and build relations of (dis)trust accordingly. Yet while the book rightly reminds us that self-esteem does not require treating others as potential enemies, it does not develop an identity-based argument to account for generalized social trust. All the reader gets is the suggestion that such trust arises out of role-play within a system of shared rules (pp. 71–72).

In order to explain the external effects of domestic social trust (or lack thereof), the book uses insights from literature on cognitive bias to suggest that political elites socialized in a particular domestic environment carry its high/low trust attitude into their dealings with external actors (p. 83). Thus, in essence, it suggests that leaders from a strong state approach perfect strangers abroad with an optimistic and cooperative outlook, whereas societies characterized by domestic anarchy will "create leaders with militant or radical orientations" (p. 85) and a paranoid foreign policy. These claims would have greatly benefited from a more careful discussion than the 10 pages spent on them, and readers will not likely be persuaded. A realist, for instance, would take issue with the reasoning that a skeptical attitude regarding the trustworthiness of other states leads to conflict.

The theory also leaves some important questions unanswered. For instance, little is said about the relational/interactive dimension. Does it matter whether a state with a certain level of domestic social trust faces a state with a lower or higher level? How does it know about this level? In the same vein, how general can the argument be? While the scenario of the "alien encounter" may be useful theoretically, it seems naive to assume that states (their representatives) encounter each other as perfect strangers. What about other factors influencing perception, such as ideologies? And then there is the hint that high-trust states support and respect international legal structures (p. 88), which begs the question of the role that system-level factors play in the argument.

In framing the analysis exclusively as a contribution to the democratic peace and diversionary war theories, the book fails to make use of, and situate the argument in, some relevant IR literature, including recent works on interstate trust, weak/failed states, and psychological accounts of foreign policy. Most unfortunate, for this reader at least, is the missing engagement with the social constructivist literature that has long explored identity- and norm-based arguments of conflict and cooperation. Only Alexander Wendt is discussed here and there, but even his attempt to theorize the overlap between domestic knowledge and transnational cultures of anarchy is not dealt with. On a more general level, parallels to the communitarianism versus cosmopolitanism debate could have been exploited. An engagement with this literature would have focused the argument and clarified its contribution to IR more broadly.

The empirical analysis displays similar strengths and weaknesses. It uses both quantitative and qualitative methods, and in each case the vague definitions of key terms and the broad argument come in handy.

The quantitative study covers the period 1990–2001, is carefully set up, and utilizes a sensible set of databases. The degree of domestic social trust is operationalized as level of corruption within a society, and an effort is made to explain this link. Different hypotheses are tested using a number of plausible control variables, and the closer they come to the main argument—with initiation in militarized interstate disputes (MID) as the dependent variable—the more statistically significant the findings become. This is interesting, although its relevance depends on whether one goes along with reading a correlation between domestic corruption and MID initiation as evidence validating the argument outlined earlier.

It would have been nice to read a case study (or two) from the same period. That the author chose the outbreak of World War I instead can be justified with its status as the litmus test for IR theories of war. Yet it probably is also the most overdetermined event, making a competent evaluation difficult. In his account, Jasinski assesses factors not considered in the quantitative analysis, such as state strength and national identity, through brief studies of the internal configuration of the European great powers involved. Whether one finds these studies convincing depends, ultimately, on whether one accepts the interpretation that Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia experienced domestic anarchy prior to the outbreak of the war, and that France and Great Britain enjoyed effective governance and a high level of social trust.

In the end, the creative ambition driving *Social Trust, Anarchy, and International Conflict* and its attempt to integrate a variety of conceptual and empirical insights make it worth reading. It may not link up to a coherent whole, and its conclusion that international peace requires strong states may stand on thin legs. Still, the book should prompt IR scholars to think harder about phenomena of trust and stimulate new questions about the domestic sources of conflict and cooperation—and that is an achievement.

**Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes beyond East and West.** Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. New York: Routledge, 2012. 296p. $145.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.

— Henry R. Nau, *George Washington University*

This book is the third installment of a trilogy on civilizations inspired and edited by Peter Katzenstein. Taken together, the three books constitute a *tour de force* in advancing our understanding of world affairs. Katzenstein is determined to bridge the civilizational divides associated with the work of another political science giant, Samuel P. Huntington ("The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign* Affairs 72 [Summer 1993]: 22–49). The first volume, *Civilizations*

*in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives,* 2010, established the cornerstone of this bridge. Civilizations are plural, not primordial; they reflect multiple actors, standards, traditions, and practices. They do not cohere and clash; they encounter and intermingle. The first volume examined six civilizations—United States, Europe, China, Japan, India, and Islam. The second volume, *Anglo-America and Its Discontents: Civilizational Identities beyond West and East, 2012,* explored in greater detail the Anglo-American civilization. This third volume examines Sinicization, or the Sino-centric civilization of China and its related neighbors.

