networks; (2) supporters are more likely to provide both electoral support and "political services" (p. 29), which also tend to flow through personal networks; and (3) supporters tend to believe that their job is contingent on the "political success of the incumbent" (p. 130). While other theories of clientelism might also predict the first two points, the third is more distinctive: Oliveros refers to it as the "main empirical implication of the theory" (p. 130), and extensive evidence supporting it helps to distinguish her explanation from the alternatives. For example, she shows that supporters who express more concern about what would happen to them if the incumbent lost the next election are more likely to serve as election monitors (p. 145), while those who have either job tenure or comparable private-sector employment options are less likely to participate in political activities.

The theory of self-enforcing patronage has many important implications. For one, we should expect patronage to be a problem in any country that has less-than-perfect civil service institutions. In a cross-national comparative chapter, Oliveros offers evidence to suggest that patronage is widespread, even in a country like Chile that has a reputation for good governance and a professional civil service (chapter 7). Relatedly, the self-enforcing nature of patronage will make it extremely difficult to overcome because the patronage workers are essentially free to the incumbent, and they do not have to be monitored (p. 104). As Oliveros writes: "If clientelistic arrangements can be self-sustaining without punishment, … clientelism becomes less costly, more difficult to detect, and even more difficult to curb" (p. 202).

And of course, patronage has important implications for the quality of democratic governance, which Oliveros discusses at the end of the book (chapter 8). She rightly argues that patronage violates basic democratic principles because it misuses state resources and tilts the electoral playing field toward the incumbent. Yet much more could be said on this topic. Future research could explore the difference between "political favors" and constituent service (p. 110), or ask how patronage helps to perpetuate inequality between clients and patrons (which is an important but often overlooked aspect of clientelism). And while Oliveros's focus on public employees is appropriate and valuable—indeed, this is the main contribution of the book—one wonders about the linkages between supporters and voters. The book suggests that voters are tied to the political machine through personal networks, which once again raises the possibility of a norms-based logic of clientelism. But we also know that voters value good governance in addition to personalistic favors (p. 29), which raises questions about the limits of patronage, and the conditions under which voters might choose to punish politicians for using it. These are just a few of the additional questions and ideas that might inspire future readers who take on this excellent and thought-provoking book.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Costly Calculations: A Theory of War, Casualties, and Politics. By Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021. 225p. $99.99 cloth, $34.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S153759272200175X

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In the decades following the formative observation in John Mueller's (1973) *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* that popular support for war declined as wartime deaths rose, a large and vibrant literature has struggled to make sense of this pattern. International relations scholars have come to favor a rational calculus approach that interprets collective-level opinion dynamics as a function of perceived benefits, costs, and chances of success for a given military action (e.g., Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler [2009], *Paying the Human Costs of War*). In contrast, a rival approach informed by public opinion research (e.g., Adam Berinsky [2009], *In Time of War*) and political communication scholarship (e.g., Matthew Baum and Timothy Groeling [2010], *War Stories*) favors an elite signaling model in which types and levels of dissensus among political leaders serve as a primary driver of mass opinion change during wartime. Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura's *Costly Calculations* draws upon the American experience of war since 1950 to move the terms of debate onto firmer theoretical ground by developing a "general framework for understanding war initiation, war policy, and war termination in democratic politics, and the role that citizens and their deaths through conflict play in those policy choices" (p. 2).

In contrast to earlier versions of the rational calculus approach, Gartner and Segura move casualty information into the center of the theoretical story. Their "price theory of war" posits that anticipated losses serve as a key component for weighing the value of a war's potential benefits, while already-incurred losses serve an informative heuristic for assessing the war's likely outcome. Against the elite signaling approach, the authors offer evidence that position taking by elected leaders is structured by expectations of future losses, as well as by the losses occurring within their constituencies. But while Gartner and Segura's account places casualty information as the primary mover of war support for both elites and masses, theirs is no reductionistic story. Gartner and Segura's nuanced theoretical framework entails a sophisticated array of variables

https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759272200175X Published online by Cambridge University Press

and conditioning factors that together yield a satisfyingly complex theoretical account.

