. Pluralism is not identical with relativism. It rather functions as a regulative pattern in the dialogue between religions and theologies concerning different concepts of God, the Transcendent, and salvation.

Gerth rightly concludes therefore that Hick's proposals are indeed not only coherent and plausible, but also consistent. The first two may come less as a surprise than the latter. That pluralism holds a certain plausibility in the present world at large, cannot be denied. The extent to which it may also be coherent, however, or even consistent, may have to be qualified further. Hick mainly accumulates arguments from history in order to strengthen his point. His approach is in some way similar to that of Charles Darwin in his *Origin of Species*, who also tried to 'prove' his simply structured basic theses accumulatively by amassing empirical evidence supporting it. In the field of religious studies the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* too had a similar kind of approach. But although the argument from history of religion does play a certain role in Hick's account, he transcends it by introducing theological, spiritual and ethical principles as well. In the vein of a more recent representative of political pluralism like Isaiah Berlin he poses the question whether an inclusivist could seriously argue from 'praxis'. In other words: Who advocates the convergence of religions and to what avail? Or should we assume that inclusivism works by way of a quasi evolutionist paradigm, in which all religions converge, maybe within an indefinitely long period in history? The actual history of religions and the internal dynamism in many religions, not least Christianity, tell a different story.

When it comes to core beliefs and practices, exclusivism is at work. This is what Gerth's account teaches us by way of a case study in theology of religion. In practice, the only way in which to tackle the challenge of religious pluralism (as questioning universal claims to salvation or other) is to acknowledge it and take it on board, i.e. accepting it as an element of one's own beliefs and doctrines. Consequently, Hick develops a (spirit) Christology from below and abandons attempts to reconcile this with a metaphysical reading of orthodox two-nature doctrine. For him, in contrast, the Jesus Christ of Christianity is but one possible (or, for that matter, real) instance of a salvation event, which may have taken place in innumerable different other forms throughout the cosmos. This is neither relativism nor, as the earlier D'Costa may have also suggested, agnosticism as a mild version of atheism. It is rather, as Hick has long held and Gerth well reported and analysed by contrasting it with D'Costa's model, a valid, plausible, coherent

and indeed also consistent (and in that respect also religious and indeed theological!) fundamental reflection on any religion, beginning with one's own.

JOSEF LÖSSL  
King's College London

Barry Miller, *A Most Unlikely God* (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996) 175pp., £21.50 sterling.

In a previous book *From Existence to God* (1992), Miller argues to an uncaused cause of the universe. The present book is an attempt to move towards the God of Christian worship through an analysis of the concept of this absolutely independent creator. Whether or not one finds Miller's God 'unlikely' will depend largely upon one's education. Those conversant with Aquinas will recognize, as scattered references throughout the book attest, that Miller's 'subsistent Existence' is the Pure Act or Being Itself of the Thomist tradition. The task that Miller has set himself, then, is an explanation and defence of a basically Thomist (with some qualifications) approach to God in the contemporary idiom. It is a job eminently worth doing given how often the name of Aquinas crops up in current philosophy of religion and how widely and deeply his views are misunderstood. Does Miller succeed in unpacking the notion of 'subsistent Existence' in a way that renders it philosophically plausible and recognizably akin to the God of Christian worship? Yes and no.

Many contemporary philosophers of religion summarily dismiss the notion that God could be Pure Being. Existence, they say, is not a predicate and could not possibly subsist, or, if it is a predicate, it is a most impoverished one, since it is shared by everything. Miller devotes Chapters Two and Three to arguing that 'existence' is a predicate, but not one like 'redness' or 'wisdom' which inheres in a subject. The relationship between the subject and its existence is rather that the subject individuates its existence by being its 'bound.' Miller explains this through the use of the analogies of water in a bucket and butter cut from the larger mass, both of which are individuated by their bounding surfaces. He then goes on to argue that if the individual subject is the bound of its real existence, then existence is an ontologically rich term admitting of degrees. Different kinds of subjects will possess different properties and degrees of properties which will render these subjects more or less constricting bounds of existence. 'Consequently, although it may be true that existence is an on/off property, it is quite false that an instance of existence had by an electron can be neither more or less rich than an instance had by Einstein: the difference is simply incalculable' (p. 41). Although the analogies of the water and the butter 'limp rather badly', as



Miller admits (p. 35), I find his analysis of the subject as the bound of its existence, and hence of existence being more or less constricted in different individuals, a plausible way to look at things. I had better confess that I have long accepted the Thomist view that existence is a real property which can be had to a greater or lesser degree. I am not at all sure that Miller makes a case which would convince the sceptic. But even if the sceptic should remain unconverted, he will at least gain a better appreciation for what Aquinas means.