In the opening chapter, Katzenstein identifies what he calls "the rhyme of Chinese history" (p. 6). China's rise will bring neither a "return" to China's imperialist past, as realists expect, nor a "rupture" of China's traditions and its emergence as the epicenter of a transformed Asian and global economy, as some liberals expect. Rather, as China's long history suggests, it will bring a "recombination" of old and new elements. The old element is the "core value" or "Chinese notion of all-embracing unity (*da yitong*)" that "is normally uncontested" and appropriates from Confucianism hierarchical, reciprocal, and morally based values [and] the political qualities that supposedly flow from these values—wisdom, morality, generosity, obligation to respect the interests of others" (pp. 10–11). The new element emerges from "a non-linear, multi-sited, and multi-directional set of processes" that does not simply "radiate in one direction, outward from the center" (p. 9) and at times "impose its heavy hand on provinces . . . as in today's Tibet and Xinjiang" (pp. 12–13). Rather, it generates "an unprecedented process of self-invention . . . full of internal contradictions [which] like the American Dream . . . is empty and leaves boundless space to the human imagination" (p. 17). The six empirical chapters elaborate on this theme: Allen Carlson examines Chinese thinking toward border regions (*bianjiang*) that combines past traditions of Han flexibility ("loose rein") with modern foreign concepts of non-traditional security issues and multiculturalism. Xu Xin dissects the Taiwan formula of "one country, two systems," a "blend [of] the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty, and the Sinocentric way of dealing with autonomous entities in the periphery" (p. 66). Tianbiao Zhu emphasizes China's "flexible policies" toward economic development compressed by globalization, which allow China to circumnavigate between centralized "tributary modes of production," including political repression and decentralized "petty capitalist modes of production" based on networks of family and kinship.

Takashi Shiraishi tests the proposition that China's state and corporate actors, like Japanese and American ones before them, seek "to create a milieu outside China that is familiar to them so that they can operate more comfortably and perhaps more effectively" (p. 120). However, China arrives late in the game, and except for one

or two exceptions—Laos and Myanmar—confronts Asian states eager to exploit China's economic expansion but also determined to foster security alignments with the United States.

In a different but illuminating chapter, Chih-yu Shih examines four views of "Sinicization" by Asian diasporic academics—a Japanese (Akira Iriye) who sees China as an open-ended process of *becoming,* both different from yet compatible with the West; a Korean (Samuel Kim) who sees China as an open-ended process of *synthesis,* similar to and integrated with the West; a Cantonese (John Wong) who sees China as a relentless *problem-solver,* reflecting a distinctive but pragmatic nationalism; and a Chinese in India (Chung Tan) who sees China as an intermingling of civilizations, neither dominating nor threatening other civilizations.

Caroline Hau looks at the process of "becoming 'Chinese' in Southeast Asia" through successive waves of colonial imperialism—European, Japanese, and American—and concludes that "contrary to the idea that mainland China is currently remaking the region and world in its image, parts of mainland China . . . are actually undergoing a form of Anglo-Sinicization that makes [them] more like the modern hybrid 'Anglo-Chinese' that emerged . . . out of . . . 'East Asia'" (p. 199).

This volume, along with its earlier companion volumes, stands as a testament to the intellectual mastery and mentoring of Katzenstein. He sets out to challenge what he regards as singular constructions of civilization by intellectual and political entrepreneurs who serve particular interests through divisive discursive maneuvers (p. 215). Singular traditions, he asserts, are "illusions" (p. 211). All identities are multiple and contested. They do not radiate outward but ferment in peripheral areas where they intermingle and influences flow back and forth. They do not clash; only political actors within them clash: "The history of civilizations is one of mutual borrowing that does not endanger a civilization's character" (p. 215).

The editor provides a vital third way to view the world of civilizations, a constructivist confluence rather than realist clash or liberal consolidation. But, at times, he seems to want to place civilizations above politics. For him, civilizations are context, not content. They are structures, not agents. That may well be. But if the motivations and behavior of political actors do not differ across civilizations, civilizations are meaningless.

