

The four 1980s essays largely disappoint, repeating the author's earlier obsessions (militarisation, the Left, and Cuban foreign policy's Soviet dependence). In fact, it is noticeable that by the 1980s (and into the 1990s), the essays show much less evidence of academic rigour and greater evidence of polemic on the familiar themes – some of them even being speeches or lectures rather than essays. It is as if, by then, Horowitz had abandoned any claim to his earlier radicalism and was entrenched in a Cold War anti-communism. That the 1990s produced so many writings on Cuba seems almost to have demonstrated a belief that the system which he had spent three decades condemning was in its death throes; indeed, Horowitz is to be congratulated for his honesty in including a 1991 lecture where he predicted the collapse of the Cuban system in 1992. However, the essays of that decade add nothing new; the fire of the rigorous social scientist seemed to have gone out, replaced by the image of an old warrior repeating old complaints.

Where, then, does this collection take us? In his heyday of 1965–79, Horowitz was an admirable political scientist; for all his obsessions, he was always capable of reminding us to look carefully, logically and imaginatively at a system which few examined in such a way, and at aspects which more sympathetic observers preferred to ignore. The best essays belong to the canon of Cuban studies, but the post-1980s work also illustrates the growing poverty of much of the Cold War-fossilised interpretations of the Cuban reality which continued to dominate a part of the literature on Cuban politics. As a collection, therefore, *The Long Night of Dark Intent* ends up telling us more about 'Cubanology' than it does about the revolution.

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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 41 (2009). doi:10.1017/S0022216X09990708

Dayan Jayatilleka, *Fidel's Ethics of Violence: The Moral Dimension of the Political Thought of Fidel Castro* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp. x + 235, £17.99, pb.

This is a welcome and important book at a time when the question of the ethical dimension of politics – both the politics of those in power and the political struggles of those resisting neoliberal domination – is of acute relevance and human significance. Jayatilleka's provocative central argument is that the moral dimension of Fidel Castro's political thought and practice has been at the core of his and Cuba's astounding military, political and social-cultural success against the odds. Jayatilleka contends that Castro thereby overcomes the theoretical impasse in radical thought in relation to ethics and violent political struggle as exemplified in the polemic between Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre. In his insistence on the morally correct use of violence, Castro breaks the mould of all radical and revolutionary thought and practice to forge a 'unique synthesis' (p. 159) between the realist and idealist/romantic political traditions (p. 194). Castro also overcomes the dichotomy between absolute non-violence and the unrestrained use of violence for political ends and, so Jayatilleka argues, provides a model for a 'leftist political ethos' and a military-political ethics for both states and anti-state organisations (p. 115).

The argument is clearly developed in four parts divided into seven chapters. Part I introduces the ethics of violence in relation to political power and struggle, highlighting the relative paucity of ethical-theoretical resources for radical politics and movements for change. Neither 'Just War Theory' nor Marxism has provided adequate moral resources for guiding radical and revolutionary movements.

As Jayatilleka points out, ‘Unfortunately, within the radical and Marxian tradition in which Castro must be situated, there is for the most part a silence concerning the correct use of violence’ (p. 19). Lenin is shown to have placed merely strategic and not ethical constraints on the use of violence, while Mao is held to have lacked an ethics of violence despite having outlined regulations for the correct treatment of prisoners and for dealing with internal contradictions and rivalries in the revolutionary conjuncture. For Jayatilleka, Mao’s ideas on the right and wrong use of violence were never a recurrent theme in his thought, and their credibility ‘was vitiated by Mao’s resort to or permitting of precisely the categories of violence he deplored during the Cultural Revolution’ (p. 15). Later radical/Marxist theorists like Sartre, Sorel and Fanon addressed the theme of violence, applauding its liberating aspects but never stipulating moral restraints on its use. Theirs was ultimately an ethics of ends divorced from means, and they had ‘no dialectical understanding of the violence of the oppressed, encompassing its contradictory aspects, both liberating and dehumanising’ (p. 26). Jayatilleka then makes the provocative but well-supported argument that the failure of socialist revolutionary projects across the globe had as one of its root causes the absence of an ethics of violence, which led to internecine rivalry and the subsequent implosion and discrediting of socialism as a cause and project.