In order to apply his analysis of existence to God Miller employs the concept of a 'limit case.' In an ordered series one may have a maximum or minimum, which would constitute limits simpliciter, and would be the same sort of thing as the other members of the series. A limit case, on the other hand, is that towards which a series may be ordered, but which is 'outside' of the series and does not share the nature of the members of the series. Miller does not offer a more precise definition, but explains his point through examples. In a series of ordered lines becoming progressively shorter the limit case is a point. In the case of a series of regular polygons with progressively more and more sides the limit case is a circle. God's existence will be unbounded existence, i.e. the limit case of existence which is not at all the existence belonging to created beings.

We can establish God's non-existential properties by discovering which properties admit of limit cases which are absolutely unbounded. Power and knowledge are examples. Thus we can hold that God is 'omnipotent' and 'omniscient', but we must recognize that God's 'power' and 'knowledge' are limit cases. They are what creaturely instances 'point to', but they do not share the nature of these properties as they appear in creatures. As absolutely unbounded, the divine properties will be identical to one another, so God is simple (p. 83). And if it is puzzling how God's power, for example, could simply *be* His knowledge, remember that 'limit case' is an 'alienans' adjective. It indicates that the noun it modifies is not to be taken in its usual sense. Thus 'rocking' in rocking horse, or 'negative' in negative growth, are alienans adjectives (p. 10). Human power and knowledge are quite different properties, but it does not follow that their limit cases in God, being quite unlike the members of the series they limit, must be distinct (pp. 117–121).

There are a number of points one might question in the progress of this argument, but the most serious problem, it seems to me, is with the driving concept of the 'limit case'. Miller, quite rightly in my view, criticizes many contemporary perfect being theologians for applying terms to God in an unqualifiedly univocal sense which renders Him a sort of super scientist. (Please, let's stop calling these philosophers 'Anselmians'! Anselm himself clearly understood God to be eternal, immutable, simple, Subsistent Existence.) But if we are to speak meaningfully about God at all, we will have to explore the relationship between God and creatures in a way which steers a



middle course between seeing Him as ‘one of us’ and seeing Him as beyond comprehension. Miller claims that his analysis of divine attributes as the limit cases of human properties does just this, but ‘limit case’ is never adequately defined. One gets a sense of the meaning through Miller’s analogies, but things get muddy when one tries to apply the concept to God and creation. Surely God is not to creation as a point to a series of lines or a circle to a series of polygons. Miller repeatedly insists that in a series of instances of F, if there is a limit case instance of F, it is not F. So God’s ‘limit case’ power is not power, and His ‘limit case’ knowledge is not knowledge. This is not that version of the *via negativa* which holds that perfections are properly negated in God because in Him they exist to so great, even infinite, a degree that the human mind cannot encompass them. Miller insists that divine properties are not ‘mere extensions’ of human properties, no matter how far they are extended (p. 162). Clearly we are in danger of denying any positive meaning at all to our theological language.

Miller claims to have avoided this horn of the dilemma because there is a relationship between the members of a series and its limit case. ‘Yet, unless there were some likeness between members of the series and their limit cases, it would be just as reasonable to say that a [point] was the limit case of a series of regular polygons and that a circle was the limit case of a series of [lines]. Since that is plainly quite unreasonable, there must be at least some likeness between the members of a series and their limit case. (p. 151).’ (The brackets are inserted in the quotation since Miller used a different example which I found hard to grasp.) What sort of likeness is there between divine and creaturely attributes? Just what *can* we properly mean when we say that God is powerful or wise? Miller offers no analysis. The above sentences are the sole argument that on his ‘limit case’ doctrine of analogy language about God does not wind up being purely equivocal. And since Aquinas is mentioned with approval in Miller’s chapter on ‘God-Talk’, it is impossible to avoid comparison. Whereas Aquinas’s well-developed doctrine of analogy protects divine transcendence by insisting that God is unlimited and perfectly unified, it also explains how words can be used positively in that creatures are caused by God and reflect or ‘participate in’ His being. Admittedly, these are difficult terms, and Aquinas’s doctrine is the subject of debate, but at least there is a positive theory to be discussed. Miller’s analysis of God as a limit case needs elaboration.