The authors' theoretical model hinges on the observation that wartime deaths serve as information that is both readily available and highly credible for assessing how a conflict is going. Both citizens and leaders are posited to be sensitive to the Expected Total Costs (ETC) of a conflict: "an individual's estimate of the total costs that will be required to achieve the understood aims of the war effort" (p. 40). ETC can only ever be estimated, so individuals are posited to infer ETC dynamically from three forms of casualty information (pp. 40–52): their perceptions of the cumulative number of casualties that have occurred since the start of the conflict (which tell them how the war has gone so far), their perceptions of recent casualty numbers (which tell them how the war is going right now), and their perceptions of whether recent casualty levels are rising or falling (which tell them how the war is likely to go in the future). Individuals are also posited to have a Reservation Point (RP), which "is the number of estimated—that is, perceived—casualties the observer is willing to expend to accomplish a specific goal" (p. 55). These two pieces of information offer a straightforward heuristic for assessing the merit of a conflict: "When these Expected Total Costs (ETC) of a war exceed the value of the goal itself (i.e., the price the citizen is willing to pay), the citizen has passed his or her Reservation Point (RP), and will no longer support paying those costs" (p. 40). The authors expect ETC to vary over time and across individuals as casualty information and other news about a war differentially reaches citizens. Individual-level variation in ETC comes from several factors, including local experiences of war casualties, but should become increasingly more accurate the longer a war lasts. In contrast, RP is conceived as a fairly stable element with potential to shift only if the war's goals and tactics change over time (p. 55).

In terms of organization, the book begins by laying out this new "price theory of war" that positions information about military casualties as a central component for assessments about a war's potential value and expected costs (chapt. 2). The argument then turns to explicating how citizens assess the merits of war before the onset of conflict and as the conflict progresses, detailing a variety of component elements relevant for calculating the model's RP term (chapt. 3). Several expectations from the theoretical model are then tested, yielding evidence that casualty sensitivity among citizens operates in ways that align with the premises of the theory in experiments (chapt. 4) and in observational data (chapt. 5). After considering the impact of localized attention to war casualties as well as observational data on social network connections to military losses (chapt. 6), the book's empirical section concludes with case studies exploring how casualties affect the position-taking behavior of US Senate candidates as well as how those positions have electoral consequences related to constituent experiences of localized losses (chapt. 7).

Marshalling an impressive array of experimental and observational data, Gartner and Segura succeed in establishing the plausibility of their theoretical model. Nonetheless, the authors acknowledge that because their primary aim is to develop a conceptual framework that can generalize across conflicts, they test only some of the propositions that their theoretical model entails. This leaves ample ground for other researchers to explore, refine, and dispute elements of Gartner and Segura's innovative model. Three areas seem especially ripe for further investigation. First, leader dynamics are less thoroughly tested here than mass opinion dynamics, and because the book's "price theory of war" seems especially well-suited to elite decision making there is an important opportunity for other scholars to apply this approach more broadly for understanding elite position taking and conflict-initiating behavior. Second, the book's theoretical story currently lacks a well-grounded psychological model, as the complex weighing of expected versus perceived costs runs against the grain of current thinking within political psychology about how judgmental processes operate. The authors acknowledge that the RP component of their model is unobserved and can only be assumed (p. 226), even though "the shape of the RP distribution is the critical component in determining how casualties manifest themselves in domestic politics through opposition to ongoing conflict" (pp. 65–66). A theoretically compelling individual-level account of psychological mechanisms underlying ETC and RP calculations would help to solidify the case for the book's theoretical model. Third, although the authors provide ample evidence that mass casualty sensitivity follows the general contours of their theoretical model, the book offers no head-to-head test of their model against alternative explanations such as those offered by the elite signaling approach or by previous formulations of the rational calculus approach. This opens a good opportunity for future research to assess the relative strengths of competing claims across these different theoretical perspectives.

Costly Calculations serves as a capstone synthesis that cumulates insights from the authors' nearly quarter-century collaborative effort to understand how wartime casualties influence opinion dynamics. It presents the most thoroughgoing, ambitious, and nuanced version of the rational calculus approach to date. Gartner and Segura's volume is equally valuable as an invitation for more scholarship to test its predictions, fill its gaps, and refine its intuitions about the underlying mechanisms that structure how domestic politics is affected by the conduct of war. While offering a more forceful challenge to earlier formulations of the rational calculus approach than to the elite signaling approach, the theoretical clarity of the

https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759272200175X Published online by Cambridge University Press

book's conceptual model is a signal achievement that has much to recommend it to both camps.