Part II impressively documents the moral dimension of Castro’s political thought, demonstrating its authentic nature through the use of hostile sources and Castro’s own speeches and writings in contexts that prove his ideas were genuinely held and not mere histrionic adornments for strategic use. The consistency of ethical themes in these sources stands out and certainly buttresses Jayatilleka’s contention that morality was central to Castro’s thought and practice. Part III analyses the form and content of Castro’s moral-political thought, helpfully condensing Castro’s moral arguments and positions in relation to the use of violence, foreign policy, and the wider moral-political issues of the nature of the revolution and its particular embodiment of socialism. In Jayatilleka’s view, Cuba has not gone the way of the USSR or Eastern Europe ‘primarily because it rests on a far stronger foundation of moral legitimacy’ (p. 150), which is an argument with arguably important philosophical implications for political theory and practice. Finally, Part IV demonstrates in detail the way Castro resolves through synthesis the contradictions in radical political thought in relation to violence and social change. It is an intriguing and powerful argument that points to the contemporary relevance of Castro or *Fidelismo*.

In general terms this book makes a convincing case for the necessity and efficacy of a strong and genuine moral dimension to politics that is capable of transcending radically divergent ideological positions. As such it implicitly makes a profound philosophical argument about morality that is distinct from classical Marxism, liberalism and some forms of post-modernism: morality is not reducible to economic or class interests and is not ahistorical or detached from desire and substantive conceptions of the good; nor is it merely relative to cultural formations or radically separate from politics.

Unfortunately, the book’s ‘top-down’ focus on the morality of Castro means it leaves out important philosophical questions about the ethics of social change and political struggle from below. Although the emphasis in the title is on Castro’s ethics of violence, the third chapter is titled ‘Evolution of Castro’s Ethics of Liberation’, which led me to expect an exploration of the wider social and political dimensions of Castro’s thought and practice. A closer examination of these other moral

dimensions of Castro's political thought besides the military aspect was lacking, however, perhaps because they were not prominent in Castro's moral thinking, which it seems tended to centre on the single dimension of violence and military practice. Indeed, this suggests that Castro's contemporary relevance to the complex ethical-political issues of violence, power, resistance and revolution is not as great as the author suggests. There are also serious questions about the kind of moral agency permitted by Castro and his tightly controlled state, and these raise important issues about the moral legitimacy of the Cuban project irrespective of its superiority relative to other political-economic systems.

One of the most important moral-political philosophers of the last 30 years, Alasdair MacIntyre, has powerfully critiqued the philosophical cogency of the ethical dimensions of modern state-centred politics and Marxism as well as the latter's claim to a morally distinctive standpoint. For MacIntyre, 'large-scale politics has become barren. Attempts to reform the political systems of modernity from within are always transformed into collaborations with them. Attempts to overthrow them always degenerate into terrorism or quasi terrorism' ('An Interview with Giovanna Borradori', in K. Knight (ed.), *The MacIntyre Reader* (1998), p. 265). I would suggest, however, that Jayatilaka provides strong evidence against this in the case of Cuba, and at the level of theory he implicitly posits *Fidelismo* as the kind of ethical-political-social theory/tradition that MacIntyre sees as the necessary intellectual framework for rational moral-political inquiry – for example, in his *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (1990). In my view Jayatilaka makes a strong case that Fidel Castro's moral-political thought not only constitutes an important theoretical contribution to political philosophy but is itself also a moral-political tradition partly born of concrete political-social practice. This tradition takes ethics out of the liberal domain of ahistorical morality and the problematic modern fragmentation and incommensurability of moral discourse diagnosed by MacIntyre, embodying not just a rival theory but also a rival mode of socio-political-military practice through which moral criteria regain rational purchase and can once again play a role in guiding social-political relations and the search for social justice.

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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 41 (2009). doi:10.1017/S0022216X0999071X

Gary Williams, *US-Grenada Relations: Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. xii + 298, \$84.95, hb.

Published 24 years after the combined United States and Caribbean invasion of Grenada, Gary Williams' book provides the most comprehensive and detailed examination that I have read of the events leading up to the overthrow of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) on October 25, 1983. Drawing on an astonishing range of primary and secondary sources (the bibliography runs for 37 pages), this book provides the definitive account of the discussions and negotiations which took place prior to the invasion. For anyone with an interest in either the Caribbean or US foreign policy in the region, this book is a must-read.

The book is divided into seven chapters excluding introduction and conclusion, an epilogue and four appendices. The first chapter of the book, 'United States' Intervention in the Caribbean Basin', is the weakest. It provides a very brief