This is not to suggest that contemporary philosophers of religion should settle for simply resurrecting Aquinas. There are problematic issues in his system that need to be worked through, and it may be that we can come up with better solutions than he did seven centuries ago. (I don’t say it’s likely, but it’s possible.) Miller attempts to deal with a series of these questions, but here his work is at its weakest. A number of philosophers have disputed the concept of God as absolutely simple, arguing that, since creation is contin-

gent for Him, there must be things He knows and wills necessarily, like His own existence, and things He knows and wills contingently (that is, He might have known and willed otherwise) like the existence of all the rest of us. There seem to be then necessary and contingent ‘components’ to the divine makeup. Miller argues that we can solve the problem by appreciating that ‘necessarily’ just means ‘in all possible worlds’ so that the point about what God knows can be expressed as follows,...

Possibly (God knows his own essence but not himself as creator)

Possibly (God knows both his own essence and himself as creator of W<sub>(orld 1)</sub>)

Possibly (God knows both his own essence and himself as creator of W<sub>2</sub>)

...and so on. An analogous move can be made for God’s willing, *mutatis mutandis* (pp. 96–106).

But this does not capture what the theist means by saying that God is necessarily omniscient and omnipotent. The theist intends to be saying something about God *in the actual world*; that His knowledge and power are so tremendous that they could not be lost or otherwise altered. Miller goes on to explain that creating does not affect God’s nature because it is merely a ‘Cambridge Property’. To be a creator adds nothing to God in any way at all. Miller spends some time explaining how in willing His own good, which He does necessarily, God may (or may not) will creation without this making any difference at all to God in Himself (pp. 106–112). Here Miller follows Aquinas closely, and there is nothing inconsistent in the argument. But the religious believer is rightly concerned that God, who supposedly loves him and has numbered the hairs on his head, could quite happily do without him. This is the real problem and it goes unaddressed.

Perhaps the most difficult problem for the Thomist is whether or not human freedom can be reconciled with God as Subsistent Existence, the absolute source of all being. There is a great deal of debate about how Aquinas deals with the issue. Miller’s solution is woefully inadequate. He grants that for any event it is God who brings it about. Suppose (counterfactually) that I beat my son. Because of his analysis of secondary causality Miller holds that we ought not say ‘God causes Rogers to beat her son.’ Nonetheless it is quite true that ‘God brings it about that (Rogers beats her son)’. Why isn’t He responsible for evil? Because ‘Whether or not the activity in question is in fact criminal depends, however, on [Rogers’] intention. (p. 137)’. Exactly how intentions can be exempted from divine causality is opaque. And the idea that I can’t help but beat my son, since God brings it about that I do it, but I could save my soul by beating him with pious intent strikes me as bizarre.

So there are problems with *A Most Unlikely God*. I do not think that Miller deals adequately with the worst problems bequeathed by Aquinas. (Of course, if Aquinas had trouble with them then they are very recalcitrant

problems indeed!) The idea of God as a ‘limit case’, while it is useful to ensure divine transcendence, needs to be developed. In order to speak meaningfully of God we must not only grant that there is some sort of likeness between God and creatures, we must say something about what that likeness consists in. On the other hand Miller’s analysis of God as Subsistent Existence, depending as it does on his explanation of existence as a property admitting of degrees, with the created individual serving as the ‘bound’ of its being, seems to me a very valuable contribution to the contemporary debate. And I must add that, being keen on the original Anselm, I heartily agree with Miller’s criticism of contemporary ‘Anselmians’ who, unlike their namesake, seem content with a God than whom a greater can be pretty easily conceived. Miller’s ‘unlikely’ Thomist God is, to my mind, still the most likely candidate for the title of Perfect Being.

KATHERIN A. ROGERS  
University of Delaware

David Ray Griffin, *Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem*. (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1998.) Pp. xv + 266. £35/US\$45 hb.

Since the time of Descartes, most attempts to solve problems concerning the mind-body relationship and human freedom have oscillated between dualist and materialist theories. Materialists hold that dualists have difficulty in showing how a ‘bodiless’ mind can influence a ‘physical’ body while dualists charge materialists with problems in making sense of humankind’s deep seated convictions about the reality of the ‘mind’ and of personal freedom. Discussions of these issues are often prolonged and complex; theories about ‘supervenience’ cast light on the issues for some and make them increasingly foggy for others. There is also lack of agreement about what the issues are. Where one person finds ‘freedom’, another finds ‘determinism’; what some consider to be hard-core convictions about the mind are popular illusions for another.