What is more, by putting civilizations above politics, Katzenstein risks creating his own political construction or singularity. As Shih reminds us in his chapter, "no view on China can be politically neutral" (p. 154). Huntington concluded that Western civilization is not universal ("The West: Unique, Not Universal," *Foreign Affairs* 75 [November/December 1996]: 28–46), and focused on differences among civilizations. Katzenstein believes that there is or can be one global civilization and focuses

on similarities. He appeals in the end for a new "civilization of empathy," "a new biosphere consciousness" that replaces "civilizational consciousness inhering in multiple modernities." (p. 236). In *Anglo-America and Its Discontents,* he calls for a "polymorphic globalism," "a loose sense of shared values entailing . . . the material and psychological well-being of all humans" (p. 242).

Well, what is this loose sense of shared values that unites East and West? What, for example, are minimum expectations across civilizations for women's rights and their psychological well-being? Are we talking about individual rights (e.g., woman's right to divorce) or social rights (e.g., family's or husband's right to honor, authority)? Does psychological well-being include political rights to self-government, the practice of religion, the possession of property, and access to the media? These questions require some analysis of the cores and not just the peripheries of civilizations. This volume deals almost entirely with the periphery of Chinese civilization—borderlands, Taiwan, industrialized South, East Asia, diasporic academics, and Southeast Asia. What if the volume had included a core Han Chinese point of view or a native, not diasporic, point of view from Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, or Vietnam?

Katzenstein is too inquisitive to miss the implications of these civilizational differences. He embraces the continued necessity of the U.S.-Japan security treaty "to reduce the uncertainty of the regional security environment in which China and its neighbors operate" (pp. 25–26). That is a profound concession to Huntington and realism. But it is a concession made only after rebalancing Huntington's view that core civilizations never change. Thanks to Katzenstein and his collaborators, we now know that civilizations comingle and are neither superior (cosmopolitan) nor exclusionist (core). But we are still faced with the question of what in each civilization is good or bad—including the new civilization of modernity and empathy that Katzenstein advocates.

**Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It.** By Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2010. 360p. $32.00 cloth, $20.00 paper.

**The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research.** Edited by Alex P. Schmid. New York: Routledge, 2011. 718p. $225.00 cloth, $54.95 paper.

**Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice.** Edited by Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012. 352p. $105.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592713001989

— Ted Robert Gurr, *University of Maryland*

The analytic literature on the causes and prevention of terrorism, and militant campaigns of strategic violence more generally, has exploded in the last decade. Alex

Schmid's *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* contains a comprehensive bibliography of about 4,000 items, most published since 2000, organized under 21 substantive headings that range from etiologies to ideologies to countermeasures. Yet, as Schmid points out, there is no consensus on definitions or boundaries. His critical review of definitional issues (pp. 39–98) is accompanied by an appendix listing some 250 academic and official definitions, from Robspierre (1794) to Louise Richardson (2006). Schmid makes two important contributions here. One is a social scientific definition that is as close to consensus as we shall ever get; the other is a set of distinctions among the characteristics of different types of political action, violent and nonviolent. This helps provide an antidote to overly general usages of the term *terrorism* in public and some academic discourse.

A related contribution of the *Handbook* is a review and critique of typologies by Schmid and Sarah Marsden (pp. 158–200). They provide conceptual mappings of types of violent political action, motivations, organizations, and operations. Also surveyed are 20 publically accessible databases on incidents of terrorism, and political violence more generally, that are available for new empirical research. And there is a world directory of terrorist and extremist groups organized by region and countries in which they are active. This handbook is far richer than a similar review compiled in 1988 by Schmid and A. J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases*.

Much of the newer literature on terrorism is hortatory, filled with alarms and calls for action. One might cite titles like *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Michael Scheuer, 2004*)* and *Terror Incorporated (*Loretta Napoleoni, 2005; a book about the financing of terrorist organizations that is better than its hyperbolic title implies). Yet embedded in these writings are serious theoretical arguments and evidence about etiology across all levels of analysis, from the individual to the international. There is, first of all—in the *Handbook*'s dense 79-page review of "Theories of Terrorism" (by Bradley McAllister and Alex Schmid)—terrorism carried out or sponsored by states. This subject has its own rich theoretical literature, largely divorced from the analysis of oppositional terrorism. The latter theories, and relevant bodies of case studies and empirical evidence, tell us a great deal about how individuals are recruited and socialized into terrorist movements, the structure and leadership of militant organizations, and the social and political settings that give rise to them. The ideologies that support terrorism, like Salafism and jihadism, and anarchism in a past era, are a rich subject of inquiry and arguably provide more insight into the psychosocial dynamics of terror movements than analyses that focus on the "structural" or "root" causes of terrorism. There is also an emerging literature on dyadic theories, that is, those that examine interactions between counterterrorists and their antagonists.