Theorizing World Orders: Cognitive Evolution and Beyond. Edited by Piki Ish-Shalom, Markus Kornprobst, and Vincent Pouliot. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. 270p. $110.00 cloth.

doi:10.1017/S153759272200161X

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Theorizing World Orders explores the importance of Emmanuel Adler's theory of "cognitive evolution" for the study of order(s) in world politics. This volume begins with a chapter by the editors, Markus Kornprobst, Piki Ish-Shalom, and Vincent Pouliot, who describe and explore Adler's theory of cognitive evolution (as outlined in a separate work: *World Ordering: A Social Theory of Cognitive Evolution*, 2019). This is followed by seven chapters, each authored by scholars who explore specific "vistas" of research within this theoretical framework. A concluding chapter by Adler reviews these contributions and seeks to "sketch" a constructivist theory of politics.

Cognitive evolution theory, according to the editors, consists of "six core building blocks" (p. 12). The first—evolution and process—is based on a conception of evolution borrowed from the natural sciences but applied in a novel way to social phenomena. The editors, as well as Adler in his concluding chapter, are at pains to emphasize their metaphorical use of evolutionary theory, which they argue is useful primarily because it "shifts the analytical focus to the institutional environment, where the selection process takes place," and "it points out that the process lacks a necessary direction" (p. 12). This innovation allows the conceptual opening necessary to reconcile a core problem of constructivism with a key principle of its project in the study of international relations: the challenge of explaining why some ideas emerge and spread relative to others without sacrificing agency and contingency on the altar of structure or functionalism. Other core principles described include a familiar emphasis on social learning, creativity processes, the multiplicity of social order, the role of progress, and perhaps most importantly to the editors and to Adler, the role of communities of practice.

The introductory chapter by the editors is a significant accomplishment, at once both elaborating Adler's theory of cognitive evolution as well as situating it among competing theories of international order, particularly realism, liberalism, and the English School. The chapters that follow are a useful and impressive collection of theoretical and empirical extensions of the framework established by Adler and the editors. For example, Stefano Guzzini reminds us that "even if power systematically refers to order, order does not need to be defined through power" (p. 36). His chapter navigates the useful distinction between deontic and performative power to argue that power is not merely a variable acting upon relationships but also a feature intrinsic to those relationships. Maika Sondarjee's chapter offers a compelling discussion of the coevolution of narrative and practice, and a window into one mechanism by which, as Adler later acknowledges, "practices and knowledge spread" (p. 234). Similarly, Beverly Crawford Ames explores how historical change in a set of practices can occur by focusing on refugees as "agents of progress," which Adler later praises as a particularly useful example of how to empirically apply his theory of cognitive evolution.

The chapters by Peter Haas and Christian Reus-Smit are broader examinations of theoretical issues of complexity (Haas) and Adler's implicit identification of two distinct "middle grounds" to be seized by constructive theory (Reus-Smit). Haas's discussion of the integrated role played by communities of practice and epistemic communities in the transformation of ideas into practice is a compelling connector piece for several chapters within this volume, and Reus-Smit helps constructivists to realize an important distinction between an analytical and a normative middle ground.

Theorizing World Orders is not just an elaboration of a theory but it is also a global and academic promise of sorts, at the heart of which is an irreducible pluralism. The volume is self-aware in terms of its interdisciplinarity and tapestry-like weaving of concepts and arguments from fields as distinct as biology and phenomenology. Yet, this nominal inclusivity sometimes sits awkwardly alongside the apparently reflexive rejection of some theoretical orientations, such as functionalism of any stripe. For example, Alena Drieschova's chapter on New Materialism insightfully calls our attention to the possibility that artifacts may sometimes shape the "parameters of thought" (p. 55). In his response, Adler asserts that this type of "Darwinian functionalism" is not useful because, as the evolution of the QWERTY keyboard illustrates, the most efficient solution is not always the one that socially evolves (p. 233). However, contra Adler, Darwinian selection is not a process that selects for efficiency, as several aspects of human anatomy easily illustrate.

This example may be a case in which a slightly phobic avoidance of evolutionary theory beyond metaphorical uses tragically works against the very pluralism for which this volume calls. Adler insists that constructivists should be free to adopt concepts "wholesale, regardless of what their designers first meant by them" (p. 234), which is somewhat ironic given several authors' emphatic underlining of the powerfully constitutive nature of language. Although it is certainly possible *in principle* to borrow concepts and deliberately disembed them from their original frameworks, the result *in practice* is that communication and understanding is sometimes hindered, not deepened.

An implicit even if unintended gem of this text that deserves greater scrutiny is an occasional but regular

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