In the first part of his study David Griffin examines many of the difficulties that stand in the way of dualist and materialist solutions to the mind and body problem. He also identifies regulative ideas and unquestionable data that must inform any satisfactory solution, distinguishing between soft-core commonsense beliefs that may be the product of ‘wishful-and-fearful’ thinking, and hard-core commonsense notions that we cannot coherently deny because they are entailed by our practice even when we purport to deny them (e.g., in the case, noted by Whitehead, of ‘professors who write papers with the purpose of proving that purposes play no causal role in human behaviour’ – p. 163). Griffin’s discussion of these issues is clear and useful, engaging with several recent works.

The crux of the intellectual knot that he seeks to ‘unsnarl’ lies in the difficulty of understanding how, given current scientific views about nature (and in particular about the human body), ‘our conscious experience, which we know exists [a hard-core belief], could arise out of the body, and also how this experience could have the dual capacity for self-determining freedom and for employing this freedom in directing the body, which we all presuppose in practice [another hard-core belief]’ (p. 117). In essaying his solution to this problem Griffin eschews dualist and materialist approaches in favour of a distinct, third option. In the history of modern thought this option has received much less attention than the other two. When it has been mentioned, it has generally attracted adverse criticism and sometimes summary dismissal. It is based on what is variously called a panpsychist, psychicalist or, in Griffin’s preferred terminology, panexperientialist view of reality.

Taking up Whitehead’s ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’, Griffin maintains that dualist and materialist theories are fundamentally flawed because they fail to appreciate that their basic notions of matter and mind are abstractions. An adequate conception of what exists as individual realities, from particles, atoms and neurons to compound individuals like human persons, needs instead to recognize that every individual reality is constituted by both internal and external relations and so has both mental and physical qualities. In how things actually are, therefore, there is no unbridgeable logical–ontological chasm between mind and matter because any and every real individual has, even if minimally, mental as well as physical characteristics. The basic problems of the mind–body relationship and of human freedom are thus held to be products of faulty analyses and applications of the key notions. In fact, like the turtles, there is mind as well as matter all the way down!

Two common objections to panexperientialist attempts to solve the basic mind–body problem are that it seems implausible to consider, first, that objects like particles, atoms or neurons are conscious, and, secondly, that a lump of rock has feelings. The first objection is answered by maintaining that *experience* does not have to involve (and in all but a very few cases does not involve) conscious awareness. Consciousness (and even more self-consciousness) is ‘a very high-level type of experience’ (p. 71n) that develops only gradually with the emergence of complex individuals. The second objection is met by pointing to the distinction, overlooked by those who make this criticism, between a compound individual (such as a human person) that is a society of individual occasions with a unifying centre of experience (i.e., that has a ‘presiding’, ‘dominant’ or ‘regnant’ occasion that prehends and brings together the feelings of the lower-level individuals that constitute it), and an aggregational society of individuals (such as a rock, or the audience at a rock concert) that has no such coordinating and unifying occasion that

would enable it ‘to respond to its environment as a unity with even the slightest degree of freedom’ (p. 186).

While, however, there is a certain attractiveness about this thesis (and only slight indications of the author’s convictions about the significance of such extrasensory perceptions as clairvoyance and telepathy that some may find off-putting), it is not free from problems. In the first place, while Griffin is confessedly indebted to Whitehead’s ideas and often cites the latter’s later works, what he presents is a naturalistic reading of Whitehead’s analysis of the constitution of actual occasions. Griffin’s view of mental prehension replaces the claim that it grasps ‘eternal objects’ in ‘the primordial nature’ of God with the claim that the possibilities that it grasps are the product of abstraction from the subject’s physical prehension of what has gone before. Although this substitution avoids problems with certain aspects of the role of God in Whitehead’s thought, it is not clear that it is compatible with the Whiteheadian requirement, based on the ‘ontological principle’, that possibilities of genuine novelty can only be prehended in what is. Although this review is not the place to examine this issue in detail (for it would require an extensive analysis of Whitehead’s views), it should be noted that Griffin’s employment of Whiteheadian (and process) thought is not uncontroversial. Furthermore, it is not clear that it is helpful to replace the notion of ‘God’ with that of ‘the mind of the universe’ or ‘the cosmic mind’, while the root-and-branch rejection of references to the ‘supernatural’ seems as dogmatic as some materialist rejections of references to the mind. In a work that presses for radical rethinking of what is meant by such terms as ‘matter’ and ‘mind’, the assertion that talk of ‘God’ makes ‘most naturalists nervous’ (p. 205) is not a convincing reason for abandoning it.

Secondly, while fundamental problems with dualist and materialist attempts to solve the mind–body problem make it reasonable to investigate whether a solution exists elsewhere, and while panexperientialism is an option that has the initial attraction of denying that any genuine individual lacks an experiential (and so a mental) component, it is not clear whether this option can be credibly sustained. To hold that everything is to some extent experiential, however trivially (cf. p. 148), and so has what may be called an ‘inner’ side through which it can be said to be *pour soi* as well as *en soi* (cf. p. 102), leads to the question of the character of the experiencing at the levels of such individuals as a particle, an atom, or even a cell. Whatever ‘experiencing’ may refer to at such levels, it is far from clear how it is different from what may be described as a case of ‘being affected by’ that has no necessary mental component. When an iron filing responds to a magnet, we may say that the constituent individuals of this aggregation ‘feel’ or ‘experience’ or ‘respond’ to the magnetic field, but it is not clear that these verbs are more than metaphors for describing what happens (and, if implicit reference to mentality in them be not clearly erased, misleading metaphors).

If this be the case, it is arguable that the mind–body problem is not solved by the adoption of panexperientialism but is transferred to what, in spite of discussions of the issue, seems to remain a major problem, namely, the problem of how consciousness, and even more critically self-consciousness, emerges from this ‘experiencing’. Furthermore, as has been noted, while Griffin, like Whitehead before him, stresses that only a very small proportion of ‘experiencing’ is conscious, let alone self-conscious, the model of the process of the coming-to-be of actual occasions through ‘prehensions’ and ‘feelings’ on examination seems only to make sense on the supposition of a degree of awareness in that process that resembles a form of consciousness. While, therefore, the Whiteheadian principle of using ‘our own experience’ as ‘our very standard of actuality’ (p. 176) may seem an attractive up-dating of the Cartesian starting point, it may turn out in certain respects to lead in practice into the slough of the dilemma where the notion of ‘experience’ *either* becomes so attenuated (as in the case of particles) that it is not clear that it signifies anything (and also have fallen into the trap of taking metaphors as literal descriptions), *or* presupposes a degree of consciousness that is not credible in the circumstances. Unfortunately, because our experience is *our* experience and because in order to use it deliberately we must be conscious of it according to how we think of things, it is not as uncontroversially comprehensive a starting-point as might be expected.

Finally, while the problems of the mind–body relationship and of the reality and nature of human freedom are fundamental to human self-understanding, while the materialist and dualist solutions to them may be judged unsatisfactory, and while Griffin offers a robust, interestingly argued and self-confident affirmation of his panexperientialist solution, his thesis is open to the question of whether panexperientialism, like dualism and materialism, is still too determined by traditional ideas of mind and matter to allow for a thoroughly adequate breakthrough in understanding. Perhaps the three options examined in this study are not the only possible ones. If none of the three convince, we may hope so. To show that two have failed does not demonstrate the third must be accepted unless it is known that there is solution to the problem in principle available to use and that there are no other options. It may be that the problem is insoluble. In his discussion Griffin (referring to Colin McGinn’s *The Problem of Consciousness*) quotes what he describes as ‘a remarkable passage’ in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* where Kant is said to have ‘assumed a panpsychist solution to the mind–body problem’ (p. 83). The sentences quoted from Kant do speak of this type of solution to the problem and are certainly in Kant’s text (B427f; Kemp Smith’s translation, p. 381). What perhaps is remarkable, however, is that, both here and in later references to this passage, it is not noted that Kant went on to state that, in view of what has been maintained in the *Analytic* about ‘fundamental powers and faculties’, his ‘reader will not hesitate to

regard' this matter 'as likewise lying outside the field of all human knowledge'. In his first edition Kant had been even more positive. The question of the mind–body problem is one which 'no man can possibly answer' (A393; Kemp Smith p. 359); only by carefully observing the limits of our understanding can we hope to avoid the 'dogmatic delusion, which through the lure of an imagined felicity keeps so many in bondage to theories and systems' (A395; Kemp Smith p. 361). Kant may be overly pessimistic but growth in understanding minds, brains, freedom and matter as well as of theories and systems since his time has made the solution seem more rather than less elusive. Panexperientialism may suggest routes that avoid problems undermining materialist and dualist solutions. In these respects Griffin's work presents a provocative contribution to what is still unfinished business. Whatever the plausibility or implausibility of his notion of panexperientialism, he is also right to remind us of Whitehead's remark that 'almost all really new ideas have a certain aspect of foolishness when they are first produced'. The problem, however, is not to discern those that are really new but to identify those which will turn out not to be foolish.

DAVID A. PAILIN  
University of Manchester